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HoweverThe anxious expectation that [[nothing]] will happen, the ultimate argument against "big" political interventions which aim at a global transformation is, of course, the terrifying experience of the catastrophes of the XXth century, catastrophes which unleashed unheard-of modes of violence. There are three main versions of theorizing these catastrophes: (1) the one epitomized by the name of that [[Habermascapitalism]]: will go on indefinitely, the desperate [[Enlightenmentdemand]] to do something, to revolutionize capitalism, is in itself a positive emancipatory process with no inherent "fake. The will to revolutionary [[totalitarianchange]]" potentialsemerges as an urge, these catastrophies are merely as an indicator that "[[I cannot do it remained an unfinished projectotherwise]], so our task should be " or it is worthless. With [[regard]] to bring this project to completion; (2) the one associated with [[AdornoBernard Williams]]'s [[distinction]] between Ought and Must, an authentic [[Horkheimerrevolution]]'s is by definition performed as a Must - it is not something we "ought to do"as an [[dialectic of Enlightenmentideal]]we are striving for," as well asbut something we cannot but to, since we cannot do it otherwise. Which is why today, with 's worry of the [[AgambenLeft]]: the "totalitarian" potentials of the Enlightenment are inherent and crucialists that revolution will not occur, the "that [[administered worldglobal]]" capitalism will just go on indefinitely, is the truth of Enlightenment, the XXth century concentration camps and genocides are a kind of negative-teleological endpoint of the entire history of the West; (3) the third one, developed, among others, in the works of [[Etienne Balibarfalse]]: modernity opens up insofar as it turns revolution into a field of new [[freedommoral obligation]]s, but at into something we ought to do while we fight the same time inertia of new dangers, and there is no ultimate the [[capitalist]] [[teleology|teleologicalpresent]] guarantee of the outcome, the battle is open, undecided.

The starting point of Balibar's remarkable entry on However, the ultimate argument against "Violencebig"<ref>Etienne Balibar[[political]] [[intervention]]s which aim at a global transformation is, "Gewaltof course," in <i>Historisch-Kritisches Wüsrterbuch des Marxismus</i>, forthcoming </ref> is the insufficiency terrifying [[experience]] of the catastrophes of the standard XXth century, catastrophes which unleashed unheard-of modes of [[Hegelviolence]]ian-. There are [[Marxthree]]ist notion main versions of theorizing these catastrophes: (1) the one epitomized by the name of [[Habermas]]: [[Enlightenment]] is in itself a positive emancipatory [[process]] with no inherent "converting[[totalitarian]]" violence into potentials, these catastrophies are merely an indicator that it remained an instrument unfinished [[project]], so our task should be to bring this project to completion; (2) the one associated with [[Adorno]]'s and [[Horkheimer]]'s "[[dialectic of historical ReasonEnlightenment]]," as well as, today, a force which begets a new social formationwith [[Agamben]]: the "irrational[[totalitarianism|totalitarian]]" brutality potentials of violence is thus <i>aufgehoben</i>the [[Enlightenment]] are inherent and crucial, the "sublated[[administered world]]" in is the strict Hegelian sense[[truth]] of Enlightenment, reduced to a particular stain that contributes to the overall harmony of the historical progress. The XXth century confronted us with catastrophies, some [[concentration camp]]s and [[genocide]]s are a kind of [[negation|negative]]-[[teleology|teleological]] endpoint of them directed against Marxist political forces and some the entire [[history]] of them generated by the Marxist political engagement itselfWest; (3) the [[third]] one, developed, among [[others]], which cannot be "rationalized" in this way: their instrumentalization into the tools works of the Cunning [[Etienne Balibar]]: [[modernity]] opens up a field of Reason is not only ethically inacceptablenew [[freedom]]s, but also theoretically wrong, ideological in at the strongest sense same [[time]] of the term. In his close reading of Marxnew dangers, Balibar nonetheless discerns in his texts an oscillation between this and there is no ultimate [[teleology|teleological "conversion"-theory ]] [[guarantee]] of violence and a much more interesting <b>notion of history as an open-undecided process of antagonistic struggles whose final "positive" the outcome , the battle is not guaranteed by any encompassing historical Necessity</b> (the future society will be communism or barbarismopen, etc.)undecided.

