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THE INTERVENTION OF THE FATHER
It is only the [[intervention ]] of the [[father]], via the [[threat ]] of [[castration]], which forces the [[child]] to give up his [[desire]] for the [[mother]].
FATHER
KLEINIAN PSYCHOANALYSIS
The [[work ]] of [[Melanie Klein]] is concerned with the [[pregenital ]] [[mother]]-[[child]] relation (rather than the with the [[role ]] of the [[father]]).
[[Jacques Lacan]] alludes several [[times ]] to [[Melanie Klein]]'s work in his pre-war writings.
FAMILY COMPLEX - WEANING COMPLEX
MOTHER AND DEATH DRIVE
[[Lacan]] describes the [[death drive]] as a [[nostalgic]] [[yearning ]] to [[return ]] to this relation of fusion with the [[mother]]'s [[breast]].<ref>Lacan. 1938. p.35</ref>
DISORDERS
The failure of the [[child]] to detach itself from the [[imaginary]] [[relation]] with the [[mother]] can result in a [[number ]] of disorders.
The failure of the [[paternal function]] can also give rise to such disorders.
PRIVATION
[[Privation]] is [[Lacan]]'s attempt to theorize more rigorously [[Freud]]'s [[concept ]] of [[female]] [[castration]] and [[penis envy]].
According to [[Freud]], when [[children]] realize that some [[people ]] ([[women]]) do not have a [[penis]], this is a [[trauma]]tic [[moment ]] which produces different effects in the [[boy]] and in the [[girl]].
The consequences are different in the [[boy]] and the [[girl].
THE BOY
In the [[case ]] of the [[boy]], the [[castration complex]] is the point of exist from the [[Oedipus complex]], its terminal crisis.
Because of his [[fear]] of [[castration]] (often aroused by a threat), the [[boy]] renounces his [[desire]] for the [[mother]] and thus enters the [[latency period]].
The [[child]], on discovering the [[anatomical]] [[difference ]] between the [[sexes]] (the [[presence]] or [[absence]] of the [[penis]]), makes the assumption that this difference is due to the [[female]]'s [[penis]] having been cut off.<ref>Freud. 1908c.</ref>
The [[girl]] sees herself as already [[castrated]] (by the [[mother]]) and attempts to deny this or to compensate for it by seeking a [[child]] as a [[substitute]] for the [[penis]] ([[penis envy]]).
(The [[girl]] [[envies]] the [[boy]]'s posession of the [[penis]], which she sees as a highly valuable [[organ]].)
Even though the [[girl]] may at first resent the [[mother]] for depriving her of a [[penis]] and turn to the [[father]] in the hope that he will provide her with a [[symbolic]] [[substitute]], she later turns her resentment against the [[father]] when he fails to provide her with the [[desire]]d [[child]].
[[Freud]] argues that [[penis envy]] persists into [[adulthood]], manifesting itself in the [[desire]] to have a [[child]] (since the [[father]] has failed to provide her with a [[child]], the [[woman]] turns to [[another ]] [[man]] instead).
[[Lacan]] argues that even when the [[woman]] has a [[child]], this does not spell the end of her [[sense ]] of [[privation]].
Her [[desire]] for the [[phallus]] remains [[unsatisfied]], not matter how many [[children]] she has.
The [[mother]]'s basic [[dissatisfaction]] is perceived by the [[child]] from very early on.<ref>{{S4}} p.194</ref>
The [[child]] realizes that she has a [[desire]] that aims at something beyond her [[relationship ]] with him - the [[imaginary phallus]].
The [[child]] then seeks to fulfil her [[desire]] by [[identifying]] with the [[imaginary]] [[phallus]].
In this way, the [[privation]] of the [[mother]] is [[responsible ]] for introducing the [[dialectic]] of [[desire]] in the [[child]]'s [[life ]] for the first [[time]].
(The [[girl]] blames the [[mother]] for depriving her of a [[penis]], and redirects her [[affection]]s to the [[father]] in the hope that he will provide her with a [[child]] as a [[symbolic]] [[substitute]] for the [[penis]] she [[lacks]].<ref>Freud. 1924d.</ref>)
The [[child]] soon realizes that he does not completely [[satisfy]] the [[mother]]'s [[desire]], that her [[desire]] aims at something beyond him, and thus attempts to decipher this enigmatic [[desire]].
