Difference between revisions of "Transference"

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transference (transfert)                    The  term 'transference' first emerged in
+
{{Top}}[[transfert]]{{Bottom}}
  
Freud's work       as simply another term for the displacement of affect from
+
==Sigmund Freud==
 +
===Definition===
 +
The term "[[transference]]" first emerged in [[Freud]]'s [[work]] as simply [[another]] term for the [[displacement]] of [[affect]] from one [[idea]] to another.<ref>{{F}} ''[[The Interpretation of Dreams]]''. 1900a: [[SE]] V, 562</ref>
  
  one idea to another (see Freud, 1900a: SE V, 562). Later on, however, it
+
Later on, however, it came to refer to the [[patient]]'s [[relationship]] to the [[analyst]] as it develops in the [[treatment]].
  
  came to refer to the patient's relationship to the analyst as it develops in the
+
This soon became the central [[meaning]] of the term, and is the [[sense]] in which it is usually [[understood]] in [[psychoanalytic theory]] today.
  
treatment. This soon became the central meaning of the term, and is the sense
+
The use of a special term to denote the [[patient]]'s relationship to the [[analyst]] is justified by the peculiar [[character]] of this relationship.
  
in which it is usually understood in psychoanalytic theory today.
+
===Treatment===
 +
[[Freud]] was first struck by the intensity of the [[patient]]'s [[affect]]ive reactions to the doctor in [[Breuer]]'s [[treatment]] of [[Anna O]] in 1882, which he argued was due to the [[patient]] transferring [[unconscious]] [[ideas]] onto the doctor.<ref>{{F}} (1895d) With Josef Breuer. ''[[Sigmund Freud|Bibliography|Studies on Hysteria]]''. [[SE]] II.</ref>
  
      The use of a special term to denote the patient's relationship to the analyst is
+
====Resistance====
 +
As he developed the [[psychoanalytic]] method, [[Freud]] first regarded the [[transference]] exclusively as a [[resistance]] which impedes the [[recall]] of [[repression|repressed]] [[memories]], an obstacle to the [[treatment]] which must be "destroyed".<ref>{{F}} (1905e [1901]) "[[Sigmund Freud:Bibliography|Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria]]." [[SE]] VII, 3: 116</ref>
  
justified by the peculiar character of this relationship. Freud was first struck by
+
Gradually, however, he modified this view, coming to see the [[transference]] also as a positive factor which helps the [[treatment]] to [[progress]].  
  
the intensity of the patient's affective reactions to the doctor in Breuer's
+
====Progress====
 +
The positive [[value]] of [[transference]] lies in the fact that it provides a way for the [[analysand]]'s history to be confronted in the immediacy of the [[present]] relationship with the [[analyst]]; in the way he relates to the [[analyst]], the [[analysand]] inevitably repeats earlier relationships with other [[figures]] (especially those with the [[parents]]).
  
  treatment of Anna O in 1882, which he argued            was due to the patient
+
This paradoxical [[nature]] of [[transference]], as both an obstacle to the [[treatment]] and that which [[drives]] the [[treatment]] forward, perhaps helps to explain why there are so many different and opposing views of [[transference]] in [[psychoanalytic theory]] today.
  
transferring unconscious ideas onto the doctor (Freud, 1895d). As he devel-
+
==Jacques Lacan==
 +
[[Lacan]]'s [[thinking]] [[about]] [[transference]] goes through several [[development|stages]].  
  
oped the psychoanalytic method, Freud first regarded the transference exclu-
+
===Dialectic===
 +
His first work to deal with the subject in any detail is '''[[Jacques Lacan:Bibliography|An Intervention on the Transference]]'',<ref>{{L}} (1951) "[[Intervention sur le transfert]]." ''[[Écrits]]''. [[Paris]]: Seuil, 1966: 215-26 ["[[Intervention sur le transfert|Intervention on the transference]]." Trans. [[Jacqueline Rose]]. Eds. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose. ''[[Feminine]] [[Sexuality]]: [[Jacques Lacan]] and the école freudienne''. [[London]]: Macmillan, 1982; New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1982: 61-­73].</ref> in which he describes the [[transference]] in [[dialectic]]al [[terms]] borrowed from [[Hegel]].
  
sively as a RESISTANCE which impedes the recall of repressed memories, an
+
===Affect===
 +
He criticises [[ego-psychology]] for defining the [[transference]] in terms of [[affect]]s:
  
obstacle to the treatment which must be 'destroyed' (Freud, 1905e: SE VII, 116).
+
<blockquote>"Transference does not refer to any mysterious property of affect, and even when it reveals itself under the [[appearance]] of [[emotion]], it only acquires meaning by virtue of the [[dialectical]] [[moment]] in which it is produced."<ref>{{Ec}} p. 225</ref></blockquote>
  
