Difference between revisions of "Desire"

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The concept of [[desire]] is the central concern of [[psychoanalytic theory]].
 
The concept of [[desire]] is the central concern of [[psychoanalytic theory]].
  
If there is any one concept which can claim to ve the very center of [[Lacan]]'s thought, it is the concept of [[desire]].
 
  
 +
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[[Lacan]]'s term, ''[[désir]]'', is the term used in the French translations of Freud to translate Freud's term Wunsch, which is translated as 'wish' by Strachey in the Standard Edition. Hence English translators of Lacan are faced with a dilemma; should they translate dÈsir by 'wish', which is closer to Freud's Wunsch, or should they translate it as 'desire', which is closer to the French term, but which lacks the allusion to Freud? All of Lacan's English translators have opted for the latter, since the English term 'desire' conveys, like the French term, the implication of a continuous force, which is essential to Lacan's concept. The English term also carries with it the same allusions to Hegel's Begierde        as  are carried by the French term, and thus retains the philosophical nuances which are so essential to Lacan's concept of dÈsir and which make it 'a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by Freud himself' (Macey, 1995: 80).
  
 
==Human Desire==
 
==Human Desire==
 +
If there is any one concept which can claim to be the very center of [[Lacan]]'s thought, it is the concept of [[desire]].
 +
 
[[Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] in arguing that "[[desire]]" is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p.275</ref>
 
[[Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] in arguing that "[[desire]]" is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p.275</ref>
  
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This is not because [[Lacan]] sees [[conscious]] [[desire]] as unimportant, but simply because it is [[unconscious]] [[desire]] that forms the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]].
 
This is not because [[Lacan]] sees [[conscious]] [[desire]] as unimportant, but simply because it is [[unconscious]] [[desire]] that forms the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]].
  
[[Unconscious desire]] is entirely [[sexuality|sexual]]:
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[[Unconscious]] [[desire]] is entirely [[sexuality|sexual]]:
  
 
<blockquote>"The motives of the unconscious are limited . .  . to sexual desire .  . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p.142</ref>
 
<blockquote>"The motives of the unconscious are limited . .  . to sexual desire .  . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p.142</ref>
  
' (E, 142).
+
---
  
 
[[Desire]] is the heart of [[human]] [[existence]], fundamental to every aspect of the [[psychic]] [[life]] of the [[individual]] and to the [[social]] [[system]] in which the [[individual]] finds him or herself embedded.
 
[[Desire]] is the heart of [[human]] [[existence]], fundamental to every aspect of the [[psychic]] [[life]] of the [[individual]] and to the [[social]] [[system]] in which the [[individual]] finds him or herself embedded.
  
 
[[Desire]] provides the [[subject]] with its primary motivation and [[frustration]].  
 