He must work out an answer to the question ''[[Che vuoi?]]'' ("What do you [[want ]] from me?").
The answer the [[child]] comes up with is that what the [[mother]] [[desire]]s is the [[imaginary]] [[phallus]].
For a time, the [[child]] experiences his attempts to [[satisfy]] the [[mother]]'s [[desire]], his attempts at being the [[phallus]] as a relatively [[satisfying]] [[game]] of [[seduction]].
It is only when the [[child]]'s [[sexual]] [[drive]]s begin to stir (in [[infantile ]] [[masturbation]]), and an element of the [[real]] is thus introduced into the [[imaginary]] [[game]], that the [[omnipotence]] of the [[mother]]
IMAGINARY PHALLUS
END OF IMAGINARY PHALLUS
The [[Oedipus complex]] and the [[castration complex]] involve the [[renunciation ]] of this attempt to be the [[imaginary phallus]].
(The [[imaginary phallus]] is written OP (lower-case phi) in [[Lacanian]] [[algebra]].)
Following [[Freud]], [[Lacan]] argues that the [[castration complex]] is central to the [[Oedipus complex]].<ref>{{S4}} p.216</ref>
However, whereas [[Freud]] argues that these two [[complexes ]] are articulated differently in [[boy]]s and [[girl]]s, [[Lacan]] argues that the [[castration complex]] always denotes the final moment of the [[Oedipus complex]] in both [[sex]]es.
LACK OF THE MOTHER
The [[state ]] of [[lack]] already [[exist]]s in the [[mother]] prior to the [[birth ]] of the [[child]].
This [[lack]] is evident in her own [[desire]], which the [[child]] perceives as a [[desire]] for the [[imaginary phallus]].
In other [[words]], the [[child]] realizes at a very early [[stage]] that the [[mother]] is not [[complete]] and self-sufficient in herself, nor fully [[satisfied]] with her [[child]], but [[desire]]s something else.
(This is the [[subject]]'s first [[perception ]] that the [[Other]] is not [[complete]] but [[lacking]].)
3.
The [[real]] [[father]] intervenes by showing that he really possesses the [[phallus]], in such a way that the [[child]] is [[forced ]] to abandon its attempts to be the [[phallus]].<ref>{{S4}} p.208-9, 227</ref>
(The [[Oedipus complex]] is resolved by means of [[castration]].)
The [[child]] must [[renounce ]] its attempts to ''be'' the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]], to be the [[object]] of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]].
The [[subject]] gives up a certain ''[[jouissance]]'' which is never regained despite all attempts to do so.
This "relationship to the [[phallus]] .. is established without [[regard ]] to the [[anatomical]] difference of the [[sex]]es."<ref>{{E}} p.282</ref>
CASTRATION
[[Castration]] is a [[symbolic]] [[act]] which bears on an [[imaginary]] [[object]].
("[[Castration]] means that ''[[jouissance]]'' must be refused so that it can be reached on the inverted ladder (''l'e(bottom [[left ]] to upper [[right]])chelle renversE(bottom left to upper right)e'') of the [[Law]] of [[desire]]."<ref>{{E}} p.324</ref>)
CASTRATION AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
[[Lacan]] argues that it is only by accepting (or 'assuming') [[castration]] that the [[subject]] can reach a degree of [[psychic ]] normality.
In other words, the assumption of [[castration]] has a "[[normalizing effect]]."
This normalizing effect is to be [[understood ]] in [[terms ]] of both [[psychopathology]] ([[clinical structure]]s and [[symptom]]s) and [[sexual]] [[identity]].
CASTRATION AND CLINICAL STRUCTURES
It is the [[refusal ]] of [[castration]] that lies at the root of all [[psychopathological]] [[structure]]s.
However, since it is impossible to accept [[castration]] entirely, a completely 'normal' position is never achieved.
The closest to such a position is the [[neurotic]] [[structure]], in which the [[subject]] [[defends]] itself against the [[lack]] in the [[Other]] by [[repressing]] [[awareness ]] of [[castration]].
