Democracy is not merely the “power of, by, and for the people.” It is not enough just to claim that, in democracy, the will and the interests (the two in no way automatically coincide) of the large majority determine state decisions. Democracy—in the way the term is used today—concerns, above all, ‘’’formal legalism’’’. Its minimal definition is ‘’the unconditional adherence to a certain set of formal rules which guarantee that antagonisms are fully absorbed into the “rules of the game.”’’’
Democracy is not merely “Democracy” means that, whatever electoral manipulation actually takes place, every political agent will unconditionally respect the results. In this sense, the “power U.S. presidential elections of2000 were effectively “democratic.” Despite obvious and patent electoral manipulations in Florida, bythe Democratic candidate accepted his defeat. In the weeks of uncertainty after the elections, and for the Bill Clinton made an appropriately acerbic comment: “The American peoplehave spoken. We just don’t know what they said.” It is not enough just to claim that This comment should have been taken more seriously than it was meant, in for it revealed how the present machinery of democracycan be problematic, to say the least. ‘’’Why should the will left always and unconditionally respect the interests (the two in no way automatically coincide) formal “rules of the large majority determine state decisions. Democracy—in the way the term is used today—concernsgame”? Why should it not, above allin some circumstances, formal legalism. Its minimal definition is put in question the unconditional adherence to a certain set legitimacy of formal rules which guarantee that antagonisms are fully absorbed into the “rules outcome of the game.”<br><br>a formal democratic procedure?’’’
“Democracy” means thatAlternatively, whatever electoral manipulation actually takes placethere is at least one case in which formal democrats themselves (or, every political agent will unconditionally respect the results. In this senseat least, the U.S. presidential elections a substantial portion of 2000 were effectively “democratic.” Despite obvious and patent electoral manipulations in Florida, them) would tolerate the Democratic candidate accepted his defeat. In the weeks suspension of uncertainty after the democracy: What if formally free elections, Bill Clinton made are won by an appropriately acerbic comment: “The American people have spoken. We just don’t know what they said.” This comment should have been taken more seriously than it was meant, for it revealed how anti-democratic party whose platform promises the present machinery abolition of formal democracy can be problematic? (This did happen, among other places, to say the leastin Algeria a few years ago. Why should ) In such a case, many a democrat would concede that the left always and unconditionally respect the formal “rules of the game”? Why should it people were notyet “mature” enough to be allowed democracy, in and that some circumstances, put in question the legitimacy kind of enlightened despotism whose aim is to educate the outcome of a formal democratic procedure?<br><br>majority to become proper democrats is preferable.
AlternativelyFollowing this rhetorical line of attack, there the gradual limitation of democracy is at least one case clearly perceptible in attempts to “rethink” the present situation in which formal democrats themselves (or, at least, a substantial portion of them) would tolerate the suspension aftermath of democracy: What if formally free elections are won by an anti-democratic party whose platform promises the abolition Iraq war. One is, of formal course, for democracy? (This did happen, among other placesand [[human rights]], but one should “rethink” them. A series of recent interventions in Algeria the public debate give a few years agoclear sense of the direction of this “rethinking.) ” In such a case<i>The Future of Freedom</i>, [[Fareed Zakaria]], Bush’s favored columnist, many a democrat would concede that locates the people were not yet “mature” enough threat to be allowed freedom in “overdoing democracy, ” i.e., in the rise of “illiberal democracy at home and abroad.” He draws the lesson that some kind of enlightened despotism whose aim is to educate democracy can only “catch on” in economically developed countries: If developing countries are “prematurely democratized,” the majority to become proper democrats result is preferablea [[populism]] which ends in economic catastrophe and political despotism.<br><br>
Following No wonder, goes this rhetorical line theory, that today’s economically most successful Third World countries (Taiwan, South Korea, Chile) embraced full democracy only after a period of attackauthoritarian rule. The immediate lessons for Iraq are clear and unambiguous: Yes, the gradual limitation of United States should bring democracy is clearly perceptible in attempts to “rethink” the present situation in the aftermath of the Iraq war. One is, of course, for democracy and human rights, but one not immediately. There should “rethink” them. A series first be a period of recent interventions five or so years in the public debate give which a clear sense of benevolently authoritarian, U.S.-controlled regime would create proper conditions for the direction effective functioning of this “rethinkingdemocracy.” In <i>The Future of Freedom</i> This regime will not tolerate, Fareed Zakariafor example, Bush’s favored columnista democratic desire to nationalize oil revenues, locates the threat or to apply sanctions to freedom in “overdoing democracyIsrael,” ior to refuse global free trade schemes.e., in We know now what bringing democracy means: It means that the rise of “illiberal democracy at home United States and abroad.” He draws its “willing partners” impose themselves as the lesson that ultimate judges who decide if and when a country is ripe for democracy can only “catch on” in economically developed countries: If developing countries are “prematurely democratized,” the result is a populism which ends in economic catastrophe and political despotism.<br><br>
