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{{BSZ}} <b>The Antinomies of Tolerant [[Reason]]</b><BR>To many a Western historian of [[religion]], [[Islam ]] is a problem – how could it have emerged <i>after</i> [[Christianity]], the religion to end all [[religions]]? Its very geographic [[place ]] belies the cliché on [[Orientalism]]: much more than belonging to the Orient, the location of Islam makes it a fatal obstacle to the [[true ]] union of the East and the West – the point made exemplarily by Claude Levi-[[Strauss]]:

Today, it is behind Islam that I contemplate [[India]]; the India of [[Buddha]], prior to Muhammad who – for me as a European and because I am European – arises between our [[reflection ]] and the [[teachings ]] which are closest to it /…/ the hands of the East and the West, predestined to be joined, were kept apart by it. /.../<BR><BR>The West should [[return]] to the sources of its torn condition: by way of interposing itself between [[Buddhism]] and Christianity, Islam islamized us when, in the course of the Crusades, the West let itself be caught in the opposition to it and thus started to resemble it, instead of delivering itself – in the [[case]] of the inexistence of Islam – to the slow osmosis with Buddhism which would christianize us even more, in a [[sense]] which would have been all the more [[Christian]] insofar as we were to mount beyond Christianity itself. It is then that the West has lost its [[chance]] to remain [[woman]]. [[A Glance into the Archives of Islam#Notes|1]]</blockquote>

The West should return to This passage from the sources last pages of its torn condition: by way <i>Tristes tropiques</i> articulates the [[dream]] of interposing itself a direct [[communication]] and reconciliation between West and East, Christianity and Buddhism , [[male]] and Christianity[[female]] principles. Like a [[harmonious]] [[sexual]] [[relationship]], this direct contact would have been a chance for [[Europe]] to become [[feminine]]. Islam islamized us when, in served as the course of the Crusades, the West let [[screen]] interposing itself be caught in between the opposition to it and thus started to resemble ittwo, instead of delivering itself – in preventing the case rise of the inexistence of Islam a harmonious hermaphroditic [[world]] [[civilization]] – to the slow osmosis with Buddhism which would christianize us even moreits interposition, in a sense which would have been all the more Christian insofar as we were to mount beyond Christianity itself. It is then that the West has lost its last chance to remain “remain woman. <” (As we shall soon see, what this view fails to note is how Islam itself is grounded on a title="" name="_ftnref1" href="#_ftn1">disavowed [[femininity]], trying to get rid of the umbilical cord that [[links]] it to the feminine.) Islam thus functions as what [[1Freud]]called </ai>Liebesstoerer</fonti><: the intruder/font>obstacle of the harmonious [[sexual relationship]]. This harmonious relationship, of course, would have been the one under the predominance of femininity: the male West would have rejoined the feminine East and thus “remain woman,” locate itself within femininity.</pbr></blockquotebr>

<p align="justify"><font color="#73737b"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">This passage from the last pages of <i>Tristes tropiques</i> articulates the dream of a direct communication and reconciliation between West and East, Christianity and Buddhism, male and female principles. Like a harmonious sexual relationship, this direct contact would have been a chance for Europe to become feminine. Islam served as the screen interposing itself between the two, preventing the rise of a harmonious hermaphroditic world civilization – with its interposition, the West lost its last chance to “remain woman.” (As we shall soon see, what this view fails to note is how Islam itself is grounded on a disavowed femininity, trying to get rid of the umbilical cord that links it to the feminine.) Islam thus functions as what Freud called <i>Liebesstoerer</i>: the intruder/obstacle of the harmonious sexual relationship. This harmonious relationship, of course, would have been the one under the predominance of femininity: the male West would have rejoined the feminine East and thus “remain woman,” locate itself within femininity.<br><br> François Regnault defined [[Jews ]] as our <i>[[objet ]] a</i> - but are here not Muslims this a-sexual “partial “[[partial]] object”? We usually [[speak ]] of the [[Jewish]]-Christian civilization – perhaps, the [[time ]] has come, especially with [[regard ]] to the [[Middle East ]] [[conflict]], to talk [[about ]] the <i>Jewish-Muslim civilization</i> as an axis opposed to Christianity. ([[Recall ]] a surprising [[sign ]] of this deeper [[solidarity]]: after Freud published his <i>[[Moses]]</i> booklet in 1938 depriving Jews of their founding [[figure]], the most ferocious reactions to it came from the Muslim intellectuals in Egypt!) Was [[Hegel ]] not already on the trace of it with his insight into the speculative [[identity ]] of [[Judaism ]] and Islam? According to a commonplace, Judaism (like Islam) is a “pure” [[monotheism]], while Christianity, with its Trinity, is a compromise with polytheism; Hegel even designates Islam as THE “religion of sublimity” at its purest, as the universalization of the Jewish monotheism:</font></font></p>

<p align="justify"><font color="#73737b"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">In Mohammedanism the limited [[principle ]] of the Jews is expanded into [[universality ]] and thereby overcome. Here, God is no longer, as with the Asiatics, contemplated as existent in immediately sensuous mode but is apprehended as the one infinite [[sublime ]] [[Power ]] beyond all the [[multiplicity ]] of the world. Mohammedanism is, therefore, in the strictest sense of the world, the religion of sublimity. <a title="" name="_ftnref2" href="[[A Glance into the Archives of Islam#_ftn2">[Notes|2]]</a></font></font></pblockquote>

This, perhaps, explains why there is so much [[anti-Semitism]] in Islam: because of the extreme <i>proximity</i> of the two religions. In Hegelese, what Islam encounters in Judaism is ITSELF in its “[[oppositional determination]],” in the mode of [[particularity]]. The [[difference]] between Judaism and Islam is thus ultimately not substantial, but purely [[formal]]: they are the SAME religion in a different formal mode (in the sense in which [[Spinoza]] claims that the [[real]] dog and the [[idea]] of a dog are substantially one and the same [[thing]], just in a different mode).<a title="" [[name]]="_ftnref3" href="#_ftn3">[3]</blockquotea> - Against this, one should argue that it is Judaism which is an “abstract negation” of polytheism and, as such, still haunted by it (there is a [[whole]] series of clues pointing in this direction: “Jehovah” is a plural substantive; in one of his commandments, God prohibits Jews to celebrate [[other]] gods “in front of me,” not when [[outside]] of his [[gaze]]; etc.), while Christianity is the only true monotheism, since it includes [[self]]-differentiation into the One – its lesson is that, in [[order]] to have truly a One, you [[need]] THREE.<br><br>

So what is Islam, this disturbing [[excess]] that represents East for the West and West for the East? In his <p align="justify"i>La [[psychanalyse]] a l’epreuve de l’Islam<font color="#73737b"/i><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">This, perhaps, explains why there is so much anti-Semitism in Fethi Benslama [[A Glance into the Archives of Islam: because #Notes|4]] provides a systematic [[search]] for the “archive” of the extreme Islam, for its [[obscene]] [[secret]] [[mythical]] support which <i>proximityne cesse pas de ne pas s’ecrire</i> of and as such sustains the two religions[[explicit]] dogma. In HegeleseIs, for example, what Islam encounters in Judaism is ITSELF in its “oppositional determinationthe story of Hagar not Islam’s “[[archive]],” relating to Islam’s explicit teaching in the mode same way the Jewish secret [[tradition]] of Moses relates to explicit teachings of particularity. The difference between Judaism and Islam is thus ultimately not substantial? In his [[discussion]] of the [[Freudian]] figure of Moses, but purely formal: they are [[Eric Santner]] introduces the SAME religion in a different formal mode key [[distinction]] between [[symbolic]] [[history]] (in the sense in which Spinoza claims set of explicit mythical narratives and ideologico-[[ethical]] prescriptions that constitute the real dog and the idea tradition of a dog are substantially one and the same thing[[community]], just in a different mode).<a title=what Hegel would have called its "ethical substance" name=) and its obscene [[Other, the]] unacknowledgeable "_ftnref3[[spectral]]," href="#_ftn3">[3[fantasmatic]</a> - Against this] secret history that effectively sustains the explicit symbolic tradition, one should argue that but has to remain [[foreclosed]] if it is Judaism which is an “abstract negation” to be operative. [[A Glance into the Archives of Islam#Notes|5]]> What Freud endeavors to reconstitute in his Moses book (the story of the [[murder]] of polytheism andMoses, as etc.) is such, still haunted by it (there is a whole series spectral history that haunts the [[space]] of Jewish [[religious]] tradition. One becomes a [[full]] member of clues pointing in this direction: “Jehovah” is a plural substantive; in community not simply by [[identifying]] with its explicit symbolic tradition, but only when one also assumes the spectral [[dimension]] that sustains this tradition, the undead ghosts that haunt the [[living]], the secret history of his commandments[[traumatic]] [[fantasies]] transmitted "between the lines," through the [[lacks]] and distortions of the explicit symbolic tradition. Judaism's stubborn attachment to the unacknowledged violent founding gesture that haunts the [[public]] [[legal]] order as its spectral [[supplement]], God prohibits enabled the Jews to celebrate other gods “in front persist and survive for thousands of meyears without land and common institutional tradition: they refused to give up their [[ghost]],” not when outside to cut off the link to their secret, disavowed tradition. The [[paradox]] of his gaze; etc.), while Christianity Judaism is that it maintains fidelity to the only true monotheismfounding violent [[Event]] precisely by NOT confessing, since symbolizing it includes self-differentiation into : this "[[repressed]]" status of the One – Event is what gives Judaism its lesson is that, in order to have truly a One, you need THREEunprecedented vitality.<br><br>