[[Desire]] provides the [[subject]] with its primary motivation and [[frustration]].  
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==Desire and Psychoanalytic Treatment==
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==Truth of Desire in Psychoanalytic Treatment==
 +
The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his or her [[desire]].
 +
 +
It is only possible to recognize one's [[desire]] when it is articulate in [[speech]].
 +
 +
<blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p.183</ref></blockquote>
 +
 +
Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p.228</ref>
 +
 +
However, it is not a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given [[desire]], for this would imply a expressionist theory of [[language]].
 +
 +
On the contrary, by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], the [[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]].
 +
 +
<blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious action of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[subject]] creates, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p.228-9</ref></blockquote>
 +
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---
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The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]].
 +
 +
---
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 +
However, there is a limit to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]];"<ref>{{E}} p.275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the [[unconscious]] (i.e. the fact the the [[unconscious]] is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known'').
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 +
"Although the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is present to some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]], there is always a leftover, a [[surplus]], which exceeds [[speech]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p.36</ref>
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 +
 +
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One of Lacan's most important criticisms of the psychoanalytic theories of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of desire with the related concepts of DEMAND and NEED. In opposition to this tendency, Lacan insists on distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957 (see S4, 100-1, 125), but only crystallises in 1958 (Lacan, 1958c).
 +
 +
Need is a purely biological INSTINCT, an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The human subject, being born in              a state of helplessness, is unable to satisfy its own needs, and hence depends on the Other to help it satisfy them. In order to get the Other's help, the infant must express its needs vocally; need must be articulated in demand. The primitive demands of the infant may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the Other to minister to the infant's needs. However, the presence of the Other soon acquires  an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the satisfaction of need, since this presence symbolises the Other's love. Hence demand soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of need and as a demand for love. However, whereas the Other can provide the objects which the subject requires to satisfy his needs, the Other cannot provide that unconditional love which the subject craves. Hence even after the needs which were articulated in demand have been satisfied, the other aspect of demand, the craving for love, remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is desire. 'Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second' (E, 287).
 +
Desire is thus the surplus produced by the articulation of need in demand; ''Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need' (E, 311). Unlike a need, which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the subject until another need arises, desire can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal. The realisation of desire does not consist in being 'fulfilled', but in the reproduction of desire as such.
 +
 +
Lacan's distinction between need and desire, which lifts the concept of desire completely out of the realm of biology, is strongly reminiscent of KojËve's distinction between animal and human desire; desire is shown to be distinctively human when it is directed either toward another desire, or to an object which is 'perfectly useless from the biological point of view' (KojËve, 1947: 6).
 +
 +
It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives. Although they both belong to the field of the Other (as opposed to love), desire is one whereas the drives are many. In other words, the drives are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called desire (although there may also be desires which are not manifested in the drives: see S1l, 243). There is only one object of desire, OBJETPETITA, and this is represented by a variety of partial objects in different partial drives. The OBJET PETIT A iS not the object towards which desire tends, but the cause of desire. Desire is not a relation to an object, but a relation to a LACK.
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 +
One of Lacan's most oft-repeated formulas is: 'man's desire is the desire of the Other' (Sll, 235). This can be understood in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.
 +
 +
1. Desire is essentially 'desire of the Other's desire', which means both desire to be the object of another's desire, and desire for recognition by another. Lacan takes this idea from Hegel, via KojËve, who states:
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 +
Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other .  . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired'        or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value.      .  . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire  . .  . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'. (KojËve, 1947: 6)
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KojËve goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that in order to achieve the desired recognition, the subject must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see MASTER). That desire is essentially desire to be the object of another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the Oedipus complex, when the subject desires to be the phallus for the mother.
 +
 +
2. It is qua Other that the subject desires (E, 312): that is, the subject desires from the point of view of another. The effect of this is that 'the object of man's desire    . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else' (Lacan, 1951b:
 +
 +
12). What makes an object desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is desired by another. The desire of the Other is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this 'tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number' (Lacan, 1951b: 12).
 +
This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that 'Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is "mediated" by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it' (KojËve, 1947: 6).
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The reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him (KojËve, 1947: 40).
 +
 +
This universal feature of desire is especially evident in hysteria; the hysteric is one who sustains another person's desire, converts another's desire into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138; see Freud, 1905e). Hence what is important in the analysis of a hysteric is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she desires (the subject with whom she identifies).
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# Desire is desire for the Other (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition de). The fundamental desire is the incestuous desire for the mother, the primordial Other (S7, 67).
 +
# Desire is always 'the desire for something else' (E, 167), since it is impossible to desire what one already has. The object of desire is continually deferred, which is why desire is a METONYMY (E, 175).
 +
 +
# Desire emerges originally in the field of the Other; i.e. in the unconscious.
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 +
The most important point to emerge from Lacan's phrase is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects.
 +
 +
The first person to occupy the place of the Other is the mother, and at first the child is at the mercy of her desire. It is only when the Father articulates desire with the law by castrating the mother that the subject is freed from subjection to the whims of the mother's desire (see CASTRATION COMPLEX).
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(The [[prohibition]] establishes [[desire]] as the ultimate motivational force in [[subjectivity]].)
 
(The [[prohibition]] establishes [[desire]] as the ultimate motivational force in [[subjectivity]].)
  
==Desire and Psychoanalytic Treatment==
 
The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his or her [[desire]].
 
 
It is only possible to recognize one's [[desire]] when it is articulate in [[speech]].
 