Gradually, however, he modified this view, coming to see the transference also as
+
In other [[words]], [[Lacan]] argues that although [[transference]] often manifests itself in the guise of particularly strong [[affect]]s, such as [[love]] and [[hate]], it does not consist of such emotions but in the [[structure]] of an [[intersubjectivity|intersubjective relationship]].
  
  a positive factor which helps the treatment to progress. The positive value of
+
This [[structural]] definition of [[transference]] remains a constant theme throughout the rest of [[Lacan]]'s work; he consistently locates the [[essence]] of [[transference]] in the [[symbolic]] and not in the [[imaginary]], although it clearly has powerful imaginary effects.
 +
 +
Later on, Lacan will remark that if [[transference]] often manifests itself under the appearance of [[love]], it is first and foremost the [[love]] of [[knowledge]] (''[[savoir]]'') that is concerned.
  
transference lies in the fact that it provides a way for the analysand's history to be
+
===Seminar of 1953-54===
 +
[[Lacan]] returns to the subject of the [[transference]] in the [[seminar]] of 1953-4.
  
confronted in the immediacy of the present relationship with the analyst; in the
+
This [[time]] he conceives it not in terms borrowed from [[dialectic|Hegelian dialectic]]s but in terms borrowed from the [[anthropology]] of [[exchange]].
  
  way he relates to the analyst, the analysand inevitably repeats earlier relationships
+
[[Transference]] is implicit in the [[speech act]], which involves an exchange of [[sign]]s that transforms the [[speaker]] and listener: In its essence, the efficacious [[transference]] which we're considering is quite simply the [[speech]] [[act]].
  
with other figures (especially those with the parents). This paradoxical nature of
+
Each time a man speaks to another in an authentic and [[full]] manner, there is, in the [[true]] sense, [[transference]], [[symbolic]] [[transference]] - something which takes [[place]] which changes the nature of the two beings present.<ref>{{S1}} p. 109</ref>
  
transference, as both an obstacle to the treatment and that which drives the
+
In the [[seminar]] of the following year, he continues to elaborate on the [[symbolic]] nature of [[transference]], which he [[identifies]] with the [[compulsion to repeat]], the [[insistence]] of [[the symbolic]] determinants of the [[subject]].<ref>{{S2}} p. 210-11</ref>
  
treatment forward, perhaps helps to explain why there are so many different
+
This is to be distinguished from the [[imaginary]] aspect of [[transference]], namely, the [[affect]]ive reactions of [[love]] and [[aggressivity]].
  
  and opposing views of transference in psychoanalytic theory today.
+
In this [[distinction]] between the [[symbolic]] and [[imaginary]] aspects of [[transference]], [[Lacan]] provides a useful way of [[understanding]] the paradoxical function of the [[transference]] in [[psychoanalytic treatment]]; in its symbolic aspect ([[repetition]]) it helps the [[treatment]] [[progress]] by revealing the [[signifiers]] of the subject's [[history]], while in its [[imaginary]] aspect ([[love]] and [[hate]]) it [[acts]] as a [[resistance]].<ref>{{S4}} p. 135; {{S8}} p. 204</ref>
  
      Lacan's thinking about transference goes through several stages. His first
+
[[Lacan]]'s next approach to the subject of [[transference]] is in the eighth year of his [[seminar]],<ref>Lacan, 1960-1</ref> entitled simply "[[The Transference]]".  
  
  work to deal with the subject in any detail is 'An Intervention                  on the
+
Here he uses [[Plato]]'s [[Symposium]] to illustrate the relationship between the [[analysand]] and the [[analyst]].
  
Transference' (Lacan, 1951), in which he describes the transference in dialec-
+
[[Alcibiades]] compares [[Socrates]] to a plain box which encloses a precious [[object]] (Grk ''[[agalma]]''); just as Alcibiades attributes a hidden treasure to Socrates, so the [[analysand]] sees his object of [[desire]] in the [[analyst]] (see [[objet petit a]]).
  
tical terms borrowed from Hegel. He criticises ego-psychology for defming the
+
In 1964, [[Lacan]] articulates the [[concept]] of [[transference]] with his concept of the [[subject supposed to know]], which remains central to [[Lacan]]'s view of the [[transference]] from then on; indeed, it is this view of the [[transference]] which has come to be seen as [[Lacan]]'s most [[complete]] attempt to theorise the matter.
  