So what Which, then, is the repressed Event which gives vitality to Islam? The key is provided by the reply to [[another]] question: how does Islam, this disturbing excess that represents East for the West and West for the East? In his <i>La psychanalyse a l’epreuve de l’Islam</i>, Fethi Benslama <a title="" name="_ftnref4" href="#_ftn4">[4[third]</a> provides a systematic search for ] Religion of the “archive” of IslamBook, for its obscene secret mythical support which <i>ne cesse pas de ne pas s’ecrire</i> and as such sustains fit into this series? Judaism is the explicit dogma. Isreligion of genealogy, for example, the story of Hagar not Islam’s “archivesuccession of generations; when,” relating to Islam’s explicit teaching in Christianity, the same way the Jewish secret tradition of Moses relates to explicit teachings of Judaism? In his discussion of Son dies on the Freudian figure of MosesCross, Eric Santner introduces this means that the key distinction between symbolic history [[Father]] also dies (as Hegel was fully aware) – the set of explicit mythical narratives and ideologico-ethical prescriptions that constitute patriarchal genealogical order as such dies, the Holy Spirit does not fit the tradition of [[family]] series, it introduces a post-paternal/familial community, what Hegel would have called its "ethical substance") . In contrast to both Judaism and its obscene OtherChristianity, the unacknowledgeable "spectraltwo other religions of the book," fantasmatic secret history that effectively sustains Islam excludes God from the [[domain]] of the explicit paternal [[logic]]: Allah is not a father, not even a symbolic traditionone – God is one, but has to remain foreclosed if it he is neither [[born]] nor does he give [[birth]] to be operative[[creatures]]. <i>There is no place for a title="" name="_ftnref5" href="#_ftn5">[5]Holy Family in Islam.</ai> What Freud endeavors to reconstitute This is why Islam emphasizes so much the fact that Muhammed himself was an orphan; this is why, in his Moses book (Islam, God intervenes precisely at the story moments of the murder suspension, [[withdrawal]], failure, “black-out,” of Moses, etcthe [[paternal function]] (when the [[mother]] or the [[child]] are abandoned or ignored by the [[biological]] father).) What this means is such a spectral history that haunts God remains thoroughly in the space domain of Jewish religious tradition. One becomes a full member of a community not simply by identifying with its explicit symbolic tradition, but only when one also assumes [[impossible]]-Real: he is the spectral dimension that sustains this traditionimpossible-Real outside father, the undead ghosts so that haunt there is a “genealogical desert between man and God”(320). This was the livingproblem with Islam for Freud, since his entire [[theory]] of religion is based on the secret history parallel of traumatic fantasies transmitted "between the linesGod with father. More importantly even," through this inscribes [[politics]] into the lacks and distortions very heart of Islam, since the explicit symbolic tradition. Judaism's stubborn attachment “genealogical desert” renders impossible to ground a community in the [[structures]] of parenthood or other blood-links: “the desert between God and Father is the unacknowledged violent founding gesture that haunts place where the public legal order as its spectral supplement[[political]] institutes itself”(320). With Islam, enabled it is no longer possible to ground a community in the Jews to persist and survive for thousands mode of years without land <i>[[Totem]] and common institutional tradition: they refused to give up their ghost[[Taboo]]</i>, to cut off through the link to their secret, disavowed tradition. The paradox murder of Judaism is that it maintains fidelity to the founding violent Event precisely by NOT confessing, symbolizing it: this "repressed" status of father and the Event is what gives Judaism its unprecedented vitalityensuing [[guilt]] as bringing brothers together – thence Islam’s unexpected actuality.<br><br>

Which, then, is the repressed Event which gives vitality In contrast to Islam? The key is provided by the reply to another question: how does Judaism and Islam, in which the third Religion sacrifice of the Book, fit into this series? Judaism son is the religion of genealogy, of succession of generations; when, prevented in Christianity, the Son dies on the Cross, this means that the Father also dies last [[moment]] (as Hegel was fully awareangel intervenes to [[Abraham]]) – the patriarchal genealogical order as such dies, the Holy Spirit does not fit the family series, it introduces a post-paternal/familial community. In contrast to both Judaism and <i>only Christianity, opts for the two other religions actual sacrifice (killing) of the book, Islam excludes God from the domain of the paternal logic: Allah is not a father, not even a symbolic one – God is one, he is neither born nor does he give birth to creatures. son</i>There is no place for a Holy Family in Islam.</i> (268) This is why , although Islam emphasizes so much recognizes the Bible as a sacred [[text]], it has to deny this fact that Muhammed himself was an orphan; this is why, : in Islam, God intervenes precisely at [[Jesus]] did not really die on the moments of Cross: the suspensionJews “said (in boast), withdrawal‘We killed [[Christ]] Jesus the son of Mary, failurethe Messenger of Allah’; but they killed him not, “black-outnor crucified him,” of the paternal function but so it was made to appear to them”(when the mother or the child are abandoned or ignored by the biological father4.157). What this means There is that God remains thoroughly effectively in the domain of impossibleIslam a consistent anti-Realsacrificial logic: he is in the impossible-Real outside fatherQuran version of Isaac’s sacrifice, so that there is a “genealogical desert between man and God”(320). This was the problem with Islam for Freud, since Abraham’s decision to kill his entire theory of religion son is based on read not as the parallel ultimate indication of God with father. More importantly even, this inscribes politics into the very heart of Islam, since the “genealogical desert” renders impossible his willingness to ground a community in do the structures of parenthood or other blood-links: “the desert between God and Father is the place where the political institutes itself”(320). With IslamGod’s will, it is no longer possible to ground but as a community in the mode consequence of Abraham’s <i>Totem and Taboowrong [[interpretation]] of his dream</i>, through : when the murder of angel prevents [[The Act|the father and the ensuing guilt as bringing brothers together – thence Islam’s unexpected actualityact]], his [[message]] is that Abraham got it wrong, that God did not really [[want]] him to do it.(275)<br><br>

In contrast to Judaism and Islam, in which the sacrifice of the son is prevented in the last moment (angel intervenes to Abraham), <i>only Christianity opts for the actual sacrifice (killing) of the son</i>. (268) This is why, although Islam recognizes the Bible as a sacred text, it has to deny this fact: in Islam, Jesus did not really die on the Cross: the Jews “said (in boast), ‘We killed Christ Jesus the son of Mary, the Messenger of Allah’; but they killed him not, nor crucified him, but so it was made to appear to them”(4.157). There is effectively in Islam a consistent anti-sacrificial logic: in the Quran version of Isaac’s sacrifice, Abraham’s decision to kill his son is read not as the ultimate indication of his willingness to do the God’s will, but as a consequence of Abraham’s <i>wrong interpretation of his dream</i>: when the angel prevents the act, his message is that Abraham got it wrong, that God did not really want him to do it.(275)<br><br> Insofar as, in Islam, God is an impossible-Real, this works both ways with regard to sacrifice: it can [[work ]] against sacrifice (there is no symbolic [[economy ]] of [[exchange ]] between the believers and Gods, God is the pure One of Beyond), but also in favour of sacrifice, when the divine Real turns into the [[superego ]] figure of “obscure gods who [[demand ]] continuous blood”([[Lacan]]-XI). Islam seems to oscillate between these two extremes, with the obscene sacrificial logic culminating in its redescription of the story of Abel and Cain – here is how <i>Quran</i> reports on “the [[truth ]] of the story of the two sons of Adam. Behold! they each presented a sacrifice (to Allah): It was accepted from one, but not from the other. Said the latter: ‘Be sure I will slay thee.’ ‘Surely,’ said the former, ‘Allah doth accept of the sacrifice of those who are righteous. If thou dost stretch thy hand against me, to slay me, it is not for me to stretch my hand against thee to slay thee: for I do [[fear ]] Allah, the cherisher of the worlds. For me, I intend to let thee draw on thyself my sin as well as thine, for thou wilt be among the companions of the fire, and that is the reward of those who do wrong.’<br><br>