 
<blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p.183</ref></blockquote>
 
 
<blockquote>In [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p.228</ref></blockquote>
 
 
There is a limit to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]]."<ref>{{E}} p.275</ref>
 
 
The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]].
 
 
<blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious action of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[subject]] creates, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p.228-9</ref></blockquote>
 
  
<blockquote>"Although the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is present to some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]], there is always a leftover, a [[surplus]], which exceeds [[speech]]."<ref>Evans 36</ref></blockquote>
 
  
 
==Desire and Language==
 
==Desire and Language==

Revision as of 03:32, 24 August 2006

French: désir


Desire is a major concept of psychoanalytic theory.

The concept of desire is the central concern of psychoanalytic theory.


Lacan's term, désir, is the term used in the French translations of Freud to translate Freud's term Wunsch, which is translated as 'wish' by Strachey in the Standard Edition. Hence English translators of Lacan are faced with a dilemma; should they translate dÈsir by 'wish', which is closer to Freud's Wunsch, or should they translate it as 'desire', which is closer to the French term, but which lacks the allusion to Freud? All of Lacan's English translators have opted for the latter, since the English term 'desire' conveys, like the French term, the implication of a continuous force, which is essential to Lacan's concept. The English term also carries with it the same allusions to Hegel's Begierde as are carried by the French term, and thus retains the philosophical nuances which are so essential to Lacan's concept of dÈsir and which make it 'a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by Freud himself' (Macey, 1995: 80).

Human Desire

If there is any one concept which can claim to be the very center of Lacan's thought, it is the concept of desire.

Lacan follows Spinoza in arguing that "desire" is the essence of man."[1]

Desire is simultaneously the heart of human existence and the central concern of psychoanalysis.

However, when Lacan talks about desire, it is not any kind of desire he is referring to, but always unconscious desire.

This is not because Lacan sees conscious desire as unimportant, but simply because it is unconscious desire that forms the central concern of psychoanalysis.

Unconscious desire is entirely sexual:

"The motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."[2]

---

Desire is the heart of human existence, fundamental to every aspect of the psychic life of the individual and to the social system in which the individual finds him or herself embedded.

Desire provides the subject with its primary motivation and frustration.

Desire and Psychoanalytic Treatment

Truth of Desire in Psychoanalytic Treatment

The aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to recognize the truth about his or her desire.

It is only possible to recognize one's desire when it is articulate in speech.

"It is only once it is formulated, named in the presence of the other, that desire, whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."[3]

Hence in psychoanalysis, "what's important is to teach the subject to name, to articulate, to bring this desire into existence."[4]

However, it is not a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given desire, for this would imply a expressionist theory of language.

On the contrary, by articulating desire in speech, the analysand brings it into existence.

"That the subject should come to recognise and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn't a question of recognising something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world."[5]

---

The analysand, by articulating desire in speech, (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing desire but rather) brings that desire into existence.

---

However, there is a limit to how far desire can be articulated in speech because of a fundamental "incompatibility between desire and speech;"[6] it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the unconscious (i.e. the fact the the unconscious is not that which is not known, but that which cannot be known).

"Although the truth about desire is present to some degree in all speech, speech can never articulate the whole truth about desire; whenever speech attempts to articulate desire, there is always a leftover, a surplus, which exceeds speech."[7]


One of Lacan's most important criticisms of the psychoanalytic theories of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of desire with the related concepts of DEMAND and NEED. In opposition to this tendency, Lacan insists on distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957 (see S4, 100-1, 125), but only crystallises in 1958 (Lacan, 1958c).

Need is a purely biological INSTINCT, an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The human subject, being born in a state of helplessness, is unable to satisfy its own needs, and hence depends on the Other to help it satisfy them. In order to get the Other's help, the infant must express its needs vocally; need must be articulated in demand. The primitive demands of the infant may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the Other to minister to the infant's needs. However, the presence of the Other soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the satisfaction of need, since this presence symbolises the Other's love. Hence demand soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of need and as a demand for love. However, whereas the Other can provide the objects which the subject requires to satisfy his needs, the Other cannot provide that unconditional love which the subject craves. Hence even after the needs which were articulated in demand have been satisfied, the other aspect of demand, the craving for love, remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is desire. 'Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second' (E, 287). Desire is thus the surplus produced by the articulation of need in demand; Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need' (E, 311). Unlike a need, which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the subject until another need arises, desire can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal. The realisation of desire does not consist in being 'fulfilled', but in the reproduction of desire as such.