The starting point of Balibar's remarkable entry on "[[Violence]]"<ref>Etienne Balibar thinks that, for necessary structural reasons"Gewalt," in <i>Historisch-Kritisches Wüsrterbuch des Marxismus</i>, Marxism forthcoming </ref> is unable to think the excess insufficiency of violence that cannot be integrated into the narrative of historical Progress standard [[Hegel]]ian- more specifically, that it cannot provide an adequate theory of [[FascismMarx]] and ist [[Stalinismnotion]] and their of "extremeconverting" outcomes, violence into an [[shoahinstrument]] and of [[gulaghistorical Reason]]. Our task is therefore double: to deploy , a theory of historical violence as something force which cannot be mastered/instrumentalized by any political agent, which threatens to engulf this agent itself into begets a self-destructive vicious cycle, and - the other side of new [[social]] [[formation]]: the same task - to pose the question "civilizing[[irrationality|irrational]]" brutality of violence is thus <i>[[revolutionaufgehoben]]</i>, of how to make the revolutionary process itself a "civilizing[[sublimation|sublated]]" force. Recall in the infamous St Bartholomew's Day Massacre - what went wrong there? Catherine de Medici's goal was limited and precise: hers was a Macchiavellian plot strict [[Hegelian]] [[sense]], reduced to have Admiral de Coligny, a powerful Protestant pushing for war with Spain in the Netherlands, assassinated, and let the blame fall on the Guise family, the over-mighty Catholic family. In this way, Catherine hoped particular stain that the final outcome will be the fall of both houses that posed a menace contributes to the unity overall [[harmony]] of the French statehistorical [[progress]]. But this ingenious plan to play off her enemies against each other degenerated into an uncontrolled frenzy The XXth century confronted us with catastrophies, some of blood: in her ruthless pragmatism, Catherine was blind for the passion with which men clung to their beliefs.[[Hannah Arendtthem]]'s insights are also crucial heredirected against [[:Category: she emphasized the distinction between Marxist theory|Marxist]] political power forces and the mere exercise some of (social) violence: organizations run them generated by direct non-the [[Marxist]] political authority - by an order of command that is not politically grounded authority (Armyengagement itself, Church, school) - represent examples of violence (Gewalt), not of political Power which cannot be "rationalized" in the strict sense of the term. Here, however, it would be productive to introduce the distinction between the public symbolic Law and its obscene supplementthis way: their instrumentalization into the notion tools of the obscene superego double-supplement [[Cunning of Power implies that there Reason]] is no Power without violence. Power always has to rely on an obscene stain of violencenot only ethically inacceptable, political space is never "pure" but always involves some kind of reliance on "pre-political" violence. Of coursealso theoretically wrong, [[ideological]] in the relationship between political power and pre-political violence is one strongest sense of mutual implication: not only is violence the necessary supplement term. In his close [[reading]] of powerMarx, (political) power itself is always-already at the roots of every apparently Balibar nonetheless discerns in his [[texts]] an oscillation between this teleological "conversion"non-political" relationship [[theory]] of violence. The accepted violence and direct relationship a much more interesting <b>notion of subordination in the Army, Church, family and other "nonhistory as an open-politicalundecided process of antagonistic struggles whose final " social forms is in itself the positive"reification" of a certain ethico-political struggle and decision - what a critical analysis should do outcome is to discern not guaranteed by any encompassing [[historical Necessity]]</b> (the hidden political process that sustains all these "non-" [[future]] society will be [[communism]] or "pre-political" relationshipsbarbarism, etc. In human society, the political is the encompassing structuring principle, so that every neutralization of some partial content as "non-political" is a political gesture par excellence).

This acceptance of violenceBalibar thinks that, this "political suspension of the ethicalfor necessary [[structural]] reasons," [[Marxism]] is unable to [[think]] the limit [[excess]] of violence that which even cannot be integrated into the most [[narrative]] of [[historical Progress]] - more specifically, that it cannot provide an adequate theory of [[Fascism]] and [[Stalinism]] and their "tolerantextreme" liberal stance outcomes, [[shoah]] and [[gulag]]. Our task is unable therefore [[double]]: to deploy a theory of historical violence as something which cannot be mastered/instrumentalized by any [[political agent]], which threatens to trespass engulf this [[agent]] itself into a [[self]]-destructive [[vicious cycle]], and - witness the uneasiness [[other]] side of the same task - to pose the question "radicalcivilizing" post-colonialist Afro-American studies apropos of [[Frantz Fanonrevolution]]'s fundamental insight into the unavoidability , of violence in how to make the revolutionary process of effective decolonizationitself a "civilizing" force. One should recall here [[Fredric JamesoRecall]]nthe infamous [[St Bartholomew's idea that violence plays in Day Massacre]] - what went wrong there? [[Catherine de Medici]]'s [[goal]] was limited and precise: hers was a [[Macchiavelli]]an plot to have [[Admiral de Coligny]], a revolutionary process the same role as worldly wealth powerful [[Protestantism|Protestism]] pushing for [[war]] with [[Spain]] in the Calvinist logic of [[predestinationNetherlands]]: although it has no intrinsic value, it is a sign of assassinated, and let the authenticity of blame fall on the revolutionary processGuise family, of the fact that this process is effectively disturbing the existing power relationsover-mighty [[Catholicism|Catholic]] [[family]]. In other wordsthis way, Catherine hoped that the dream of final outcome will be the revolution without violence is precisely the dream fall of both houses that posed a "revolution without revolution"(Robespierre). On menace to the other hand, the role [[unity]] of the Fascist spectacle [[French]] [[state]]. But this ingenious plan to play off her enemies against each other degenerated into an uncontrolled [[frenzy]] of violence is exactly oppositeblood: it is a violence whose aim is in her ruthless [[pragmatism]], Catherine was blind for the [[passion]] with which men clung to PREVENT the true change - something spectacular should happen all the time so that, precisely, nothing would really happentheir beliefs.