So it is not only Cain who wants the killing: Abel himself actively participates in this [[desire]], provoking Cain to do it, so that he (Abel) would get rid of his own sins also. Benslama is [[right ]] to discern here traces of an “ideal “[[ideal]] [[hatred]],” different from the [[imaginary ]] hatred of the [[aggressivity ]] towards one’s [[double ]] (289): the [[victim ]] itself actively desires the crime whose victim it will be, so that, as a [[martyr]], it will enter Paradise, sending the perpetrator to burn in hell. From today’s perspective, one is tempted to play with the anachronistic [[speculation ]] on how the “terrorist” logic of the martyr’s [[wish ]] to die is already here, in <i>Quran</i> – although, of course, one has to locate the problem in the context of [[modernization]]. The problem of Islamic world is, as is well known, that, since it was exposed to Western modernization abruptly, without a proper time to “work through” the [[trauma ]] of its impact, to [[construct ]] a symbolic-fictional space/screen for it, the only possible reactions to this impact were either a superficial modernization, an imitated modernization destined to fail ([[Iran ]] Shah [[regime]]), or, in the failure of the proper symbolic space of fictions, a direct recourse to the violent Real, an outright war between Islam Truth and Western Lie, with no space for symbolic mediation. In this “fundamentalist” solution (a modern phenomenon with no direct links to Muslim traditions), the divine dimension reasserts itself in its [[SuperEgo|superego]]-Real, as a murderous explosion of sacrifical [[violence ]] to pay off the obscene [[SuperEgo|superego ]] divinity.<br><br>

A further key distinction between Judaism (together with its Christian continuation) and Islam is that, as we can see in the case of Abraham’s two sons, Judaism chooses Abraham as [[the symbolic ]] father, i.e., the [[phallic ]] solution of the paternal symbolic [[authority]], of the [[official ]] symbolic lineage, discarding the second woman, enacting a “phallic appropriation of the impossible”(153). Islam, on the contrary, opts for the lineage of Hagar, for Abraham as the biological father, maintaining the distance between father and God, retaining God in the domain of the Impossible.(149) <a title="" name="_ftnref6" href="[[A Glance into the Archives of Islam#_ftn6">[Notes|6]</a>]<br><br>

Both Judaism and Islam [[repress ]] their founding gestures – how? As the story of Abraham and his two sons with two different [[women ]] shows, in both Judaism and Islam, father can become father, assume the paternal function, only through the mediation of <i>another</i> woman. Freud’s hypothesis is that the [[repression ]] in Judaism concerns the fact that Abraham was a foreigner (an Egyptian), not a Jew – it is the founding paternal figure, the one who brings revelation and establishes the covenant with God, that has to come from the outside. With Islam, the repression concerns a woman (Hagar, the Egyptian [[slave ]] who gave to Abraham his first son): although Abraham and Ishmail (the progenitor of all Arabs, according to the [[myth]]) are mentioned dozens of [[times ]] in <i>Quran</i>, Hagar is unmentioned, erased from the official history. As such, however, she continues to haunt Islam, her traces surviving in [[rituals]], like the obligation of the pilgrims to Mecca to run six times between the two hills Safa and Marwah, a kind of [[neurotic ]] [[repetition]]/reenactment of Hagar’s desperate search for water for her son in the desert. - Here is, in <i>Genesis</i>, the story of Abraham’s two sons, this key umbilical link between Judaism and Islam – first, the Birth of Ishmael:</font></font></p>

<blockquote><p align="justify"><font color="#73737b"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">Now Sarai, Abram’s wife, had not given birth to any [[children]], but she had an Egyptian servant named Hagar. So Sarai said to Abram, ‘Since the Lord has prevented me from having children, have [[sexual relations ]] with my servant. Perhaps I can have a family by her.’ Abram did what Sarai told him.<br> <BR>So after Abram had lived in Canaan for ten years, Sarai, Abram’s wife, gave Hagar, her Egyptian servant, to her husband to be his wife. He had sexual relations with Hagar, and she became pregnant. Once Hagar realized she was pregnant, she despised Sarai. Then Sarai said to Abram, ‘You have brought this wrong on me! I allowed my servant to have sexual relations with you, but when she realized that she was pregnant, she despised me. May the Lord judge between you and me!’<br> <BR>Abram said to Sarai, ‘Since your servant is under your authority, do to her whatever you [[think ]] best.’ Then Sarai treated Hagar harshly, so she ran away from Sarai. The Lord’s angel found Hagar near a spring of water in the desert – the spring that is along the road to Shur. He said, ‘Hagar, servant of Sarai, where have you come from, and where are you going?’ She replied, ‘I’m running away from my mistress, Sarai.’<br> <BR>Then the Lord’s angel said to her, ‘Return to your mistress and submit to her authority. I will greatly multiply your descendants,’ the Lord’s angel added, ‘so that they will be too numerous to count.’ Then the Lord’s angel said to her,<br> lsquo;<BR>"You are now pregnant and are about to give birth to a son. You are to name him Ishmael, for the Lord has heard your painful groans. He will be a wild donkey of a man. He will be hostile to everyone, and everyone will be hostile to him. He will live away from his brothers."<BR><BR>So Hagar named the Lord who spoke to her, ‘You are the God who sees me,’ for she said, ‘Here I have seen the one who sees me!’<BR><BR>That is why the well was called Beer Lahai Roi. (It is located between Kadesh and Bered.)<br><BR>So Hagar gave birth to Abram’s son, whom Abram named Ishmael. ”(16:1-16:15)<br><BR>After the miraculous birth of [[Isaac]], whose immaculate conception seems to point forward to Christ ([[Good]] “ visited Sarah” and made her pregnant), when the child was old enough to be weaned, Abraham prepared a great feast:<br><BR>But Sarah noticed the son of Hagar the Egyptian – the son whom Hagar had borne to Abraham – mocking. So she said to Abraham, ‘Banish that slave woman and her son, for the son of that slave woman will not be an heir along with my son Isaac!’<br><BR>Sarah’s demand displeased Abraham greatly because Ishmael was his son. But God said to Abraham, ‘Do not be upset about the boy or your slave wife. Do all that Sarah is telling you because through Isaac your descendants will be counted. But I will also make the son of the slave wife into a great [[nation]], for he is your descendant too.’<br><BR>Early in the morning Abraham took some food and a skin of water and gave [[them]] to Hagar. He put them on her shoulders, gave her the child, and sent her away. So she went wandering aimlessly through the wilderness of Beer Sheba. When the water in the skin was gone, she shoved the child under one of the shrubs. Then she went and sat down by herself across from him at quite a distance, about a bowshot away; for she [[thought]], ‘I refuse to watch the child die.’ So she sat across from him and wept uncontrollably.<br><BR>But God heard the boy’s [[voice]]. The angel of God called to Hagar from heaven and asked her, ‘What is the matter, Hagar? Don’t be afraid, for God has heard the boy’s voice right where he is crying. Get up! [[Help]] the boy up and hold him by the hand, for I will make him into a great nation.’ Then God enabled Hagar to see a well of water. She went over and filled the skin with water, and then gave the boy a drink.”(21:10-21:19)</blockquote>

So Hagar named the Lord who spoke to her, ‘You are the God who sees me,’ for she said, ‘Here I have seen the one who sees me!’<a name="Ge_16:14"><In &lt;i&gt;Galatians 2&lt;/a> That is why the well was called Beer Lahai Roi. (It is located between Kadesh and Bered.)<br> So Hagar gave birth to Abram’s soni&gt;, whom Abram named Ishmael. ”(16:1-16:15)<br> After [[Paul]] provides the miraculous birth Christian version of IsaacAbraham, whose immaculate conception seems to point forward to Christ (Good “ visited Sarah” Sarah and made her pregnant), when the child was old enough to be weaned, Abraham prepared a great feastHagar:<br> But Sarah noticed the son of Hagar the Egyptian – the son whom Hagar had borne to Abraham – mocking. So she said to Abraham, ‘Banish that slave woman and her son, for the son of that slave woman will not be an heir along with my son Isaac!’<br> Sarah’s demand displeased Abraham greatly because Ishmael was his son. But God said to Abraham, ‘Do not be upset about the boy or your slave wife. Do all that Sarah is telling you because through Isaac your descendants will be counted. But I will also make the son of the slave wife into a great nation, for he is your descendant too.’<br>

