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From "Passionate Attachments" to Dis-Identification<br>{{BSZ}}By Slavoj Zizek</font></td></trBR><trBR>I [[want]] to address the problem of [[identification]] by confronting the predominant deconstructionist doxa according to which the main problem with [[Lacanian]] [[theory]] - which allegedly also limits its [[political]] use - is that [[Lacan]] elevates the [[symbolic]] into a kind of [[transcendental]] [[position]] of a fixed [[normative]] [[order]] exempted from the transformative [[process]] of historical [[practice]]. According to this critique, [[the symbolic]] fixes in advance the constraints of compulsory [[heterosexuality]] and reduces all [[resistance]] to it to [[imaginary]] [[misrecognition]]. And if one does effectively break up the chains of the [[symbolic order]], one is expelled into the [[void]] of [[psychosis]]. Since the main proponent of this criticism is [[Judith]] [[Butler]], let me focus on her latest book, </tri>The [[Psychic]] [[Life]] of [[Power]]</tbodyi>.</tableref>[[Judith Butler]], The Psychic Life of Power (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997). Numbers in parentheses refer to the pages of this book.</center><brref>

  <table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" height="100%" width="100%"> <tbody><tr><td width="15%"></td><td valign="top" width="70%"><font face1="Times New Roman,Times,Courier" size="3"></font><p class="b" align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,Times,Courier" size="3">I want to address the problem of identification by confronting the predominant deconstructionist doxa according to which the main problem with Lacanian theory - which allegedly also limits its political use - is that Lacan elevates the symbolic into a kind of transcendental position of a fixed normative order exempted from the transformative process of historical practice. According to this critique, the symbolic fixes in advance the constraints of compulsory heterosexuality and reduces all resistance to it to imaginary misrecognition. And if one does effectively break up the chains of the symbolic order, one is expelled into the void of psychosis. Since the main proponent of this criticism is Judith Butler, let me focus on her latest book, <i>The Psychic Life of Power</i>.[1]<br><br> 1<br><br> Butler's, as well as Lacan's, starting point is the old [[Leftist ]] one -- how is it possible not only to resist effectively, but also to undermine and/or displace the existing socio-symbolic network - the Lacanian "big [[Other]]" - which predetermines the only [[space ]] within which the [[subject ]] can [[exist]]. Significantly, Butler [[identifies ]] "subject" with the [[symbolic position ]] occupied within this space, while she reserves the term "[[psyche]]" for the larger [[unity ]] encompassing that in the [[individual ]] which resists [[being ]] included in the symbolic space.<ref>Butler demonstrates that the Foucauldian "[[body]]" as the site of resistance is none other than the [[Freudian]] "psyche." Paradoxically, "body" is [[Foucault]]'s [[name]] for the psychic [[apparatus]] insofar as it resists the soul's domination. That is to say, when, in his well-known definition of the soul as the "prison of the body," Foucault turns around the standard Platonic-[[Christian]] definition of the body as the "prison of the soul," what he calls the "body" is not simply the [[2biological] ] body, but is that which is already caught in some kind of pre-[[subjective]] [[psychic apparatus]].</ref> Butler, of course, is well aware that the site of this resistance cannot be simply and directly [[identified ]] as the [[unconscious]]; the existing order of Power is also supported by unconscious "passionate attachments," attachments publicly non-acknowledged by the subject:</font></p>

If the unconscious escapes from a given normative [[injunction]], to what other injunction does it [[form]] an attachment? What makes us [[think]] that the unconscious is any less [[structured]] by the power relations that pervade [[cultural]] [[signifiers]] than is the [[language]] of the subject? If we find an attachment to subjection at the level of the unconscious, what kind of resistance is to be wrought from that? (88).<p align="justify"/blockquote>

<font face=The exemplary [[case]] of the unconscious "Times New Roman,Times,Courierpassionate attachments" size="2">If which sustain Power is precisely the unconscious escapes from a given normative injunction, to what other injunction does it form an attachment? What makes us think that the unconscious is any less structured by inherent reflective eroticization of the regulatory power relations that pervade cultural signifiers than is -mechanisms and procedures themselves. In the language performance of the subject? If we find an attachment [[obsessional]] [[ritual]], one designated to subjection keep at bay the level illicit temptation, the ritual itself becomes the source of [[libidinal]] [[satisfaction]]. It is thus the "reflexivity" involved in the [[relationship]] between regulatory power and [[sexuality]], the unconsciousway the repressive regulatory procedures themselves get libidinally invested, what kind that functions as a source of resistance libidinal satisfaction. And it is to be wrought from that? (88)this radical masochistic reflective turn which remains unaccounted for in the standard [[notion]] of the "[[internalization]]" of [[social]] norms into psychic prohibitions.</font></p></blockquote>

<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,Times,Courier" size="3">The exemplary case of the unconscious "passionate attachments" which sustain Power is precisely the inherent reflective eroticization of the regulatory power-mechanisms and procedures themselves. In the performance of an obsessional ritual, one designated to keep at bay the illicit temptation, the ritual itself becomes the source of libidinal satisfaction. It is thus the "reflexivity" involved in the relationship between regulatory power and sexuality, the way the repressive regulatory procedures themselves get libidinally invested, that functions as a source of libidinal satisfaction. And it is this radical masochistic reflective turn which remains unaccounted for in the standard notion of the "internalization" of social norms into psychic prohibitions.The second problem with the quick identification of the unconscious as the site of resistance is that, even if we concede that the unconscious is the site of resistance which forever prevents the smooth functioning of power mechanisms, that [[interpellation ]] - the subject's [[recognition ]] in his or her allotted symbolic [[place ]] - is always ultimately incomplete, failed. "Does such resistance do anything," asks Butler, "to alter or expand the dominant injunctions or interpellations of subject [[formation]]?" (88). In short, she concludes that "this resistance establishes the incomplete [[character ]] of any effort to produce a subject by disciplinary means, but it remains unable to rearticulate the dominant [[terms ]] of productive power" (89).<br><br>

Therein resides the kernel of Butler's criticism of Lacan. According to her, Lacan reduces resistance to [[the imaginary ]] misrecognition of the symbolic [[structure]]. Such a resistance, although it thwarts the [[full ]] symbolic realization, nonetheless depends on the symbolic order and asserts it in its very opposition, unable to rearticulate its terms - "For the Lacanian, then, the imaginary signifies the [[impossibility ]] of the discursive - that is, symbolic - [[constitution ]] of [[identity]]" (96-97). Along these lines, she even identifies the Lacanian unconscious itself as imaginary, as "that which thwarts any effort of the symbolic to constitute sexed identity coherently and fully, an unconscious indicated by the slips and gaps that characterize the workings of the imaginary in language" (97).<ref>Incidentally, Butler here blatantly contradicts Lacan for whom the unconscious is "the Other's [3[discourse] ]," i.e. symbolic, not imaginary. Is not the best known single line from Lacan the assertion that "the Unconscious is structured like a language?" Slips and gaps are not for Lacan thoroughly symbolic facts. They confirm the functioning of the signifying network.</ref> Against this background, it is then possible to [[claim ]] that, in Lacan, "psychic resistance presumes the continuation of the law in its anterior, symbolic form and, in that [[sense]], contributes to its status quo. In such a view, resistance appears doomed to perpetual defeat" (98).<br><br>