transference in terms of AFFECTs; 'Transference does not refer to any myster-
+
According to this view, [[transference]] is the [[attribution]] of [[knowledge]] to the [[Other]], the supposition that the [[Other]] is a [[subject supposed to know|subject who knows]]:
  
  lous property of affect, and even when it reveals itself under the appearance of
+
<blockquote>"As soon as the subject who is supposed to [[know]] [[exists]] somewhere . . . there is transference."<ref>{{S11}} p. 232</ref></blockquote>
  
emotion, it only acquires meaning by virtue of the dialectical moment in which
+
Although the [[existence]] of the [[transference]] is a necessary condition of [[psychoanalytic treatment]], it is not sufficient in itself; it is also necessary that the analyst deal with the [[transference]] in a unique way.
  
  it is produced' (Ec, 225).
+
It is this that differentiates [[psychoanalysis]] from [[suggestion]]; although both are based on the [[transference]], [[psychoanalysis]] differs from [[suggestion]] because the [[analyst]] refuses to use the [[power]] given to him by the [[transference]].<ref>{{E}} p. 236</ref>
  
      In other words, Lacan argues that although transference often manifests
+
---
  
itself in the guise of particularly strong affects, such aS LOVE and hate, it
+
From quite early on in the history of [[psychoanalysis]] it became common to distinguish between those aspects of the [[patient]]'s relationship to the [[analyst]] which were "adapted to reality" and those which were not.
  
does not consist of such emotions but in the structure of an intersubjective
+
In the latter [[category]] fell all the [[patient]]'s reactions which were caused by "perceiving the analyst in a distorted way".
  
relationship. This structural definition of transference remains              a constant
+
Some [[analyst]]s used the term "[[transference]]" to refer to all aspects of the [[analysand]]'s relationship to the [[analyst]], in which [[case]] they distinguished the distorted "[[transference|neurotic transference]]" or "[[transference|transference neurosis]]" from the "unobjectionable part of the transference" or "therapeutic alliance."<ref>Edward Bibring, Elizabeth Zeztel</ref>
  
theme throughout the rest of Lacan's work; he consistently locates the essence
+
---
  
      of transference in the symbolic and not in the imaginary, although it clearly
+
Other [[analysts]] argued that the term "[[transference]]" should be restricted to the "unrealistic" or "[[irrational]]" reactions of the [[analysand]] (William Silverberg, Franz Alexander).
  
      has powerful imaginary effects. Later on, Lacan will remark that if transfer-
+
However, the common assumption underlying both of these positions was that the [[analyst]] could tell when the [[patient]] was not reacting to him on the basis of who he really was but rather on the basis of previous relationships with other [[people]].
  
      ence often manifests itself under the appearance of love, it is first and foremost
+
The [[analyst]] was credited with this ability because he was supposed to be better "adapted to reality" than the [[patient]].
  
      the love of knowledge (savoir) that is concerned.
+
Informed by his own correct [[perception]] of [[reality]], the [[analyst]] could offer "transference [[interpretations]]"; that is, he could point out the discrepancy between the [[real]] [[situation]] and the irrational way that the [[patient]] was reacting to it.  
  
        Lacan returns to the subject of the transference in the seminar of 19534
+
It was argued that such [[transference|transference interpretation]]s helped the analysand to gain "insight" into his own [[transference|neurotic transference]] and thereby resolve it or "liquidate" it.
  
      This time he conceives it not in terms borrowed from Hegelian dialectics but in
+
---
  
      terms borrowed from the anthropology of exchange (Mauss, LÈvi-Strauss).
+
Some of [[Lacan]]'s most incisive criticisms are directed at this way of representing [[psychoanalytic treatment]].  
  
      Transference is implicit in the speech act, which involves an exchange of signs
+
These criticisms are based on the following arguments:
  
      that transforms the speaker and listener:
+
---
  
 +
1. The [[whole]] idea of [[adaptation]] to [[reality]] is based on a naive empiricist [[epistemology]], involving an appeal to an unproblematic [[notion]] of "[[reality]]" as an [[objective]] and [[self]]-evident given.
  
 +
This entirely neglects what [[psychoanalysis]] has discovered about the [[construction]] of [[reality]] by the [[ego]] on the basis of its own [[méconnaissance]].
  