Early in <blockquote>Tell me, you who want to be under the law, do you not [[understand]] the morning law? For it is written that Abraham took some food had two sons, one by the slave woman and a skin of water and gave them to Hagarthe other by the free woman. He put them on her shouldersBut one, the son by the slave woman, was born by [[natural]] descent, while the other, gave her the childson by the free woman, and sent her away. So she went wandering aimlessly was born through the wilderness of Beer Shebapromise. These things may be treated as an allegory, for these women [[represent]] two covenants. One is from Mount Sinai bearing children for slavery; this is Hagar. When Now Hagar represents Mount Sinai in Arabia and corresponds to the water [[present]] Jerusalem, for she is in slavery with her children. But the skin was goneJerusalem above is free, and she shoved the child under one of the shrubsis our mother. Then she went For it is written:<br>‘Rejoice, O barren woman who does not bear children; break forth and sat down by herself across from him at quite a distanceshout, about a bowshot away; for she thoughtyou who have no birth pains, ‘I refuse to watch because the children of the desolate woman are more numerous than those of the child diewoman who has a husband.’ So she sat across from him and wept uncontrollably.<br> But God heard you, brothers and sisters, are children of the boy’s voicepromise like Isaac. The angel of God called But just as at that time the one born by natural descent persecuted the one born according to Hagar from heaven and asked herthe Spirit, ‘What so it is now. But what does the matter, Hagarscripture say? Don’t be afraid‘Throw out the slave woman and her son, for God has heard the boy’s voice right where he is crying. Get up! Help son of the slave woman will not share the boy up and hold him by inheritance with the hand, for I will make him into a great nation.’ Then God enabled Hagar to see a well son’ of waterthe free woman. She went over Therefore, brothers and filled sisters, we are not children of the skin with water, and then gave slave woman but of the boy a drinkfree woman.”(4:21:10-214:1931)</font></font></p></blockquote>

Paul [[stages]] here a clear symmetrical confrontation here: Isaac versus Ishmail equals [[The Symbolic|the symbolic]] father ([[Name-of-the-Father]]) versus the biological (racial) father, “the origin through name and spirit versus origin through substantial transmission of life”(147), child of the free woman versus child of the slave, child of spirit versus child of flesh. This [[reading]], however, has to simplify the [[biblical]] [[narrative]] in (at least) [[three]] crucial points:<br><br>(1) God’s obvious care for Hagar and Ishmail, his [[intervention]] to save Ishmail’s [[life]];<br><br>(2) the extraordinary characterization of Hagar as not simply a woman of flesh and lust, a worthless slave, but the one who SEES God (“So Hagar named the Lord who spoke to her, ‘You are the God who sees me,’ for she said, ‘Here I have seen the one who sees me!’”). Hagar as the excluded second woman, outside symbolic genealogy, stands not only for the pagan (Egyptian) fertility of Life, but also for a direct access to God – she directly sees God himself [[seeing]], which was not given even to Moses to whom God had to appear as a burning [[bush]]. As such, Hagar announces the mystical/feminine access to God (developed later in Sufism).<br><br>(3) the (not only narrative) fact that the [[choice]] (between flesh and spirit) cannot ever be confronted directly, as a choice between the two simultaneous options. For Sarah to get a son, Hagar has first to get hers, i.e., there is a [[necessity]] of succession, of repetition, here, as if, in order to [[chose]] spirit, we first have to chose flesh – only the second son can be the true son of spirit. This necessity is what symbolic [[castration]] is about: “castration” means that the direct access to Truth is impossible- as Lacan put it, <p justify=i>la verite surgit de la meprise</i>, the way to Spirit is only through Flesh, etc. Recall Hegel's [[analysis]] of phrenonolgy which closes the chapter on "Observing Reason" align="justify&gt;In &lt;in his <i&gt;Galatians 2&lt;>[[Phenomenology]] of Spirit</i&gt;>: Hegel resorts here to a [[metaphor]] which concerns precisely [[phallus]], Paul provides the Christian version [[organ]] of Abrahampaternal insemination, Sarah in order to explain the opposition of the two possible readings of the proposition "the [[Spirit is a Bone|Spirit is a bone]]" (the vulgar [[materialist]] "reductionist" reading - the shape of our skull effectively and directly determines the features of a man's [[mind]] - and the speculative reading - the spirit is strong enough to assert its identity with the utmost inert stuff and Hagarto "sublate" it, i.e. even the utmost inert stuff cannot escape the Spirit's power of mediation). The vulgar materialist reading is like the approach which sees in phallus only the organ of urination, while the speculative reading is also able to discern in it the much higher function of insemination (i.e. precisely "conception" as the biological [[anticipation]] of [[concept]]):&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;<blockquote&gt;&lt;p align="><font color="#73737b"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">Tell me, you who want to be under The depth which the law, do you not understand Spirit brings forth from within - but only as far as its picture-[[thinking]] [[consciousness]] where it lets it remain - and the law? For [[ignorance]] of this consciousness about what it really is written that Abraham had two sonssaying, one by are the slave woman and same conjunction of the other by the free woman. But one, the son by the slave woman, was born by natural descent, while the other, the son by the free woman, was born through the promise. These things may be treated as an allegory, for these women represent two covenants. One is from Mount Sinai bearing children for slavery; this is Hagar. Now Hagar represents Mount Sinai in Arabia high and corresponds to the present Jerusalemlow which, for she is in slavery with her children. But the Jerusalem above is freeliving [[being]], and she is our mother. For [[Nature]] naively expresses when it is written:<br> ‘Rejoice, O barren woman who does not bear children; break forth and shout, you who have no birth painscombines the organ of its highest fulfillment, because the children organ of generation, with the desolate woman are more numerous than those organ of the woman who has a husbandurination.’<br> But youThe [[infinite judgment]], brothers and sistersqua infinite, are children would be the fulfillment of the promise like Isaac. But just as at life that time the one born by natural descent persecuted the one born according to comprehends itself; the Spirit, so it is now. But what does the scripture say? ‘Throw out the slave woman and her son, for the son consciousness of the slave woman will not share the inheritance with infinite judgment that remains at the son’ level of the free womanpicture-thinking behaves as urination. Therefore, brothers and sisters, we are not children of [[A Glance into the slave woman but Archives of the free woman.”(4:21-4:31)Islam#Notes|7]]</font></font></pblockquote>

<p align="justify"><font color="#73737b"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">Paul stages here a A close reading of this passage makes it clear symmetrical confrontation here: Isaac versus Ishmail equals the symbolic father (Name-of-the-Father) versus the biological (racial) fatherthat Hegel's point is NOT that, “the origin through name and spirit versus origin through substantial transmission of life”(147), child of the free woman versus child of the slave, child of spirit versus child of flesh. This reading, however, has to simplify the biblical narrative in (at least) three crucial points:<br><br> (1) God’s obvious care for Hagar and Ishmail, his intervention contrast to save Ishmail’s life;<br><br> (2) the extraordinary characterization of Hagar as not simply a woman of flesh and lust, a worthless slave, but the one who SEES God (“So Hagar named the Lord who spoke to her, ‘You are the God who sees me,’ for she said, ‘Here I have seen the one who vulgar empiricist mind which sees me!’”). Hagar as the excluded second woman, outside symbolic genealogy, stands not only for the pagan (Egyptian) fertility of Life, but also for a direct access to God – she directly sees God himself seeing, which was not given even to Moses to whom God had to appear as a burning bush. As such, Hagar announces the mystical/feminine access to God (developed later in Sufism).<br><br> (3) the (not only narrative) fact that the choice (between flesh and spirit) cannot ever be confronted directlyurination, as a choice between the two simultaneous options. For Sarah to get a son, Hagar proper speculative attitude has first to get hers, ichoose insemination.e., there is a necessity of succession, of repetition, here, as if, in order to chose spirit, we first have to chose flesh – only the second son can be the true son of spirit. This necessity is what symbolic castration The paradox is about: “castration” means that the direct access to Truth choice of insemination is impossible- as Lacan put it, <i>la verite surgit de la meprise</i>, the infallible way to Spirit miss it: it is only through Flesh, etc. Recall Hegel's analysis of phrenonolgy which closes not possible to choose directly the chapter on "Observing Reasontrue [[meaning]]" in his <, i>Phenomenology of Spirit</i>: Hegel resorts here .e. one HAS to a metaphor which concerns precisely phallus, the organ of paternal insemination, in order to explain the opposition of the two possible readings of begin by making the proposition "the Spirit is a bonewrong" choice (the vulgar materialist "reductionist" reading - the shape of our skull effectively and directly determines the features of a man's mind urination) - and the true speculative meaning emerges only through the repeated reading , as the after- effect (or by-product) of the spirit is strong enough to assert its identity with the utmost inert stuff and to first, "sublatewrong," itreading… and, we may add, i.e. even the utmost inert stuff cannot escape the Spirit's power of mediation). The vulgar materialist reading is like the approach which sees in phallus Sarah can get her child only the organ of urination, while the speculative reading is also able to discern in it the much higher function of insemination (i.eafter Hagar gets hers. precisely "conception" as the biological anticipation of concept):</fontbr></font></pbr>

