Difference between revisions of "Desire"

From No Subject - Encyclopedia of Psychoanalysis
Jump to: navigation, search
Line 34: Line 34:
  
 
<blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p. 183</ref></blockquote>
 
<blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p. 183</ref></blockquote>
 +
 +
=====More=====
  
 
Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref>
 
Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref>
Line 40: Line 42:
  
 
On the contrary, by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], the [[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]].
 
On the contrary, by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], the [[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]].
 +
 +
(The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]].)
  
 
<blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious action of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[subject]] creates, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228-9</ref></blockquote>
 
<blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious action of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[subject]] creates, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228-9</ref></blockquote>
−
 
−
---
 
−
 
−
The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]].
 
−
 
−
---
 
  
 
However, there is a limit to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]];"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the [[unconscious]] (i.e. the fact the the [[unconscious]] is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known'').
 
However, there is a limit to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]];"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the [[unconscious]] (i.e. the fact the the [[unconscious]] is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known'').
Line 53: Line 51:
 
"Although the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is present to some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]], there is always a leftover, a [[surplus]], which exceeds [[speech]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p. 36</ref>
 
"Although the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is present to some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]], there is always a leftover, a [[surplus]], which exceeds [[speech]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p. 36</ref>
  
−
---
+
=====Criticism=====
−
 
 
 
One of [[Lacan]]'s most important criticisms of the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]] of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire]] with the related concepts of [[demand]] and [[need]].  
 
One of [[Lacan]]'s most important criticisms of the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]] of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire]] with the related concepts of [[demand]] and [[need]].  
  
Line 90: Line 87:
  
 
=====Alexandre Kojève=====
 
=====Alexandre Kojève=====
−
 
 
[[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the [[biology|biological]] point of view."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>
 
[[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the [[biology|biological]] point of view."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>
  
Line 106: Line 102:
 
[[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].
 
[[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].
  
−
---
+
=====Desire of the Other=====
−
 
 
 
One of [[Lacan]]'s most oft-repeated formulas is: "man's desire is the desire of the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref>  
 
One of [[Lacan]]'s most oft-repeated formulas is: "man's desire is the desire of the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref>  
  
 
This can be understood in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.
 
This can be understood in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.
  
−
---
+
=====More=====
−
 
 
 
1. [[Desire]] is essentially "desire of the Other's desire", which means both [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]], and [[desire]] for recognition by another.  
 
1. [[Desire]] is essentially "desire of the Other's desire", which means both [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]], and [[desire]] for recognition by another.  
  
−
[[Lacan]] takes this idea from Hegel, via Kojève, who states:
+
[[Lacan]] takes this idea from [[Hegel]], via [[Kojève]], who states:
−
 
 
−
---
 
−
 
 
−
<blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other .  . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired'        or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value.      .  . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire  . .  . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.<ref>KojËve, 1947: 6</ref></blockquote>
 
−
 
 
−
---
 
  
−
KojËve goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that in order to achieve the desired recognition, the subject must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see MASTER).  
+
<blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other .  . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired'        or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value.      .  . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire  . .  . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>
  
−
That desire is essentially desire to be the object of another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the Oedipus complex, when the subject desires to be the phallus for the mother.
+
=====Object of Another's Desire=====
 +
[[Kojève]] goes on to argue (still following [[Hegel]]) that in order to achieve the [[desire]]d recognition, the [[subject]] must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see [[master]]).  
  
−
---
+
That [[desire]] is essentially [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]] is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the [[Oedipus complex]], when the [[subject]] desires to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]].
  
 +
=====Two=====
 
2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[desire]]s from the point of view of another.  
 
2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[desire]]s from the point of view of another.  
  
−
The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire    . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} 1951b: 12</ref>  
+
The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire    . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref>  
  
 
What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]]d by another.  
 
What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]]d by another.  
  
−
The [[desire]] of the [[Other]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} 1951b: 12</ref>
+
The [[desire]] of the [[Other]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref>  
−
 
 
−
This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that:
 
  
−
<blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is "mediated" by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>KojËve, 1947: 6</ref>
+
This idea too is taken from [[Kojève]]'s reading of [[Hegel]]; [[Kojève]] argues that:
  
−
---
+
<blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is 'mediated' by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>
  
−
<blockquote>The reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>KojËve, 1947: 40</ref></blockquote>
+
<blockquote>The reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 40</ref>
  
−
---
+
=====Hysteria=====
  
−
This universal feature of [[desire]] is especially evident in [[hysteria]]; the [[hysteric]] is one who sustains another person's [[desire]], converts another's [[desire]] into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138; see Freud, 1905e).  
+
This universal feature of [[desire]] is especially evident in [[hysteria]]; the [[hysteric]] is one who sustains another person's [[desire]], converts another's [[desire]] into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire).<ref>{{S4}} p. 138; {{F}} (1905e) "[[{{FB}}|Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria]]." [[SE]] VII, 3.</ref>
  
 
Hence what is important in the [[analysis]] of a [[hysteric]] is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she [[desire]]s (the [[subject]] with whom she identifies).
 
