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In the so-called 'topographical model', [[Freud ]] isolates consciousness as one of the parts of the psyche, along with the UNCONSCIOUs [[unconscious]] and the [[preconscious]].  Lacan finds Freud's remarks on consciousness far weaker than his formulations on the unconscious; '"while he [Freud] can give a coherent, balanced account of the majority of other parts of thepsychic the psychic apparatus, when it's a question of consciousness, he always encounters mutually contradictory conditions' (."<ref>S2, l 17). </ref>According to Lacan, Freud's problems with discussing consciousness return again and again to haunt his theory: '"The difficulties which this system of consciousness raises reappear at each level of Freud's theorising' (."<ref>S2, 117). </ref>In particular, Lacan rejects the apparent attempts in Freud's work to link the consciousness-perception system to the EGo[[ego]], unless this link is carefully theorised. If there is a link between the ego and consciousness, it is in terms of a [[lure]]; the illusion of a fully self-transparent consciousness is subverted by the whole psychoanalytic experience (see cociro[[cogito]]). '"Consciousness in man is by essence a polar tension between an ego alienated from the subject and a perception which fundamentally escapes it, a pure percipi' (."<ref>S2, 177).</ref>In 1954 Lacan gives '"a materialist definition of the phenomenon of consciousness' (."<ref>S2, 40-52). </ref>However, matter is not to be confused with nature; Lacan argues that consciousness does not evolve from the natural order; it is radically discontinuous, and its origin is more akin to creation than to evolution (.<ref>S7, 213-14; 223).</ref>In the 1960s Lacan rethinks the illusion of a self-consciousness (''Selbstbe-wufltsein'') fully present to itself in terms of his concept of the SUBJECT SUPPOSED TO KNOW[[Subject Supposed to Know]].  PAGES 19-20, 40, 43, 83, 20-3, 71 [[Category:Psychoanalysis]][[Category:Freud]][[Category:Lacan]]