But, again, [[Hannah Arendt]]'s insights are also crucial here: she emphasized the ultimate argument against this perspective is distinction between political [[power]] and the simple encounter mere exercise of excessive suffering generated (social) violence: organizations run by direct non-political [[authority]] - by an [[order]] of command that is not politically grounded authority ([[Army]], [[Church]], [[school]]) - [[represent]] examples of [[violence. Sometimes]] ([[Gewalt]]), one cannot but be shocked by the excessive indifference towards suffering, even and especially when this suffering is widely reported not of political Power in the media and condemned, as if it is strict sense of the very outrage at suffering which turns us into its immobilized fascinated spectatorsterm. Recall Here, in the early 1990showever, it would be productive to introduce the three-years-long siege of Sarajevo, with distinction between the population starving, exposed to permanent shelling [[public]] [[symbolic]] [[Law]] and snipers' fire. The big enigma here isits [[obscene supplement]]: although all the media were full notion of pictures and reports, why did not the UN forces, NATO or the US accomplish just a small act [[obscene]] [[superego]] double-[[supplement]] of breaking the siege [[Power]] implies that there is no Power without violence. Power always has to rely on an obscene [[stain]] of Sarajevoviolence, political [[space]] is never "pure" but always involves some kind of imposing a corridor through which people and provisions could circulate freely? It would have cost nothing: with a little bit of serious pressure reliance on the Serb forces"[[pre-political]]" violence. Of course, the prolonged spectacle of encircled Sarajevo exposed to ridiculous terror would have been over. There [[relationship]] between political power and pre-political violence is only one answer to this enigma, the one proposed by Rony Brauman himself who, on behalf of the Red Cross, coordinated the help to Sarajevomutual implication: not only is violence the very presentation necessary supplement of power, (political) power itself is always-already at the crisis roots of Sarajevo as every apparently "non-political"humanitarianrelationship of violence. The accepted violence and direct relationship of subordination in the Army,Church, family and other "non-political" social forms is in itself the very recasting "[[reification]]" of the a certain ethico-political[[struggle]] and decision -military conflict into what a [[critical analysis]] should do is to discern the humanitarian terms, was sustained by an eminently hidden political choice, process that of, basicallysustains all these "non-" or "pre-political" relationships. In [[human]] [[society]], taking the Serb side in political is the conflict. Especially ominous and manipulative was here the role encompassing [[structuring]] [[principle]], so that every neutralization of Mitterandsome [[partial]] [[content]] as "non-political" is a political gesture par excellence.