The first [[thing ]] to take note of here is that Butler seems to conflate two radically opposed uses of the term "resistance." One is the socio-critical use - resistance to power, for [[instance ]] - and the other the [[clinical ]] use operative in [[psychoanalysis ]] - the [[patient]]'s resistance to acknowledge the unconscious [[truth ]] of his [[symptoms]], the [[meaning ]] of his [[dreams]], and so on. When Lacan determines resistance as "imaginary," he has thereby in [[mind ]] the misrecognition of the symbolic network which determines us. On the other hand, for Lacan, radical rearticulation of the predominant symbolic order is altogether possible. This is what his notion of <i>[[point de capiton]]</i> - the "[[quilting point]]" or the [[master]]-[[signifier ]] - is [[about]]. When a new point de capiton emerges, the socio-symbolic field is not only [[displaced]], its very [[structuring ]] [[principle ]] changes. Here, one is thus tempted to turn around the opposition between Lacan and Foucault as elaborated by Butler. It is Foucault who insists on the immanence of the entire symbolic field by means of an act proper, a passage through "symbolic [[death]]." In short, it is Lacan who allows us to conceptualize the [[distinction ]] between imaginary resistance -- [[false ]] [[transgression ]] which reasserts the symbolic status quo and even serves as a positive condition of its functioning - and the effective symbolic rearticulation via the [[intervention ]] of the [[real ]] of an act.<br><br>

Only at this level, assuming that we take into account the Lacanian notions of point de capiton and the act as real, does a meaningful dialogue with Butler become possible. Butler's [[matrix ]] of social [[existence ]] as well as Lacan's is that of a [[forced ]] [[choice]]. In order to exist at all within the socio-symbolic space, one has to accept the fundamental [[alienation]], the definition of one's existence in the terms of the "[[big Other]]." As she is quick to add, however, this should not constrain us to - what she perceives as - the Lacanian view according to which the symbolic order is a given which can only be effectively transgressed if the subject pays the price of psychic [[exclusion]]. So on the one hand we have the false imaginary resistance to the symbolic norm, and on the [[other, the ]] [[psychotic ]] breakdown, with the only "realistic option" being full acceptance of alienation in the symbolic order - the [[goal ]] of the [[psychoanalytic ]] [[treatment]]. Butler opposes to this Lacanian fixity of the symbolic the [[Hegelian ]] [[dialectic ]] of presupposing and positing. Not only is the symbolic order always-already presupposed as the sole milieu of the subject's social existence, but this order itself [[exists ]] and is reproduced, only insofar as [[subjects ]] recognize themselves in it and, via repeated [[performative ]] gestures, again and again assume their places in it. This, of course, opens up the possibility of changing the symbolic contours of our socio-symbolic existence by way of its parodically displaced performative enactings. Therein resides the thrust of Butler's anti-[[Kantianism]]. She rejects the Lacanian symbolic a priori as a new version of the transcendental framework which fixes the coordinates of our existence in advance, leaving no space for the [[retroactive ]] [[displacement ]] of these presupposed [[conditions]]. So when in a key passage Butler asks the question:</font></p>

<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,Times,Courier" size="2">What would it mean for the subject to [[desire ]] something other than its continued 'social existence'? If such an existence cannot be undone without falling into some kind of death, can existence nevertheless be risked, death courted or pursued, in order to expose and open to transformation the hold of social power on the conditions of life's persistence? The subject is compelled to [[repeat ]] the norms by which it is produced, but the [[repetition ]] establishes a [[domain ]] of risk, for if one fails to reinstate the norm "in the [[right ]] way," one becomes subject to further sanction, one feels the prevailing conditions of existence threatened. And yet, without a repetition that risks life - in its current organization - how might we begin to imagine the [[contingency ]] of that organization, and performatively reconfigure the contours of the conditions of life? (28-29).</font></p>

<p align="justify"><font face="Times New Roman,Times,Courier" size="3">The Lacanian answer to this is clear - "to desire something other than its continued 'social existence'" and thus to fall "into some kind of death," that is, to risk a gesture by means of which death is "courted or pursued," points precisely towards the way Lacan reconceptualized the Freudian death-[[drive ]] as the elementary form of the [[ethical ]] act. Note that the act, insofar as it is irreducible to a "[[speech ]] act," relies for its performative power on the preestablished set of symbolic rules and/or norms.<br><br> Is this not the whole point of Lacan's reading of Antigone? Antigone effectively puts at risk her entire social existence, defying the socio-symbolic power of the city embodied in the rule of Creon, thereby "falling into some kind of death" - i.e., sustaining symbolic death, the exclusion from the socio-symbolic space. For Lacan, there is no ethical act proper without taking the risk of such a momentary "suspension of the big Other," of the socio-symbolic network which guarantees the subject's identity; an authentic act occurs only when a subject risks a gesture which is no longer "covered up" by the big Other. For that reason, Lacan pursues all possible versions of this entering the domain "between the two deaths," not only citing Antigone after her expulsion, but also Oedipus at Colonus, King Lear, Poe's Mr. Valdemar, and so on. Up to Sygne from Claudel's Coufontaine-trilogy, their common predicament is that they all found themselves in this domain of the undead, "beyond death and life," in which the causality of the symbolic fate is suspended. Butler, in the above-quoted passage, too quickly conflates this act in its radical dimension with the performative reconfiguration of one's symbolic condition via its repetitive displacements. The two are not the same. In other words, one should maintain the crucial distinction between mere "performative reconfiguration," a subversive displacement which remains within the hegemonic field and, as it were, fights against it an internal guerilla battle of turning against the hegemonic field its own terms, and the much more radical act of a thorough reconfiguration of the entire field which redefines the very conditions of socially sustained performativity - in Foucault's terms, the passage from one episteme to another.<br><br> 2<br><br> Is it possible to undermine also the most fundamental level of subjection, what Butler calls "passionate attachments"? The Lacanian name for the primordial passionate attachments on which the very consistency of the subject's being hinges is, of course, fundamental fantasy. The "attachment to subjectivation" constitutive of the subject is thus none other than the primordial "masochist" scene in which the subject "makes/sees himself suffer," that is, assumes la doleur d' exister and thus provides the minimum of support to his being - like Freud's primordially repressed middle term "Father is beating me" in the essay "A Child is Being Beaten." This fundamental fantasy is thoroughly "inter-passive." In it, a scene of passive suffering, or subjection, is staged which simultaneously sustains and threatens the subject's being - only insofar, that is, as being remains foreclosed, primordially repressed. From this perspective, a new approach opens up to the recent artistic practices of sado-masochistic performance. In such practices, isn't this very foreclosure ultimately undone? In other words, what if the open assuming/staging of the fantasmatic scene of primordial "passionate attachment" is far more subversive than the dialectic rearticulation and/or displacement of this scene?<br><br>