        In its essence, the efficacious transference which we're considering is quite
+
Hence when the [[analyst]] assumes that he is better adapted to [[reality]] than the [[patient]] he has no other recourse than "to fall back on his own ego" since this is the only "bit of reality he [[knows]]".<ref>{{E}} p. 231</ref>
  
        simply the speech act. Each time a man speaks to another in an authentic and
+
The healthy part of the [[patient]]'s [[ego]] is then defmed simply as "the part that thinks as we do".<ref>{{E}} p. 232</ref>
  
        full manner, there is, in the true sense, transference, symbolic transference    -
+
This reduces [[psychoanalytic treatment]] to a [[form]] of [[suggestion]] in which the [[analyst]] simply "imposes his own idea of reality" on the [[analysand]].<ref>{{E}} p. 232</ref>
  
        something which takes place which changes the nature of the two beings
+
<blockquote> Thus "the inability [of the analyst] to sustain a praxis in an authentic  manner results, as is usually the case with mankind, in the exercise of power."<ref>{{E}} p. 226</ref></blockquote>
  
        present.
+
---
  
                                                                                                                    (Sl, 109)
+
2. The idea that the [[analysand]]'s "distorted perception of the analyst" could be liquidated by means of [[interpretation]]s is a [[logical]] fallacy, since the [[transference]] is [[interpretation|interpreted]] on the basis of, and with the [[instrument]] of, the [[transference]] itself.<ref>{{S8}} p. 206</ref>
  
      In the seminar of the following year, he continues to elaborate on the symbolic
+
In other words, there is no [[metalanguage]] of the [[transference]], no vantage point [[outside]] the [[transference]] from which the [[analyst]] could offer an [[interpretation]], since any [[interpretation]] he offers "will be received as coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be."<ref>{{E}} p. 231</ref>
  
      nature of transference, which he identifies with the compulsion to repeat, the
+
---
  
      insistence of the symbolic determinants of the subject (S2, 210-11). This is to
+
Thus it is contradictory to [[claim]] that the [[transference]] can be dissolved by means of an [[interpretation]] when it is the [[transference]] itself which [[conditions]] the [[analysand]]'s acceptance of that [[interpretation]]:
  
      be distinguished from the imaginary aspect of transference, namely, the
+
<blockquote>"The emergence of the subject from the transference is thus postponed ad infinitum."<ref>{{E}} p. 231</ref></blockquote>
  
      affective reactions of love and aggressivity. In this distinction between the
+
---
  
      symbolic and imaginary aspects of transference, Lacan provides a useful way
+
Does this mean that [[Lacanian]] [[analyst]]s never interpret the [[transference]]?
  
      of understanding the paradoxical function of the transference in psychoanalytic
+
Certainly not; [[Lacan]] affirms that "it is [[natural]] to interpret the transference,"<ref>{{E}} p. 271</ref> but at the same time he harbours no [[illusion]]s about the power of such [[interpretation]]s to dissolve the [[transference]].
  
      treatment; in its symbolic aspect (REPETITION) it helps the treatment progress by
+
Like any other [[interpretation]], the [[analyst]] must use all his [[art]] in deciding if and when to [[interpret]] the [[transference]], and above all must avoid gearing his [[interpretation]]s exclusively to [[interpreting]] the [[transference]].
  
      revealing the signifiers of the subject's history, while in its imaginary aspect
+
He must also know exactly what he is seeking to achieve by such an [[interpretation]]; not to rectify the [[patient]]'s relationship to [[reality]], but to maintain the [[discourse|analytic dialogue]].
  
      (love and hate) it acts as a resistance (see S4, 135; S8, 204).
+
<blockquote>"What does it mean, to interpret the transference? [[Nothing]] else than to fill the [[void]] of this deadlock with a [[lure]]. But while it may be deceptive, this lure serves a [[purpose]] by setting off the whole [[process]] again."<ref>{{Ec}} p. 225</ref></blockquote>
  
          Lacan's next approach to the subject of transference is in the eighth year of
+
---
  
      his seminar (Lacan, 1960-1), entitled simply 'The Transference'. Here he uses
+
When describing the [[transference]] as "positive" or "[[negative]]", [[Lacan]] takes two different approaches.  
  
      Plato's Symposium to illustrate the relationship between the analysand and the
+
Following [[Freud]], [[Lacan]] sometimes uses these adjectives to refer to the nature of the [[affect]]s, "[[transference|positive transference]]" referring to loving affects and "[[transference|negative transference]]" referring to [[aggressivity|aggressive]] [[affect]]s.<ref>{{Ec}} p. 222</ref>
  
      analyst. Alcibiades compares Socrates to a plain box which encloses a precious
+
---
  
      object (Grk agalma); just as Alcibiades attributes a hidden treasure to Socrates,
+
Sometimes, however, [[Lacan]] takes the terms "positive" and "negative" to refer to the favourable or unfavourable effects of the [[transference]] on the [[treatment]]<ref>{{E}} 271</ref> (where [[Lacan]] argues that when the [[analysand]]'s [[resistance]] opposes [[suggestion]], this [[resistance]] must be "placed in the ranks of the positive transference" on the grounds that it maintains the direction of the [[analysis]]).
  
      so the analysand sees his object of desire in the analyst (see OBJETPETITA).
+
---
  
        In 1964, Lacan articulates the concept of transference with his concept of the
+
Although [[Lacan]] does [[speak]] occasionally of [[countertransference]], he generally prefers not to use this term.
  