The celebration This acceptance of violence, this "[[political suspension of the ethical]]," is the [[limit]] of that which even the most "tolerant" [[liberal]] stance is unable to trespass - [[witness]] the uneasiness of "radical" [[post-colonialism|post-colonialist]] Afro-American studies apropos of [[Frantz Fanon]]'humanitarian intervention' s fundamental insight into the unavoidability of violence in Yugoslavia took the place process of effective [[decolonization]]. One should recall here [[Fredric Jameson]]'s [[idea]] that violence plays in a political discourse, disqualifying in advance all conflicting debate. /.../ It was apparently not possible, for Francois Mitterand, to express his analysis of revolutionary process the war same [[role]] as worldly wealth in Yugoslavia. With the strictly humanitarian response, he discovered an unexpected source [[Calvinism|Calvinist]] [[logic]] of communication or[[predestination]]: although it has no intrinsic [[value]], more precisely, of cosmetics, which it is a little bit [[sign]] of the same thing. /.../ Mitterand remained in favor authenticity of the maintenance revolutionary process, of Yugoslavia within its borders and was persuaded the fact that only a strong Serbian this process is effectively disturbing the existing power was in the position to guarantee a certain stability in this explosive regionrelations. This position rapidly became unacceptable in In other [[words]], the eyes [[dream]] of the French peoplerevolution without violence is precisely the dream of a "[[revolution without revolution]]"([[Robespierre]]). All On the bustling activity and other hand, the humanitarian discourse permitted him to reaffirm role of the unfailing commitment [[Fascism|Fascist]] [[spectacle]] of France violence is exactly opposite: it is a violence whose aim is to PREVENT the Rights of Man in [[true]] change - something spectacular should happen all the endtime so that, and to mimic an opposition to Greater Serbian fascismprecisely, all in giving it free reinnothing would really happen. <ref> Rony Bauman, "From Philantropy to Humanitarianism," in <i>South Atlantic Quaterly</i> 2/3, Spring 2004</ref>

From But, again, the ultimate argument against this specific insightperspective is the simple [[encounter]] of excessive [[suffering]] generated by political violence. Sometimes, one should make cannot but be shocked by the move to excessive indifference towards suffering, even and especially when this suffering is widely reported in the general level [[media]] and render problematic condemned, as if it is the very depoliticized humanitarian politics outrage at suffering which turns us into its immobilized fascinated spectators. Recall, in the early 1990s, the three-years-long siege of "Human Rights" as Sarajevo, with the ideology of military interventionism serving specific economico-political purposespopulation starving, exposed to permanent shelling and snipers' fire. As The big enigma here is: although all the media were [[Wendy Brownfull]] develops apropos of pictures and reports, why did not the UN forces, [[Michael IgnatieffNATO]], such humanitarianism "presents itself as something of an antipolitics - a pure defense of or the innocent and the powerless against power, US accomplish just a pure defense small act of breaking the individual against immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries siege of culture, state, war, ethnic conflict, tribalism, patriarchySarajevo, of imposing a corridor through which [[people]] and other mobilizations or instantiations provisions could circulate freely? It would have cost nothing: with a little bit of collective power against individuals."<ref> Wendy Brownserious pressure on the Serb forces, "Human Rights as the Politics Ofprolonged spectacle of encircled Sarajevo exposed to ridiculous [[terror]] would have been over. Fatalism," in <i>South Atlantic Quaterly</i> 2/3, Spring 2004.</ref> However There is only one answer to this enigma, the question is: "what kind of politicization /those one proposed by Rony Brauman himself who intervene , on behalf of human rights/ set in motion against the powers they oppose. Do they stand for a different formulation Red Cross, coordinated the [[help]] to Sarajevo: the very presentation of justice or do they stand in opposition to collective justice projects?" <ref>Ibid</ref> Say, it is clear that the US overthrowing crisis of Saddam HusseinSarajevo as "[[humanitarianism|humanitarian]], legitimized in " the terms very recasting of ending the suffering of political-military [[conflict]] into the Iraqi peoplehumanitarian [[terms]], not only was motivated sustained by other politico-economic interests (oil)an eminently political [[choice]], but also relied on a determinate idea of the political and economic conditions that should open up the perspective of freedom to the Iraqi people (Western liberal democracy, guarantee of private propertybasically, taking the inclusion into Serb side in the global market economy, etcconflict.). The purely humanitarian anti-political politics of merely preventing suffering thus effectively amounts to Especially ominous and manipulative was here the implicit prohibition role of elaborating a positive collective project of socio-political transformation[[Mitterand]].