The difference between Butler and Is this not the [[whole]] point of Lacan is that for Butler primordial repression is 's [[reading]] of [[Antigone]]? Antigone effectively puts at risk her entire social existence, defying the foreclosure socio-symbolic power of the primordial city embodied in the rule of Creon, thereby "passionate attachmentfalling into some kind of death" - i.e.," while for Lacansustaining symbolic death, the fundamental fantasyexclusion from the socio-symbolic space. For Lacan, there is no ethical act proper without taking the stuff risk of which such a momentary "primordial attachmentssuspension of [[the big Other]]," are made, is already of the socio-symbolic network which guarantees the subject's identity; an authentic act occurs only when a filler, subject risks a formation gesture which covers is no longer "covered up a certain gap or void" by the big Other. Thus it is only hereFor that [[reason]], at Lacan pursues all possible versions of this very point where entering the difference domain "[[between Butler and Lacan is almost imperceptiblethe two deaths]], that we encounter the ultimate gap that separates Butler from Lacan. Butler again interprets these "primordial attachments" as the subjectnot only citing Antigone after her [[expulsion]], but also [[Oedipus]] at Colonus, King Lear, Poe's presuppositions in a proto-Hegelian meaning of the termMr. Valdemar, and therefore counts so on the subject. Up to Sygne from [[Claudel]]'s ability dialectically to rearticulate these presuppositions Coufontaine-trilogy, their common predicament is that they all found themselves in this domain of his or her beingthe undead, to reconfigure "beyond death and displace them. The subject's identity life,"will remain always and forever rooted in its injury as long as it remains an identity, but it does imply that which the possibilities [[causality]] of resignification will rework and unsettle the passionate attachment to subjection without which subject formation - and re-formation - cannot succeed" (105)symbolic fate is suspended. For exampleButler, subjects are confronted with a forced choice in which rejecting an injurious interpellation amounts to not existing at all; under the threat of nonabove-existencequoted passage, they are, as it were, emotionally blackmailed into identifying too quickly conflates this act in its radical [[dimension]] with the imposed performative reconfiguration of one's symbolic identitycondition via its [[repetitive]] displacements. The two are not the same. In other [[words]], one should maintain the crucial distinction between mere "niggerperformative reconfiguration," "bitch," etc. Since symbolic identity retains its hold only by its incessant repetitive re-enacting, however, it is possible for a subversive displacement which remains within the subject to displace this identityhegemonic field and, to recontextualize as itwere, to make it work for other purposes, to turn fights against it an [[internal]] guerilla battle of turning against the hegemonic field its hegemonic mode own terms, and the much more radical act of a thorough reconfiguration of the entire field which redefines the very conditions of functioningsocially sustained performativity - in Foucault's terms, the passage from one episteme to [[another]].<br><br>

An example Is it possible to undermine also the most fundamental level of subjection, what Butler calls "passionate attachments"? The Lacanian name for the primordial passionate attachments on which the reconfiguration very consistency of fantasy would be Clint Eastwoodthe subject's Dirty Harry seriesbeing hinges is, of course, fundamental [[fantasy]]. In The "attachment to [[subjectivation]]" constitutive of the first film, subject is thus none other than the primordial "[[masochist fantasy ]]" [[scene]] in all its ambiguity which the subject "makes/sees himself suffer," that is almost directly acknowledged, while in the following installments, it looks as if Eastwood self-consciously accepted the politically correct criticism assumes la doleur d' exister and displaced thus provides the fantasy to give minimum of support to his being - like [[Freud]]'s primordially [[repressed]] middle term "[[Father]] is beating me" in the story a more acceptable essay "A [[Child]] is Being Beaten."progressiveThis [[fundamental fantasy]] is thoroughly " flavorinter-[[passive]]. " In all these reconfigurationsit, howevera scene of passive [[suffering]], or subjection, is staged which simultaneously sustains and threatens the same fundamental fantasy subject's being - only insofar, that is, as being remains operative[[foreclosed]], primordially repressed. With all respect for From this perspective, a new approach opens up to the political efficiency [[recent]] artistic practices of such reconfigurations, they do not really touch the hard fantasmatic kernel sado- they even sustain itmasochistic performance. And in contrast to ButlerIn such practices, Lacanisn's wager is that even and also in politicst this very [[foreclosure]] ultimately undone? In other words, it is possible to accomplish a more radical gesture what if the open assuming/staging of the [[fantasmatic]] scene of primordial "traversingpassionate attachment" is far more subversive than the very fundamental fantasy. Only such gestures which disturb dialectic rearticulation and/or displacement of this fantasmatic kernel are authentic acts.<br><br>scene?

Here, one should look to The [[difference]] between Butler and Lacan is that for Butler primordial [[repression]] is the problematic foreclosure of the original Hilflosigkeit ('helplessnessprimordial "passionate attachment," while for Lacan, the fundamental fantasy,' 'distress') the stuff of small infants. The first feature to be noted is that this which "distressprimordial attachments" covers two interconnectedare made, but nonetheless differentis already a filler, levels -- first a purely organic helplessnessformation which covers up a certain gap or void. Thus it is only here, at this very point where the difference between Butler and Lacan is almost imperceptible, that we [[encounter]] the inability ultimate gap that separates Butler from Lacan. Butler again interprets these "primordial attachments" as the subject's presuppositions in a proto-Hegelian meaning of the small child to surviveterm, and therefore counts on the subject's ability [[dialectically]] to satisfy rearticulate these presuppositions of his or her most elementary needsbeing, without the parentsto reconfigure and displace [[them]]. The subject' helps identity "will remain always and forever rooted in its [[injury]] as long as it remains an identity, and second the traumatic perplexion when but it does imply that the child is thrown into the position possibilities of a helpless witness of sexual interplay among resignification will rework and unsettle the parents, other adults, or between adults passionate attachment to subjection without which subject formation - and himre- or herselfformation - cannot succeed" (105). The child is helplessFor example, without "cognitive mapping," when subjects are confronted with a [[forced choice]] in which rejecting an injurious interpellation amounts to not existing at all; under the enigma [[threat]] of non-existence, they are, as it were, emotionally blackmailed into [[identifying]] with the Other's <i>jouissance</i>imposed symbolic identity, "nigger, unable to symbolize the mysterious sexual gestures and innuendoes he or she is witnessing. Crucial for "becoming-human" is the overlapping of the two levelsbitch, the implicit "sexualization" of the way a parent satisfies a child's bodily needs etc. Since symbolic identity retains its hold only by its incessant repetitive re- sayenacting, when the mother feeds the child by excessively caressing himhowever, and it is possible for the child detects in subject to displace this excess the mystery identity, to recontextualize it, to make it [[work]] for other purposes, to turn it against its hegemonic mode of sexual <i>jouissance</i>functioning.<br><br>