      SUBJECT SUPPOSED TO KNOw, which remains central to Lacan's view of the
+
==See Also==
 +
{{See}}
 +
* [[Affect]]
 +
* [[Aggressivity]]
 +
* [[Analysand]]
 +
||
 +
* [[Counter-transference]]
 +
* [[Dialectic]]
 +
* [[Love]]
 +
||
 +
* [[Knowledge]]
 +
* [[Imaginary]]
 +
* [[Interpretation]]
 +
||
 +
* [[Metalanguage]]
 +
* [[Progress]]
 +
* [[Repression]]
 +
||
 +
* [[Resistance]]
 +
* [[Subject supposed to know]]
 +
* [[Suggestion]]
 +
||
 +
* [[Symbolic]]
 +
* [[Treatment]]
 +
* [[Unconscious]]
 +
{{Also}}
  
      transference from then on; indeed, it is this view of the transference which
+
==References==
 
+
<references/>
      has come to be seen as Lacan's most complete attempt to theorise the matter.
 
 
 
      According to this view, transference is the attribution of knowledge to the
 
 
 
      Other, the supposition that the Other is a subject who knows; 'As soon as the
 
 
 
      subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere      . . . there is transference'
 
 
 
      (Sll, 232).
 
 
 
        Although the existence of the transference is          a necessary condition of
 
 
 
      psychoanalytic treatment, it is not sufficient in itself; it is also necessary that
 
 
 
      the analyst deal with the transference in a unique way. It is this that differ-
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    entiates psychoanalysis from SUGGESTION; although both    are based    on the
 
 
 
    transference, psychoanalysis differs from suggestion because the analyst
 
 
 
    refuses to use the power given to him by the transference (see E, 236).
 
 
 
        From quite early on in the history of psychoanalysis it became common to
 
 
 
distinguish between those aspects of the patient's relationship to the analyst
 
 
 
    which were 'adapted to reality' and those which were not. In the latter category
 
 
 
    fell all the patient's reactions which were caused by 'perceiving the analyst in
 
 
 
    a distorted way'. Some analysts used the term 'transference' to refer to all
 
 
 
    aspects of the analysand's relationship to the analyst, in which case they
 
 
 
distinguished the distorted 'neurotic transference'            or 'transference neurosis'
 
 
 
    from the 'unobjectionable part of the transference' or 'therapeutic alliance'
 
 
 
    (Edward Bibring, Elizabeth Zeztel). Other analysts argued that the term
 
 
 
    'transference' should be restricted to the 'unrealistic' or 'irrational' reactions
 
 
 
    of the analysand (William Silverberg, Franz Alexander). However, the com-
 
 
 
    mon assumption underlying both of these positions was that the analyst could
 
 
 
    tell when the patient was not reacting to him on the basis of who he really was
 
 
 
    but rather on the basis of previous relationships with other people. The analyst
 
 
 
    was credited with this ability because he was supposed to be better 'adapted to
 
 
 
    reality' than the patient. Informed by his own correct perception of reality, the
 
 
 
    analyst could offer 'transference interpretations'; that is, he could point out the
 
 
 
    discrepancy between the real situation and the irrational way that the patient
 
 
 
    was reacting to it. It was argued that such transference interpretations helped
 
 
 
    the analysand to gain 'insight' into his own neurotic transference and thereby
 
 
 
    resolve it or 'liquidate' it.
 
 
 
        Some of Lacan's most incisive criticisms          are directed at this way of
 
 
 
    representing psychoanalytic treatment. These criticisms        are based    on the
 
 
 
    following arguinents:
 
 
 
        1. The whole idea of adaptation to reality is based on a naive empiricist
 
 
 
epistemology, involving an appeal to an unproblematic notion of 'reality' as an
 
 
 
    objective and self-evident given. This entirely neglects what psychoanalysis
 
 
 
    has discovered about the construction of reality by the ego on the basis of its
 
 
 
    own mÈconnaissance. Hence when the analyst          assumes that he is better
 
 
 
    adapted to reality than the patient he has no other recourse than 'to fall back
 
 
 
    on his own ego' since this is the only 'bit of reality he knows' (E, 231). The
 
 
 
healthy part of the patient's ego is then defmed simply as 'the part that thinks
 
 
 
    as we do' (E, 232). This reduces psychoanalytic treatment to            a form of
 