This prevents the [[neurotic]] from fully assuming its [[desire]], since "it is the assumption of [[castration]] that creates the [[lack]] upon which [[desire]] is instituted.<ref>{{Ec}} p.852</ref>
The [[psychotic]] completely repudiates [[castration]], as if it had never [[exist]]ed.<ref>{{S1}} p.53</ref>
This [[repudiation ]] of [[symbolic]] [[castration]] leads to the return of [[castration]] in the [[real]], such as in the [[form ]] of [[hallucinations]] of dismemberment or even self-mutilation of the real [[genital organs]].
CASTRATION AND SEXUALITY IDENTITY
PERVERSION AND LACAN
[[Lacan]] overcomes this [[impasse ]] in [[Freudian]] [[psychoanalytic theory]] by defining [[perversion]] not as a form of [[behavior] but as a [[clinical structure]].
<blockquote>"What is [[perversion]]? It is not simply an aberration in relation to [[social ]] criteria, an anomly contrary to [[good ]] morals, although this [[register ]] is not [[absent]], nor is it an atypicality according to natural criteria, namely that it more or less derogates from the [[reproductive ]] finality of the sexual union. It is something else in its very [[structure]]."<ref>{{S1}} p.221</ref>
SKIP
GESTALT
''[[Gestalt]]'' is a [[German]] [[word ]] meaning an organized pattern or [[whole]] which has properties other than those of its components in [[isolation]].
The experimental study of [[gestalt]]s began in 1910 with the study of certain phenomena of perception, and led to a [[school]] of [[thought ]] known as "[[gestalt]] [[psychology]]" which was based on a holistic concept of [[mind]] and [[body]] and which stressed the [[psychological]] importance of [[body]] presentation.
These [[ideas ]] formed the basis of [[Gestalt]] [[therapy]] as developed by [[Paul Goodman]], [[Fritz Perls]] and [[Ralph Hefferline]].
When [[Lacan]] refers to the [[gestalt]], he refers specifically to one kind of oganized pattern, namely the [[visual]] [[image]] of another member of the same [[species]], which is perceived as a [[unified]] [[whole]].
Such an [[image]] is a [[gestalt]] because it has an effect which none of its component parts have in isolation; this effect is to act as a "releasing [[mechanism]]" ([[French]]: ''dEclencheur'') which triggers certain [[instinct]]ual responses, such as reproductive behavior.<ref>{{S1}} p.121f</ref>
In other words, whne an [[animal ]] perceives a [[unified]] [[image]] of another member of its species, it responds in certan [[instinct]]ual ways.
[[Lacan]] gives many examples from [[ethology]] of such [[instinct]]ual responses to [[images]], but his main interest is in the way the [[gestalt]] functions in [[human]] beings.
For [[human]]s the [[body]] [[image]] is also a [[gestalt]] which produces [[instinct]]ual responses, especially [[sexual]] ones, but the [[power]] of the [[image]] is also more than merely [[instinct]]ual; it constitutes the essential captivating [[power]] of the [[specular iamge]] (see [[captation]]).
It is by [[identifying]] with the [[unified]] [[gestalt]] of the [[body]] [[image]] that the [[ego]] is constantly threatened by [[fear]]s of disintegration, which [[manifest ]] themselves in [[image]]s of the [[fragmented body]]; these [[image]]s [[represent ]] the opposite of the [[unified]] [[gestalt]] of the [[body]] [[image]].
GENITAL
In the [[stage]]s of [[psychosexual development]] listed by [[Freud]], the [[genital]] [[stage]]is the last [[stage]] in the series, coming after the two pregenital [[stages ]] (the [[oral]] [[stage]] and the [[anal]] [[stage]]).
The [[genital]] [[stage]] first arises between the ages of [[three ]] and five (the infantile genital organization or [[phallic]] [[phase]]) and is then interrupted by the [[latency period]], before returning at [[puberty ]] (the [[genital]] [[stage]] proper).
[[Freud]] defined this [[stage]] as the final "complete organization" of the [[libido]], a [[synthesis ]] of the previously anarchic "[[polymorphous perversity" of the pregenital stages.<ref>Freud. 1940a. SE XXIII. p.155</ref>
Because of this, the concept of 'genitality' came to represent a privileged value in [[psychoanalytic theory]] after [[Freud]], coming to represent a [[stage]] of [[full ]] [[psychosexual ]] maturity.
