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New page: Imaginary The imaginary in Lacan's theory immediately invokes a set of characteristic terms, most of which are already present in his article on the mirror stage (1949). This set comprises...
Imaginary
The imaginary in Lacan's theory immediately invokes a set of characteristic
terms, most of which are already present in his article on
the mirror stage (1949).
This set comprises the notions of Gestalt (ideal), ego and identification,
lure and méconnaissance, reciprocity, counterpart, object,
(paranoiac) knowledge and aggressivity. Of the three registers (or
orders) of the subject, the imaginary is the first to enter on stage
both in Lacan's writings and teachings. It dominates his thinking
until the mid-1950s.
The imaginary as such is not a Freudian concept, although Lacan
cautions us not to think that the function of the imaginary is
absent in Freud's texts. In his elaboration of the imaginary, Lacan
makes use of at least three major references, namely the notion of
Gestalt, animal ethology and Freud's early theory on narcissism.
For Lacan, the function of the Gestalt in animal behaviour,
which presents itself par excellence in the behaviour of the animal
couple, allows a much clearer structuring of the function of the
imaginary in man than was possible for Freud. To illustrate this
function of the imaginary in animal behaviour, Lacan takes the
example of the stickleback (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 137). Gestalten
come into play in releasing the complementary sexual behaviour of
the male and the female stickleback; the male or the female is captivated by a Gestalt. Typical for animal behaviour is that the animal subject is completely identical to the image governing the release of a specific motor behaviour. Man's relation to the unitary image (Gestalt) is fundamentally different. This is linked to the fact that man comes into the world in a structurally premature state, which
is mastered at an early stage — the mirror stage — by means of the
identification with the unitary image of the body.
The mirror stage constitutes a first structuring moment for the
human subject. It also functions as the prime reference in distinguishing between the imaginary relation in animal and in man. 'In
man, the imaginary is reduced, specialized, centred on the specular
image' (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 282).
The assumption of the unitary image of the body, meaning that
the human subject recognizes the specular image as being its own,
presents the anticipation of real mastery. Both anticipation and
recognition are crucial in man's relation to the specular image.
Combined, they typify the imaginary as illusory and alienating -
one recognizes and assumes an attainable totality. It is important to
add that this recognition of the specular image is a function of
something outside the imaginary relation, namely the symbolic.
Lacan accentuates the difference between animal and man in
still another way:
For the animal there is a limited number of pre-established correspondences
between its imaginary structure and whatever
interests it in its Umwelt ... In man, by contrast, the reflection in
the mirror indicates an original noetic possibility, and introduces
a second narcissism. Its fundamental pattern is immediately the
relation to the other. (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 125)
This takes us back to the Freudian reference of narcissism, including
both the formation of the ego and the object. In Lacan's view, the
specular image as a total unity functions as a primordial form of the
ego, which 'simply because it is an image ... is ideal ego' (Seminar
I, 1953-54, p. 282).
At this point, Lacan also refers to the notion of specular Urbild.
Conceived as such, the ego is constituted by an alienating identification
with a Gestalt - of the body or the other - functioning as an
ideal image. The ego is an imaginary function serving (imaginary)
mastery. In linking the constitution of the ego to the relation to the
other, the ego is defined as the identification with the other. This
has a certain implication for the relation to the object:
... [man] only perceives the unity of this specific image [of the
body] from the outside, and in an anticipated manner. Because
of this double relation which he has with himself, all the objects
of his world are always structured around the wandering shadow
of his own ego. (Seminar II, 1954-55, p. 166)
Hence, the specular image (of the other) is both the framework of
the ego and the object.
Imaginary 89
Lacan's further development of the dialectics between ego, other
and object as being a function of rivalry and competition is clearly
influenced by Hegel. Here the (Hegelian) notion of desire comes
into play. Since the ego is constituted in reference to the other,
whatever the ego is oriented towards will depend on what this
other is oriented towards. 'An apprehended, desired object, it's
either he or I who will get it, it has to be one or the other. And
when the other gets it, it's because it belongs to me' (Seminar II,
1954-55, p. 51). All this implies that the object of man's desire is
essentially an object desired by someone else.
Thus far, it has become apparent that the imaginary relation is
always a (specular) relation between similar or equal others. This
means that in a certain sense the notion of 'sameness' is central.
This is also invoked in the characterization of the imaginary in
terms of reciprocity, and symmetrical and interchangeable positions.