 
 
    suggestion in which the analyst simply 'imposes his own idea of reality' on
 
 
 
    the analysand (E, 232). Thus 'the inability [of the analyst] to sustain a praxis in
 
 
 
    an authentic  manner results,    as is usually the      case with mankind, in the
 
 
 
    exercise of power' (E, 226).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    b 2- The idea that the analysand's 'distorted perception of the analyst' could
 
 
 
      e liquidated by    means of interpretations is      a logical fallacy, since 'the
 
 
 
    transference is interpreted on the basis of, and with the instrument of, the
 
 
 
transference itself' (S8, 206). In other words, there is nO METALANGUAGE of the
 
 
 
transference, no vantage point outside the transference from which the analyst
 
 
 
could offer an interpretation, since any interpretation he offers 'will be received
 
 
 
  as coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be' (E, 231)
 
 
 
  Thus it is contradictory to claim that the transference can be dissolved by means
 
 
 
  of an interpretation when it is the transference itself which conditions the
 
 
 
analysand's acceptance of that interpretation; 'the emergence of the subject
 
 
 
  from the transference is thus postponed ad infinitum' (E, 231).
 
 
 
      Does this  mean that Lacanian analysts      never interpret the transference?
 
 
 
Certainly not; Lacan affirms that 'it is natural to interpret the transference'
 
 
 
(E, 271), but at the same time he harbours no illusions about the power of such
 
  
interpretations to dissolve the transference. Like any other interpretation, the
+
{{OK}}
 +
[[Category:Practice]]
 +
[[Category:Treatment]]
  
analyst must use all his art in deciding if and when to interpret the transfer-
+
__NOTOC__
 
 
  ence, and above all must avoid gearing his interpretations exclusively to
 
 
 
interpreting the transference. He must also know exactly what he is seeking
 
 
 
  to achieve by such an interpretation; not to rectify the patient's relationship to
 
 
 
reality, but to maintain the analytic dialogue. 'What does it mean, to interpret        .
 
 
 
  the transference? Nothing else than to fill the void of this deadlock with a lure.
 
 
 
  But while it may be deceptive, this lure serves a purpose by setting off the
 
 
 
    whole process again' (Ec, 225).
 
 
 
      When describing the transference as 'positive' or 'negative', Lacan takes two
 
 
 
  different approaches. Following Freud, Lacan sometimes uses these adjectives
 
 
 
  to refer to the nature of the affects, 'positive transference' referring to loving
 
 
 
  affects and 'negative transference' referring to aggressive affects (Ec, 222).
 
 
 
Sometimes, however, Lacan takes the terms 'positive' and 'negative' to refer to
 
 
 
  the favourable or unfavourable effects of the transference on the treatment (see
 
 
 
E, 271, where Lacan argues that when the analysand's resistance opposes
 
 
 
suggestion, this resistance must be 'placed in the ranks of the positive trans-
 
 
 
  ference' on the grounds that it maintains the direction of the analysis).
 
 
 
      Although Lacan does speak occasionally of COUNTERTRANSFERENCE, he gen-
 
 
 
erally prefers not to use this term.
 
 
 
== def ==
 
 
 
The displacement of one's unresolved conflicts, dependencies, and aggressions onto a substitute object (e.g. substituting a lover, spouse, etc. for one's parent). This operation can also occur in the psychoanalytical cure, when a patient transfers onto the analyst feelings that were previously directed to another object. By working through this transference of feelings onto the analyst, the patient can come to grips with the actual cause of his or her feelings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
== References ==
 
<references/>
 
  
[[Category:Lacan]]
+
{{Encore}} pp. 67, 144
[[Category:Terms]]
 
[[Category:Concepts]]
 
[[Category:Psychoanalysis]]
 

Latest revision as of 02:45, 21 May 2019

French: [[transfert]]

Sigmund Freud

Definition

The term "transference" first emerged in Freud's work as simply another term for the displacement of affect from one idea to another.[1]

Later on, however, it came to refer to the patient's relationship to the analyst as it develops in the treatment.

This soon became the central meaning of the term, and is the sense in which it is usually understood in psychoanalytic theory today.

The use of a special term to denote the patient's relationship to the analyst is justified by the peculiar character of this relationship.

Treatment

Freud was first struck by the intensity of the patient's affective reactions to the doctor in Breuer's treatment of Anna O in 1882, which he argued was due to the patient transferring unconscious ideas onto the doctor.[2]

Resistance

As he developed the psychoanalytic method, Freud first regarded the transference exclusively as a resistance which impedes the recall of repressed memories, an obstacle to the treatment which must be "destroyed".[3]

Gradually, however, he modified this view, coming to see the transference also as a positive factor which helps the treatment to progress.