Lacan's distinction between need and desire, which lifts the concept of desire completely out of the realm of biology, is strongly reminiscent of KojËve's distinction between animal and human desire; desire is shown to be distinctively human when it is directed either toward another desire, or to an object which is 'perfectly useless from the biological point of view' (KojËve, 1947: 6).

It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives. Although they both belong to the field of the Other (as opposed to love), desire is one whereas the drives are many. In other words, the drives are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called desire (although there may also be desires which are not manifested in the drives: see S1l, 243). There is only one object of desire, OBJETPETITA, and this is represented by a variety of partial objects in different partial drives. The OBJET PETIT A iS not the object towards which desire tends, but the cause of desire. Desire is not a relation to an object, but a relation to a LACK.

One of Lacan's most oft-repeated formulas is: 'man's desire is the desire of the Other' (Sll, 235). This can be understood in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.

1. Desire is essentially 'desire of the Other's desire', which means both desire to be the object of another's desire, and desire for recognition by another. Lacan takes this idea from Hegel, via KojËve, who states:

Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'. (KojËve, 1947: 6)


KojËve goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that in order to achieve the desired recognition, the subject must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see MASTER). That desire is essentially desire to be the object of another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the Oedipus complex, when the subject desires to be the phallus for the mother.

2. It is qua Other that the subject desires (E, 312): that is, the subject desires from the point of view of another. The effect of this is that 'the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else' (Lacan, 1951b:

12). What makes an object desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is desired by another. The desire of the Other is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this 'tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number' (Lacan, 1951b: 12). This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that 'Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is "mediated" by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it' (KojËve, 1947: 6).

The reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him (KojËve, 1947: 40).

This universal feature of desire is especially evident in hysteria; the hysteric is one who sustains another person's desire, converts another's desire into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138; see Freud, 1905e). Hence what is important in the analysis of a hysteric is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she desires (the subject with whom she identifies).

  1. Desire is desire for the Other (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition de). The fundamental desire is the incestuous desire for the mother, the primordial Other (S7, 67).
  2. Desire is always 'the desire for something else' (E, 167), since it is impossible to desire what one already has. The object of desire is continually deferred, which is why desire is a METONYMY (E, 175).
  1. Desire emerges originally in the field of the Other; i.e. in the unconscious.

The most important point to emerge from Lacan's phrase is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects.

The first person to occupy the place of the Other is the mother, and at first the child is at the mercy of her desire. It is only when the Father articulates desire with the law by castrating the mother that the subject is freed from subjection to the whims of the mother's desire (see CASTRATION COMPLEX).







Desire, Need and Demand

Lacan distinguishes between three related concepts:


Need

The human infant is born with certain biological needs that require (constant or periodic) satisfaction.

The human infant has certain biological needs which are satisfied by certain objects.

Need is a biological instinct that requires (constant or periodic) satisfaction.

Need emerges according to the requirements of the organism and abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied.

The human infant is born into a state of helplessness, and is unable to satisfy its own biological needs.

The infant, unable to satisfy its own needs, must depend on the Other to help it satisfy them.

The Other can help to satisfy the needs of the infant.

The Other can provide the objects which the subject requires to satisfy his needs.


Demand

The function of demand is to serve as an articulation of need.

The infant, in order to get help from the Other, must articulate (express) its needs (vocally) in (the form of a) demand.

The demand serves to bring the Other to help satisfy the needs of the infant.

Demand is also a demand for love (beyond the satisfaction of need).

The presence of the Other (becomes important in itself) symbolizes the Other's love.

The biological needs of the infant becomes subordinated to the demand for the recognition and love of the Other.

The needs which are articulated in demands are satisfied.

