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The gene directly responsible for the onset of Huntington's chorea has been isolatedDo we today have an available bioethics? Yes, and anyone can now be told not only whether they will get Huntington'swe do, but when. At issue is a transcription mistakebad one: what the stuttering repetition of the nucleotide sequence CAG Germans call <i>Bindestrich-Ethik</i>, or 'hyphen-[[ethics]]', where what gets lost in the middle of a particular genehyphenation is ethics as such. The age at which the disease will appear depends implacably problem is not that a [[universal]] ethics is [[being]] dissolved into a [[multitude]] of specialised ones (bioethics, business ethics, medical ethics and so on the number of repetitions of CAG: if there ) but that [[particular]] [[scientific]] breakthroughs are 40immediately set against [[humanist]] 'values', you will get the first symptoms at 59; if 41leading to complaints that [[biogenetics]], at 54; if 50for example, at 27threatens our [[sense]] of dignity and [[autonomy]].</p><p>The main consequence of the current breakthroughs in biogenetics is that [[natural]] organisms have become [[objects]] open to manipulation. Healthy living[[Nature]], [[human]] and inhuman, keeping fitis 'desubstantialised', the best medicinedeprived of its impenetrable density, none of them can helpwhat [[Heidegger]] called 'earth'. We can submit If biogenetics is able to reduce the human [[psyche]] to a test andan [[object]] of manipulation, if it is positive, find out exactly when we will go mad and dieevidence of what Heidegger perceived as the '[[danger]]' inherent in modern [[technology]]. It's hard By reducing a human being to imagine a clearer confrontation with the meaninglessness of a life-determining contingencynatural object whose properties can be altered, what we lose is not (only) humanity but nature itself. No wonder In this sense, Francis [[Fukuyama]] is [[right]] in <i>Our Posthuman [[Future]]</i>: the majority [[notion]] of people (including humanity relies on the scientist who identified the gene) choose not to know[[belief]] that we possess an inherited 'human nature', that we are [[born]] with an ignorance that is not simply negative, since it allows us to fantasiseunfathomable [[dimension]] of ourselves.*

The prospect gene directly [[responsible]] for the onset of [[Huntington]]'s chorea has been isolated, and anyone can now be told not only whether they will get Huntington's, but when. At issue is a transcription mistake: the stuttering [[repetition]] of biogenetic intervention opened up by increasing access to the human genome effectively emancipates humankind from nucleotide sequence CAG in the constraints middle of a finite speciesparticular gene. The age at which the disease will appear depends implacably on the [[number]] of repetitions of CAG: if there are 40, from enslavement to you will get the 'selfish gene'. Emancipation comes first [[symptoms]] at 59; if 41, at a price54; if 50, howeverat 27. In a talk he gave in Marburg in 2001Healthy [[living]], keeping fit, the best [[medicine]], Habermas repeated his warning against biogenetic manipulationnone of [[them]] can [[help]]. There areWe can submit to a [[test]] and, as he sees if itis positive, two main threats. First, that such interventions find out exactly when we will blur the borderline between the made go mad and the spontaneous and thus affect the way we understand ourselvesdie. For an adolescent It's hard to learn that his 'spontaneous' (say, aggressive or peaceful) disposition is imagine a clearer confrontation with the result meaninglessness of a deliberate external intervention into his genetic code will undermine [[life]]-determining [[contingency]]. No wonder the heart majority of his identity, putting paid to [[people]] (including the notion that we develop our moral being through <i>Bildung</i>, [[scientist]] who [[identified]] the painful struggle gene) choose not to educate our natural dispositions. Ultimately[[know]], biogenetic intervention could render the idea of education meaningless. Secondan [[ignorance]] that is not simply [[negative]], such interventions will give rise since it allows us to asymmetrical relations between those who are 'spontaneously' human and those whose characters have been manipulated: some individuals will be the privileged 'creators' of othersfantasise.