Progress

The positive value of transference lies in the fact that it provides a way for the analysand's history to be confronted in the immediacy of the present relationship with the analyst; in the way he relates to the analyst, the analysand inevitably repeats earlier relationships with other figures (especially those with the parents).

This paradoxical nature of transference, as both an obstacle to the treatment and that which drives the treatment forward, perhaps helps to explain why there are so many different and opposing views of transference in psychoanalytic theory today.

Jacques Lacan

Lacan's thinking about transference goes through several stages.

Dialectic

His first work to deal with the subject in any detail is 'An Intervention on the Transference,[4] in which he describes the transference in dialectical terms borrowed from Hegel.

Affect

He criticises ego-psychology for defining the transference in terms of affects:

"Transference does not refer to any mysterious property of affect, and even when it reveals itself under the appearance of emotion, it only acquires meaning by virtue of the dialectical moment in which it is produced."[5]

In other words, Lacan argues that although transference often manifests itself in the guise of particularly strong affects, such as love and hate, it does not consist of such emotions but in the structure of an intersubjective relationship.

This structural definition of transference remains a constant theme throughout the rest of Lacan's work; he consistently locates the essence of transference in the symbolic and not in the imaginary, although it clearly has powerful imaginary effects.

Later on, Lacan will remark that if transference often manifests itself under the appearance of love, it is first and foremost the love of knowledge (savoir) that is concerned.

Seminar of 1953-54

Lacan returns to the subject of the transference in the seminar of 1953-4.

This time he conceives it not in terms borrowed from Hegelian dialectics but in terms borrowed from the anthropology of exchange.

Transference is implicit in the speech act, which involves an exchange of signs that transforms the speaker and listener: In its essence, the efficacious transference which we're considering is quite simply the speech act.

Each time a man speaks to another in an authentic and full manner, there is, in the true sense, transference, symbolic transference - something which takes place which changes the nature of the two beings present.[6]

In the seminar of the following year, he continues to elaborate on the symbolic nature of transference, which he identifies with the compulsion to repeat, the insistence of the symbolic determinants of the subject.[7]

This is to be distinguished from the imaginary aspect of transference, namely, the affective reactions of love and aggressivity.

In this distinction between the symbolic and imaginary aspects of transference, Lacan provides a useful way of understanding the paradoxical function of the transference in psychoanalytic treatment; in its symbolic aspect (repetition) it helps the treatment progress by revealing the signifiers of the subject's history, while in its imaginary aspect (love and hate) it acts as a resistance.[8]

Lacan's next approach to the subject of transference is in the eighth year of his seminar,[9] entitled simply "The Transference".

Here he uses Plato's Symposium to illustrate the relationship between the analysand and the analyst.

Alcibiades compares Socrates to a plain box which encloses a precious object (Grk agalma); just as Alcibiades attributes a hidden treasure to Socrates, so the analysand sees his object of desire in the analyst (see objet petit a).

In 1964, Lacan articulates the concept of transference with his concept of the subject supposed to know, which remains central to Lacan's view of the transference from then on; indeed, it is this view of the transference which has come to be seen as Lacan's most complete attempt to theorise the matter.

According to this view, transference is the attribution of knowledge to the Other, the supposition that the Other is a subject who knows:

"As soon as the subject who is supposed to know exists somewhere . . . there is transference."[10]

Although the existence of the transference is a necessary condition of psychoanalytic treatment, it is not sufficient in itself; it is also necessary that the analyst deal with the transference in a unique way.

It is this that differentiates psychoanalysis from suggestion; although both are based on the transference, psychoanalysis differs from suggestion because the analyst refuses to use the power given to him by the transference.[11]

---

From quite early on in the history of psychoanalysis it became common to distinguish between those aspects of the patient's relationship to the analyst which were "adapted to reality" and those which were not.

In the latter category fell all the patient's reactions which were caused by "perceiving the analyst in a distorted way".

Some analysts used the term "transference" to refer to all aspects of the analysand's relationship to the analyst, in which case they distinguished the distorted "neurotic transference" or "transference neurosis" from the "unobjectionable part of the transference" or "therapeutic alliance."[12]

---

Other analysts argued that the term "transference" should be restricted to the "unrealistic" or "irrational" reactions of the analysand (William Silverberg, Franz Alexander).

However, the common assumption underlying both of these positions was that the analyst could tell when the patient was not reacting to him on the basis of who he really was but rather on the basis of previous relationships with other people.