[[Lacan]] rejects most [[psychoanalytic theory]] concerning the [[genital]] [[stage]], [[genital]] [[love]], etc., calling it an "absurd hymn to the [[harmony]] of the [[genital]]."<ref>{{E}} p.245</ref>
According to [[Lacan]], there is [[nothing ]] [[harmonious]] [[about ]] [[genital]]ity.
GENITAL LOVE
[[Lacan]] rejects Michael [[Balint]]'s concept of '[[genital]] [[love]].'
The term indicates a psychosexual maturity in which the two elements of sensuality and [[affection]] are completely integrated and [[harmonized]], and in which there is thus no longer any [[ambivalence]].
The term '[[helplessness]' ([[French]]: ''[[dE(from lower left to upper right)tresse''; [[German]]: ''[[Hilflosigkeit]]'') is used in [[psychoanalysis]] to denote the state of the newborn [[infant]] who is incapable of carrying out the specific [[action]]s required to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and so is completely dependent on other people (especially the [[mother]]).
The [[helplessness]] of the [[human]] [[infant]] is grounded in its '[[prematurity]]' of birth, a fact which was pointed out by [[Freud]] and which [[Lacan]] takes up in his early writings.
Compared to other animals such as apes, the [[human]] [[infant]] is relatively unformed when it is [[born]], especially with respect to [[motor coordination]].
This means that it is more dependent than other animals, and for a longer time, on its [[parents]].
[[Lacan]] follows [[Freud]] in highlighting the importance of the initial [[dependence ]] of the [[human]] [[infant]] on the [[mother]].
[[Lacan]]'s originality lies in the way he draws attention to "the fact that this dependence is maintained by a [[world ]] of [[language]].<ref>{{E}} p.309</ref>
The [[mother]] [[interpret]]s the [[infant]]'s cries as hunger, tiredness, loneliness, etc. and [[retroactively ]] determines their [[meaning]] (see [[punctuation).
The [[child]]'s [[helplessness]] contrasts with the omnipotence of the [[mother]], who can decide whether or not to [[satisfy]] the [[child]]'s [[need]]s.<ref>{{S4}} p.69, 185</ref>
(The [[recognition ]] of this contrast engenders a depressive effect in the [[child]].<ref>{{S4}} p.186</ref>)
[[Lacan]] also uses the concept of [[helplessness] to illustrate the sense of [[abandonment]] and [[subjective destitution]] that the [[analysand]] feels at the [[end of analysis]].
<blockquote>"At the end of a [[training]] [[analysis]] the [[subect]] should reach and [[know ]] the [[domain ]] and level of the [[experience ]] of absolute disarray."<ref>{{S7}} p.304</ref></blockquote>
The [[end of analysis]] is not conceived of by [[Lacan]] as the realization of some blissful plenitude, but quite the contrary, as a moment when the [[subject]] comes to terms with his utter solitude.
However, whereas the [[infant]] can rely on its [[mother]]'s [[help]], the [[analysand]] at the [[end of analysis]] "can expect [[help]] from no one."<ref>{{S7}} p.304</ref>
If this seems to [[present ]] a particularly ascetic view of [[psychoanalytic treatment]], this is exactly how [[Lacan]] wishes it to be seen; [[psychoanalysis]] is, in [[Lacan]]'s words, a "long [[subjective ]] acesis."<ref>{{E}} p.105</ref>
INTERSUBJECTIVITY
[[Lacan]] begins (in 1953) to analyze in detail the function of [[speech]] in [[psychoanalysis]].
[[Lacan]] emphasizes that [[speech]] is essentially an [[intersubjective]] [[process]].
"The allocution of the [[subject]] entails an allocutor" and therefore "the locutor is constituted in it as [[intersubjectivity]]."<ref>{{E}} p.49</ref>
The term '[[intersubjectivity]]' draws attention to the importance of [[language]] in [[psychoanalysis]] and emphasizes the fact that the [[unconscious]] is "transindividual."
[[Psychoanalysis]] is thus to be conceived in [[intersubjective]] rather than [[intrasubjective ]] terms.
By 1960 the term '[[intersubjectivity]]' has come to acquire [[negative ]] connotations for [[Lacan]].
It is now associated, not with [[speech]] as such, but with the notions of reciprocity and symmetry that characterize the [[dual relationship]];<ref>{{S8}} p.20</ref> that is, with the [[imaginary]] rather than with the [[symbolic]].