At the most elementary level, this will affect our sexual identity. The ability prospect of parents biogenetic [[intervention]] opened up by increasing access to choose the sex of their offspring is one issue. Another is human genome effectively emancipates humankind from the status constraints of sex-change operations. Up until nowa finite [[species]], it has been possible from enslavement to justify these by evoking the 'selfish gene'. Emancipation comes at a gap between biological and psychic identity: when price, however. In a biological man experiences himself as a woman trapped talk he gave in Marburg in a man's body2001, it is reasonable that (s)he be allowed to change her biological sex in order to introduce a balance between her sexual and her emotional life. Biogenetic [[Habermas]] repeated his warning against biogenetic manipulation opens up much more radical perspectives. It may retroactively change our understanding of ourselves as 'natural' beingsThere are, in the sense that we will experience our 'natural' dispositions as mediatedhe sees it, not as given - as things which can in principle be manipulated and therefore as merely contingenttwo main [[threats]]. There can be no return to a naive immediacy once we know First, that our natural dispositions depend on genetic contingency; to stick to them through thick and thin such interventions will be as false as sticking to blur the borderline between the old 'organic' mores. According to Habermas, however, we should act as if this were not made and the case, spontaneous and thus maintain our sense of dignity and autonomy[[affect]] the way we [[understand]] ourselves. The paradox is that this autonomy can be preserved only by prohibiting access For an adolescent to the contingency which determines us - learn that his 'spontaneous' (say, [[aggressive]] or peaceful) disposition is, by limiting the possibilities result of scientific a deliberate [[external]] intervention. This is a new version into his genetic [[code]] will undermine the heart of his [[identity]], putting paid to the old argument notion that, if we are to retain develop our [[moral dignity]] being through <i>Bildung</i>, it's better not the painful [[struggle]] to know certain thingseducate our natural dispositions. Curtailing scienceUltimately, as Habermas seems to be suggesting, would come at biogenetic intervention could render the price [[idea]] of widening the split education meaningless. Second, such interventions will give rise to asymmetrical relations between science those who are 'spontaneously' human and ethicsthose whose characters have been manipulated: a split which already prevents us from seeing some individuals will be the way these new conditions compel us to transform and reinvent the notions privileged 'creators' of freedom, autonomy and ethical responsibility[[others]].

According At the most elementary level, this will affect our [[sexual]] identity. The ability of [[parents]] to choose the sex of their offspring is one issue. [[Another]] is the status of sex-[[change]] operations. Up until now, it has been possible to justify these by evoking a gap between [[biological]] and [[psychic]] identity: when a biological man experiences himself as a [[woman]] trapped in a possible Roman Catholic counter-argumentman's [[body]], the true danger it is reasonable that(s)he be allowed to change her biological sex in [[order]] to introduce a [[balance]] between her sexual and her emotional life. Biogenetic manipulation opens up much more radical perspectives. It may [[retroactively]] change our [[understanding]] of ourselves as 'natural' beings, in engaging the sense that we will [[experience]] our 'natural' dispositions as mediated, not as given - as things which can in biogenetics, [[principle]] be manipulated and therefore as merely [[contingent]]. There can be no [[return]] to a naive immediacy once we forget know that we have immortal soulsour natural dispositions depend on genetic contingency; to stick to them through thick and thin will be as [[false]] as sticking to the old '[[organic]]' mores. This argument only displaces the problemAccording to Habermas, however. If , we should act as if this were not the [[case]], Catholic believers would and thus maintain our sense of dignity and autonomy. The [[paradox]] is that this autonomy can be preserved only by prohibiting access to the ideal people to engage in biogenetic manipulationcontingency which determines us - that is, since they would be aware that they were dealing only with by limiting the material aspect possibilities of scientific intervention. This is a new version of human existencethe old argument that, if we are to retain our moral dignity, it's better not with the spiritual kernelto know certain things. Their faith Curtailing [[science]], as Habermas seems to be suggesting, would protect them come at the price of widening the [[split]] between science and ethics: a split which already prevents us from reductionism. If we have an autonomous spiritual dimension[[seeing]] the way these new [[conditions]] compel us to transform and reinvent the notions of [[freedom]], there is no need to fear biogenetic manipulationautonomy and [[ethical]] [[responsibility]].

From According to a possible Roman [[Catholic]] counter-argument, the psychoanalytic standpoint[[true]] danger is that, the core of the problem resides in the autonomy of the symbolic order. Suppose I am impotent because of some unresolved blockage engaging in my symbolic universe andbiogenetics, instead of 'educating' myself by trying to resolve the blockage, I take Viagrawe forget that we have immortal souls. The solution works, I am able to perform again sexually, but This argument only displaces the problem remains, however. How will the symbolic blockage be affected by If this chemical solution? How will were the solution case, Catholic believers would be 'subjectivised'? The situation is undecidable: the solution might unblock the symbolic obstacle, compelling me to accept its meaninglessness; or it might cause the obstacle [[ideal]] people to return at some more fundamental level (engage in a paranoiac attitudebiogenetic manipulation, perhaps, so since they would be aware that I experience myself as exposed to they were dealing only with the caprice [[material]] aspect of a 'master' whose interventions can decide my destiny)human [[existence]], not with the spiritual kernel. There is always a symbolic price to be paid for such 'unearned' solutionsTheir [[faith]] would protect them from reductionism. AndIf we have an [[autonomous]] spiritual dimension, mutatis mutandis, the same goes for attempts there is no [[need]] to fight crime through biochemical or [[fear]] biogenetic intervention; compelling criminals to take medication to curb excessive aggression, for example, leaves intact the social mechanisms that triggered the aggression in the first placemanipulation.

