Subject supposed to know

subject suppposed to know (sujet supposÈ savoir) The term

sujet supposÈ savoir (often abbreviated to S.s.S.) is difficult to translate into

English. Sheridan translates it as 'subject suppposed to know', and this is the

translation adopted in most English works on Lacan. However, Schneiderman

suggests the alternative translation 'supposed subject of knowledge', on the

grounds that it is the subject, not just the knowledge, which is supposed

(Schneiderman, 1980: vii).

     The phrase is introduced by Lacan in 1961 in order to designate the illusion

of a self-consciousness (Ger. Selbstbewufltsein) which is transparent to itself in

its act of knowing (see CONSCIOUSNEss). This illusion, which is born in the

mirror stage, is put into question by psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis demon-

  strates that KNOWLEDGE (savoir) cannot be located in any particular subject but

is, in fact, intersubjective (Lacan, 1961-2: seminar of 15 November 1961).

      In 1964, Lacan takes up the phrase in his definition of TRANSFERENCE as the

  attribution of knowledge to asubject; 'As soon as the subject who is supposed

  to know exists somewhere there is transference' (Sll, 232). This definition

emphasises that it is the analysand's supposition of a subject who knows that

  initiates the analytic process.rather than the knowledge actually possessed by

  the analyst.

      The term 'subject supposed to know' does not designate the analyst himself,

   but a function which the analyst may come to embody in the treatment. It is

only when the analyst is perceived by the analysand to embody this function

  that the transference can besaid to be established (Sll, 233). When this

  occurs, what kind of knowledge is it that the analyst is presumed to pos-

   sess? 'He is supposed to know that from which no one can escape, as soon as

   he formulates it  - quite simply, signification' (Sll, 253). In other words, the

analyst is often thought to know the secret meaning of the analysand's words,

   the significations of speech of which       even the speaker is       unaware. This

supposition alone (the supposition that the analyst is one who knows) causes

   otherwise insignificant details (chance gestures, ambiguous remarks)                to

acquire retroactively a special meaning for the patient who 'supposes'.

      It may happen that the patient supposes the analyst to be a subject who

   knows from the very first meinent of the treatment, or even before, but it often

   takes some time for the transference to become established. In the latter case,

   'when the subject enters tlie analsysis, he is far from giving the analyst this

   place [of the subject supposed to know]' (Sll, 233); the analysand may

initially regard the analyst as a buffoon, or may withold information from

   him in order to maintain his ignorance (S11, 137). However, 'even the

psychoanalyst put in question is credited at some point with a certain infall-

ibility' (Sl 1, 234); sooner orlater some chance gestiire of the analyst's is taken

by the analysand as a sign of some secret intention, some hidden knowledge.

   At this point the analyst has come to embody the subject supposed to know; the

   transference is established.

      The end of analysis comes when the analysand de-supposes the analyst of

knowledge, so that the analyst falls from the position of the subject supposed

   to know.

      The term 'subject supposed to know' also emphasises the fact that it is a

   particular relationship to knowledge that constitutes the unique position of the

analyst; the analyst is awarethat there is a split between him and the knowl-

edge attributed to him. In ´her words. the analyst must realise that he only

occupies the position of ome who is presumed (by the analysand) to know,

   without fooling himself that he really does possess the knowledge attributed to

   him. The analyst must realise that, of the knowledge attributed to him by the

analysand, he knows nothing (Lacan, 1967: 20). However, the fact that it is a

supposed knowledge that is the mainstay of the analytic process, rather than

the knowledge actually possessed by the analyst, does not mean that the

analyst can therefore be content with knowing nothing; on the contrary, Lacan

  argues that analysts should emulate Freud in becoming experts in cultural,

literary and linguistic matters.

      Lacan also remarks that, for the analyst, the analysand is a subject supposed

  to know. When the analyst explains the fundamental rule of free association to

  the analysand, he is effectively saying; 'Come on, say anything, it will all be

  marvellous' (Sl7, 59). In other words, the analyst tells the analysand to behave

  as if he knew what it was all about, thereby instituting him              as  a subject

supposed to know.