[[Psychoanalysis]] is no longer to be conceived of in terms of [[intersubjectivity]].<ref>{{S8}} p.20</ref>
Indeed, the experience of [[transference]] is precisely what undermines the [[notion ]] of [[intersubjectivity]].<ref>Lacan. 1967</ref>
INVERSION
[[Freud]] uses the term '[[inversion]]' to designate [[homosexuality]], the [[idea ]] being that [[homosexuality]] is the [[inverse ]] of [[heterosexuality]].
[[Lacan]] uses the term in this sense too in his early works.<ref>Lacan. 1938. p.109</ref>
By extension, [[inversion]] becomes a quality of all [[imaginary]] phenomena, such as [[transitivism]].
Thus in [[schema L]], the [[imaginary]] is represented as a [[barrier ]] blockign the [[discourse]] of the [[Other]], causing this [[discourse]] to arrive at the [[subject]] ''in an inverted form''.
Hence [[Lacan]]'s definition of [[analytic]] [[communication]] in which the sender receives his own [[message]] in an inverted form.
In 1957, both senses of the term are brought together in [[Lacan]]'s [[discussion ]] of [[Leonardo da Vinci]].
Taking up [[Freud]]'s argument about [[Leonardo]]'s [[homosexuality]],<ref>Freud. 1910c.</ref> [[Lacan]] goes on to argue that [[Leonardo]]'s [[specular]] [[identification]] was highly unusual in that it resulted in an [[inversion]] of the positions (on [[schema L) of the [[ego]] and the [[little other]].<ref>{{S4}} p.433-4</ref>
[[Transitivism]] ([[French]]: ''[[transitivisme]]''), a phenomenon first discovered by Charlotte Buhler, refers to a special kind of [[identification]] often observed in the [[behavior]] of small [[children]].
For example a [[child]] can hit another [[child]] of the same age on the left side of his face, and then touch hte right side of his own face and cry in imagined [[pain]].
For [[Lacan]], [[transitivism]] illustrates the confusion of [[ego]] and [[other]] which is inherent in [[imaginary]] [[identification]].
[[Frustration]] is generally understood as the [[act]] whereby the [[mother]] denies the [[child]] the [[object]] which would [[satisfy]] its [[biological]] [[need]]s.
[[Freud]] attributes to [[frustration]] an important [[place ]] in the aetiology of [[symptom]]s, [[stating ]] that "it was a ''[[frustration]]'' that made the [[patient]] ill."<ref>Freud. 1919a. SE XVII. p.162</ref>
The [[object]] is thus valued more for being a [[symbolic]] [[gift]] than for its capacity to [[satisfy]] a [[need]].
As a [[gift]], it is inscribed in the [[symbolic[[[ [[network]] of [[law]]s which regulate the circulate of exchanges, and thus seen as something to which the [[subject]] has a legitimate [[claim]].<ref>{{S4}} p.101</ref>
[[Frustration]], properly speaking, can only occur in the context of this [[legal ]] order, and thus whne the [[object]] which the [[infant]] [[demand]]s is not provided, one can only [[speak ]] of [[frustration]] when the [[infant]] senses that it has been wronged.<ref>{{S4}} p.101</ref>
In such a case, when the [[object]] is eventually provided, the sense of wrong persists in the [[child]], who then consoles himself for this by [[enjoying]] the sensations which follow the [[satisfaction]] of the original [[need]].
(Thus, far from [[frustration]] involving the failure to [[satisfy]] a [[biological]] [[need]], it often involves precisely the opposite; a [[biological]] [[need]] is [[satisfied]] as a vain attempt to compensate for the [[true ]] [[frustration]], which is the refusal of [[love]].)
FRUSTRATION AND PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT
[[Frustration]] plays an important role in [[psychoanalytic treatment]].
[[Freud]] noted that, to the extent that distressing [[symptom]]s [[disappear ]] as the [[treatment]] [[progress]]es, the [[patient]]'s motivation to continue the [[treatment]] tends to diminish accordingly.
In order, therefore, to avoid the risk of the [[patient]] losing motivation altogether and breaking off the [[treatment]] prematurely, [[Freud]] recommended that the [[analyst]] must "re-instate [the [[patient]]'s [[suffering]]] elsewhere in the form of some appreciable [[privation]]."<ref>Freud. 1919a. SE XVI. p.163</ref>
It maintains an [[aggressive]] relation to the [[other]] on whom it depends.