Hence what is important in the [[analysis]] of a [[hysteric]] is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she [[desire]]s (the [[subject]] with whom she identifies).
  
−
---
+
=====Desire for the Other=====
  
−
# [[Desire]] is desire for the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition de).
+
# [[Desire]] is [[desire]] ''for'' the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition ''de'').  
−
 
 
−
The fundamental [[desire]] is the incestuous [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial Other (S7, 67).
 
  
 +
The fundamental [[desire]] is the incestuous [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p. 67</ref>
  
 
# [[Desire]] is always "the desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.  
 
# [[Desire]] is always "the desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.  
Line 165: Line 152:
 
# [[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]]; i.e. in the [[unconscious]].  
 
# [[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]]; i.e. in the [[unconscious]].  
  
−
---
+
=====Social Product=====
−
 
 
−
The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]]'s phrase is that desire is a social product.
 
  
−
[[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other [[subject]]s.
+
The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]]'s phrase is that [[desire]] is a social product.  
  
−
---
+
[[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a [[dialectic|dialectical relationship]] with the perceived [[desire]]s of other [[subject]]s.
  
 +
=====(M)other=====
 
The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the child is at the mercy of her [[desire]].  
 
The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the child is at the mercy of her [[desire]].  
  
 
It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by castrating the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to the whims of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]].
 
It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by castrating the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to the whims of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]].
−
 
−
==Desire, Need and Demand==
 
−
[[Lacan]] distinguishes between three related concepts:
 
−
* [[desire]]
 
−
* [[need]] (''besoin'')
 
−
* [[demand]] (''demande'')
 
−
 
−
==Need==
 
−
The [[human]] [[infant]] is born with certain [[biological]] [[need]]s that require (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]].
 
−
 
−
The [[human]] [[infant]] has certain [[biological]] [[need]]s which are satisfied by certain [[object]]s.
 
−
 
−
[[Need]] is a [[biological]] [[instinct]] that requires (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]].
 
−
 
−
[[Need]] emerges according to the requirements of the organism and abates completely (even if only temporarily) when [[satisfied]].
 
−
 
−
The [[human]] [[infant]] is born into a state of [[helplessness]], and is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[biological]] [[needs]].
 
−
 
−
The [[infant]], unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[needs]], must depend on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them.
 
−
 
−
The [[Other]] can help to [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s of the [[infant]].
 
−
 
−
The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s.
 
−
 
−
==Demand==
 
−
The function of [[demand]] is to serve as an articulation of [[need]].
 
−
 
−
The [[infant]], in order to get help from the [[Other]], must articulate (express) its [[need]]s (vocally) in (the form of a) [[demand]].
 
−
 
−
The [[demand]] serves to bring the [[Other]] to help [[satisfy]] the [[needs]] of the [[infant]].
 
−
 
−
[[Demand]] is also a [[demand]] for [[love]] (beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]]).
 
−
 
−
The [[presence]] of the [[Other]] (becomes important in itself) [[symbolizes]] the [[Other]]'s [[love]].
 
−
 
−
The [[biological]] [[need]]s of the [[infant]] becomes subordinated to the [[demand]] for the [[recognition]] and [[love]] of the [[Other]].
 
−
 
−
The [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]].
 
−
 
−
The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, but cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[infant]] craves.
 
−
 
−
The [[Other]] (can [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s that are articulated in the [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] but) cannot [[satisfy]] the [[infant]]'s [[demand]] for [[love]].
 
−
 
−
Even after the [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]], [[demand]] (as the [[demand]] for [[love]]) remains [[unsatisfied]]
 
−
 
−
This leftover is [[desire]].
 
−
 
−
==Desire==
 
−
[[Desire]] is what remains of [[demand]] after the [[need]]s which are articulated in that [[demand]] are [[satisfied]].
 