So, back What Lacan does here is to introduce a distinction between the two terms which are identified in Butler - , the crucial question concerns fundamental fantasy which serves as the philosophical status ultimate support of this original the subject's being, and constitutive <i>Hilflosigkeit</i>. Is this <i>Hilflosigkeit</i> not another name for the gap of the primordial dis-attachment [[symbolic identification]] which triggers is already a symbolic response to the need for [[trauma]] of the fantasmatic primordial "passionate attachment."? In other words, what if The symbolic identity we assume in a forced choice when we turn around recognize ourselves in [[ideological]] interpellation relies on the perspective and conceive [[disavowal]] of the obstacle which prevents the infans fully to fit into its environs - this original fantasmatic "out-of-jointpassionate attachment" state - in which serves as its positive aspectultimate support.<ref>For example, as another name for apropos of the very abyss of freedom[[army]] life, for that gesture of such a "disconnectingpassionate attachment" that liberates is provided by a subject from its direct immersion into its environs? Or, [[homosexual]] link which has to put be disavowed if it in yet another way - true, the subject is as it were "blackmailed" into passively submitting to some form remain operative. See Chapter 2 of the primordial "passionate attachmentSlavoj [[Zizek]]," since, outside ''The Plague of it[[Fantasies]]'' ([[London]]: Verso, he simply does not exist1997). </ref> This nonleads to a further distinction between symbolic rearticulations and variations on the fundamental fantasy -existence is not directly the absence of existence, however, but a certain gap or void in like the order of being which variations on "Father isbeating me" the subject itself. The need for "passionate attachment" to provide a minimum of being implies that the subject qua "abstract negativity," qua the primordial gesture of dis-attachment from which do not effectively undermine its environshold, that is already here. Fantasy is thus a defense-formation against , between this dialecticization and the primordial abyss if dis-attachment that possible "is[[traversing]]" the subject itselfvery fundamental fantasy. At this precise point, then, Butler should be supplemented - The ultimate aim of the emergence of psychoanalytic process is precisely for the subject and subjection in the sense of to undo the ultimate "passionate attachment," i.e. submission to some figure which guarantees the consistency of the Otherhis or her being, are not strictly equivalent, since, for and thus to undergo what Lacan calls the "passionate attachment[[subjective destitution]]." to take placeAt its most fundamental level, the gap which primordial "ispassionate attachment" the subject must already be here. Only if this gap is already here, can we account for how it is possible for the subject to escape the hold scene of the fundamental fantasyis not "dialecticizable.[5]<br><br>"

So what is a proper act? Jacques-Alain Miller Here, one should look to the problematic of the original [[Hilflosigkeit]] ('[[6helplessness]] proposes as the definition ,' 'distress') of small infants. The first feature to be noted is that this "a true womandistress" covers two interconnected, but nonetheless different, levels -- first a certain radical act - purely [[organic]] helplessness, the act inability of taking from manthe small child to survive, to [[satisfy]] his or her partnermost elementary [[needs]], without the [[parents]]' [[help]], and second the [[traumatic]] perplexion when the child is thrown into the position of a [[helpless]] [[witness]] of obliterating[[sexual]] interplay among the parents, destroying evenother [[adults]], that which or between adults and him- or herself. The child is helpless, without "in him more than himselfcognitive [[mapping]]," that which "means everything when confronted with the enigma of the Other's <i>[[jouissance]]</i>, unable to him" [[symbolize]] the mysterious sexual gestures and to which innuendoes he holds more than his own life, the precious agalma round which his life turnsor she is witnessing. The exemplary figure of such an act in literature Crucial for "becoming-[[human]]" is that the overlapping of Medea whothe two levels, upon learning that Jason, her husband, plans to abandon her for the implicit "sexualization" of the way a parent [[satisfies]] a younger womanchild's [[bodily]] needs - say, kills their two young childrenwhen the [[mother]] feeds the child by excessively caressing him, her husband's most precious possessions. It is and the child detects in this horrible act of destroying that which matters most to her husband that she acts as une vraie femme, as Lacan put it.[7[excess]]the mystery of sexual <bri>jouissance<br/i>.

Would it not be possible, along these linesSo, also back to interpret Butler - the unique figure crucial question concerns the [[philosophical]] status of the this original and constitutive <i>femme fataleHilflosigkeit</i> in the new noir of the 90s, as exemplified by Linda Fiorentino in John Dahl's . Is this <i>The Last SeductionHilflosigkeit</i>not another name for the gap of the primordial dis-attachment which triggers the [[need]] for the fantasmatic primordial "passionate attachment"? In contrast other words, what if we turn around the perspective and conceive of the obstacle which prevents the [[infans]] fully to fit into its environs - this original "out-of-joint" [[state]] - in its positive aspect, as another name for the classic noir <i>femme fatale</i> very abyss of the 40s[[freedom]], who remains an elusive spectral presencefor that gesture of "disconnecting" that liberates a subject from its direct immersion into its environs? Or, to put it in yet another way - [[true]], the new <i>femme fatale</i> subject is characterized by directas it were "blackmailed" into passively submitting to some form of the primordial "passionate attachment, outspoken sexual aggressivity" since, verbal and physical[[outside]] of it, by direct selfhe simply does not exist. This non-commodification and self-manipulation. She has existence is not directly the "mind [[absence]] of existence, however, but a pimp certain gap or void in the body order of being which "is" the subject itself. The need for "passionate attachment" to provide a whore.minimum of being implies that the subject qua "abstract negativity," Two dialogues are qua the primordial gesture of dis-attachment from its environs, is already here indicative . Fantasy is thus a [[defense]]- formation against the classic exchange of double entendres about a primordial abyss if dis-attachment that "speed limitis" which finishes the first encounter subject itself. At this precise point, then, Butler should be supplemented - the emergence of Barbara Stanwyck the subject and Fred McMurray subjection in Billy Wilder's <i>Double Indemnity</i>, and the first encounter sense of Linda Fiorentino with her partner in <the "passionate attachment," i>The Last Seduction</i>. In e. submission to some [[figure]] of the latterOther, Fiorentino directly opens up his flyare not strictly equivalent, since, reaches into it and inspects his merchandise before accepting him as a lover: for the "I never buy anything sight unseen,passionate attachment" she saysto take place, and later rejects any the gap which "warm human contactis" with himthe subject must already be here.[8] How does Only if this brutal "self-commodificationgap is already here," can we account for how it is possible for the subject to escape the hold of the fundamental fantasy.<ref>One should link this reduction opposition of herself attachment and her male partner dis-attachment to an object to be satisfied the old Freudian metapsychological opposition of Life and Death [[drives]]. In The Ego and [[the Id]], Freud defines these drives as the opposition between the forces of connection/unity and exploitedthe forces of disconnection/disunity. Dis-attachment is thus [[death drive]] at its purest, affect the allegedly gesture of [[ontological]] "subversivederailment" status which throws "out of joint" the <i>femme fatale<order of Being. It is the gesture of disinvestment, of "contraction"/i> with regard withdrawal from being immersed in the [[world]]. The primordial attachment is the counter-move to this [[negative]] gesture. In the paternal Law last resort, this negative tendency to disruption is none other than [[libido]] itself: what throws a subject "out of speech?joint" is none other than the [[traumatic encounter]] with ''jouissance''.<br><br/ref>

Perhaps So what one should do here is change the terms of the debate by, first, pointing out that, far from being simply a threat to the male patriarchal identity, the classic proper act? Jacques-[[Alain]] [[Miller]]<iref>femme fataleSee [[Jacques-Alain Miller]], "Des Semblants dans la Relation Entre les [[Sexes]]," ''La [[Cause]] Freudianne'' 36 (1997): 7-15.</iref> functions proposes as the definition of "inherent transgressiona true [[woman]]" a certain radical act - the act of the patriarchal symbolic universetaking from man, her partner, as the male masochist-paranoiac fantasy of the exploitative and sexually insatiable woman who simultaneously dominates us and enjoys obliterating, destroying even, that which is "in her sufferinghim more than himself, provoking us violently " that which "means everything to take her him" and to abuse her.which he holds more than his own life, the precious [[9agalma]] round which his life turns. The threat exemplary figure of the <i>femme fatale</i> such an act in [[literature]] is thus a false one. It is effectively a fantasmatic support that of patriarchal dominationMedea who, the figure of the enemy engendered by the patriarchal system itself. In Judith Butler's termsupon learning that Jason, <i>femme fatale</i> is the fundamental disavowed "passionate attachment" of the modern male subjecther husband, plans to abandon her for a fantasmatic formation which is neededyounger woman, but cannot be openly assumedkills their two young [[children]], so her husband's most precious possessions. It is in this horrible act of destroying that it can only be evoked on the condition which matters most to her husband that, at the level of the explicit narrative line - standing for the public socio-symbolic sphere - she is punished and the order of male domination is reasserted. Oracts as une vraie [[femme]], to as Lacan put it in Foucauldian terms, in the same way that the discourse on sexuality creates sex as the mysterious, impenetrable entity to be conquered, the patriarchal erotic discourse creates the .<iref>femme fatale</i> as the inherent threat against which the male identity should assert itself. And the neo-noirLacan's achievement other example is that of Andre Gide's wife who, after his death, burned all his [[love]] letters to bring to light this underlying fantasy: the new <i>femme fatale</i> who fully accepts the male game of manipulationher, and as it were beats considered by him at his own game, is much more effective in threatening the paternal Law than the classic spectral <i>femme fatalemost precious possession.</i>.<br><brref>