It comes to distinguish itself as subject from its own [[body]], over which it establishes a distance and [[control]].
(It develops a [[paranoiac ]] relation to what it [[knows]], for what it knows is bound up with the order of images, the domain of the ego, and not [[the Real]].)
(Self-[[knowledge ]] is not longer possible.)
# the [[specular image]] is a totalized, [[complete]], [[external]] [[image]] - a ''[[gestalt]]'' - of the [[subject]], the [[subject]] as seen from [[outside]];
# the visual ''[[gestalt]]'' is in [[conflict ]] with the [[child]]'s [[fragmentary]], disorganized felt [[reality]];
# the discordnace of the visual ''[[gestalt]]'' with the [[subject]]'s perceived [[reality]] means that the [[specular iamge]] remains both a literl [[image]] of itself and an idealized rpresentation.
# the [[specular iamge]] positions the child within a spatial field, and, within the [[body]], which is located as a central point within this field;
# the [[mirror stage]] initiates the [[child]] into the two-person structure of [[imaginary]] [[identification]]s, orientating it forever towards identification with and dependence on (human) images and representations for its own forms or [[outline]];
# the ego can be seen as the sedimentation of images of [[others ]] which are libidinally invested, through [[narcissism]], by being internalized;
# the ego does not uphold reality to the [[demands ]] of the id; it systematically misrecognizes reality.
Lacan displaces the ego as the centrla and most secure component of the [[individual]], unsettling the presumptions of a fixed, unified, or natural core of [[identity]], and the subject's capacity to know itself and the world.
The [[certainty ]] the subject brings with it in its claims to knowledge is not, as [[Descartes ]] argued, a guaranteed or secure foundation for knowledge.
It is a funcion of the ivnestment the ego has in maintaining certain images which please it.
Lacan's conception of the ego as inherently [[alienated ]] has..
The subject is constituted as such by [[processes ]] of [[internalization]], [[introjection]], [[projection]], and identification, then there cannot be a [[universal ]] general subjec,t but only [[concrete]], specific [[subjects ]] who are produced within a concrete socio-symbolic and [[family ]] structure.
NEED, DEMAND AND DESIRE
OEDIPUS, THE [[Name|NAME]]-OF-THE-FATHER, AND THE OTHER
The [[drive]] involves the process in which the [[subject]] detaches part of itself, and, in attempting a reincorporation, returns this movement back to the subject's body.
This movement outside and back again is only capable of being sustain if the [[object]], the ''[[objet a]]'', is not an actual [[object]], but the "presence of a hollow, a [[void]], which can be occupied ... by any [[object]]."<ref>1977b: 180</ref>
The [[absence]] that sustains the [[drive]], the [[absence]] of a real [[object]], is produced only through the [[other]].
The [[scopic]] [[drive]] must be distinguished from [[vision]].
The [[gaze]] demonstrates the ''[[excess]]'' of the [[drive]] over [[geometrical]] or in [[Lacan]]'s term, "geometral" or flat [[optics]], a perspectival [[optics]].
Perspective represents the reception of ''light'', a light which conforms to the laws of [[physics ]] and the rules governing projection and the point-for-point [[representation ]] of [[space]].
This may explain why it is so difficult to mape the gaze.
[[Lacan]] refers to [[Diderot]]'s observation, in ''[[Lettre ]] sur les aveugles a l'usage de ceux qui voient'', that the geometral perspective of the [[Cartesian ]] subject is a perspective understandable even by the blind, for whom the gaze is not experienced.
<blockquote>The geometral space of vision - even if we include those imagianry aprts in the [[virtual ]] space of the mirror, of which, as you know, I have spoken at length - is perfectly reconstructible, imaginable, by a blind man. What is at issue in geometral perspective is simply the [[mapping ]] of space, not [[sight]].<ref>1977b. p.86</ref></blockquote>
This may be why Lacan resorts to [[topological ]] [[figures]], [[objects ]] represented from impossible perspectives to [[capture ]] something of the enigma fo the gaze.