Lacan illustrates this by means of what he calls the
phenomenon of transitivism, in which the infant takes as equivalent
his own action and that of the other. For instance, an infant
saying 'Paul hit me', whereas it was he who hit Paul. In discussing
transitivism, Lacan refers to the well-known 1927 study by
Charlotte Bühler.
With all this, the coordinates of the relation between the imaginary
and aggressivity are given. Aggressivity always refers to the
imaginary register. In his 1948 article on aggressivity, Lacan posits
that aggressivity is the 'correlative tendency of a mode of identification
that we call narcissistic' (Écrits, 1977, p. 16), thus linking
aggressivity to the imaginary relation. This link can be interpreted
in two ways.
First, the constitution of the ego implies a certain satisfaction as
compensation for the original organic disarray of the human
subject. However, the tension implied in the relation between the
initial fragmentation (original disarray) and the unifying image also
becomes a source of aggressivity in the sense that the image that
shapes the subject also structures the subject as rival for himself.
Furthermore, since the narcissistic identification mediates the imaginary
relation, rivalry is at the core of the imaginary relation to the
other as well. Thus, aggressivity is always present in the relation to
the similar other, which is perceived as ideal. The other is always one
step ahead of the subject, and is thus seen as a rival. At this point we
90 A Compendium of Lacanian Terms
can more clearly refer to animal ethology to render the functioning
of aggressivity, as essentially different from aggression. The function
of the imaginary in animals makes it possible that a struggle
between two males, that is, between two rivals, is not turned into a
real struggle which would lead to the destruction of one of the
animals. By transposing the conflict on to the imaginary plane, real
destruction is prevented. Here it becomes clear that aggressivity has
nothing to do with aggression. 'At the limit, virtually, aggressivity
turns into aggression ... aggression is an existential act linked to an
imaginary relation' (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 177).
Second, aggressivity emerges in the situation of the ego encountering
another subject like itself, giving rise to a desire for the object
of this other's desire. Here also, the potential struggle is a function
of something the other has, namely the object of his desire. Thus,
aggressivity is linked to the object which is always the object of a
counterpart, and therefore in the logic of the imaginary, an object
that belongs to the ego. According to Lacan, the human object
differs fundamentally from the object of the animal in that it is
'originally mediated through rivalry, through the exacerbation of
the relation to the rival ... man's desire is the desire of the other'
(Seminar I, 1953-54, pp. 176-7). Hence, aggressivity, rivalry and
desire are closely linked within the frame of the imaginary relation.
The imaginary is also linked by Lacan to knowledge (connaissance).
This link, which is a function of Lacan's critique of the
Cartesian cogito, is centred on the ego's relation to reality and is
typified by Lacan as miscognition (méconnaissance) and as being
paranoiac in nature.
Although based on the recognition of the specular image, the
ego can be conceived as 'a capacity to fail to recognize (méconnaissance)'
(Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 153). Indeed, one of the
fundamental characteristics of the specular image is that the reflection
in the mirror is an inversion of what stands before the mirror.
This implies that there is a primitive distortion and thus miscognition
in the ego's experience of reality. Another way to understand
this miscognition, is to link it to the alienating nature of the ego.
In identifying with the image of the other, the subject inevitably
fails to recognize many things about itself. In the same sense, all
knowledge deriving from the imaginary relation — the ego's relation
to the world of objects and similar others — is a function of miscog-
J
Imaginary 91
nition, since this very relation is based on the ego's miscognition of
its own alienating nature.
In his article on the mirror stage, Lacan speaks of human knowledge
as paranoiac in nature. The term 'paranoiac knowledge' refers
to what is found in paranoia (e.g., in the external persecution and
observation) and which is also detectable in the imaginary relation,
especially in the phenomenon of transitivism. It concerns the
captivation by the image of the other — one recognizes the image of
the other as one's own — and thus again reinforces the imaginary
alienation of the ego.
During the period 1953 to 1974, the imaginary maintained
importance, especially in relation to the signified and its effect; see
for example, 'The function and field of speech and language in
psychoanalysis' (1953); 'On a question preliminary to any possible
treatment of psychosis' (1955-56); 'The agency of the letter in the
unconscious or reason since Freud' (1957); 'The direction of the
treatment and the principles of its power' (1958). All are published
in the English translation of Écrits (1977) and The Four Fundamental
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (1978).
