Desire

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desire (dÈsir) Lacan's term, dÈsir, is the term used in the French transla-

   tions of Freud to translate Freud's term Wunsch, which is translated as 'wish'

by Strachey in the Standard Edition. Hence English translators of Lacan are

   faced with a dilemma; should they translate dÈsir by 'wish', which is closer to
   Freud's Wunsch, or should they translate it as 'desire', which is closer to the
   French term, but which lacks the allusion to Freud? All of Lacan's English
   translators have opted for the latter, since the English term 'desire' conveys,
   like the French term, the implication of a continuous force, which is essential
   to Lacan's concept. The English term also carries with it the same allusions to

Hegel's Begierde as are carried by the French term, and thus retains the

philosophical nuances which are so essential to Lacan's concept of dÈsir and



which make it 'a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by

Freud himself' (Macey, 1995: 80).

     If there is any one concept which can claim to be the very centre of Lacan's

thought, it is the concept of desire. Lacan follows Spinoza in arguing that

'desire is the essence of man' (Sll, 275; see Spinoza, 1677: 128); desire is

simultaneously the heart of human existence, and the central concern of

psychoanalysis. However, when Lacan talks about desire, it is not any kind

of desire he is referring to, but always unconscious desire. This is not because

Lacan sees conscious desire as unimportant, but simply because it is uncon-

scious desire that forms the central concern of psychoanalysis. Unconscious

desire is entirely sexual; 'the motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to

sexual desire . . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not

represented' (E, 142).

    The aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to recognise

the truth about his desire. However, it is only possible to recognise one's desire

when it is articulated in speech: 'It is only once it is formulated, named in the

presence of the other, that desire, whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense

of the term' (Sl, 183).

    Hence in psychoanalysis 'what's important is to teach the subject to name,

to articulate, to bring this desire into existence' (S2, 228). However, it is not a

question of seeking a new means of expression for a given desire, for this

would imply a expressionist theory of language. On the contrary, by articulat-

ing desire in speech, the analysand brings it into existence:

    That the subject should come to recognise and to name his desire; that is the
    efficacious action of analysis. But it isn't a question of recognising some-
    thing which would be entirely given.     . . . In naming it, the subject creates,
     brings forth, a new presence in the world.
                                                                                                         (S2, 228-9)



However, there is a limit to how far desire can be articulated in speech because

of a fundamental 'incompatibility between desire and speech' (E, 275); it is

this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the unconscious (i.e.

the fact that the unconscious is not that which is not known, but that which

cannot be known). Although the truth about desire is present to some degree in

all speech, speech can never articulate the whole truth about desire; whenever

speech attempts to articulate desire, there is always a leftover, a surplus, which

exceeds speech.

    One of Lacan's most important criticisms of the psychoanalytic theories of

his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of desire with the related

concepts of DEMAND and NEED. In opposition to this tendency, Lacan insists on

distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge

in his work in 1957 (see S4, 100-1, 125), but only crystallises in 1958 (Lacan,

1958c).



     Need is a purely biological INSTINCT, an appetite which emerges according to

the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only

temporarily) when satisfied. The human subject, being born in a state of

helplessness, is unable to satisfy its own needs, and hence depends on the

Other to help it satisfy them. In order to get the Other's help, the infant must

express its needs vocally; need must be articulated in demand. The primitive

demands of the infant may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring

the Other to minister to the infant's needs. However, the presence of the Other

  soon acquires   an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the

satisfaction of need, since this presence symbolises the Other's love. Hence

demand soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of

need and as a demand for love. However, whereas the Other can provide the

objects which the subject requires to satisfy his needs, the Other cannot

provide that unconditional love which the subject craves. Hence even after

the needs which were articulated in demand have been satisfied, the other

aspect of demand, the craving for love, remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is

desire. 'Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love,

but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second'

(E, 287).

     Desire is thus the surplus produced by the articulation of need in demand;
  'Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated

from need' (E, 311). Unlike a need, which can be satisfied and which then

  ceases to motivate the subject until another need arises, desire can never be

satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal. The realisation of desire

does not consist in being 'fulfilled', but in the reproduction of desire as such.

     Lacan's distinction between need and desire, which lifts the concept of

desire completely out of the realm of biology, is strongly reminiscent of

KojËve's distinction between animal and human desire; desire is shown to

be distinctively human when it is directed either toward another desire, or to an

object which is 'perfectly useless from the biological point of view' (KojËve,

1947: 6).

     It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives. Although they

both belong to the field of the Other (as opposed to love), desire is one whereas

the drives are many. In other words, the drives are the particular (partial)

manifestations of a single force called desire (although there may also be

desires which are not manifested in the drives: see S1l, 243). There is only

  one object of desire, OBJETPETITA, and this is represented by a variety of partial

objects in different partial drives. The OBJET PETIT A iS not the object towards

which desire tends, but the cause of desire. Desire is not a relation to an object,

but a relation to a LACK.

     One of Lacan's most oft-repeated formulas is: 'man's desire is the desire of

the Other' (Sll, 235). This can be understood in many complementary ways,

of which the following are the most important.