AndThe celebration of '[[humanitarian intervention]]' in [[Yugoslavia]] took the [[place]] of a political [[discourse]], disqualifying in advance all conflicting debate. /.../ It was apparently not possible, at for [[Francois Mitterand]], to express his [[analysis]] of the war in Yugoslavia. With the strictly humanitarian response, he discovered an even unexpected source of [[communication]] or, more general levelprecisely, one should problematize of cosmetics, which is a little bit the very opposition between same [[thing]]. /.../ Mitterand remained in favor of the universal (pre-political) Human Rights which belong to every human being "as such," maintenance of Yugoslavia within its borders and specific political rights of was persuaded that only a citizen, member of strong Serbian power was in the [[position]] to guarantee a particular political community; certain [[stability]] in this sense, Balibar argues for explosive region. This position rapidly became unacceptable in the "reversal eyes of the historical French people. All the bustling activity and theoretical relationship between 'man' the humanitarian discourse permitted him to reaffirm the unfailing commitment of [[France]] to the [[Rights of Man]] in the end, and 'citizen'" which proceeds by "explaining how man is made by citizenship and not citizenship by manto mimic an opposition to Greater Serbian fascism, all in giving it free rein."<ref> Etienne BalibarRony Bauman, "Is a Philosophy Of. Human Rights PossibleFrom Philantropy to Humanitarianism," in <i>South Atlantic Quaterly</i> 2/3, Spring 2004</ref> Balibar refers here to Hannah Arendt's insight apropos he XXth century phenomenon of refugees:<blockquote>The conception of human rights based upon the assumed existence of a human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships - except that they were still human.<ref>Hannah Arendt, <i>i.e. Origins Of. Totalitarianism</i>, New York: Meridian, 1958.</ref></blockquote>

This lineFrom this specific insight, of course, leads straight one should make the move to Agamben's notion the general level and render problematic the very depoliticized humanitarian [[politics]] of "[[homo sacerHuman Rights]] " as a human being reduced to the [[ideology]] of military interventionism serving specific economico-political purposes. As [[Wendy Brown]] develops apropos [[Michael Ignatieff]], such [[humanitarianism]] "bare life": in presents itself as something of an antipolitics - a properly Hegelian paradoxical pure [[dialecticdefense]]s of the innocent and the powerless against power, a pure defense of the [[universalindividual]] against immense and potentially cruel or despotic machineries of [[particularculture]], it is precisely when a human being is deprived of his particular socio-political identity which accounts for his determinate citizenshipstate, war, ethnic conflict, tribalism, that he[[patriarchy]], in one and other mobilizations or instantiations of collective power against individuals."<ref>Wendy Brown, "Human Rights as the same movePolitics Of. Fatalism, is no longer recognized and" in <i>South Atlantic Quaterly</i> 2/or treated as human3, Spring 2004. In short</ref> However, the paradox question is that one is deprived : "what kind of [[politicization]] /those who intervene on behalf of human rights precisely when one is effectively, / set in motion against the powers they oppose. Do they stand for a different formulation of justice or do they stand in one's social reality, reduced opposition to a human being collective justice projects?"in general<ref>Ibid</ref> Say," without citizenshipit is clear that the US overthrowing of [[Saddam Hussein]], professionlegitimized in the terms of ending the suffering of the Iraqi people, etc.not only was motivated by other politico-[[economic]] interests (oil), but also relied on a determinate idea of the political and economic [[conditions]] that is should open up the perspective of freedom to say, precisely when one effectively becomes the ideal BEARER of "universal human rights" Iraqi people (which belong to me "independently [[Western liberal democracy]], guarantee of" my profession[[private property]], sexthe inclusion into the [[global market economy]], citizenship, religion, ethnic identityetc.)..) The purely humanitarian anti-political politics of merely preventing suffering thus effectively amounts to the implicit [[prohibition]] of elaborating a positive collective project of socio-political transformation.

We thus arrived And, at a standard "postmodernan even more general level," "antione should problematize the very opposition between the universal (pre-essentialistpolitical) [[Human Rights]] which belong to every human [[being]] " positionas such, " and specific political rights of a kind [[citizen]], member of a particular political version [[community]]; in this sense, [[Balibar]] argues for the "[[reversal]] of the historical and [[Foucaulttheoretical]]relationship between 'man' and 'citizen's notion of sex as generated " which proceeds by a multitude of the practices of sexuality: "explaining how man," the bearer of Human Rights, is generated made by a set of political practices which materialize citizenship - is, however, this enough? Jacques Ranciereand not citizenship by man."<ref> Jacques RancièreEtienne Balibar, "Who is the Subject of Is a [[Philosophy]] Of. Human RightsPossible," in <i>South Atlantic Quaterly</i> 2/3, Spring 2004</ref> proposed a very elegant and precise solution of the antinomy between Human Rights (belonging to "man as such") and the politicization of citizens: while Human Rights cannot be posited as an unhistorical "essentialist" Beyond with regard to the contingent sphere of political struggles, as universal "natural rights of man" exempted from history, they also should not be dismissed as a reified fetish which is a product of concrete historical processes of the politicization of citizens. The gap between the universality of Human Rights and the political rights of citizens is thus not a gap between the universality of man and a specific political sphere; it, rather, "separates the whole of the community from itself," as Ranciere put it in a precise Hegelian way.<ref>Ibid.