One can argueWould it not be possible, along these lines, also to [[interpret]] the unique figure of course, that this new the <i>[[femme fatale]]</i> is no less hallucinatoryin the new noir of the 90s, that her direct approach as exemplified by Linda Fiorentino in John Dahl's <i>The Last [[Seduction]]</i>? In contrast to a man is no less the realization classic noir <i>femme fatale</i> of a (masochist) male fantasy; what one should not forgetthe 40s, howeverwho remains an elusive [[spectral]] [[presence]], is that the new <i>femme fatale</i> subverts the male fantasy precisely is characterized by way of directly direct, outspoken sexual [[aggressivity]], [[verbal]] and brutally realizing it[[physical]], acting it out by direct self-commodification and self-manipulation. She has the "mind of a pimp in "real lifethe body of a whore." It is thus not only that she realizes Two dialogues are here indicative - the male hallucination; she is fully aware that men hallucinate classic [[exchange]] of [[double]] entendres about such a direct approach, "speed [[limit]]" which finishes the first encounter of Barbara Stanwyck and that directly giving them what they hallucinate about is the most effective way to undermine their domination. In other words, what we have Fred McMurray in the above-described scene from Billy Wilder's <i>The Last SeductionDouble Indemnity</i> is , and the exact feminine counterpart to the scene from Lynch's first encounter of Linda Fiorentino with her partner in <i>Wild at Heart[[The Last Seduction]]</i> in which Wilem Defoe verbally abuses Laura Dern. In the latter, Fiorentino directly opens up his fly, forcing her to utter the words reaches into it and inspects his merchandise before accepting him as a lover: "Fuck me!I never buy anything [[sight]] unseen," And when she finally does respond, i.e. when her fantasy is arousedsays, he treats this offer as an authentic free offer and politely later rejects it - any "warm human contact"Nowith him.<ref>I rely here on Kate Stables, thanksBritish Film Institute, I've got to go, but maybe some other time..London.</ref> How does this brutal " In both scenesself-commodification, the subject is humiliated when his or " this reduction of herself and her fantasy is brutally externalized.[10[male]] In short, Linda Fiorentino acts here as a true sadist, not only on account of her reduction of her partner to an [[object]] to be [[satisfied]] and exploited, [[affect]] the bearer of partial objects which provide pleasure - thereby depriving the sexual act of its allegedly "human and emotional warmthsubversive" and transforming it into a cold physiological exercise -- but also because of the cruel manipulation status of the other's fantasy which is directly acted out and thus thwarted in its efficiency as the support of desire.<bri>femme fatale<br/i>with [[regard]] to the paternal Law of speech?

Is this gesture of intentionally and brutally dropping According to standard [[feminist]] [[cinema]] theory, in the spectral aura of classical noir, the traditional <i>femme fatale</i> not another version of is punished at the act level of une vraie femme? Is not the object which [[explicit]] [[narrative]] line. She is destroyed for being assertive and undermining the male patriarchal dominance and for presenting a threat to it. Although she is destroyed or domesticated, her [[image]] survives her partner "more than himself," physical [[destruction]] as the treasure around element which his life turnseffectively dominates the scene. The subversive character of the noir [[films]] is exhibited in the way the [[texture]] of the film belies and subverts its explicit narrative line. In contrast to this classic noir, the neo-noir of the 80s and 90s, from Kasdan's <i>femme fatale[[Body Heat]]</i> herself? By brutally destroying the spectral aura of "feminine mystery," by acting as a cold manipulating subject interested only in raw sex, reducing her partner to a partial object, the appendix to - and the bearer of - his penis, does she not also violently destroy what is "for him more than himself"? The enigma of this new <i>femme fataleThe Last Seduction</i> is that although, in contrast to at the level of explicit narrative, openly allows the classic <i>femme fatale</i>to triumph, to reduce her partner to a sucker condemned to death - she is totally transparent, openly assuming the role of survives rich and alone over his [[dead]] body. She does not survive as a calculating bitch, the perfect embodiment of what Baudrillard called the spectral "transparency of Evil,undead" threat which libidinally dominates the scene even after her enigma persists. Here we encounter the paradox already discerned by Hegel - sometimes, total self-exposure physical and self-transparency, isocial destruction.e. the awareness that there is no hidden contentShe triumphs directly, makes the subject even more enigmaticin social [[reality]] itself. Sometimes, being totally outspoken is How does this affect the most effective and cunning way subversive edge of deceiving the Other. For that reason, the neo-noir <i>femme fatale</i> continues to exert figure? Does the fact that her irresistible seductive power on triumph is real not undermine her poor partner. Her strategy is the one of deceiving him by openly telling the truth. The male partner is unable to accept thismuch stronger spectral/fantasmatic triumph, and so, he desperately clings to the conviction that, behind the cold manipulative surface, there must be a heart instead of gold to be saved, a person of warm human feelingspectral all-powerful threat, and that indestructible in her cold manipulative approach is just a kind of defensive strategy. Sovery physical destruction, in the vein of Freud's well-known Jewish joke "Why are you telling me that you are going to Lemberg, when you are actually going she turns out to Lemberg?" the basic implicit reproach of the sucker-partner to the new <i>femme fatale</i> could be formulated as "Why do you act if you are just a vulgar, cold manipulative bitch, when you are really just a cold manipulative "bitch" deprived of any aura?"<br><br>

4Perhaps what one should do here is [[change]] the terms of the debate by, first, pointing out that, far from being simply a threat to the male patriarchal identity, the classic <bri>femme fatale<br/i>functions as the "inherent transgression" of the patriarchal symbolic [[universe]], as the male masochist-[[paranoiac]] fantasy of the exploitative and sexually [[insatiable]] woman who simultaneously dominates us and [[enjoys]] in her suffering, provoking us violently to take her and to abuse her.<ref>The fantasy of the all-powerful woman whose irresistible attraction presents a threat not only to male domination, but to the very identity of the male subject, is the "fundamental fantasy" against which the male symbolic identity defines and sustains itself.</ref> The threat of the <i>femme fatale</i> is thus a false one. It is effectively a fantasmatic support of patriarchal domination, the figure of the [[enemy]] engendered by the patriarchal [[system]] itself. In Judith Butler's terms, <i>femme fatale</i> is the fundamental disavowed "passionate attachment" of the modern male subject, a fantasmatic formation which is needed, but cannot be openly assumed, so that it can only be evoked on the condition that, at the level of the explicit narrative line - standing for the [[public]] socio-symbolic sphere - she is punished and the order of male domination is reasserted. Or, to put it in Foucauldian terms, in the same way that the discourse on sexuality creates sex as the mysterious, impenetrable entity to be conquered, the patriarchal [[erotic]] discourse creates the <i>femme fatale</i> as the inherent threat against which the male identity should assert itself. And the neo-noir's [[achievement]] is to bring to light this underlying fantasy: the new <i>femme fatale</i> who fully accepts the male [[game]] of manipulation, and as it were beats him at his own game, is much more effective in threatening the paternal Law than the classic spectral <i>femme fatale</i>.