     1. Desire is essentially 'desire of the Other's desire', which means both



desire to be the object of another's desire, and desire for recognition by

another. Lacan takes this idea from Hegel, via KojËve, who states:

     Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the
     other .  . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired'         or 'loved', or, rather,
      'recognised' in his human value.      .  . . In other words, all human, anthro-
     pogenetic Desire  . .  . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.
                                                                                                (KojËve, 1947: 6)



KojËve goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that in order to achieve the

desired recognition, the subject must risk his own life in a struggle for pure

prestige (see MASTER). That desire is essentially desire to be the object of

another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the Oedipus com-

plex, when the subject desires to be the phallus for the mother.

     2. It is qua Other that the subject desires (E, 312): that is, the subject desires

from the point of view of another. The effect of this is that 'the object of man's

desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else' (Lacan, 1951b:

12). What makes an object desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in

itself but simply the fact that it is desired by another. The desire of the Other is

thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this 'tends to diminish

the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it

brings into view the existence of objects without number' (Lacan, 1951b: 12).

     This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that

'Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is

  "mediated" by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is

human to desire what others desire, because they desire it' (KojËve, 1947: 6).

The reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire being

desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the

other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other

recognise my superiority over him (KojËve, 1947: 40).

     This universal feature of desire is especially evident in hysteria; the hysteric

is one who sustains another person's desire, converts another's desire into her

  own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus

appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138; see Freud, 1905e). Hence what

is important in the analysis of a hysteric is not to find out the object of her

desire but to discover the place from which she desires (the subject with whom

she identifies).

     3. Desire is desire for the Other (playing on the ambiguity of the French

preposition de). The fundamental desire is the incestuous desire for the mother,

the primordial Other (S7, 67).

     4. Desire is always 'the desire for something else' (E, 167), since it is

impossible to desire what one already has. The object of desire is continually

deferred, which is why desire is a METONYMY (E, 175).

     5. Desire emerges originally in the field of the Other; i.e. in the unconscious.



    The most important point to emerge from Lacan's phrase is that desire is a

social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always

constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other

subjects.

    The first person to occupy the place of the Other is the mother, and at first

the child is at the mercy of her desire. It is only when the Father articulates

desire with the law by castrating the mother that the subject is freed from

subjection to the whims of the mother's desire (see CASTRATION COMPLEX).

def

In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the term desire designates the impossible relation that a subject has with objet petit a. According to Lacan, desire proper (in contrast with demand) can never be fulfilled.

==

Desire is the Desire of the Other

It is on the basis of this fundamental understanding of identity that Lacan maintained throughout his career that desire is the desire of the Other. What is meant by him in this formulation is not the triviality that humans desire others, when they sexually desire (an observation which is not universally true). Again developing Freud's theorisation of sexuality, Lacan's contention is rather that what psychoanalysis reveals is that human-beings need to learn how and what to desire. Lacanian theory does not deny that infants are always born into the world with basic biological needs that need constant or periodic satisfaction. Lacan's stress, however, is that, from a very early age, the child’s attempts to satisfy these needs become caught up in the dialectics of its exchanges with others. Because its sense of self is only ever garnered from identifying with the images of these others (or itself in the mirror, as a kind of other), Lacan argues that it demonstrably belongs to humans to desire- directly- as or through another or others. We get a sense of his meaning when we consider such social phenomena as fashion. As the squabbling of children more readily testifies, it is fully possible for an object to become desirable for individuals because they perceive that others desire it, such that when these others' desire is withdrawn, the object also loses its allure. Lacan articulates this 'decentring' of desire when he contends that what has happened to the biological needs of the individual is that they have become inseparable from, and importantly subordinated to, the vicissitudes of its demand for the recognition and love of other people. Events as apparently 'natural' as the passing or holding back of stool, he remarks in Ecrits, become episodes in the chronicle of the child's relationship with its parents, expressive of its compliance or rebellion. A hungry child may even refuse to eat food if it perceives that this food is offered less as a token of love than one of its parents' dissatisfaction or impatience. In this light, Lacan's important recourse to game theory also becomes explicable. For game theory involves precisely the attempt to formalise the possibilities available to individuals in situations where their decisions concerning their wants can in principle both affect and be affected by the decisions of others. As Lacan's article in the Ecrits on the "Direction of the Treatment" spells out, he takes it that the analytic situation, as theorised by Freud around the notion of transference (see Part 2), is precisely such a situation. In that essay, Lacan focuses on the dream of the butcher's wife in Freud's Interpretation of Dreams. The said 'butcher’s wife’ thought that she had had a dream which was proof of the invalidity of Freud's theory that dreams are always encoded wish-fulfilments. As Freud comments, however, this dream becomes explicable when one considers how, after a patient has entered into analysis, her wishes are constructed (at least in part) in relation to the perceived wishes of the analyst. In this case, at least one of the wishes expressed by the dream was the woman's wish that Freud’s desire (for his theory to be correct) be thwarted. In the same way, Lacan details how the deeper unconscious wish expressed in the manifest content of the dream (which featured the woman attempting to stage a dinner party with only one piece of smoked salmon) can only be comprehended as the coded fulfilment of a desire that her husband would not fulfil her every wish, and leave her with an unsatisfied desire.