</ref> Far from being pre-political, "universal Human Rights" designate the precise space of politicization proper: what they amount to is the right to universality as such, the right of a political agent to assert its radical non-coincidence with itself (in its particular identity), i.e., to posit itself - precisely insofar as it is the "surnumerary" one, the "part with no part," the one without a proper place in the social edifice - as an agent of universality of the Social as such. The paradox is thus a very precise one, and symmetrical to the paradox of universal human rights as the rights of those reduced to inhumanity: at the very moment when we try to conceive political rights of citizens without the reference to universal "meta-political" Human Rights, we lose politics itself, i.e., we reduce politics to a "post-political" play of negotiation of particular interests. - What, then, happens to Human Rights when they are reduced to the rights of homo sacer, of those excluded from the political community, reduced to "bare life" - i.e., when they become of no use, since they are the rights of those who, precisely, have no rights, are treated as inhuman? Ranciere proposes Balibar refers here an extremely salient dialectical reversal /.../ when they are of no use, you do the same as charitable persons do with their old clothes. You give them to the poor. Those rights that appear to be useless in their place are sent abroad, along with medicine and clothes, to people deprived of medicine, clothes, and rights. It is in this way, as the result of this process, that the Rights of Man become the rights of those who have no rights, the rights of bare human beings subjected to inhuman repression and inhuman conditions [[Hannah Arendt]]'s insight apropos he XXth century phenomenon of existence. They become humanitarian rights, the rights of those who cannot enact them, the victims of the absolute denial of right. For all this, they are not void. Political names and political places never become merely void. The void is filled by somebody or something else. /.../ if those who suffer inhuman repression are unable to enact Human Rights that are their last recourse, then somebody else has to inherit their rights in order to enact them in their place. This is what is called the "right to humanitarian interference" - a right that some nations assume to the supposed benefit of victimized populations, and very often against the advice of the humanitarian organizations themselves. The "right to humanitarian interference" might be described as a sort of "return to sender"refugees: the disused rights that had been send to the rightless are sent back to the senders. <ref>Ibid.</ref>

So, to put it in the Leninist way: what today, in the predominant Western discourse, the "Human Rights <blockquote>The conception of human rights based upon the Third World suffering victims" effectively mean is the right assumed [[existence]] of the Western powers themselves to intervene - politically, economically, culturallya human being as such, militarily - in broke down at the Third World countries of their choice on behalf of the defense of Human Rights. The reference very [[moment]] when those who professed to Lacan's formula of communication (believe in which it were for the sender gets back from the receiver[[first time]] confronted with people who had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships -addressee his own message in its invertedexcept that they were still human.<ref>Hannah [[Arendt]], <i>i.e. true, form) is here up to the point: in the reigning discourse of humanitarian interventionism, the developed West is effectively getting back from the victimized Third World its own message in its true form. And the moment Human Rights are thus depoliticized, the discourse dealing with them has to change to ethics: reference to the pre-political opposition of Good and Evil has to be mobilized. Today's "new reign of Ethics," <ref>IbidOrigins Of.Totalitarianism</refi> clearly discernible in, sayNew York: Meridian, Michael Ignatieff's work, thus relies on a violent gesture of depoliticization, of denying to the victimized other political subjectivization1958. And, as Ranciere pointed out, liberal humanitarianism a la Ignatieff unexpectedly meets the "radical" position of Foucault or Agamben with regard to this depoliticization: the Foucauldian-Agambenian notion of "biopolitics" as the culmination of the entire Western thought ends up getting caught in a kind of "ontological trap" in which concentration camps appear as a kind of "ontological destiny: each of us would be in the situation of the refugee in a camp. Any difference grows faint between democracy and totalitarianism and any political practice proves to be already ensnared in the biopolitical trap."</ref>Ibid.</refblockquote>

WhenThis line, in a shift from Foucaultof course, leads straight to [[Agamben identifies sovereign power and biopolitics (in today]]'s generalized state of exception, the two overlap), he thus precludes the very possibility of the emergence of political subjectivity. - However, the rise of political subjectivity takes place against the background notion of [[homo sacer]] as a certain limit of the human being reduced to "inhuman,[[bare life]]" so that one should continue to endorse the paradox of the inhumanity : in a properly Hegelian paradoxical [[dialectic]]s of [[universal]] and [[particular]], it is precisely when a human being is deprived of his particular socio-political [[identity]] which accounts for his determinate citizenship, that he, in one and posit the "inhuman" pure man same move, is no longer recognized and/or treated as a necessary excess of humanity over itself, its "indivisible remainderhuman. In short," a kind of Kantian limit-concept of the phenomenal notion [[paradox]] is that one is deprived of humanity? So that[[human rights]] precisely when one is effectively, in exactly the same way in Kantone's philosophy the sublime Noumenalsocial [[reality]], when we come too close reduced to it, appears as pure horror, man a human being "as suchin general," deprived of all phenomenal qualificationswithout [[citizenship]], appears as an inhuman monsterprofession, something like Kafka's odradeketc. The problem with , that is to say, precisely when one effectively becomes the ideal BEARER of "universal human rights humanism is that it covers up this monstrosity " (which belong to me "independently of the "human as suchmy [[profession]], [[sex]], [[citizenship]], [[religion]]," presenting it as a sublime human essence[[ethnic identity]]...).