However, from the late 1950s onwards the ideas of the symbolic
relation or the radical Other and the subject as subject of the signifier
occupy a more central position. This does not mean that Lacan
suddenly ceases to acknowledge the importance of the imaginary,
or that the imaginary is depreciated or pushed aside. This should be
stressed, since the imaginary is often regarded in a pejorative way
for being pure 'illusion'. Although the imaginary is indeed essentially
linked to miscognition, to mirage and thus also to 'false
reality', it is nonetheless a 'verified reality' (Seminar II, 1954-55, p.
244), mediating man's relation to similar others and to the objects
of his desire.
One thing is certain: without the imaginary there can be no
human reality as such. Moreover, the imaginary is the only 'consistency'
man has. This is developed by Lacan in one of his later
seminars, on R.S.I. (1974-75). As far as the imaginary is concerned,
Lacan here refers to his earliest formulations on the subject, by
defining it as essentially departing from the body as a reflection of
the organism. This seminar also illustrates that Lacan's conception
of the imaginary does not fundamentally alter over the years. In
this sense, it indeed functions as a consistency.
92 A Compendium of Lacanian Terms
The function of the imaginary is always related to the other two
registers used by Lacan, namely, the symbolic and the real.
See also: aggressivity, desire, ideal ego, mirror stage, real, symbolic
Other terms: ego, identification
References
Lacan, J. (1975-76) [1974-75] `Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, Book
XXII: Réel, symbolique, imaginaire (Real, symbolic, imaginary)'.
In Ornicar? (2, 3, 4) 1975, (5) 1975-76.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1948] 'Aggressivity in psychoanalysis'. In Écrits: A
Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1949] `The mirror stage as formative of the
function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience' in
Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1953] `The function and field of speech and
language in psychoanalyis'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A.
Sheridan). London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1957] 'On a question preliminary to any possible
treatment of psychosis'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan).
London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1957] `The agency of the letter in the unconscious
or reason since Freud'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan).
London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1958] `The direction of the treatment and the
principles of its power'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan).
London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1978) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis
(trans. Alan Sheridan). New York: W.W. Norton.
Lacan, J. (1988) [1975] The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I. Freud's
Papers on Technique I953-I954. (ed. J. A. Miller; trans. J.
Forrester). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lacan, J. (1988) [1978] The Seminar o fJacques Lacan. Book II. The Ego
in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis.
I954-I955. (ed. J. A. Miller; trans. S. Tomaselli). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Katrien Libbrecht
The imaginary in Lacan's theory immediately invokes a set of characteristic
terms, most of which are already present in his article on
the mirror stage (1949).
This set comprises the notions of Gestalt (ideal), ego and identification,
lure and méconnaissance, reciprocity, counterpart, object,
(paranoiac) knowledge and aggressivity. Of the three registers (or
orders) of the subject, the imaginary is the first to enter on stage
both in Lacan's writings and teachings. It dominates his thinking
until the mid-1950s.
The imaginary as such is not a Freudian concept, although Lacan
cautions us not to think that the function of the imaginary is
absent in Freud's texts. In his elaboration of the imaginary, Lacan
makes use of at least three major references, namely the notion of
Gestalt, animal ethology and Freud's early theory on narcissism.
For Lacan, the function of the Gestalt in animal behaviour,
which presents itself par excellence in the behaviour of the animal
couple, allows a much clearer structuring of the function of the
imaginary in man than was possible for Freud. To illustrate this
function of the imaginary in animal behaviour, Lacan takes the
example of the stickleback (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 137). Gestalten
come into play in releasing the complementary sexual behaviour of
the male and the female stickleback; the male or the female is captivated by a Gestalt. Typical for animal behaviour is that the animal subject is completely identical to the image governing the release of a specific motor behaviour. Man's relation to the unitary image (Gestalt) is fundamentally different. This is linked to the fact that man comes into the world in a structurally premature state, which
is mastered at an early stage — the mirror stage — by means of the
identification with the unitary image of the body.
The mirror stage constitutes a first structuring moment for the
human subject. It also functions as the prime reference in distinguishing between the imaginary relation in animal and in man. 'In
man, the imaginary is reduced, specialized, centred on the specular
image' (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 282).
The assumption of the unitary image of the body, meaning that
the human subject recognizes the specular image as being its own,
presents the anticipation of real mastery. Both anticipation and
recognition are crucial in man's relation to the specular image.
Combined, they typify the imaginary as illusory and alienating -
one recognizes and assumes an attainable totality. It is important to
add that this recognition of the specular image is a function of
something outside the imaginary relation, namely the symbolic.