<blockquote><p align="justify"><font color="#73737b"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">The depth which Where, precisely, is here castration? Prior to Hagar’s entry on the [[scene]], Sarah, the Spirit brings forth from within phallic- but only as far as its picture-thinking consciousness where it lets it remain - and patriarchal woman, remains barren, infertile, precisely because she is too powerful/phallic; so the ignorance of this consciousness about what it really opposition is saying, are not simply the same conjunction opposition of the high Sarah, fully submitted to patriarchal/phallic order, and the low whichHagar, in the living beingindependent and subversive, Nature naively expresses when it combines the organ of its highest fulfillmentis inherent to Sarah herself, the organ of generationher two aspects (phallic arrogance, with the organ of urination[[maternal]] service). The infinite judgmentIt is Sarah herself who is too powerful, qua infinitebossy, would and had to be the fulfillment humiliated through Hagar in order to get a child and thereby enter patriarchal genealogic order. This castration of life that comprehends itself; hers is signalled through the consciousness of the infinite judgment that remains at the level of picture-thinking behaves as urination. <a title="" name="_ftnref7" href="#_ftn7">[7[change]]</a></font></font></p></blockquote><p align="justify"><font color="#73737b"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">A close reading of this passage makes it clear that Hegel's point is NOT thather name, in contrast from Sarai to the vulgar empiricist mind which sees Sarah. Is, however, only urinationSarah [[castrated]]? Is also Abraham not castrated? With Hagar, the proper speculative attitude has to choose insemination. The paradox is that the direct choice of insemination he is the infallible way able to miss it: it is not possible to choose conceive a child directly the "true meaning"-[[biologically]], i.e. one HAS to begin by making but outside the "wrong" choice (proper genealogy of urination) - the true speculative meaning emerges symbolic lineage; this becomes possible only through the repeated reading, as the after-effect (or by-product) [[external]] intervention of the first, "wrong," reading… God who “visits Sarah” – this gap between symbolic and, we may add, Sarah can get her child only after Hagar gets hersbiologic [[paternity]] IS castration.<br><br>

WhereThe choice of Hagar, preciselythe independent seer of God, is here castration? Prior to Hagar’s entry on over the scene, docile housewife Sarah, in Islam provides the phallic-patriarchal womanfirst hint of the insufficiency of the standard [[notion]] of Islam, remains barrenthat of an extreme [[masculine]] monotheism, infertilethe collective of brothers from which women are excluded and have to be veiled, precisely because she since their “monstration” is too powerfulas such excessive, disturbing/phallic; so provoking men, diverting them from their service to God. Recall the ridiculous Taliban [[prohibition]] of metal heels for women – as if, even if women are entirely covered with cloth, the opposition clinging sound of their heels would still provoke men… There is not simply the opposition , however, a whole series of Sarahfeatures which disturb this standard notion. First, fully submitted the need to patriarchalkeep women veiled implies an <i>extremely sexualized</phallic order, and Hagar, independent and subversive, it i> [[universe]] in which the very [[encounter]] of a woman is a provocation that any man is inherent unable to Sarah herself, her two aspects (phallic arrogance, maternal service)resist. It Repression has to be so strong because sex itself is Sarah herself who so strong - what a [[society]] is too powerful, bossythis in which the click of metal heels can make men explode with lust? A newspaper report a couple of years ago, a non-related young woman and had to be humiliated through Hagar man were caught for a couple of hours in order to get a child and thereby enter patriarchal genealogic orderwire-gondola because the [[machine]] broke down. This castration Although [[nothing]] happened, the woman killed herself afterwards: the very idea of being alone with a foreign man for hours renders the idea that “nothing happens” unthinkable… No wonder that, in the course of the analysis of hers is signalled through the change famous “Signorelli” dream in his <i>[[Psychopathology]] of her nameEveryday Life</i>, Freud reports it was an old Muslim from Sarai to Sarah. Is, however, Bosnia and Herzegovina who imparts him the “wisdom” of sex as the only Sarah castrated? Is also Abraham not castrated? With Hagar, he thing that makes life worth living: “Once a man is no longer able to conceive a child directly-biologicallyhave sex, but outside the proper genealogy of symbolic lineage; this becomes possible only through the external intervention of God who “visits Sarah” – this gap between symbolic and biologic paternity IS castrationthing that remains is to die.”&nbsp;<br><br>

The choice Second, there is the very pre-history of Islam, with Hagar, the independent seer primordial mother of Godall Arabs, over unmentioned in Quran; plus the docile housewife Sarahstory of Muhammed himself, in Islam provides the with Khadija (his first hint of wife) as the insufficiency of one who enabled him to draw the standard notion line of Islam, that of an extreme masculine monotheism[[separation]] between truth and lie, between the collective of brothers messages from angel and those from which women demon. There are excluded and have cases where the divine messages Mohammed received come dangerously closed to be veiledself-serving fabrications, since their “monstration” is as such excessivethe best-known among them being his [[marriage]] with Zaynab, disturbing/provoking menhis adopted son Zayd’s wife. After seeing her half-naked, diverting them from their service Mohammed began to Godcovet her passionately; after Zayd became aware of it, he dutifully “repudiated” (divorced) her, so that his stepfather could move in and marry her. Recall the ridiculous Taliban prohibition of metal heels for women – as ifUnfortunately, even if women are entirely covered with clothunder Arab customary law, the clinging sound of their heels would still provoke men… There issuch a union was prohibited, howeverbut – surprise, surprise! – Mohammed soon got a whole series of features timely revelation in which disturb Allah exempted Mohammed from this standard notion. First, the need to keep women veiled implies an law (<i>extremely sexualizedQuran</i> universe in which the very encounter of a woman is a provocation that any man is unable to resist33:37, 33:50). Repression has to be so strong because sex itself There is so strong - what a society is this in which the click of metal heels can make men explode with lust? A newspaper report a couple of years ago, a non-related young woman and man were caught for a couple even an element of hours in a wire-gondola because the machine broke down. Although nothing happened, the woman killed herself afterwards: the very idea of being alone with a foreign man for hours renders the idea that “nothing happens” unthinkable… No wonder that, in the course of the analysis of the famous “Signorelli” dream in his <i>Psychopathology of Everyday LifeUr-Vater</i>in Mohammed her, Freud reports it was an old Muslim from Bosnia and Herzegovina who imparts him the “wisdom” of sex as the only thing that makes life worth living: “Once a man is no longer able to have sex, the only thing that remains is to diefather figure possessing all women in his large family.”&nbsp;<br><br>

SecondHowever, there a good argument for Mohammed’s basic sincerity is that he himself was the very pre-history of Islam, with Hagar, first to [[doubt]] radically the primordial mother divine nature of all Arabshis visions, unmentioned in Quran; plus the story dismissing them as [[hallucinatory]] [[signs]] of Muhammed himself, with Khadija (his first wife) [[madness]] or as the one who enabled him to draw the line outright cases of separation between truth and lie, between the messages from angel and those from demondemonic possession. There are cases where His first revelation occurred in during his Ramadhaan retreat outside Mecca: he saw the divine messages Mohammed received come dangerously closed to self-serving fabricationsarchangel Gabriel, the best-known among them being his marriage with Zaynab, his adopted son Zayd’s wife. After seeing her half-naked, Mohammed began calling upon him to covet her passionately; after Zayd became aware of it, he dutifully “repudiated” (divorced) her, so that his stepfather could move in and marry her. Unfortunately, under Arab customary law, such a union was prohibited, but – surprise, surprise“Recite! – Mohammed soon got a timely revelation in which Allah exempted Mohammed from this law ” (<i>QuranQarâ’</i> 33:37, 33:50). There is even an element of whence <i>Ur-VaterQur’ân</i> in ). Mohammed herthought he was going mad, and since he didn’t want to spend the rest of his life as Mecca’s village idiot, preferring [[death]] to disgrace, he decided to throw himself from a father figure possessing all women high rock. But then the [[vision]] repeated itself: he heard a voice from above saying: “O Mohammed! Thou art the apostle of God and I am Gabriel.” But even this voice did not reassure him, so he slowly returned to his house and, in deep despair, asked Khadija, his large familyfirst wife (as well as the first believer in him): "Wrap me in a blanket, wrap me up in a blanket." She wrapped him up, and then Muhammed told her what had happened to him: "My life is in [[danger]]." Khadija dutifully solaced him.<br><br>