−
 
−
<blockquote>"[[Desire]] is neither the appetite for [[satisfaction]], nor the [[demand]] for [[love]], but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."<ref>{{E}} p.287</ref></blockquote>
 
−
 
−
[[Desire]] is the [[surplus]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]].
 
−
 
−
<blockquote>"[[Desire]] begins to take shape in the margin in which [[demand]] becomes separated from [[need]]."<ref>{{E}} p.311</ref></blockquote>
 
−
 
−
[[Desire]], unlike [[need]], can never be [[satisfied]].
 
−
 
−
A [[need]] (that is [[satisfied]]) ceases to motivate the [[infant]] until another [[need]] arises.
 
−
 
−
[[Desire]] is constant in its pressure, and eternal.
 
−
 
−
 
−
==Desire of the Other==
 
−
[[Lacan]] asserted that [[desire]] is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]].
 
−
 
−
[[Desire]] is [[human]] when it is directed toward another [[desire]].
 
−
 
−
<blockquote>"[[Man]]'s [[desire]] is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]].<ref>{{S11}} p.235</ref></blockquote>
 
−
 
−
The statement provides the basis for our consideration of [[desire]] in [[Lacan]]’s conception of [[subjectivity]] and points to the fundamentally social character of [[desire]].
 
−
 
−
 
−
==Object of the Other's Desire==
 
−
[[Desire]] is the [[desire]] for the [[Other]]'s [[desire]], that is, the [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of the [[Other]]'s [[desire]].
 
−
 
−
[[Desire]] is a [[desire]] for '[[recognition]]' (by another).
 
−
 
−
The [[Oedipus complex]] illustrates the [[desire]] of the [[subject]] to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]].
 
−
 
−
==Object Desired by Others==
 
−
<blockquote>"The [[object]] of [[man]]'s [[desire]] ... is essentially an [[object]] [[desire]]d by someone else."<ref>Lacan. 1951b. p.12</ref></blockquote>
 
−
 
−
The [[object]] is [[desirable]] (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because [[other]]s [[desire]] it.
 
−
 
−
It is qua [[Other]] that the [[subject]] [[desire]]s.<ref>{{E}} p.312</ref>
 
−
 
−
It is [[human]] to [[desire]] what others [[desire]] because they [[desire]] it.
 
−
 
−
==Desire for the Other==
 
−
[[Desire]] is [[desire]] for the [[Other]].
 
−
 
−
The fundamental [[desire]] is the [[incestuous]] [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p.67</ref>
 
−
 
−
 
−
==Impossible Desire==
 
−
<blockquote>[[Desire]] is always "the [[desire]] for something else," because it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.<ref>{{E}} p.167</ref></blockquote>
 
−
 
−
The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref>
 
−
 
−
 
−
==Social Desire==
 
−
[[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]], that is, in the [[unconscious]].
 
−
 
−
[[Desire]] is a social product.
 
−
[[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be, but is always constituted in a [[dialectical]] relationship with the perceived [[desire]]s of others.
 
−
 
−
<blockquote>The most important point to emerge from Lacan’s phrase [that "the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects."<ref>Evans 39</ref></blockquote>
 
−
 
−
OBJET A
 
−
The [[objet petit a]] is represented by a variety of [[partial object]]s in diffent partial [[drive]]s.
 
−
 
−
The [[objet petit a]] is not the object towards which [[desire]] tends, but the cause of desire.
 
−
 
−
[[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].
 
−
 
−
 
−
==Desire and Prohibition==
 
−
<blockquote>The [[law]] (or [[prohibition]]) "creates [[desire]] in the first place by creating interdiction. [[Desire]] is essentially the [[desire]] to [[transgress]], and for there to be [[transgression]] it is first necessary for there to be [[prohibition]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p.99</ref></blockquote>
 
−
 
−
The [[law]] gives rise to [[desire]] as that which circulates endlessly around a [[prohibited]] core (of ''[[jouissance]]'').
 
−
 
−
(The [[prohibition]] establishes [[desire]] as the ultimate motivational force in [[subjectivity]].)
 
−
 
−
 
−
 
−
==Desire and Language==
 
−
 
−
[[Desire]] is created at the moment of the [[infant]]'s accession to the [[symbolic]] [[order]].
 
−
 
−
[[Desire]] is inseparable from the [[symbolic]] [[order]] and thus inhabits all (inheres in) [[signification]] (as such).
 
−
 
−
[[Desire]] is inscribed in the [[signifying chain]] in its essential [[metonymy]].
 
