Instinct
Instinct (German: Trieb) is a foundational concept in psychoanalytic theory, introduced by Sigmund Freud to designate fundamental motivational forces that emerge at the boundary between the somatic and the psychic. These forces exert pressure on the mental apparatus, compelling representation, discharge, or transformation. Although traditionally translated as “instinct,” the German term Trieb is more accurately rendered as drive, a distinction with substantial theoretical consequences.
Psychoanalytic instincts differ fundamentally from biological instincts (German: Instinkt). Rather than being innate behavioral programs or fixed action patterns, psychoanalytic instincts are variable, symbolically mediated, and subject to unconscious conflict, repression, and fantasy.
Instinct in psychoanalysis refers to the fundamental motivational forces that originate at the boundary between the somatic and the psychic, exerting pressure on the mental apparatus. The concept was formulated and developed by Sigmund Freud, who used the German word Trieb to describe these forces. Although often translated into English as “instinct,” a more accurate rendering is drive, a distinction that carries significant theoretical implications.[1]
In psychoanalysis, instincts are not reflexes or innate behavioral programs as conceived in biology. Instead, they are psychic forces that demand symbolic expression, generate internal conflict, and manifest through fantasy, symptom-formation, and unconscious repetition. Psychoanalytic instincts are variable, non-linear, and mediated by language and the unconscious, setting them apart from the biological concept of instinct.
Terminology and Translation
Freud distinguished between two German terms:
- Instinkt
- used to refer to rigid, biological patterns of animal behavior
- Trieb
- the key psychoanalytic term, referring to an internally generated pressure that requires psychic representation and symbolic mediation[2]
Early English translations of Freud, such as those by James Strachey, rendered Trieb as “instinct,” which obscured Freud’s intended meaning and contributed to confusion. Later psychoanalytic scholarship and Lacanian theory have emphasized the importance of the term drive to preserve the conceptual specificity of Trieb.[3]
Freud’s Theory of Instincts
Freud defined instincts as the psychic representatives of somatic stimuli, operating as motivational forces that originate within the body but act within the psyche.[1] In Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (1915), Freud identified four essential components of every instinct:
- Source
- the bodily site of excitation
- Pressure
- the quantitative force demanding discharge
- Aim
- satisfaction through tension reduction
- Object
- the contingent thing or person through which satisfaction is achieved[1]
Instincts are constant and unconscious, shaping mental life through conflict with ego and superego structures, often resulting in repression or symptom formation.
Dual-Instinct Theories
Freud’s theory evolved from a biological to a more speculative, metapsychological model.
Early Dualism
In early theory, Freud proposed a dualism between:
- Self-preservative instincts – related to survival, nourishment, and safety
- Sexual instincts – or libido, aimed at pleasure and reproduction[4]
Later Dualism: Life and Death Drives
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud revised this into a conflict between:
- Eros – the life instincts, promoting unity, growth, and reproduction
- Thanatos – the death instinct, seeking tension reduction, repetition, and a return to an inorganic state[5]
The death drive explained phenomena such as repetition compulsion, aggression, and self-destructive behavior, previously unaccounted for in Freud's libido theory.[5]
Instinct, Repression, and Conflict
Psychoanalysis views instincts as intrinsically conflictual. Their aims frequently clash with social prohibitions and internalized moral laws (superego), leading to repression. Repressed instinctual content does not disappear but returns in disguised forms—dreams, parapraxes, symptoms—shaping neurotic formations.[6]
Psychoanalytic treatment does not aim to repress instincts further but to help the subject engage them in symbolic and conscious ways, transforming the relation to desire and drive.
Lacanian Reinterpretation
Jacques Lacan preserved Freud’s distinction between Instinkt and Trieb, and sharply criticized English translators for collapsing them into a single term, “instinct.”[3] For Lacan, instincts belong to animal ethology, involving fixed behaviors and a direct relation to their biological object. By contrast, drives are uniquely human, symbolically structured, and organized around lack, not fulfillment.
Lacan argued that drives do not attain their object and are not reducible to biological needs. Rather, the drive is defined by its circuitous path and repetitive structure, with satisfaction lying in the process itself rather than in goal completion.[7]
He replaced the Freudian instinctual framework with a theory of drives centered on partial objects (e.g., the breast, the voice, the gaze) and their relation to objet petit a—the lost object-cause of desire.[3]
Critique of Biological Reductionism
From his earliest writings, Lacan criticized attempts to explain human psychology purely in biological or instinctual terms, arguing that this falsely assumes a harmonious fit between human beings and their environment.[8]
Lacan introduced the concept of vital insufficiency or congenital helplessness, referring to the fact that human beings are biologically unprepared and require cultural and symbolic support to survive.[8] Human psychology is dominated by complexes rather than instincts, making any biologically deterministic account of human behavior incomplete.
Distinction from Biological Instinct
Psychoanalytic theory contrasts instinct (Trieb) with biological instinct (Instinkt) in several ways:
- Drives are not innate behavioral programs
- The object of the drive is contingent, substitutable, and symbolic
- The aim is not biological satisfaction but repetition around lack
- Human motivation is shaped by language, fantasy, and social structure, not biological adequacy
This distinction marks a clear boundary between psychoanalysis and behaviorist or evolutionary psychology models.
Clinical Significance
In psychoanalytic practice, the concept of instinct (or drive) is central to:
- Understanding symptoms as compromise formations
- Exploring resistance as defense against repressed instinctual material
- Interpreting transference as a reenactment of early instinctual conflicts
- Addressing jouissance—the paradoxical satisfaction in suffering, repetition, or loss
The goal is not to normalize instinctual life but to transform the subject’s relation to the drive through interpretation and symbolic integration.
See Also
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Freud, Sigmund. “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes” (1915). In: The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. XIV. Trans. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1957, pp. 117–140.
- ↑ Laplanche, Jean and Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand. The Language of Psycho-Analysis. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. London: Hogarth Press, 1973, pp. 134–136.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Evans, Dylan. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. London: Routledge, 1996, p. 43.
- ↑ Freud, Sigmund. Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905). In: The Standard Edition, Vol. VII. Trans. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.
- ↑ 5.0 5.1 Freud, Sigmund. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). In: The Standard Edition, Vol. XVIII. Trans. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1955.
- ↑ Freud, Sigmund. The Ego and the Id (1923). In: The Standard Edition, Vol. XIX. Trans. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1961.
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1964). Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Trans. Bruce Fink. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006, pp. 88–90.