The analyst was credited with this ability because he was supposed to be better "adapted to reality" than the patient.

Informed by his own correct perception of reality, the analyst could offer "transference interpretations"; that is, he could point out the discrepancy between the real situation and the irrational way that the patient was reacting to it.

It was argued that such transference interpretations helped the analysand to gain "insight" into his own neurotic transference and thereby resolve it or "liquidate" it.

---

Some of Lacan's most incisive criticisms are directed at this way of representing psychoanalytic treatment.

These criticisms are based on the following arguments:

---

1. The whole idea of adaptation to reality is based on a naive empiricist epistemology, involving an appeal to an unproblematic notion of "reality" as an objective and self-evident given.

This entirely neglects what psychoanalysis has discovered about the construction of reality by the ego on the basis of its own méconnaissance.

Hence when the analyst assumes that he is better adapted to reality than the patient he has no other recourse than "to fall back on his own ego" since this is the only "bit of reality he knows".[13]

The healthy part of the patient's ego is then defmed simply as "the part that thinks as we do".[14]

This reduces psychoanalytic treatment to a form of suggestion in which the analyst simply "imposes his own idea of reality" on the analysand.[15]

Thus "the inability [of the analyst] to sustain a praxis in an authentic manner results, as is usually the case with mankind, in the exercise of power."[16]

---

2. The idea that the analysand's "distorted perception of the analyst" could be liquidated by means of interpretations is a logical fallacy, since the transference is interpreted on the basis of, and with the instrument of, the transference itself.[17]

In other words, there is no metalanguage of the transference, no vantage point outside the transference from which the analyst could offer an interpretation, since any interpretation he offers "will be received as coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be."[18]

---

Thus it is contradictory to claim that the transference can be dissolved by means of an interpretation when it is the transference itself which conditions the analysand's acceptance of that interpretation:

"The emergence of the subject from the transference is thus postponed ad infinitum."[19]

---

Does this mean that Lacanian analysts never interpret the transference?

Certainly not; Lacan affirms that "it is natural to interpret the transference,"[20] but at the same time he harbours no illusions about the power of such interpretations to dissolve the transference.

Like any other interpretation, the analyst must use all his art in deciding if and when to interpret the transference, and above all must avoid gearing his interpretations exclusively to interpreting the transference.

He must also know exactly what he is seeking to achieve by such an interpretation; not to rectify the patient's relationship to reality, but to maintain the analytic dialogue.

"What does it mean, to interpret the transference? Nothing else than to fill the void of this deadlock with a lure. But while it may be deceptive, this lure serves a purpose by setting off the whole process again."[21]

---

When describing the transference as "positive" or "negative", Lacan takes two different approaches.

Following Freud, Lacan sometimes uses these adjectives to refer to the nature of the affects, "positive transference" referring to loving affects and "negative transference" referring to aggressive affects.[22]

---

Sometimes, however, Lacan takes the terms "positive" and "negative" to refer to the favourable or unfavourable effects of the transference on the treatment[23] (where Lacan argues that when the analysand's resistance opposes suggestion, this resistance must be "placed in the ranks of the positive transference" on the grounds that it maintains the direction of the analysis).

---

Although Lacan does speak occasionally of countertransference, he generally prefers not to use this term.

See Also

References

  1. Freud, Sigmund. The Interpretation of Dreams. 1900a: SE V, 562
  2. Freud, Sigmund. (1895d) With Josef Breuer. Bibliography|Studies on Hysteria. SE II.
  3. Freud, Sigmund. (1905e [1901]) "Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria." SE VII, 3: 116
  4. Lacan, Jacques. (1951) "Intervention sur le transfert." Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966: 215-26 ["Intervention on the transference." Trans. Jacqueline Rose. Eds. Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose. Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne. London: Macmillan, 1982; New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1982: 61-­73].
  5. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. p. 225
  6. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-54. Trans. John Forrester. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p. 109
  7. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988. p. 210-11
  8. Lacan, Jacques. Le Séminaire. Livre IV. La relation d'objet, 19566-57. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Seuil, 1991. p. 135; Lacan, Jacques. Le Séminaire. Livre VIII. Le transfert, 1960-61. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Seuil, 1991. p. 204
  9. Lacan, 1960-1
  10. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p. 232
  11. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 236
  12. Edward Bibring, Elizabeth Zeztel
  13. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 231
  14. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 232
  15. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 232
  16. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 226
  17. Lacan, Jacques. Le Séminaire. Livre VIII. Le transfert, 1960-61. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Seuil, 1991. p. 206
  18. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 231
  19. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 231
  20. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 271
  21. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. p. 225
  22. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. p. 222
  23. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. 271


Index