HoweverWhen, a good argument for Mohammed’s basic sincerity is that he himself was during the following visions of the first archangel Gabriel, Mohammad’s doubts persisted, Khadija asked him to doubt radically the divine nature of notify her when his visionsvisitant returned, dismissing them as hallucinatory signs of madness so that they could verify whether he really was Gabriel or as outright cases of demonic possessionan ordinary demon. His first revelation occurred in during his Ramadhaan retreat outside MeccaSo, next time, Mohammed said to Khadija: he saw the archangel “This is Gabrielwho has just come to me.” “Get up and sit by my [[left]] thigh.” Mohammad did so, calling upon and she said: “Can you see him to “Recite!?” “Yes.” (<i>Qarâ’</i>, whence <i>Qur’ân</i>)“Then turn round and sit on my right thigh. Mohammed thought he was going mad” He did so, and since she said: “Can you see him?” When he said that he didn’t want could, Khadija finally she asked him to spend the rest of his life as Mecca’s village idiotmove and sit in her lap, and, preferring death to disgraceafter disclosing her [[form]] and casting aside her [[veil]], asked again: “Can you see him?” And he decided to throw himself from a high rockreplied: “No. But ” She then the vision repeated itselfcomforted him: “Rejoice and be of good heart, he heard is an angel and not a voice from above saying: “O Mohammed! Thou art the apostle of God and I am Gabriel[[Satan]].” But even &nbsp;(There is a further version of this voice did not reassure him, so he slowly returned to his house andstory in which, in deep despairthe final [[test]], asked Khadijanot only revealed herself, his first wife but made Mohammad “come [[inside]] her shift” (as well as the first believer in himpenetrate her sexually): "Wrap me in a blanket, wrap me up in a blanketand thereupon Gabriel departed." She wrapped him up, and then Muhammed told her what had happened she said to him: "My life the apostle of God, ‘This verily is an angel and not a satan.’” The underlying assumption is in dangerthat, while a lustful demon would have enjoyed the [[sight]] of copulation, an angel would politely withdraw from the scene." ) Only after Khadija dutifully solaced himprovided Muhammed with this proof of the genuineness of his meeting with Gabriel, was Mohammed cured of his doubts and could embark upon his career as God’s spokesman.[[A Glance into the Archives of Islam#Notes|8]]<br><br>

When, during the following visions Muhammed thus first experienced his revelations as signs of the archangel Gabriel, Mohammad’s doubts persisted, Khadija asked him poetic [[hallucinations]] – his immediate reaction to notify her when his visitant returned, so that they could verify whether he really them was Gabriel or an ordinary demon. So, next time, Mohammed said to Khadija: “This is Gabriel who has just come “Now none of God’s creatures was more hateful to methan an ecstatic poet or a man possessed.” “Get up and sit by my left thigh.” Mohammad did soThe one who saved him from this unbearable uncertainty, and she said: “Can you see him?” “Yes.” “Then turn round and sit on my right thigh.” He did soas well as from the [[role]] of a [[social]] outcast, and she said: “Can you see him?” When he said that he coulda village idiot, Khadija finally she asked him to move and sit the first believer in her laphis message, andthe first Muslim, after disclosing her form and casting aside her veilwas Khadija, asked again: “Can you see him?” And he replied: “No<i>a woman</i>.In the above scene, she is the [[Lacanian]] “[[big Other]],” She then comforted him: “Rejoice the [[guarantee]] of Truth of the subject’s [[enunciation]], and be it is only in the guise of good heartthis circular support, through someone who beliefs in Muhammed, that he is an angel can believe in his own message and not thus serve as a Satanmessenger of Truth to believers.”&nbsp;(There [[Belief]] is a further version of this story never direct: in whichorder for me to believe, somebody else has to believe in the final test, Khadija not only revealed herself, but made Mohammad “come inside her shift” (penetrate her sexually)me, and thereupon Gabriel departedwhat I believe in is this others’ believe in me. Recall the proverbial doubtful hero, and she said to the apostle [[leader]], or other figure of Godauthority, ‘This verily is an angel and not a satan.’” The underlying assumption is thatwho, while a lustful demon would have enjoyed the sight of copulationalthough desperate, an angel would politely withdraw from the scene.fulfils his mission because [[others]] (his followers) Only after Khadija provided Muhammed with this proof of believe in him, and he cannot bear the genuineness prospect of his meeting with Gabriel, was Mohammed cured of his doubts and could embark upon his career as God’s spokesmandisappointing them. <Is there a title="" name="_ftnref8" href="#_ftn8">stronger pressure than the one we [[8experience]]</a>when an innocent child looks into our eyes and says: “But I believe in you!”<br><br>

Muhammed thus first experienced his revelations as signs Years ago, some feminists (Mary Ann Doanne) accused Lacan of poetic hallucinations – his immediate reaction to them wasprivileging male desire: “Now none of God’s creatures was more hateful it is only men who can fully directly [[desire,]] while women can only desire to me than an ecstatic poet or a man possesseddesire, hysterically imitate as desire.” The With regard to belief, one should turn things around: women believe, while men believe those who saved him from this unbearable uncertainty, as well as from the role of believe in them. <a social outcast, title="" name="_ftnref9" href="#_ftn9">[9]</a village idiot, and the first believer in his message, > The underlying topic is here that of the first Muslim, was Khadija, <i>objet [[petit a woman]]</i>. In : the above scene, she is the Lacanian “big Otherother who “believes in me” sees in me something more than myself,” the guarantee something of Truth of the subject’s enunciationwhich I myself am not aware, and it is only in the guise of this circular support, through someone who beliefs in Muhammed, that he can believe in his own message and thus serve as <i>[[objet a messenger of Truth to believers. Belief is never direct: ]]</i> in order for me . According to believeLacan, somebody else has woman is for men reduced to believe in me, and <i>objet a</i> – what I believe in if it is this others’ believe in me. Recall the proverbial doubtful hero, leader, or other figure way round? What if a man desires his [[object]] of authoritydesire, whounaware of the [[cause]] that makes him desire it, although desperate, fulfils his mission because others while a woman is more directly focused on the (his followersobject-) believe in him, and he cannot bear the prospect [[cause of disappointing them. Is there a stronger pressure than the one we experience when an innocent child looks into our eyes and says: “But I believe in you!”desire]]?<br><br>

Years ago, some feminists (Mary Ann Doanne) accused Lacan of privileging male desire: it is only men who can fully directly desire, while women can only desire to desire, hysterically imitate as desire. With regard to belief, one This feature should turn things aroundbe given all its weight: women believe, while men believe those who believe in them. <a title="" name="_ftnref9" href="#_ftn9">woman possesses a [[9knowledge]</a> The underlying topic ] about the truth which precedes even the prophet’s own knowledge. - What further complicates the picture is here that the precise mode of Khadija’s intervention, the way she was able to draw the line of separation between truth and lie, between divine revelation and demonic possession: by way of <i>objet petit a</i>: the other who “believes in me” sees in me something more than myselfputting forward (interposing) herself, something of which I myself am not awareher disclosed [[body]], as the <i>objet auntruth embodied</i> in me. According to Lacan, woman is for men reduced the temptation to <i>objet a</i> – what if it is the other way round? What if true angel. Woman: a man desires his object of desirelie which, at its best, unaware [[knows]] herself as lie embodied. Opposite of the cause that makes him desire itSpinoza, while a woman is more directly focused on the (object-) cause of desire?truth as its own and lie’s [[index]] – here lie its own and truth’s index.<br><br>