This allows us further to specify the Lacanian notion One can argue, of an authentic act. Act course, that this new <i>femme fatale</i> is no less [[hallucinatory]], that her direct approach to be opposed to mere activity. Activity relies on some fantasmatic support, while the authentic act involves disturbing - "traversing" - a man is no less the realization of a (masochist) male fantasy. In this precise sense; what one should not forget, however, act is for Lacan on that the new <i>femme fatale</i> subverts the side male fantasy precisely by way of the object qua directly and brutally realizing it, acting it out in "real as opposed to signifier - to "speech actlife." We can It is thus not only perform speech acts insofar as we have accepted that she realizes the fundamental alienation in the symbolic order and the fantasmatic support necessary for the functioning of this order, while the act as real male [[hallucination]]; she is an event which occurs ex nihilo, without any fantasmatic support. As fully aware that men hallucinate about sucha direct approach, act as object and that directly giving them what they hallucinate about is also the most effective way to be opposed to the subjectundermine their domination. In other words, at least what we have in the standard Lacanian sense of above-described scene from <i>The Last Seduction</i> is the "alienated" divided subject. The correlate exact [[feminine]] [[counterpart]] to the act is a divided subject, but not scene from Lynch's <i>Wild at Heart</i> in the sense that because of that division act is always failed or displaced. On the contrarywhich Wilem Defoe verbally abuses Laura Dern, act as traumatic tuche is that which divides forcing her to utter the subject who cannot ever subjectivize this act, assume it as words "[[Fuck]] me!"his ownAnd when she finally does respond," posit himself as its author-agenti.e. The authentic act that I accomplish when her fantasy is always by definition a foreign bodyaroused, he treats this offer as an intruder which simultaneously attracts/fascinates authentic free offer and also repels mepolitely rejects it - "No, so thatthanks, if and when I come too close 've got to itgo, this leads to my aphanisis, self-erasurebut maybe some other [[time]]... If there is a subject to the act" In both scenes, it is not the subject of subjectivization, of integrating the act into the universe of symbolic integration and recognition, of assuming the act as "my own," but rather it is an uncanny "acephalous" subject through which the act takes place as that which humiliated when his or her fantasy is "in him more than himselfbrutally externalized." Act thus designates <ref>For a detailed [[analysis]] of the level scene from Wild at which the fundamental divisions and displacements usually associated with the "Lacanian subject" Heart, see Appendix 2 to [[Slavoj Zizek]]'s [[11The Plague of Fantasies]] are momentarily suspended. </ref> In the act, the subjectshort, Linda Fiorentino acts here as Lacan puts ita true [[sadist]], posits itself as its own cause and is no longer determined by the decentered object-cause. Thus if we subtract from it its scenic imagery, its fascination with the divine majesty, and reduce it to the essential, Kant's well-known description not only on account of how a direct insight into the noumenal God as the Thing in itself would deprive us her reduction of our freedom and turn us into lifeless puppets paradoxically fits perfectly her partner to the description bearer of the ethical act.[12[partial]] [[objects]] which provide [[pleasure]] This - thereby depriving the sexual act is precisely something which unexpectedly of its "just occurs.human and emotional warmth" It is an occurrence which most surprises its agent itself.and transforming it into a cold [[13physiological]] The paradox is that in an authentic act, the highest freedom coincides with the utmost passivity, with a reduction to a lifeless automaton who just blindly performs its gestures. The problematic of act thus compels us to accept the radical shift exercise -- but also because of perspective involved in the modern notion cruel manipulation of finitude. What is so difficult to accept is not the fact that the true act - in other's fantasy which noumenal and phenomenal dimensions coincide - is forever directly acted out of our reach. The true trauma resides and thus thwarted in its efficiency as the opposite awareness that there are acts, that they do occur and that we have to come to terms with themsupport of desire.<br><br>

This shift is homologous to that implied in Is this gesture of intentionally and brutally dropping the Kierkegaardian notion spectral aura of "sickness unto death." The "sickness unto death" proper, its despair, opposes the standard despair traditional <i>femme fatale</i> not another version of the individual who is split between act of une vraie femme? Is not the certainty that death object which is to her partner "more than himself," the endtreasure around which his life turns, that there is no beyond of eternal life and the equal certainty that death is not <i>femme fatale</i> herself? By brutally destroying the last thing, that there is another life with its promise spectral aura of redemption and eternal bliss. The "sickness unto deathfeminine mystery," rather involves the opposite paradox of the by acting as a cold manipulating subject who knows that death is not the endinterested only in raw sex, that he has an immortal soulreducing her partner to a [[partial object]], but cannot face the exorbitant demands of this fact - the necessity appendix to abandon vain aesthetic pleasures and to work for his salvation - and so, desperately wants to believe that death is the endbearer of - his [[penis]], that there does she not also violently destroy what is no divine unconditional demand exerting its pressure upon "for him. more than himself"? The standard religious je sais bien, mais quand meme enigma of this new <i>femme fatale</i> is inverted here. It is not that "I know very well that I am a mere mortal living beingalthough, but I nonetheless desperately want to believe that there is redemption in eternal life." It is rather that "I know very well that I have an eternal soul responsible contrast to God's unconditional commandmentsthe classic <i>femme fatale</i>, but I desperately want to believe that there she is nothing beyond deathtotally [[transparent]], I want to be relieved openly assuming the [[role]] of a calculating bitch, the unbearable pressure perfect embodiment of divine injunction.what [[Baudrillard]] called the " In other words[[transparency]] of [[Evil]], in contrast to " her enigma persists. Here we encounter the individual caught in the standard skeptical despair [[paradox]] already discerned by [[Hegel]] - sometimes, [[total]] self-exposure and [[self- transparency]], i.e.the [[awareness]] that there is no hidden [[content]], makes the subject even more enigmatic. Sometimes, being totally outspoken is the individual who knows he will die but cannot accept it most effective and hopes for eternal life cunning way of deceiving the Other. For that reason, the neo- we have here, in noir <i>femme fatale</i> continues to exert her irresistible [[seductive]] power on her poor partner. Her strategy is the case one of "sickness unto deathdeceiving him by openly telling the truth. The male partner is unable to accept this, and so," the individual who he desperately wants clings to diethe conviction that, behind the cold manipulative surface, there must be a heart of gold to disappear foreverbe saved, but knows that he cannot do ita person of warm human [[feeling]], and that he her cold manipulative approach is condemned to eternal lifejust a kind of defensive strategy. The predicament So, in the vein of the individual Freud's well-known [[Jewish]] [[joke]] "sick unto deathWhy are you telling me that you are going to Lemberg, when you are actually going to Lemberg?" is the same as that basic implicit reproach of the Wagnerian heroes, from sucker-partner to the new <i>Flying Dutchman</i> to Amfortas in <i>Parsifalfemme fatale</i>could be formulated as "Why do you act if you are just a cold manipulative bitch, who desperately strive for death, for the final annihilation and self-obliteration which would relieve them of the hell of their when you are really just a cold manipulative bitch?"undead" existence.<br><br>