The Other can provide the objects which the subject requires to satisfy his needs, but cannot provide that unconditional love which the infant craves.

The Other (can satisfy the needs that are articulated in the demands of the infant but) cannot satisfy the infant's demand for love.

Even after the needs which are articulated in demands are satisfied, demand (as the demand for love) remains unsatisfied

This leftover is desire.


Desire

Desire is what remains of demand after the needs which are articulated in that demand are satisfied.

"Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."[8]

Desire is the surplus produced by the articulation of need in demand.

"Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need."[9]

Desire, unlike need, can never be satisfied.

A need (that is satisfied) ceases to motivate the infant until another need arises.

Desire is constant in its pressure, and eternal.


Desire of the Other

Lacan asserted that desire is the desire of the Other.

Desire is human when it is directed toward another desire.

"Man's desire is the desire of the Other.[10]

The statement provides the basis for our consideration of desire in Lacan’s conception of subjectivity and points to the fundamentally social character of desire.


Object of the Other's Desire

Desire is the desire for the Other's desire, that is, the desire to be the object of the Other's desire.

Desire is a desire for 'recognition' (by another).

The Oedipus complex illustrates the desire of the subject to be the phallus for the mother.


Object Desired by Others

"The object of man's desire ... is essentially an object desired by someone else."[11]

The object is desirable (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because others desire it.

It is qua Other that the subject desires.[12]

It is human to desire what others desire because they desire it.

Desire for the Other

Desire is desire for the Other.

The fundamental desire is the incestuous desire for the mother, the primordial Other.[13]


Impossible Desire

Desire is always "the desire for something else," because it is impossible to desire what one already has.[14]

The object of desire is continually deferred, which is why desire is metonymy.[15]


Social Desire

Desire emerges originally in the field of the Other, that is, in the unconscious.

Desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be, but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of others.

The most important point to emerge from Lacan’s phrase [that "the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects."[16]

OBJET A The objet petit a is represented by a variety of partial objects in diffent partial drives.

The objet petit a is not the object towards which desire tends, but the cause of desire.

Desire is not a relation to an object, but a relation to a lack.


Desire and Prohibition

The law (or prohibition) "creates desire in the first place by creating interdiction. Desire is essentially the desire to transgress, and for there to be transgression it is first necessary for there to be prohibition."[17]

The law gives rise to desire as that which circulates endlessly around a prohibited core (of jouissance).

(The prohibition establishes desire as the ultimate motivational force in subjectivity.)


Desire and Language

Desire is created at the moment of the infant's accession to the symbolic order.

Desire is inseparable from the symbolic order and thus inhabits all (inheres in) signification (as such).

Desire is inscribed in the signifying chain in its essential metonymy.

"Man’s desire is a metonymy. [...] Desire is a metonymy."[18]

The perpetual reference of one signifer to another in an eternal deferral of meaning is a formulation of the ceaseless movement of desire.

Impossible Desire

According to Lacan, desire is by its very nature insatiable; it can never be fulfilled.

Any attempt to satisfy desire is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable.

Desire designates the impossible relation that a subject has with objet petit a.

The core around which desire circulates is prohibited.

Desire and Impossibility

The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility.

The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossible.

The paternal interdiction only formalises this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with the compensation of symbolisation.

The prohibitive aspect of the law is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental impossibility at the heart of desire.

No object can ever fulfil desire.

Desire and the Death Drive

Lacan posits a distinction between desire and drive.

It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives.

The drives are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called desire.


See Also

References

  1. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p.275
  2. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.142
  3. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-54. Trans. John Forrester. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p.183
  4. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988. p.228
  5. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988. p.228-9
  6. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.275
  7. Evans, Dylan. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. 2003. New York: Brunner-Routledge. p.36
  8. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.287
  9. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.311
  10. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p.235
  11. Lacan. 1951b. p.12
  12. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.312
  13. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-60. Trans. Dennis Porter. London: Routledge, 1992. p.67
  14. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.167
  15. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.175
  16. Evans 39
  17. Evans, Dylan. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. 2003. New York: Brunner-Routledge. p.99
  18. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.175