No wonder, goes this theory, that today’s economically most successful Third World countries (Taiwan, South Korea, Chile) embraced full democracy only after a period of authoritarian rule. The immediate lessons As for Iraq are clear and unambiguous: Yes, the United States should bring democracy to Iraqitself, but not immediately. There should first be a period of five or so years in which Zakaria’s diagnosis is that “America is increasingly embracing a benevolently authoritarian, U.S.simple-controlled regime would create proper conditions for minded populism that values popularity and openness as the effective functioning key measures of democracylegitimacy. This regime will not tolerate, for example, … The result is a democratic desire to nationalize oil revenuesdeep imbalance in the American system, or more democracy but less liberty.” The remedy is thus to apply sanctions counteract this excessive “democratization of democracy” by delegating more power to Israelimpartial experts insulated from the democratic fray, or to refuse global free trade schemes. We know now what bringing democracy means: It means that like the United States and its “willing partners” impose themselves as the ultimate judges who decide if and when a country is ripe for democracyindependent central banks.<br><br>
As for Such a diagnosis cannot but provoke ironic laughter: Today, in this alleged “overdemocratization,” the United States itselfand Britain started a war on Iraq against the overwhelming will of the rest of the planet (and, in Britain’s case, its own people). And are we not, all the time, witnessing the imposition of key decisions concerning global trade agreements by “impartial” bodies exempted from democratic control? Even more fundamentally, Zakaria’s diagnosis is that “America is increasingly embracing it not ridiculous to complain about “overdemocratization” in a simple-minded populism that values popularity time when the key economic and openness geopolitical decisions are, as the key measures of legitimacy. … The result is a deep imbalance rule, not an issue in elections? For at least the American systempast three decades, what Zakaria demands is already fact. What we experience today are acrimonious splits over ideological lifestyle issues, where fierce debates rage and choices are solicited (on abortion, on gay marriages, etc.), more democracy but less libertywhere basic economic policy is presented as a depoliticized domain of expert authority.” The remedy proliferation of “overdemocracy” with its “excesses” of a “culture of complaint” is thus to counteract this excessive “democratization ultimately the front whose backside is the silent, sturdy weaving of democracy” by delegating more power to impartial experts insulated from the democratic frayeconomic, like the independent central bankscorporatist logic.<br><br>
Such a diagnosis cannot but provoke ironic laughter: Today, in this alleged “overdemocratization,” The obverse of the United States and Britain started a war on Iraq against same tendency to counteract democratic “excesses” is the overwhelming will open dismissal of any international body that would effectively control the rest conduct of the planet (and, in Britain’s case, its own people). And are we notwar—which might, after all the time, witnessing the imposition of key decisions concerning global trade agreements by “impartial” bodies exempted be necessary from democratic control? Even more fundamentally, is it not ridiculous time to complain about “overdemocratization” in a time when to enforce the key economic and geopolitical decisions areagenda. Exemplary is Kenneth Anderson’s recent <i>New York Times Magazine</i> essay, as a rule, not an issue in elections“Who Owns the Rules of War? For at least ” whose subtitle makes the past three decades, what Zakaria point unambiguously clear: “The war in Iraq demands is already facta rethinking of the international rules of conduct. What we experience today are acrimonious splits over ideological lifestyle issuesThe outcome could mean less power for neutral, where fierce debates rage well-meaning human rights groups and choices are solicited (on abortion, on gay marriages, etcmore for big-stick-wielding states.), but where basic economic policy is presented as That would be a depoliticized domain of expert authoritygood thing. The proliferation of “overdemocracy” with its “excesses” of a “culture of complaint” is ultimately the front whose backside is the silent, sturdy weaving of economic, corporatist logic.<br><br>”
The obverse main complaint of this essay is that, “For the same tendency to counteract democratic “excesses” is past 20 years, the open dismissal center of any international body that would effectively control gravity in establishing, interpreting and shaping the conduct law of war—which might, after all, be necessary war has gradually shifted away from time to time to enforce the economic agendamilitary establishments of leading states and toward more activist and publicly aggressive NGOs. Exemplary ” This tendency is Kenneth Anderson’s recent <i>New York Times Magazine</i> essayperceived as unbalanced, “unfair” toward the big military powers who intervene in other countries, “Who Owns and partial toward the Rules of War?” whose subtitle makes attacked countries—with the point unambiguously clear: “The war in Iraq demands a rethinking of conclusion that the militaries on the international rules of conduct. The outcome could mean less power for neutral, well-meaning human rights groups and more for big“big-stick-wielding statesstates” should themselves determine the standards by which their actions will be judged. This conclusion is indeed consistent with the U.S. rejection of the authority of the International Criminal Court over its citizens. That would be And it spells out a bitter reality: that a good thingnew dark age is descending upon the human race.”<br><br>
The main complaint of this essay is that, “For the past 20 years, the center of gravity in establishing, interpreting and shaping the law of war has gradually shifted away from the military establishments of leading states and toward more activist and publicly aggressive NGOs.” This tendency is perceived as unbalanced, “unfair” toward the big military powers who intervene in other countries, and partial toward the attacked countries—with the clear conclusion that the militaries on the “big-stick-wielding states” should themselves determine the standards by which their actions will be judged.<br><br>
This conclusion is indeed consistent with the U.S. rejection of the authority of the International Criminal Court over its citizens. And it spells out a bitter reality: that a new dark age is descending upon the human race.
==References==[http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/73/]