SoThis allows us further to specify the Lacanian notion of an authentic act. Act is to be opposed to mere [[activity]]. Activity relies on some fantasmatic support, while the authentic act involves disturbing - "traversing" - the fantasy. In this precise sense, if act is for Lacan on the side of the object qua real as opposed to signifier - to "[[speech act]]." We can only perform speech acts insofar as we return have accepted the fundamental alienation in the symbolic order and the fantasmatic support necessary for the functioning of this order, while the act as real is an [[event]] which occurs ex nihilo, without any fantasmatic support. As such, act as object is also to be opposed to the subject, at least in the standard Lacanian sense of the "[[alienated]]" [[divided]] subject. The correlate to the act is a divided subject, but not in the sense that because of that [[division]] act is always failed or displaced. On the contrary, act as traumatic tuche is that which [[divides]] the subject who cannot ever subjectivize this act, assume it as "his own," posit himself as its [[author]]-[[agent]]. The authentic act that I accomplish is always by definition a foreign body, an intruder which simultaneously attracts/fascinates and also repels me, so that, if and when I come too close to it, this leads to my [[aphanisis]], self-erasure. If there is a brief moment subject to the act, it is not the subject of [[subjectivization]], of integrating the act into the universe of symbolic integration and recognition, of assuming the act as "my own," but rather it is an [[uncanny]] "acephalous" subject through which the act takes place as that which is "in him more than himself." Act thus designates the level at which the fundamental divisions and displacements usually associated with the "Lacanian subject"<iref>The Last SeductionThat is, the [[split]] between the subject of the [[enunciation]] and the subject of the [[enunciated]]/statement, the subject's "decenterment" with regard to the symbolic big Other, and so on.</iref>are momentarily suspended. In the act, Linda Fiorentinothe subject, as Lacan puts it, posits itself as its own cause and is no longer determined by the decentered object-cause. Thus if we subtract from it its scenic imagery, its [[fascination]] with the divine majesty, and reduce it to the essential, [[Kant]]'s gesture nevertheless does not quite fit well-known description of how a direct insight into the noumenal God as the Thing in itself would deprive us of our freedom and turn us into lifeless puppets paradoxically fits perfectly the description of a true the ethical act.<ref>"Instead of the [[conflict]] which now the [[moral]] disposition has to [[wage]] with inclinations and in which, insofar after some defeats, moral strength of mind may be gradually won, God and [[eternity]] in their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before our eyes... Thus most actions conforming to the law would be done from [[fear]], few would be done from hope, none from [[duty]]. The moral worth of our actions, on which alone the worth of the person and even of the world depends in the eyes of supreme wisdom, would not exist at all. The conduct of man, so long as his [[nature]] remained as she it is presented now, would be changed into mere [[mechanism]], where, as in a perfect demoniac beingpuppet show, as everything would gesticulate well but no life would be found in the subject with a diabolical will who [[figures]]." [[Immanuel Kant]], ''Critique of [[Practical]] Reason'' (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 152-153.</ref> This act is precisely something which unexpectedly "just occurs." It is perfectly aware of what she an occurrence which most surprises its agent itself.<ref>After an authentic act, my reaction is doing; she fully subjectivizes her actsalways, insofar as her Will "I myself do not [[know]] how I was able to do that - it just happened!"</ref> The paradox is at that in an authentic act, the highest freedom coincides with the level of her wicked deeds. As suchutmost [[passivity]], she remains with a reduction to a male fantasy: lifeless [[automaton]] who just blindly performs its gestures. The problematic of act thus compels us to accept the fantasy radical shift of encountering a perfect subject perspective involved in the guise modern notion of [[finitude]]. What is so difficult to accept is not the absolutely corrupted woman who fully knows fact that the true act - in which noumenal and wills what she phenomenal dimensions coincide - is doingforever out of our reach. The true trauma resides in the opposite awareness that there are acts, that they do occur and that we have to come to terms with them.<br><br>

Consequently, this Lacanian This shift is homologous to that implied in the Kierkegaardian notion of act also enables us to break with "sickness unto death." The "sickness unto death" proper, its despair, opposes the deconstructionist ethics standard despair of the irreducible finitude, of how our situation individual who is always split between the [[certainty]] that of a displaced beingdeath is the end, caught in a constitutive lack, so that all we can do there is to assume heroically this lack, to assume heroically no beyond of eternal life and the fact equal certainty that our situation death is not the last thing, that there is another life with its promise of being thrown into an impenetrable finite contextredemption and eternal bliss. The corollary "sickness unto death" rather involves the opposite paradox of this ethicsthe subject who [[knows]] that death is not the end, of coursethat he has an immortal soul, is that but cannot face the ultimate source exorbitant [[demands]] of totalitarian this fact - the [[necessity]] to abandon vain aesthetic pleasures and to work for his salvation - and other catastrophes so, desperately wants to believe that death is man's presumption the end, that he can overcome this condition of finitudethere is no divine unconditional [[demand]] exerting its pressure upon him. The standard [[religious]] je sais bien, lack and displacement, and mais quand meme is inverted here. It is not that "act like GodI know very well that I am a mere mortal [[living]] being," but I nonetheless desperately want to believe that there is redemption in a total transparency, surpassing his constitutive divisioneternal life. Lacan" It is rather that "I know very well that I have an eternal soul [[responsible]] to God's answer unconditional commandments, but I desperately want to this believe that there is that absolute/unconditional acts do occur[[nothing]] beyond death, I want to be relieved of the unbearable pressure of divine injunction." In other words, in contrast to the individual caught in the standard skeptical despair - i.e., the individual who knows he will die but not cannot accept it and hopes for eternal life - we have here, in the idealist guise case of a self-transparent gesture performed by a subject with a pure will who fully intends them. They occur"sickness unto death, on " the contraryindividual who desperately wants to die, as a totally unpredictable tucheto [[disappear]] forever, a miraculous event which shatters our lives. To put but knows that he cannot do it in somewhat pathetic terms, this that he is how condemned to eternal life. The predicament of the individual "divinesick unto death" dimension is present in our lives, and the different modalities same as that of ethical betrayal relate precisely to the different ways of betraying Wagnerian heroes, from the act-event. The true source of evil is not a finite mortal man who acts like God, but a man who disavows that divine miracles occur and reduces himself <i>Flying Dutchman</i> to just another finite mortal being.[15]Amfortas in <bri>Parsifal<br/i>, who desperately strive for death, for the final annihilation and self-obliteration which would relieve them of the hell of their "undead" existence.