Lacan exemplifies the failure of perspective to capture the desire entailed by the gaze in the peculiar [[fascination ]] of the [[spectator ]] with anamorphic images, images that distort, stretch, and contort perspective in their remapping, reprojection of perspectival space.
He refers to [[Hans ]] [[holbein]]'s painting of 1533, '[[The Ambassadors]]'.
Between the two figures in the foreground hovers a barely discernable ghostly [[distortion ]] of [[death]]'s head, the image of the skull to which the spectator is irresistably drawn.
(The Ambassadors is reproduced on the front cover of the Four Fundamental [[Concepts]].)
For Lacan, the [[formula ]] best capturing the complexity of the scopic drive is the [[statement]], from [[Paul ]] Valery, "I saw myself [[seeing ]] myself.<ref>p. 74, 80</ref>
This makes clear that the subject cannot be reduced to the sum of its anatomical functions.
<blockquote>''I warm myself by warming myself'' is a reference to the body as body - I feel that [[sensation ]] of warmth which, from some point [[inside ]] me, is diffused and located me as body. Whereas in the ''I see myself seeing myself'', there is no such sensation of being absorbed by vision."<ref>1977b. p.80</ref></blockquote>
Referring to [[Merleau-Ponty]]'s ''The [[Visible ]] and the Invisible'', in which seeing is defined interms of what it is impossible to see, Lacan affirms that seeing is a function both of the subject [[looking ]] from a [[singular]], perspectival point - in which case, what it sees it located ''outside'' itself ('Perception is not inme, ... it is on the objects that it apprehends."<ref>1977b. p.80</ref>); it is also [[contingent ]] on the possibility of being seen.
The gaze is thus, like the phallus itself, the [[driver ]] under which the subject's identity and certainty fail.
The subject is necessarily alienated, for it is defined on Lacan's [[model ]] as seeable, shown, being seen, without being able to see either its [[observer ]] or itself.
[[Sartre]]'s definition of the Look implies the inprinciple reversibility of observer and observed.
But Lacan's point is quite different: for him the possibility of being observed is always primary.
Sexual [[drives ]] are not the effects of [[nature ]] or biology, but are the consequences of the introduction of a gap, lack, or absence in the child's life.
Sexual drives are marked by the lack (of a fixed object).
The sexual drives mimic or simualte the biological processes and organs marked as signficiant by biological [[instincts]].
Although they appear to be innate and predetermined in aims, objects, and sources, sexual drives are highly malleable, variable, and culturally specific.
In its pre-[[oedipal ]] forms, sexual drives are chaotic, anarchic and ciruculate throughout the child's body, in many regions that have little dto do with sexualiyt.
in its oeidpalized forms, sexual drives become hierarchized under the priamcy of the genitals and the aims of heteroseuxal genital reproductive sexuality.
Sexual drives always take the [[objet ]] a as their privileged object: the objet a is both a part of the child's body, and what can be detached from the body in order to become an external object.
The lack is not given, but an effect of [[signification]].
It is for this [[reason ]] that sexuality, [[desire, ]] is marked by the [[search ]] for [[particular ]] [[meanings]].
Sexuality is a consequence of the [[necessity ]] of representing biological [[needs ]] in signifying systems.
The [[constitution ]] of the subject as a sexual and [[desiring ]] being at the same time produces subjects as sexually differentiated, i.e., as [[active ]] and therefore masculine or [[passive ]] and thus feminine.
By meas of oedipalization, the child of either sex is separated from its first love object, the mother, and positioned within the larger social and symbolic [[environment ]] of its culture.
It is by means of the contorl or the repression of sexual drives that the unconscious is formed.
the unconscious is the residue of [[repressed ]] and renounced [[pre-oedipal ]] drives.
[[Lacan]] focuses on the [[male]] [[ideal]] of One-ness or union with his sexual partner.
[[Lacan]] asserts that [[woman]] is ''[[not-all]]'' (which he represents pseudo-algebraically as ExOP - to be read as "not all subjects are phallic,' or its [[logical ]] equivalent, 'there is a subject who is not phallic.')
This definition is a device for revealing the masculine [[myths ]] and phantasies invested in representing [[woman]] as ''all''.
She is defined as ''not-a'' partly through a [[reversal ]] of her [[myth]]ical status for the [[man]], especially the [[myth]] of [[unity]] that posits [[love]] as a form of self-[[completion]].
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