Another lesson of psychoanalysis is thatFrom the [[psychoanalytic]] standpoint, contrary to the notion that curiosity is innate, that there is deep inside each one core of us a <i>Wissenstrieb</i>, a 'drive to know', there is, the problem resides in fact, the oppositeautonomy of the [[symbolic]] order. Every advance in knowledge has to be earned by a painful struggle against our spontaneous propensity for ignorance. If there's a history Suppose I am impotent because of Huntington's chorea some unresolved blockage in my familysymbolic [[universe]] and, should I take the test which will tell me whether or not (and when) I will inexorably get it? If I caninstead of 'educating't bear myself by trying to resolve the prospect of knowing when blockage, I will dietake Viagra. The solution works, the (not very realistic) solution may appear to be to authorise another person or institution whom I trust completely am able to test me and not tell me the resultperform again sexually, but, if the result is positive, to kill me unexpectedly and painlessly in my sleep just before problem remains. How will [[the symbolic]] blockage be affected by this chemical solution? How will the diseasesolution be 's onset. subjectivised'? The problem with this solution [[situation]] is that I know that undecidable: the Other knows solution might unblock [[The Symbolic|the answersymbolic]] obstacle, and this ruins everything, exposing compelling me to gnawing suspicion. The ideal solution may then be for meaccept its meaninglessness; or it might [[cause]] the obstacle to return at some more fundamental level (in a [[paranoiac]] attitude, perhaps, if so that I suspect that my child may have the disease, experience myself as exposed to test him without his knowing and kill him painlessly at the right momentcaprice of a '[[master]]' whose interventions can decide my destiny). The ultimate fantasy here would There is always a symbolic price to be that an anonymous state institution would do this paid for us without our knowledgesuch 'unearned' solutions. Again the question surfacesAnd, howevermutatis mutandis, of whether the same goes for attempts to fight crime through biochemical or not we know that the Other knows. The way biogenetic intervention; compelling criminals to take medication to a perfect totalitarian society is open. What is false is curb excessive [[aggression]], for example, leaves intact the underlying premise: [[social]] mechanisms that triggered the ultimate ethical duty is to protect others from pain, to keep them aggression in ignorancethe first [[place]].

It's not so much Another lesson of [[psychoanalysis]] is that we are losing our dignity and freedom with , contrary to the advance of biogenetics but notion that we realise we never had them in the first place. Ifcuriosity is innate, as Fukuyama argues, we already have 'therapies that blur the line between what we achieve on our own and what we achieve because there is deep [[inside]] each one of the levels of various chemicals in our brains'us a <i>Wissenstrieb</i>, the efficiency of these therapies implies that a 'what we achieve on our own[[drive]] to know' also depends on , there is, in fact, the 'levels of various chemicals opposite. Every advance in [[knowledge]] has to be earned by a painful struggle against our brains'spontaneous propensity for ignorance. We are not being told, to quote Tom Wolfe, If there'Sorry, but Your Soul Just Dieds a [[history]] of Huntington': we are in effect being told that we never had a soul s chorea in my [[family]], should I take the first place. test which will tell me whether or not (and when) I will inexorably get it? If I can't bear the claims prospect of biogenetics hold[[knowing]] when I will die, then the choice is between clinging (not very realistic) solution may appear to be to authorise another person or institution whom I trust completely to the illusion of dignity test me and accepting not tell me the reality of what we are. Ifresult, as Fukuyama saysbut, 'if the desire for recognition has a biological basis and that basis result is related positive, to levels of serotonin kill me unexpectedly and painlessly in my [[sleep]] just before the brain,disease' our awareness of s onset. The problem with this fact must undermine solution is that I know that the [[Other]] [[knows]] the sense of dignity answer, and this ruins everything, exposing me to gnawing suspicion. The ideal solution may then be for me, if I suspect that comes from being recognised by others. We can my [[child]] may have it only the disease, to test him without his knowing and kill him painlessly at the price right [[moment]]. The ultimate [[fantasy]] here would be that an anonymous [[state]] institution would do this for us without our knowledge. Again the question surfaces, however, of whether or not we know that the Other knows. The way to a disavowalperfect totalitarian [[society]] is open. What is false is the underlying premise: although I know very well that my self-esteem depends on serotoninthe ultimate ethical [[duty]] is to protect others from [[pain]], I nonetheless enjoy itto keep them in ignorance. Fukuyama writes:

It's not so much that we are losing our dignity and freedom with the advance of biogenetics but that we realise we never had them in the first place. If, as Fukuyama argues, we already have 'therapies that blur the line between what we achieve on our own and what we achieve because of the levels of various chemicals in our brains', the efficiency of these therapies implies that 'what we achieve on our own' also depends on the 'levels of various chemicals in our brains'. We are not being told, to quote Tom Wolfe, 'Sorry, but Your Soul Just Died': we are in effect being told that we never had a soul in the first place. If the claims of biogenetics hold, then the [[choice]] is between clinging to the [[illusion]] of dignity and accepting the [[reality]] of what we are. If, as Fukuyama says, 'the [[desire]] for [[recognition]] has a biological basis and that basis is related to levels of serotonin in the brain,' our [[awareness]] of this fact must undermine the sense of dignity that comes from being recognised by others. We can have it only at the price of a [[disavowal]]: although I know very well that my [[self]]-esteem depends on serotonin, I nonetheless [[enjoy]] it. Fukuyama writes: <blockquote>The normal, and morally acceptable, way of overcoming low self-esteem was to struggle with oneself and with others, to [[work ]] hard, to endure sometimes painful sacrifices, and finally to rise and be seen as having done so. The problem with self-esteem as it is [[understood ]] in American pop [[psychology ]] is that it becomes an entitlement, something everyone [[needs ]] to have whether it is deserved or not. This devalues self-esteem and makes the quest for it self-defeating.

Imagine the following scenario: I am to take part in a quiz, but instead of [[working ]] away at getting up the facts, I use drugs to enhance my [[memory]]. The self-esteem I acquire by winning the competition is still based on a [[real ]] [[achievement]]: I performed better than my opponent who had spent night after night trying to memorise the relevant data. The intuitive counter-argument is that only my opponent has the right to be proud of his performance, because his knowledge, unlike mine, was the result of hard work. There's something inherently patronising in that.

Again, we see it as perfectly justified when someone with a [[good ]] natural singing [[voice ]] takes pride in his performance, although we're aware that his singing has more to do with talent than with effort and [[training]]. If, however, I were to improve my singing by the use of a drug, I would be denied the same recognition (unless I had put a lot of effort into inventing the drug in question before testing it on myself). The point is that both hard work and natural talent are considered 'part of me', while using a drug is 'artificial' enhancement because it is a [[form ]] of external manipulation. Which brings us back to the same problem: once we know that my 'natural talent' depends on the levels of certain chemicals in my brain, does it matter, morally, whether I acquired it from [[outside ]] or have possessed it from [[birth]]? To further complicate matters, it's possible that my willingness to accept [[discipline ]] and work hard itself depends on certain chemicals. What if, in order to win a quiz, I don't take a drug which enhances my memory but one which 'merely' strengthens my resolve? Is this still 'cheating'?</p><p>One [[reason ]] Fukuyama moved from his 'end-of-history' [[theory ]] to a consideration of the new [[threat ]] posed by the brain [[sciences ]] is that the biogenetic threat is a much more radical version of the '[[End of History|end of history]]', one that has the potential to render the free autonomous [[subject ]] of [[liberal ]] [[democracy ]] obsolete. There is a deeper reason, however, for Fukuyama's turn: the prospect of biogenetic manipulation has [[forced ]] him, consciously or not, to take note of the dark obverse of his idealised [[image ]] of liberal democracy. All of a sudden, he has been compelled to confront the prospect of corporations misusing the free [[market ]] to manipulate people and engage in terrifying medical experiments, of rich people breeding their offspring as an exclusive [[race ]] with superior [[mental ]] and [[physical ]] capacities, thus instigating a new [[class ]] warfare. It is clear to Fukuyama that the only way to [[limit ]] this danger is to reassert strong state [[control ]] of the market and to develop new forms of a democratic [[political ]] will.