Lacan accentuates the difference between animal and man in
still another way:
For the animal there is a limited number of pre-established correspondences
between its imaginary structure and whatever
interests it in its Umwelt ... In man, by contrast, the reflection in
the mirror indicates an original noetic possibility, and introduces
a second narcissism. Its fundamental pattern is immediately the
relation to the other. (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 125)
This takes us back to the Freudian reference of narcissism, including
both the formation of the ego and the object. In Lacan's view, the
specular image as a total unity functions as a primordial form of the
ego, which 'simply because it is an image ... is ideal ego' (Seminar
I, 1953-54, p. 282).
At this point, Lacan also refers to the notion of specular Urbild.
Conceived as such, the ego is constituted by an alienating identification
with a Gestalt - of the body or the other - functioning as an
ideal image. The ego is an imaginary function serving (imaginary)
mastery. In linking the constitution of the ego to the relation to the
other, the ego is defined as the identification with the other. This
has a certain implication for the relation to the object:
... [man] only perceives the unity of this specific image [of the
body] from the outside, and in an anticipated manner. Because
of this double relation which he has with himself, all the objects
of his world are always structured around the wandering shadow
of his own ego. (Seminar II, 1954-55, p. 166)
Hence, the specular image (of the other) is both the framework of
the ego and the object.
Imaginary 89
Lacan's further development of the dialectics between ego, other
and object as being a function of rivalry and competition is clearly
influenced by Hegel. Here the (Hegelian) notion of desire comes
into play. Since the ego is constituted in reference to the other,
whatever the ego is oriented towards will depend on what this
other is oriented towards. 'An apprehended, desired object, it's
either he or I who will get it, it has to be one or the other. And
when the other gets it, it's because it belongs to me' (Seminar II,
1954-55, p. 51). All this implies that the object of man's desire is
essentially an object desired by someone else.
Thus far, it has become apparent that the imaginary relation is
always a (specular) relation between similar or equal others. This
means that in a certain sense the notion of 'sameness' is central.
This is also invoked in the characterization of the imaginary in
terms of reciprocity, and symmetrical and interchangeable positions.
Lacan illustrates this by means of what he calls the
phenomenon of transitivism, in which the infant takes as equivalent
his own action and that of the other. For instance, an infant
saying 'Paul hit me', whereas it was he who hit Paul. In discussing
transitivism, Lacan refers to the well-known 1927 study by
Charlotte Bühler.
With all this, the coordinates of the relation between the imaginary
and aggressivity are given. Aggressivity always refers to the
imaginary register. In his 1948 article on aggressivity, Lacan posits
that aggressivity is the 'correlative tendency of a mode of identification
that we call narcissistic' (Écrits, 1977, p. 16), thus linking
aggressivity to the imaginary relation. This link can be interpreted
in two ways.
First, the constitution of the ego implies a certain satisfaction as
compensation for the original organic disarray of the human
subject. However, the tension implied in the relation between the
initial fragmentation (original disarray) and the unifying image also
becomes a source of aggressivity in the sense that the image that
shapes the subject also structures the subject as rival for himself.
Furthermore, since the narcissistic identification mediates the imaginary
relation, rivalry is at the core of the imaginary relation to the
other as well. Thus, aggressivity is always present in the relation to
the similar other, which is perceived as ideal. The other is always one
step ahead of the subject, and is thus seen as a rival. At this point we
90 A Compendium of Lacanian Terms
can more clearly refer to animal ethology to render the functioning
of aggressivity, as essentially different from aggression. The function
of the imaginary in animals makes it possible that a struggle
between two males, that is, between two rivals, is not turned into a
real struggle which would lead to the destruction of one of the
animals. By transposing the conflict on to the imaginary plane, real
destruction is prevented. Here it becomes clear that aggressivity has
nothing to do with aggression. 'At the limit, virtually, aggressivity
turns into aggression ... aggression is an existential act linked to an
imaginary relation' (Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 177).
Second, aggressivity emerges in the situation of the ego encountering
another subject like itself, giving rise to a desire for the object
of this other's desire. Here also, the potential struggle is a function
of something the other has, namely the object of his desire. Thus,
aggressivity is linked to the object which is always the object of a
counterpart, and therefore in the logic of the imaginary, an object
that belongs to the ego. According to Lacan, the human object
differs fundamentally from the object of the animal in that it is
'originally mediated through rivalry, through the exacerbation of
the relation to the rival ... man's desire is the desire of the other'
(Seminar I, 1953-54, pp. 176-7). Hence, aggressivity, rivalry and
desire are closely linked within the frame of the imaginary relation.