WhatWe thus arrived at a standard "[[postmodern]]," "[[anti-essentialist]]" position, a kind of political version of [[Foucault]]'s notion of sex as generated by a [[multitude]] of the practices of [[sexuality]]: "man, then" the bearer of Human Rights, is the way out generated by a set of political practices which materialize [[citizenship]] - is, however, this deadlockenough? Balibar ends with an ambiguous reference to Mahatma Gandhi. It [[Jacques Ranciere]]<ref> Jacques Rancière, "Who is true that Gandhi's formula the [[Subject]] of Human Rights,"Be yourself in <i>South Atlantic Quaterly</i> 2/3, Spring 2004</ref> proposed a very elegant and precise solution of the change you would like [[antinomy]] between Human Rights (belonging to see in the world" encapsulates perfectly man as such") and the basic attitude politicization of emancipatory changecitizens: do not wait for the while Human Rights cannot be posited as an unhistorical "objective processessentialist" Beyond with regard to generate the expected/desired change[[contingent]] sphere of political struggles, since if you just wait for itas universal "[[natural]] rights of man" exempted from history, it will never comethey also should not be dismissed as a reified [[fetish]] which is a product of [[concrete]] historical [[processes]] of the politicization of citizens. The gap between the [[universality]] of Human Rights and the political rights of citizens is thus not a gap between the universality of man and a specific political sphere; instead, throw YOURSELF into it, BE this changerather, take upon yourself "separates the risk [[whole]] of enacting the community from itself," as [[Ranciere]] put it directlyin a precise Hegelian way.<ref>Ibid. However</ref> Far from being pre-political, "universal Human Rights" designate the precise space of politicization proper: what they amount to is not the ultimate limitation [[right]] to universality as such, the right of Gandhi's strategy that a political agent to assert its radical non-coincidence with itself (in its particular identity), i.e., to posit itself - precisely insofar as it only works against is the "[[surnumerary]]" one, the "[[part with no part]]," the one without a liberal[[proper place]] in the [[social edifice]] -democratic regime which refers as an agent of universality of the Social as such. The paradox is thus a very precise one, and symmetrical to the paradox of universal human rights as the rights of those reduced to inhumanity: at the very moment when we try to conceive political rights of citizens without the reference to certain minimal ethicouniversal "[[meta-politics|meta-political standards]]" Human Rights, we lose politics itself, i.e., in whichwe reduce politics to a "post-political" play of negotiation of particular interests. - What, then, happens to Human Rights when they are reduced to put it in pathetic termsthe rights of homo sacer, of those in power still excluded from the political community, reduced to "bare [[life]]"- i.e., when they become of no use, since they are the rights of those who, precisely, have conscienceno rights, are treated as inhuman? Ranciere proposes here an extremely salient [[dialectical]] reversal /.../ when they are of no use, you do the same as charitable persons do with their old clothes. You give them to the poor." Recall Gandhi's reply Those rights that appear to be useless in their place are sent abroad, along with [[medicine]] and clothes, to people deprived of medicine, clothes, and rights. It is in this way, as the late 1930sresult of this process, to that the Rights of Man become the question rights of what should those who have no rights, the Jews in Germany do against Hitler: they should commit a collective suicide rights of bare human beings subjected to inhuman [[repression]] and thus arouse inhuman conditions of existence. They become humanitarian rights, the rights of those who cannot enact them, the conscience victims of the worldabsolute [[denial]] of right. For all this, they are not [[void]]. Political names and political places never become merely void. The void is filled by somebody or something else. /.../ if those who suffer inhuman repression are unable to enact Human Rights that are their last recourse, then somebody else has to inherit their rights in order to enact them in their place. One can easily imagine This is what is called the Nazi reaction "right to humanitarian interference" - a right that some nations assume to it would have been: OKthe supposed benefit of victimized populations, we will help you, where do you want and very often against the advice of the poison humanitarian organizations themselves. The "right to humanitarian interference" might be delivered described as a sort of "[[return]] to sender": the disused rights that had been send to the rightless are sent back to you?the senders. <ref>Ibid.</ref>