While agreeing with all this, I am tempted to add that we need these measures independently of the biogenetic threat, simply in order to control the potential of the [[global ]] market [[economy]]. Maybe the problem is not biogenetics itself, but rather the context of [[power ]] relations within which it functions. Fukuyama's arguments are at once too abstract and too [[concrete]]. He fails to raise the [[full ]] [[philosophical ]] implications of the new [[mind ]] sciences and technologies, and to locate them in their antagonistic socioeconomic context. What he doesn't grasp (and what a true [[Hegelian ]] should have grasped) is the necessary link between the two ends of history, the passage from the one to the other: the liberal-democratic end of history immediately turns into its opposite, since, in the hour of its triumph, it starts to lose its foundation - the liberal-democratic subject.

Biogenetic (and, more generally, cognitivist-evolutionary) reductionism should be attacked from a different direction. Bo Dahlbom is right, in his 1993 critique of [[Daniel Dennett]], to insist on the social [[character ]] of 'mind'. Theories of mind are obviously conditioned by their historical context: Fredric [[Jameson ]] recently proposed a [[reading ]] of Dennett's <i>[[Consciousness ]] Explained</i> as an allegory of late [[capitalism ]] with its motifs of competition, decentralisation etc. Even more important, Dennett himself insists that tools, the externalised 'intelligence' on which human beings rely, are an inherent part of human identity: it is meaningless to imagine a human being as a biological entity without the [[complex ]] network of his/her tools - it would be like imagining a goose without its feathers. But in saying this he opens up a path which should be foll0wed much further. Since, to express it in good old [[Marxist ]] [[terms]], man is the [[totality ]] of his/her social relations, Dennett should take the next [[logical ]] step and [[analyse ]] this network of social relations.

The problem is not how to reduce mind to neuronal [[activity]], or replace the [[language ]] of mind by that of brain [[processes]], but rather to grasp how mind can emerge only from the network of social relations and material supplements. [[The Real|The real ]] problem is not how, if at all, machines can imitate the human mind, but how the 'identity' of the human mind can incorporate machines. In March 2002, Kevin Warwick, a professor of cybernetics at Reading [[University]], had his neuronal [[system ]] directly linked to a computer network. He thus became the first human being to whom data could be fed directly, bypassing the five senses. This is the future: not the replacement of the human mind by the computer, but a combination of the two. In May 2002, it was reported that scientists at New York University had attached a computer chip directly to a rat's brain, making it possible to steer the rat by means of a [[mechanism ]] similar to that in a remote-controlled toy car.

It is already possible for blind people to get elementary information [[about ]] their surroundings fed directly into their brain, bypassing the [[apparatus ]] of [[visual ]] [[perception]]; what was new in the case of the rat was that, for the first [[time]], the 'will' of a living [[agent]], its 'spontaneous' decisions about its movements, were taken over by an external [[agency]]. The philosophical question here is whether the unfortunate rat was aware that something was wrong, that its movements were being decided by another power. And when the same experiment is performed on a human being (which, ethical questions notwithstanding, shouldn't be much more complicated than it was in the case of the rat), will the steered person be aware that an external power is deciding his movements? And if so, will this power be experienced as an irresistible inner drive, or as coercion? It is symptomatic that the applications of this mechanism envisioned by the scientists involved and by the journalists who reported the story were to do with humanitarian aid and the anti-terrorist campaign: the steered rats or other animals could be used, it was suggested, to contact earthquake victims buried under rubble, or to attack terrorists without risking human lives.

A year from now, Philips plan to market a phone-cum-CD-player woven into the material of a jacket, which can be dry-cleaned without damaging the digital machinery. This is not the innocent advance it may appear to be. The Philips jacket will [[represent ]] a quasi-organic prosthesis, less an external apparatus with which we interact than part of our self-experience as a living organism. The parallel often drawn between the increasing invisibility of computer chips and the fact that when we learn something sufficiently well, we cease to be aware of it, is misleading. The [[sign ]] that we have learned a language is that we no longer need to focus on its rules: not only do we [[speak ]] it spontaneously, but actively focusing on the rules would prevent us from [[speaking ]] it fluently. We have, however, previously had to learn the language which we have now internalised: invisible computer chips are 'out there', and act not spontaneously, but blindly.

[[Hegel ]] would not have shrunk from the idea of the human genome and biogenetic intervention, preferring ignorance to risk. Instead, he would have rejoiced at the shattering of the old idea that 'Thou art that,' as though our notions of human identity had been definitively fixed. Contrary to Habermas, we should take the objectivisation of the genome fully on board. Reducing my being to the genome forces me to [[traverse ]] the phantasmal stuff of which my ego is made, and only in this way can my [[subjectivity ]] properly emerge.

* [[Bring Me My Philips Mental Jacket]]. ''[[London ]] Review of Books''. Volume 25. Number 10. May 22, 2003. <http://www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/80/>