This feature should be given all its weight: a woman possesses a knowledge about is how Khadija’s demonstration of truth is achieved through her provocative “monstration” (disclosure, exposure). (207) One thus cannot simply oppose the truth which precedes even “good” Islam (reverence of women) and the prophet’s own knowledge“bad” Islam (veiled oppressed women). - What further complicates So the picture point is not to simply return to the precise mode “repressed [[feminist]] origins” of Khadija’s interventionIslam, to renovate Islam in its feminist aspect by way of this return: these oppressed origins are simultaneously the way she was able very origins of the oppression of women. Oppression does not just oppress the origins, it has to draw oppress ITS OWN origins. The key element of the line genealogy of separation between truth Islam is this passage from the woman as the only one who can verify Truth itself, and the woman who by her nature lacks reason and lie[[faith]], between divine revelation cheats and demonic possession: by way of <i>putting forward (lies, provokes men, interposing) herself, her disclosed body, between them and God as the untruth embodied</i>a disturbing [[stain]], the temptation and who therefore has to a true angel. Woman: a lie whichbe erased, at its bestrendered invisible, knows herself as lie embodied. Opposite of Spinozacontrolled, truth as its own and lie’s index – here lie its own and truth’s indexsince her excessive [[enjoyment]] threatens to engulf men.<br><br>

This Woman as such is how Khadija’s demonstration of truth is achieved through an [[ontological]] scandal, her provocative “monstration” (disclosure, public exposure)is an affront to God. (207) One thus cannot simply oppose the “good” Islam (reverence of women) and the “bad” Islam (veiled oppressed women). So the point She is not to simply return to the “repressed feminist origins” of Islamerased, to renovate Islam but re-admitted in its feminist aspect by way of this return: these oppressed origins a closely controlled universe whose fantasmatic foundations are simultaneously most clearly discernible in the very origins myth of the oppression of women. Oppression does not just oppress eternal virgin: the origins(in)famous <i>houris</i>, it has to oppress ITS OWN originsvirgins awaiting martyrs in Paradise, never lose their virginity – after every penetration, their hymen is magically restored. The key element [[fantasy]] is here that of the genealogy undivided and undisturbed reign of Islam is this passage from the woman as phallic <i>[[jouissance]]</i>, of a universe in which all the only one who can verify Truth itself, and traces of the feminine <i>[[autre]] jouissance</i> are erased. (255-6) The profoundest reaction of a Muslim woman who by her nature lacks reason and faith, cheats and lieswhen asked why she wears a veil voluntarily, provokes menis “out of her [[shame]] in front of God, interposing herself between them and ” not to offend God as : there is, in a disturbing stainwoman’s exposure, and who therefore has to be erasedan erectile protuberance, rendered invisiblean obscenely-intrusive quality, controlledand this combination of [[visual]] intrusion and abn enigmatic knowledge is explosive, since her excessive enjoyment threatens to engulf menit disturbs the very ontological [[balance]] of the universe.&nbsp;&nbsp;<br><br>

Woman as such is an ontological scandal, her public exposure is an affront to God. She is not simply erased, but re-admitted in a closely controlled universe whose fantasmatic foundations are most clearly discernible in the myth of the eternal virgin: the (in)famous <i>houris</i>, virgins awaiting martyrs in Paradise, never lose their virginity – after every penetration, their hymen is magically restored. The fantasy is here that of the undivided and undisturbed reign of the phallic <i>jouissance</i>, of a universe in which all the traces of the feminine <i>autre jouissance</i> are erased. (255-6) The profoundest reaction of a Muslim woman, when asked why she wears a veil voluntarily, is “out of her shame in front of God,” not to offend God: there is, in a woman’s exposure, an erectile protuberance, an obscenely-intrusive quality, and this combination of visual intrusion and abn enigmatic knowledge is explosive, it disturbs the very ontological balance of the universe.&nbsp;&nbsp;<br><br> So how are we to read, against this background, administrative measures like the [[French ]] State’s prohibition for young Muslim women to wear their veil in [[schools]]? The paradox is double here. First, this prohibition prohibits something which it also qualifies as an erective exposure, a too-strong-to-be-permissible sign of one’s identity that perturbs the French principle of egalitarian [[citizenship ]] – wearing a veil is, from this French republican perspective, also a provocative “monstration.” The second paradox is that <i>what this [[State ]] prohibition prohibits is prohibition itself</i> (215), and, perhaps, this prohibition is the most oppressive of them all – why? Because it prohibits the very feature which constitutes the (socio-institutional) <i>identity</i> of the other: it des-institutionalizes this identity, changing it into an irrelevant personal idiosyncrasy. What such prohibiting of prohibitions creates is a space of [[universal ]] Man for whom all differences ([[economic]], politic, religious, [[cultural]], sexual…) are indifferent, a matter of [[contingent ]] symbolic practices, etc. Is this space really [[gender]]-neutral? No – but not in the sense of secret [[hegemony ]] of the male “phallocentric” logic: on the contrary, the space without legitimate outside, the space not marked by any cut which draws a line of inclusion/exclusion, is a “feminine” [[non-all ]] and as such all-encompassing space, space without outside, in which we are all located within a kind of “absolute femininity, a Woman-World”(217) embracing us all. In this universe, with its prohibition of prohibition, there is no guilt, but this [[absence ]] of guilt is paid for by an unbearable rise of [[anxiety]]. The prohibition of prohibitions is a kind of “general equivalent” of all prohibitions, a universal and thereby universalized prohibition, a prohibition of all actual [[otherness]]: to [[prohibit ]] the other’s prohibition equals prohibiting his/her otherness.(216) Therein resides the paradox of the tolerant multiculturalist universe of the [[multitude ]] of life-styles and other identities: the more it is tolerant, the more it is oppressively homogeneous. Martin Amis recently attacked Islam as the most boring of all religions, demanding its believers to perform again and again the same stupid rituals and learn by heart the same sacred [[formulas ]] – he was deeply wrong: it is multicultural [[tolerance ]] and [[permissiveness ]] which stand for real boredom.<br><br>

Back to role of women in the pre-history of Islam, one should add Muhammed’s conception, where we stumble again upon a mysterious “between-the-two-women.” After [[working ]] in the clay on his land, Abdallah, his father-to-be, went to the house of another woman and made advances to her, but she put him off on account of the clay that was on him. He left her, washed himself, went to Amina and had intercourse with her – thus Amina conceived Muhammed. Then he went back to the other woman and asked her if she is now still willing; she replied: “No. When you passed by me there was a white light between your eyes. I called to you and you rejected me. You went to Amina and she has taken away the light.” The official wife gets the child, the other gets knows – she sees in Abdallah more than Abdallah himself, the “light,” something he has without [[knowing ]] it, something that is in him more than himself (the sperm to beget the Prophet), and it is this <i>objet a</i> that generates her desire. Abdallah’s [[position ]] is like the one of the hero of a detective novel who is all of a sudden persecuted, even threatened with death – he knows something that can put in danger a big criminal, but he himself (or she – usually a woman) doesn’t [[know ]] what this is. Abdallah, in his [[narcissism]], confuses this <i>objet a</i> in himself with himself (he confuses the object and the cause of the woman’s desire), which is why he returns to her afterwards, wrongly presuming that she will still desire him.<br><br>

This reliance on the feminine (and on the foreign woman at that) is Islam’s repressed foundation, its un-thought, that which it endeavors to exclude, to erase or at least [[control ]] it through its [[complex ]] [[ideological ]] edifice, but what persists to haunt it, since it is the very source of its vitality. - Why, then, is woman in Islam such a traumatic [[presence]], such an ontological scandal that it has to be veiled? The true problem is not the [[horror ]] of the shameless exposure of what is beneath the veil, but, rather, the nature of the veil itself. One should link this feminine veil with Lacan’s reading of the anecdote about the competition between Zeuxis and Parrhasios, two painters from the ancient [[Greece]], about who will paint a more convincing [[illusion]]. <a title="" name="_ftnref10" href="#_ftn10">[10]</a> First, Zeuxis produced such a realistic picture of grapes that birds were lured into picking at it to eat the grape. Next, Parrhasios won by painting on the wall of his room a curtain, so that Zeuxis, when Parrhasios showed him his painting, asked him: “OK, now please pull aside the veil and show me what you painted!” In Zeuxis’s painting, the illusion was so convincing that [[image ]] was taken for [[The Real|the real ]] thing; in Parrhasios’ painting, the illusion resided in the very notion that what we see in front of us is just a veil covering up the hidden truth. This is also how, for Lacan, feminine [[masquerade ]] works: she wears a mask to make us react like Zeuxis in front of Parrhasios’ painting – <i>OK, put down the mask and show us what you really are!</i> Things are homologous in Shakespeare’s <i>As You Like It</i>, in which Orlando is passionately in [[love ]] with Rosalind who, in order to test his love, disguises herself as Ganymede and, as a male companion, interrogates Orlando about his love. She even takes on the [[personality ]] of Rosalind (in a redoubled masking, she pretends to be herself, to be Ganymede who plays to be Rosalind) and persuades her friend Celia (disguised as Aliena) to marry them in a mock ceremony. In this ceremony, Rosalind literally feigns to feign to be what she is: truth itself, in order to win, has to be <i>staged</i> in a redoubled [[deception]]. We can thus imagine Orlando, after the mock wedding ceremony, turning to Rosalind-Ganymede and telling her: “You played Rosalind so well that you almost made me believe to be her; you can now return to what you are and be Ganymede again.”<br><br>