Notes:<br><br> 1. Judith Butler, The Psychic Life In the criticism of Kant implicit in this notion of Power (Stanford: Stanford UPthe act, 1997). Numbers in parentheses refer Lacan is thus close to Hegel who also claimed that the pages unity of this bookthe noumenal and the phenomenal adjourned ad infinitum in Kant is precisely what takes place every time an authentic act is accomplished.<br>2. Butler demonstrates Kant's mistake was to presuppose that the Foucauldian "body" there is an act only insofar as the site of resistance it is none other than the Freudian adequately "psyche.subjectivized," Paradoxicallythat is, accomplished with a pure will, a will free of any "bodypathological" is Foucault's name for motivations. And, since one can never be sure that what I did was effectively motivated by the moral Law as its sole motive, the psychic apparatus insofar moral act turns into something which effectively never happens, but can only be posited as it resists the final point of an infinite asymptotic approach of the purification of the soul's domination. That is to sayFor this reason, whenKant, in order to [[guarantee]] the ultimate possibility of the act, had to propose his well-known definition postulate of the immortality of the soul , which, as it can be shown, effectively amounts to its very opposite, the Sadean fantasy of the immortality of the body.<ref>See Alenka [[Zupancic]], "prison [[The Subject]] of the bodyLaw," Foucault turns around SIC 2, ed. Slavoj Zizek (Durham: Duke UP, 1998).</ref> Only in such a way can one hope that, after endless approximation, one will reach the point of being able to accomplish a true moral act. The point of Lacan's criticism is thus that an authentic act does not presuppose its agent, the standard Platonicway Kant assumes with misleading self-Christian definition evidence, "at the level of the body as act" with his will purified of all pathological motivations. It is inevitable, then, that the agent is not "prison at the level of the soulits act," what for he calls is himself unpleasantly surprised by the "bodycrazy thing he just did" and is not simply the biological bodyunable fully to come to terms with what he did. This, incidentally, but is that which is already caught in some kind the usual structure of preheroic acts -subjective psychic apparatus._<br>3. Incidentallysomebody who, Butler here blatantly contradicts Lacan for whom the unconscious is "the Other's discoursea long time, led an opportunistic life of maneuvering and compromises, all of a sudden, inexplicably even to himself," i.e. symbolicresolves to stand firmly, not imaginarycost what it may. Is not Thus the paradox of the best known single line from Lacan act resides in the assertion fact that although it is not "the Unconscious is structured like a language?intentional" Slips and gaps are not for Lacan thoroughly symbolic facts. They confirm in the functioning usual sense of the signifying networkterm, it is nonetheless accepted as something for which its agent is fully responsible - "I cannot do otherwise, yet I am nonetheless fully free in doing it.<br>"

4. For exampleSo, apropos of the army life, such a "passionate attachment" is provided by if we [[return]] for a homosexual link which has brief [[moment]] to be disavowed if it is to remain operative. See Chapter 2 of Slavoj Zizek, <i>The Plague of FantasiesLast Seduction</i> (London: Verso, 1997).<br>5. One should link this opposition of attachment and dis-attachment to Linda Fiorentino's gesture nevertheless does not quite fit the old Freudian metapsychological opposition description of Life and Death drives. In The Ego and the Ida true ethical act, Freud defines these drives insofar as the opposition between the forces of connection/unity and the forces of disconnection/disunity. Dis-attachment she is thus death drive at its purestpresented as a perfect demoniac being, as the gesture subject with a diabolical will who is perfectly aware of ontological "derailment" which throws "out of joint" the order of Being. It what she is the gesture of disinvestmentdoing; she fully subjectivizes her acts, of "contraction"/withdrawal from being immersed in the world. The primordial attachment insofar as her Will is at the counter-move to this negative gesturelevel of her wicked deeds. In the last resortAs such, this negative tendency to disruption is none other than libido itselfshe remains a male fantasy: what throws the fantasy of encountering a perfect subject "out in the guise of joint" is none other than the traumatic encounter with <i>jouissance</i>.<br>6. See Jacques-Alain Miller, "Des Semblants dans la Relation Entre les Sexes," <i>La Cause Freudianne</i> 36 (1997): 7-15.<br>7. Lacan's other example absolutely corrupted woman who fully knows and wills what she is that of Andre Gide's wife who, after his death, burned all his love letters to her, considered by him his most precious possession._<br>8. I rely here on Kate Stables, British Film Institute, Londondoing.<br>

9. The fantasy Consequently, this Lacanian notion of act also enables us to break with the deconstructionist [[ethics]] of the irreducible finitude, of how our [[situation]] is always that of a displaced being, caught in a constitutive [[lack]], so that all-powerful woman whose irresistible attraction presents a threat not only we can do is to male dominationassume heroically this lack, but to assume heroically the very identity fact that our situation is that of being thrown into an impenetrable finite context. The corollary of this ethics, of the male subjectcourse, is that the ultimate source of totalitarian and other catastrophes is man's presumption that he can overcome this condition of finitude, lack and displacement, and "fundamental fantasyact like God," against which the male symbolic identity defines and sustains itself._<br>10. For in a detailed analysis of the scene from Wild at Hearttotal transparency, see Appendix 2 to Slavoj Zizeksurpassing his constitutive division. Lacan's <i>The Plague of Fantasies<answer to this is that absolute/i>.<br>11. That isunconditional acts do occur, but not in the split between the subject idealist guise of the enunciation and the subject of the enunciated/statement, the a self-transparent gesture performed by a subject's "decenterment" with regard to the symbolic big Othera pure will who fully intends them. They occur, and so on.<br>12. "Instead of the conflict which now the moral disposition has to wage with inclinations and in whichcontrary, after some defeatsas a totally unpredictable tuche, moral strength of mind may be gradually won, God and eternity in their awful majesty would stand unceasingly before a miraculous event which shatters our eyeslives... Thus most actions conforming to To put it in somewhat pathetic terms, this is how the law would be done from fear, few would be done from hope, none from duty. The moral worth of "divine" dimension is [[present]] in our actionslives, on which alone and the worth different modalities of ethical [[betrayal]] relate precisely to the person and even different ways of betraying the world depends in the eyes of supreme wisdom, would not exist at allact-event. The conduct true source of man, so long as his nature remained as it evil is now, would be changed into mere mechanism, where, as in not a puppet showfinite mortal man who acts like God, everything would gesticulate well but no life would be found in the figures." Immanuel Kant, <i>Critique of Practical Reason</i> (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 152-153.<br>13. After an authentic act, my reaction is always, "I myself do not know how I was able a man who disavows that divine miracles occur and reduces himself to do that - it just happened!"<br>14. See Alenka Zupancic, "The Subject of the Law," SIC 2, ed. Slavoj Zizek (Durham: Duke UP, 1998)another finite mortal being.<brref> 15. In a further elaboration, one should thus reread Lacan's matrix of the four [[discourses ]] as [[three ]] modes of coming to terms with the trauma of the [[analytic ]] act. The master's [[semblance ]] resides in the fact that he pretends to nominate and thus directly translate into the symbolic fidelity the dimension of the act. That is, the defining feature of the Master's gesture is to change the act into a new master-signifier. In contrast to the master, the [[hysteric ]] maintains the ambiguous attitude of division towards the act, insisting on the simultaneous necessity and impossibility of its [[symbolization]]. In contrast to both of them, the [[perverse ]] agent of the [[university ]] discourse disavows that the re there was the event of an act in the first place. By means of the [[chain ]] of [[knowledge]], he wants to reduce the consequences of the act to just another thing which can be explained away as part of the normal run of things.<br><br></fontref>

* [[From "Passionate Attachments" to Dis-identification]]. ''Umbr(a): Identity/Identification''. [[Number ]] 1. 1998. <http://www.gsa.buffalo.edu/lacan/zizekidentity.htm>. Also listed on ''[[Lacan.com]]''. <http://www.lacan.com/zizekpassionate.htm>.