The imaginary is also linked by Lacan to knowledge (connaissance).
This link, which is a function of Lacan's critique of the
Cartesian cogito, is centred on the ego's relation to reality and is
typified by Lacan as miscognition (méconnaissance) and as being
paranoiac in nature.
Although based on the recognition of the specular image, the
ego can be conceived as 'a capacity to fail to recognize (méconnaissance)'
(Seminar I, 1953-54, p. 153). Indeed, one of the
fundamental characteristics of the specular image is that the reflection
in the mirror is an inversion of what stands before the mirror.
This implies that there is a primitive distortion and thus miscognition
in the ego's experience of reality. Another way to understand
this miscognition, is to link it to the alienating nature of the ego.
In identifying with the image of the other, the subject inevitably
fails to recognize many things about itself. In the same sense, all
knowledge deriving from the imaginary relation — the ego's relation
to the world of objects and similar others — is a function of miscog-
J
Imaginary 91
nition, since this very relation is based on the ego's miscognition of
its own alienating nature.
In his article on the mirror stage, Lacan speaks of human knowledge
as paranoiac in nature. The term 'paranoiac knowledge' refers
to what is found in paranoia (e.g., in the external persecution and
observation) and which is also detectable in the imaginary relation,
especially in the phenomenon of transitivism. It concerns the
captivation by the image of the other — one recognizes the image of
the other as one's own — and thus again reinforces the imaginary
alienation of the ego.
During the period 1953 to 1974, the imaginary maintained
importance, especially in relation to the signified and its effect; see
for example, 'The function and field of speech and language in
psychoanalysis' (1953); 'On a question preliminary to any possible
treatment of psychosis' (1955-56); 'The agency of the letter in the
unconscious or reason since Freud' (1957); 'The direction of the
treatment and the principles of its power' (1958). All are published
in the English translation of Écrits (1977) and The Four Fundamental
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (1978).
However, from the late 1950s onwards the ideas of the symbolic
relation or the radical Other and the subject as subject of the signifier
occupy a more central position. This does not mean that Lacan
suddenly ceases to acknowledge the importance of the imaginary,
or that the imaginary is depreciated or pushed aside. This should be
stressed, since the imaginary is often regarded in a pejorative way
for being pure 'illusion'. Although the imaginary is indeed essentially
linked to miscognition, to mirage and thus also to 'false
reality', it is nonetheless a 'verified reality' (Seminar II, 1954-55, p.
244), mediating man's relation to similar others and to the objects
of his desire.
One thing is certain: without the imaginary there can be no
human reality as such. Moreover, the imaginary is the only 'consistency'
man has. This is developed by Lacan in one of his later
seminars, on R.S.I. (1974-75). As far as the imaginary is concerned,
Lacan here refers to his earliest formulations on the subject, by
defining it as essentially departing from the body as a reflection of
the organism. This seminar also illustrates that Lacan's conception
of the imaginary does not fundamentally alter over the years. In
this sense, it indeed functions as a consistency.
92 A Compendium of Lacanian Terms
The function of the imaginary is always related to the other two
registers used by Lacan, namely, the symbolic and the real.
See also: aggressivity, desire, ideal ego, mirror stage, real, symbolic
Other terms: ego, identification
References
Lacan, J. (1975-76) [1974-75] `Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan, Book
XXII: Réel, symbolique, imaginaire (Real, symbolic, imaginary)'.
In Ornicar? (2, 3, 4) 1975, (5) 1975-76.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1948] 'Aggressivity in psychoanalysis'. In Écrits: A
Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1949] `The mirror stage as formative of the
function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience' in
Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan). London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1953] `The function and field of speech and
language in psychoanalyis'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A.
Sheridan). London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1957] 'On a question preliminary to any possible
treatment of psychosis'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan).
London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1957] `The agency of the letter in the unconscious
or reason since Freud'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan).
London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1977) [1958] `The direction of the treatment and the
principles of its power'. In Écrits: A Selection (trans. A. Sheridan).
London: Tavistock.
Lacan, J. (1978) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis
(trans. Alan Sheridan). New York: W.W. Norton.
Lacan, J. (1988) [1975] The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I. Freud's
Papers on Technique I953-I954. (ed. J. A. Miller; trans. J.
Forrester). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lacan, J. (1988) [1978] The Seminar o fJacques Lacan. Book II. The Ego
in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis.
I954-I955. (ed. J. A. Miller; trans. S. Tomaselli). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Katrien Libbrecht