It is not an accident that the agents of such double masquerade are always women: while a man can only pretend to be a woman, only a woman can pretend to be a man who pretends to be a woman, as only a woman can <i>pretend to be what she is</i> (a woman). To account for this specifically feminine status of pretending, Lacan refers to a woman who wears a concealed fake [[penis ]] in order to evoke that she is phallus:</font></font></p>

<blockquote><p align="justify"><font color="#73737b"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">Such is woman concealed behind her veil: it is the absence of the penis that makes her the phallus, the [[object of desire]]. Evoke this absence in a more precise way by having her wear a cute fake one under a fancy dress, and you, or rather she, will have plenty to tell us about. <a title="" name="_ftnref11" href="[[A Glance into the Archives of Islam#_ftn11">[Notes|11]</a></font></font></p>]</blockquote>

<p align="justify"><font color="#73737b"><font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman" size="3">The logic is here more complex than it may appear: it is not merely that the obviously fake penis evokes the absence of the ‘real’ penis; in a strict parallel with Parrhasios’ painting, the man’s first reaction upon seeing the contours of the fake penis is: “Put this ridiculous fake off and show me what you’ve got beneath!” The man thereby misses how the fake penis is [[The Real|the real ]] thing: the “phallus” that the woman is is the shadow generated by the fake penis, i.e., the specter of the non-existent ‘real’ phallus beneath the cover of the fake one. In this precise sense, the feminine masquerade has the [[structure ]] of [[mimicry]], since, for Lacan, in mimicry, I do not imitate the image I want to fit into, but those features of the image which seem to indicate that there is some hidden [[reality ]] behind. As with Parrhasios, I do not imitate the grapes, but the veil: “Mimicry reveals something in so far as it is distinct from what might be called an <i>itself</i> that is behind.” <a title="" name="_ftnref12" href="[[A Glance into the Archives of Islam#_ftn12">[Notes|12]</a> ] The status of phallus itself is that of a mimicry. Phallus is ultimately a kind of stain of the [[human ]] body, an excessive feature which does not fit the body and thereby generates the illusion of another hidden reality behind the image.<br><br>

This brings us back to the topic with which we began: woman and the Orient. The true choice is not the one between the Near-East masculine Islam and the Far-East more feminine spirituality, but between the Far-Eastern elevation of a woman into the Mother-Goddess, the generative-and-destructive substance of the World, and the Muslim distrust of woman which, paradoxically, in a [[negative ]] way renders much more directly the traumatic-subversive-creative-explosive power of feminine subjectivity.<br><br> <b>Notes:</b><br><br>  <a title="" name="_ftn1" href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> Claude Levi-Strauss, <i>Tristes tropiques</i>, Paris: Plon 1955, p. 472-473.<br><br>  <a title="" name="_ftn2" href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> G.W.F. Hegel, <i>Philosophy of Mind</i>, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1971, p. 44.<br><br> <a title="" name="_ftn3" href="#_ftnref3">[3]</a> Even Hegel’s logic of triads seems to get stuck into a deadlock here: the triad that offers itself, but that Hegel cannot admit, of course, is that of Judaism – Christianity – Islam: first the immediate/abstract monotheism which, as the price to be paid for its immediate character, has to be embodied in a particular ethnic group (which is why Jews renounce all proselytism); then Christianity with its trinity; finally Islam, the truly universal monotheism.<br><br>  <a title="" name="_ftn4" href="#_ftnref4">[4]</a> Fethi Benslama, <i>La psychanalyse a l’epreuve de l’Islam</i>, Paris: Aubier 2002 (the numbers in brackets after a quote refer to this book).<br><br>  <a title="" name="_ftn5" href="#_ftnref5">[5]</a> See Eric Santner, "Traumatic Revelations: Freud's Moses and the Origins of Anti-Semitism," in Renata Salecl, ed., <i>Sexuation</i>, Durham: Duke UP 2000.<br><br> <a title="" name="_ftn6" href="#_ftnref6">[6]</a> Of course, one can claim that there is an implicit undermining of its own official ideology at work already in Genesis, where God nonetheless intervenes to save Hagar’s son, promising him a great future – Genesis does (also) take the side of the other woman who was reduced to an instrument of procreation.<br><br>  <a title="" name="_ftn7" href="#_ftnref7">[7]</a> G.W.F. Hegel, <i>Phenomenology of Spirit</i>, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1977, p. 210.<br><br>  <a title="" name="_ftn8" href="#_ftnref8">[8]</a> The only later occasion on which demonic intervention spoils his visions is the famous episode of the “Satanic verses.”&nbsp;<br><br>  <a title="" name="_ftn9" href="#_ftnref9">[9]</a> I once had a dream, the usual disgustingly self-indulgent one about getting some big prize; my reaction, IN THE DREAM, was that this cannot be true, that it is only a dream, and the content of the dream was my (successful) effort to convince myself, by way of pointing out to a series of indications, that it is not just a dream, but reality – the interpretive task here is to discover who was the woman hidden in the dream, who was my Khadija.<br><br>  <a title="" name="_ftn10" href="#_ftnref10">[10subjectivity]</a> See Jacques Lacan, <i>The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis</i>, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1979, p. 103.<br><br>  <a title="" name="_ftn11" href="#_ftnref11">[11]</a> Jacques Lacan, <i>Ecrits. A Selection</i>, translated by Bruce Fink, New York: W.W.Norton&amp;Company 2002, p. 310.<br><br>

==Notes:==#Claude [[Levi-Strauss]], <i>Tristes tropiques</i>, [[Paris]]: Plon 1955, p. 472-473.<br><br>#[[G.W.F. Hegel]], <i>[[Philosophy]] of Mind</i>, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1971, p. 44.<br><br> #Even Hegel’s logic of triads seems to get stuck into a deadlock here: the [[triad]] that offers itself, but that Hegel cannot admit, of course, is that of Judaism – Christianity – Islam: first the immediate/abstract monotheism which, as the price to be paid for its immediate [[character]], has to be embodied in a title=[[particular]] ethnic group (which is why Jews [[renounce]] all proselytism); then Christianity with its trinity; finally Islam, the truly universal monotheism.<br><br>#Fethi Benslama, <i>[[La Psychanalyse|La psychanalyse]] a l’epreuve de l’Islam</i>, Paris: Aubier 2002 (the numbers in brackets after a quote refer to this book).<br><br>#See Eric Santner, "Traumatic Revelations: Freud's Moses and the Origins of [[Anti-semitism|Anti-Semitism]]," name="_ftn12" href="in [[Renata Salecl]], ed., <i>[[Sexuation]]</i>, Durham: Duke UP 2000.<br><br>#Of course, one can [[claim]] that there is an implicit undermining of its own official [[ideology]] at work already in Genesis, where God nonetheless intervenes to save Hagar’s son, promising him a great [[future]] – Genesis does (also) take the side of the other woman who was reduced to an [[instrument]] of [[procreation]].<br><br>#_ftnref12"G.W.F. Hegel, <i>[12[Phenomenology of Spirit]]</i>, Oxford: Oxford [[University]] Press 1977, p. 210.<br><br>#The only later occasion on which demonic intervention spoils his visions is the famous episode of the “Satanic verses.”&nbsp;<br><br>#I once had a dream, the usual disgustingly self-indulgent one about getting some big prize; my reaction, IN THE DREAM, was that this cannot be true, that it is only a dream, and the [[content]] of the dream was my (successful) effort to convince myself, by way of pointing out to aseries of indications, that it is not just a dream, but reality – the interpretive task here is to discover who was the woman hidden in the dream, who was my Khadija.<br> <br>#See [[Jacques Lacan]], <i>The Four Fundamental [[Concepts ]] of [[Psycho]]-Analysis</i>, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books 1979, p. 103.<br><br>#[[Jacques lacan|Jacques Lacan]], <i>[[Ecrits]]. A Selection</i>, translated by [[Bruce Fink]], New York: W.W.Norton&amp;Company 2002, p. 310.<br><br>#[[Jacques lacan|Jacques Lacan]], <i>The [[Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis]]</i>, p. 99.</font>