So, to put it in the [[Lenin]]ist way: what today, in the predominant Western discourse, the "Human Rights of the Third [[World]] suffering victims" effectively mean is the right of the Western powers themselves to intervene - politically, economically, culturally, militarily - in the Third World countries of their choice on behalf of the defense of Human Rights. The reference to [[Lacan]]'s [[formula]] of communication (in which the sender gets back from the receiver-addressee his own [[message]] in its inverted, i.e. true, [[form]]) is here up to the point: in the reigning discourse of humanitarian interventionism, the developed West is effectively getting back from the victimized Third World its own message in its true form. And the moment Human Rights are thus depoliticized, the discourse dealing with them has to change to [[ethics]]: reference to the pre-political opposition of [[Good]] and [[Evil]] has to be mobilized. Today's "new reign of Ethics," <ref>Ibid.</ref> clearly discernible in, say, Michael Ignatieff's [[work]], thus relies on a violent gesture of depoliticization, of denying to the victimized other political [[subjectivization]]. And, as Ranciere pointed out, liberal humanitarianism a la Ignatieff unexpectedly meets the "radical" position of Foucault or Agamben with regard to this depoliticization: the [[Foucault|Foucauldian]]-[[Agamben]]ian notion of "[[biopolitics]]" as the culmination of the entire Western [[thought]] ends up getting caught in a kind of "[[ontological]] trap" in which concentration camps appear as a kind of "ontological destiny: each of us would be in the [[situation]] of the refugee in a camp. Any [[difference]] grows faint between [[democracy]] and [[totalitarianism]] and any political [[practice]] proves to be already ensnared in the biopolitical trap."<ref>Ibid.</ref> When, in a shift from Foucault, Agamben [[identifies]] [[sovereignty|sovereign]] [[power]] and [[biopolitics]] (in today's generalized state of exception, the two overlap), he thus precludes the very possibility of the emergence of [[political subjectivity]]. - However, the rise of political [[subjectivity]] takes place against the background of a certain limit of the "inhuman," so that one should continue to endorse the paradox of the inhumanity of human being deprived of [[citizenship]], and posit the "inhuman" pure man as a necessary excess of humanity over itself, its "indivisible [[remainder]]," a kind of Kantian limit-[[concept]] of the phenomenal notion of humanity? So that, in exactly the same way in [[Kant]]'s philosophy the [[sublime]] [[Noumenal]], when we come too close to it, appears as pure [[horror]], man "as such," deprived of all phenomenal qualifications, appears as an inhuman monster, something like [[Kafka]]'s odradek. The problem with human rights [[humanism]] is that it covers up this monstrosity of the "[[human as such]]," presenting it as a sublime human [[essence]]. What, then, is the way out of this deadlock? [[Balibar]] ends with an ambiguous reference to [[Mahatma Gandhi]]. It is true that Gandhi's formula "[[Be yourself the change you would like to see in the world]]" encapsulates perfectly the basic attitude of emancipatory change: do not wait for the "[[objective process]]" to generate the expected/desired change, since if you just wait for it, it will never come; instead, throw YOURSELF into it, BE this change, take upon yourself the risk of enacting it directly. However, is not the ultimate limitation of Gandhi's strategy that it only works against a [[liberal-democracy|liberal-democratic regime]] which refers to certain minimal ethico-political standards, i.e., in which, to put it in pathetic terms, those in power still "have [[conscience]]." Recall Gandhi's reply, in the late 1930s, to the question of what should the [[Jews]] in [[Germany]] do against [[Hitler]]: they should commit a collective [[suicide]] and thus arouse the conscience of the world... One can easily imagine what the [[Nazi]] reaction to it would have been: OK, we will help you, where do you [[want]] the poison to be delivered to you? There is, however, [[another ]] way in which Balibar's plea for renouncing violence can be given a specific twist - that of what one is tempted to call the [[Bartleby]]-politics. Recall the two symmetrically opposed modes of the "[[living dead]]," of finding oneself in the [[uncanny ]] place "[[between the two deaths]]": one is either [[biologically ]] [[dead ]] while [[symbolically ]] alive (surviving one's [[biology|biological ]] [[death ]] as a [[spectral ]] apparition or [[symbolic ]] [[authority ]] of the [[Name]]), or symbolically dead while biologically alive (those excluded from the [[socio-symbolic order]], from [[Antigone ]] to today's ''[[homo sacer]]''). And what if we apply the same logic to the opposition of violence and [[non-violence]], [[identifying ]] two modes of their intersection? We all [[know ]] the pop-[[psychological ]] notion of the "[[passive aggressivity|passive-aggressive behavior]]," usually applied to a housewife who, instead of actively opposing her husband, passively sabotages him. And this brings us back to our beginning: perhaps, one should assert this attitude of [[passive aggressivity ]] as a proper radical political gesture, in contrast to [[aggressive ]] passivity, the standard "[[interpassivity|interpassive]]" mode of our [[participation ]] in socio-ideological life in which we are [[active ]] all the time in order to make it sure that nothing will happen, that nothing will really change . In such a constellation, the first truly critical ("aggressive," violent) step is to WITHDRAW into [[passivity]], to refuse to participate - [[Bartleby]]'s "[[I would prefer not to]]" is the necessary first step which as it were clears the ground for a true [[activity]], for an act that will effectively change the coordinates of the constellation.<ref>Rony Bauman, "From Philantropy to Humanitarianism," in <i>South Atlantic Quaterly</i> 2/3, Spring 2004.</ref>