−
 
−
<blockquote>"[[Man]]’s [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]]. [...] [[Desire]] is a [[metonymy]]."<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref></blockquote>
 
−
 
−
The perpetual reference of one [[signifer]] to another in an eternal deferral of [[meaning]] is a formulation of the ceaseless movement of [[desire]].
 
−
 
−
==Impossible Desire==
 
−
 
−
According to [[Lacan]], [[desire]] is by its very nature [[insatiable]]; it can never be fulfilled.
 
−
 
−
Any attempt to [[satisfy]] [[desire]] is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable.
 
−
 
−
[[Desire]] designates the impossible relation that a [[subject]] has with [[objet petit a]]. 
 
−
 
−
The core around which [[desire]] circulates is [[prohibited]].
 
−
 
−
==Desire and Impossibility==
 
−
The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility.
 
−
 
−
The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossible.
 
−
 
−
The paternal interdiction only formalises this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with the compensation of symbolisation.
 
−
 
−
The prohibitive aspect of the [[law]] is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental [[impossibility]] at the heart of desire.
 
−
 
−
No [[object]] can ever fulfil [[desire]].
 
−
 
−
==Desire and the Death Drive==
 
−
 
−
[[Lacan]] posits a distinction between [[desire]] and [[drive]].
 
−
 
−
It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.
 
−
 
−
The [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]].
 
−
 
  
 
==See Also==
 
==See Also==

Revision as of 01:39, 12 September 2006

French: désir

Desire is a major concept of psychoanalytic theory.

The concept of desire is the central concern of psychoanalytic theory.

Translation

Lacan's term, désir, is the term used in the French translations of Freud to translate Freud's term Wunsch, which is translated as "wish" in the Standard Edition.

Hence English translators of Lacan are faced with a dilemma; should they translate désir by "wish", which is closer to Freud's Wunsch, or should they translate it as "desire", which is closer to the French term, but which lacks the allusion to Freud?

All of Lacan's English translators have opted for the latter, since the English term "desire" conveys, like the French term, the implication of a continuous force, which is essential to Lacan's concept.

The English term also carries with it the same allusions to Hegel's Begierde as are carried by the French term, and thus retains the philosophical nuances which are so essential to Lacan's concept of désir and which make it "a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by Freud himself."[1]

Unconscious Desire

If there is any one concept which can claim to be the very center of Lacan's thought, it is the concept of desire.

Lacan follows Spinoza in arguing that "desire is the essence of man."[2]

Desire is simultaneously the heart of human existence and the central concern of psychoanalysis.

However, when Lacan talks about desire, it is not any kind of desire he is referring to, but always unconscious desire.

This is not because Lacan sees conscious desire as unimportant, but simply because it is unconscious desire that forms the central concern of psychoanalysis.

Unconscious desire is entirely sexual;

"the motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."[3]

Truth and Desire

The aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to recognize the truth about his desire.

It is only possible to recognize one's desire when it is articulate in speech.

"It is only once it is formulated, named in the presence of the other, that desire, whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."[4]

More

Hence in psychoanalysis, "what's important is to teach the subject to name, to articulate, to bring this desire into existence."[5]

However, it is not a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given desire, for this would imply a expressionist theory of language.

On the contrary, by articulating desire in speech, the analysand brings it into existence.

(The analysand, by articulating desire in speech, (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing desire but rather) brings that desire into existence.)

"That the subject should come to recognise and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn't a question of recognising something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world."[6]

However, there is a limit to how far desire can be articulated in speech because of a fundamental "incompatibility between desire and speech;"[7] it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the unconscious (i.e. the fact the the unconscious is not that which is not known, but that which cannot be known).

"Although the truth about desire is present to some degree in all speech, speech can never articulate the whole truth about desire; whenever speech attempts to articulate desire, there is always a leftover, a surplus, which exceeds speech."[8]

Criticism

One of Lacan's most important criticisms of the psychoanalytic theories of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of desire with the related concepts of demand and need.

In opposition to this tendency, Lacan insists on distinguishing between these three concepts.

This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957,[9], but only crystallises in 1958.[10]

Need

Need is a purely biological instinct, an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied.

The human subject, being born in a state of helplessness, is unable to satisfy its own needs, and hence depends on the Other to help it satisfy them.

In order to get the Other's help, the infant must express its needs vocally; need must be articulated in demand.

The primitive demands of the infant may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the Other to minister to the infant's needs.

However, the presence of the Other soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the satisfaction of need, since this presence symbolizes the Other's love]].

Hence demand soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of need and as a demand for love.

However, whereas the Other can provide the objects which the subject requires to satisfy his needs, the Other cannot provide that unconditional love which the subject craves.

Hence even after the needs which were articulated in demand have been satisfied, the other aspect of demand, the craving for love, remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is desire.

"Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."[11]

Demand

Desire is thus the surplus produced by the articulation of need in demand;

"Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need."[12]

Unlike a need, which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the subject until another need arises, desire can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal.

The realisation of desire does not consist in being "fulfilled", but in the reproduction of desire as such.

Alexandre Kojève

Lacan's distinction between need and desire, which lifts the concept of desire completely out of the realm of biology, is strongly reminiscent of Kojève's distinction between animal and human desire; desire is shown to be distinctively human when it is directed either toward another desire, or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the biological point of view."[13]

Desire and Drive

It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives.

Although they both belong to the field of the Other (as opposed to love), desire is one whereas the drives are many.

In other words, the drives are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called desire (although there may also be desires which are not manifested in the drives).[14]

There is only one object of desire, object (petit) a, and this is represented by a variety of partial objects in different partial drives.

The object (petit) a is not the object towards which desire tends, but the cause of desire.

Desire is not a relation to an object, but a relation to a lack.

Desire of the Other

One of Lacan's most oft-repeated formulas is: "man's desire is the desire of the Other."[15]

This can be understood in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.

More

1. Desire is essentially "desire of the Other's desire", which means both desire to be the object of another's desire, and desire for recognition by another.

Lacan takes this idea from Hegel, via Kojève, who states:

Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.[16]

Object of Another's Desire

Kojève goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that in order to achieve the desired recognition, the subject must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see master).

That desire is essentially desire to be the object of another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the Oedipus complex, when the subject desires to be the phallus for the mother.

Two

2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:[17] that is, the subject desires from the point of view of another.

The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."[18]

What makes an object desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is desired by another.

The desire of the Other is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."[19]

This idea too is taken from Kojève's reading of Hegel; Kojève argues that:

"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is 'mediated' by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."[20]

The reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.[21]

Hysteria

This universal feature of desire is especially evident in hysteria; the hysteric is one who sustains another person's desire, converts another's desire into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire).[22]

Hence what is important in the analysis of a hysteric is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she desires (the subject with whom she identifies).

Desire for the Other
  1. Desire is desire for the Other (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition de).

The fundamental desire is the incestuous desire for the mother, the primordial Other.[23]

  1. Desire is always "the desire for something else,"[24] since it is impossible to desire what one already has.

The object of desire is continually deferred, which is why desire is a metonymy.[25]

  1. Desire emerges originally in the field of the Other; i.e. in the unconscious.
Social Product

The most important point to emerge from Lacan's phrase is that desire is a social product.

Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects.

(M)other

The first person to occupy the place of the Other is the mother, and at first the child is at the mercy of her desire.

It is only when the Father articulates desire with the law by castrating the mother that the subject is freed from subjection to the whims of the mother's desire.

See Also

References

  1. ↑ Macey, 1995: 80
  2. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p. 275
  3. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 142
  4. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-54. Trans. John Forrester. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p. 183
  5. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988. p. 228
  6. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988. p. 228-9
  7. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 275
  8. ↑ Evans, Dylan. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. 2003. New York: Brunner-Routledge. p. 36
  9. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Le Séminaire. Livre IV. La relation d'objet, 19566-57. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Seuil, 1991. pp. 100-1, 125
  10. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. (1958c) "La signification du phallus." Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966: 685-95 ["The signification of the phallus". Trans. Alan Sheridan Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977: 281-91].
  11. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 287
  12. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 311
  13. ↑ Kojève, Alexandre (1947 [1933-39]) Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6
  14. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p. 243
  15. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p. 235
  16. ↑ Kojève, Alexandre (1947 [1933-39]) Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6
  17. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 312
  18. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. "Some Reflections on the Ego." International Journal of Psychoanalysis. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12
  19. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. "Some Reflections on the Ego." International Journal of Psychoanalysis. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12
  20. ↑ Kojève, Alexandre (1947 [1933-39]) Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6
  21. ↑ Kojève, Alexandre (1947 [1933-39]) Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 40
  22. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Le Séminaire. Livre IV. La relation d'objet, 19566-57. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Seuil, 1991. p. 138; Freud, Sigmund. (1905e) "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria." SE VII, 3.
  23. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-60. Trans. Dennis Porter. London: Routledge, 1992. p. 67
  24. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 167
  25. ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 175


Retrieved from "https://nosubject.com/index.php?title=Desire&oldid=17491"