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<center>{| cellpadding="2" cellspacing="5" align="center" style="border:1px solid #aaaaaa;text-align:center;margin:6px -8px;align:center;vertical-align:top;width:90%;background-color:#fcfcfc"|style="text-align:center;color:#000;line-height:2em;width:100%;";|This article is currently undergoing major editing. It's a mess [[right]] now, but will be fixed soon.|}</center>{{TopTopppp}}désir]]''|-|| [[German]]: ''[[Wunsch{{Bottom}}

The concept of [[Desiredesire]] is at the center of [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]] as a major [[theoretical]], [[ethical]] and [[clinical]] point of reference. Theoretically, Lacan's elaboration of the [[concept ]] is supported by, yet goes beyond, its [[Freudian]] origins. From an ethical perspective, Lacan has examined in an original way the [[relationship]] between desire and the [[law]], and its implications for [[treatment|psychoanalytic praxis]].<!-- he concept of [[desire]] is the central concern of [[psychoanalytic theory]].-->

The concept ==Sigmund Freud==<!--[[Freud]]'s ''[[Interpretation of Dreams]]'' established the basis for the psychoanalytic conception of desire (including Lacan's own contributions), even if the Freudian ''[[Wunsch]]'' (translated as 'wish' in the ''[[Standard Edition]]'') does not exactly coincide with Lacan's desire.<ref>(Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 256-7)</ref>-->[[Lacan]]'s term, ''[[désir]]'', is the term used in the [[French]] translations of [[Freud]] to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Wunsch]]'', which is translated as "[[wish]]" in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''. <!-- Hence English translators of [[Lacan]] are faced with a dilemma; should they translate ''[[désir]]'' by "[[wish]]", which is closer to [[Freud]]'s ''[[Wunsch]]'', or should they translate it as "[[desire]]", which is closer to the [[French]] term, but which [[lacks]] the allusion to [[Freud]]? All of [[Lacan]]'s [[English]] translators have opted for the latter, since the [[English]] term "[[desire]] " conveys, like the [[French]] term, the implication of a ''continuous force'', which is essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept. The [[English]] term also carries with it the same allusions to [[Hegel]]'s ''[[Begierde]]'' as are carried by the [[French]] term, and thus retains the central concern [[philosophical]] nuances which are so essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept of ''[[désir]]'' and which make it "a [psychoanalytic theory[category]] far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]]himself." -->

The indestructibility that Freud attributes to the unconscious wish is a property of its [[Lacanstructural]]'s term, ''[[désirposition]]'', : it is the term used in the necessary, not [[Frenchcontingent]] translations , effect of a fundamental gap in the subject's [[Freudpsyche]] to translate ; the gap [[Freudleft]]'s term ''by a lost satisfaction (cf. the seventh chapter of The [[WunschInterpretation]]'', which is translated as "of [[wishDreams]]" in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''; Freud, 1953, pp. 509-621).

Hence English translators Such a structural gap in the subject is of a [[sexual]] [[Lacanorder]] are faced with ; it corresponds ultimately to a dilemma; should they translate ''[[désirloss]]'' by "of sexual jouissance due to the fact of the [[wishprohibition]]", to which [[sexuality]] is closer to subjected in the human [[being]]. This prohibition is a structural [[Freudcultural]]'s ''[[Wunschnecessity]]'', or should they translate it as "not a [[desirecontingency]]", and its [[subjective]] correlate is the [[Oedipus]] [[complex]] — which is closer to the a [[Frenchnormative]] termorganization, but which lacks the allusion to rather than a more or less typical set of [[Freudpsychological]]? manifestations.

All The [[model]] of the unconscious wish elucidated by Freud in his monumental work [[LacanOn Dreams|on dreams]]'s remained his [[Englishguide]] translators have opted for the latterrest of his theoretical and clinical production; in pa rticular, since it continued to inform, until the end, Freud's clinical interventions — [[Englishinterpretations]] term "and constructions in analysis — and his rationale for [[desirethem]]" conveys, like . This model is inseparable from the [[Frenchform]] term, of [[discourse]] that Freud created: the implication rule of a ''continuous force'', which is essential to free [[Lacanassociation]], the subject's conceptspeech, reveals his/her desire and the essential gap that constitutes it.

The [[English]] term also carries with it the same allusions to [[Hegel]]Lacan's ''elaboration of the praxis ([[Begierdetheory]]'' as are carried by the and [[Frenchpractice]] term) of desire extends over his half-century of work in psychoanalysis, and thus retains attempting to abbreviate it or replace the philosophical nuances which are so essential to necessary [[Lacanreading]]'s concept of ''with a [[désirsummary]]would be imprudent and misleading. Therefore, we can only indicate some suggestions for further reading (in Lacan'' s works) and which make it "a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]] himselffurther lines of enquiry."<ref>Macey, 1995: 80</ref>

=====A first ingredient of the concept of desire in Lacan''Unconscious'' Desire=====If there s work contains a [[Hegelian]] reference, according to which desire is any one concept which can claim bound to be its being recognized — even if later on Lacan emphasized the very center of [[Lacandifference]]between his and Hegel's thoughtpositions (Lacan, it is the concept of [1977 [desire]1959], pp. 292-325).

But the reference to Freud's analysis of desire as revealed in the dream is from the start highly significant. Lacan emphasized that the analysis of the dream is in fact an analysis of the dreamer, that is, a subject who tells the dream to an other (with whom the subject is engaged in a [[Lacantransference]] follows -relation). In '[[Spinoza]] The function and field of speech and language in arguing that "[[desirepsychoanalysis]] is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p. 275</ref>' (1953), Lacan writes:

:Nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire finds its [[Desiremeaning]] is simultaneously in the heart desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the key to the object desired, as because the first [[humanobject of desire]] [[existence]] and is to be recognized by the central concern of [other. (Lacan, 1977 [psychoanalysis]1959], p.58)

However, when That the other holds the key to the object desired takes on added [[Lacanvalue]] talks about later in Lacan's work. Yet that desire emerges in a relationship with the other which is [[desiredialectical]], it that is, which is embedded in discourse, is an essential property of human desire. Human desire is not any kind the desire of the Other (over and above the [[others]] who are [[desireconcrete]] he is referring toincarnations of the Other), but always 'not '[[unconsciousnatural]]'' , endogenous appetites or tendencies that would push the subject in one direction or [[another]] irrespective of his/her relations with the Other; desireis always inscribed in and mediated by language (cf. The Four Fundamental [[Concepts]]of [[Psycho]]-Analysis, which is an essential reference in its entirety; Lacan, 1977).

This is not because Lacan's study of the dialectical [[Lacannature]] sees of desire led to his [[consciousdistinction]] between desire, need and demand. The [[desirethree]] as unimportant, but simply because it is [[unconsciousterms]] describe lacks in the subject; yet it is indispensable to [[desireidentify]] that forms the central concern each of these lacks, and their interrelations. The satisfaction of vital [[psychoanalysisneeds]]is subject to demand, and makes the subject dependent on speech and language.

The least noisy appeal of the infant is already inscribed in language, as it is [[Unconsciousinterpreted]] by the 'significant' others as speech, not as a mere cry. This primordial discursive circuit makes of the infant already a [[desirespeaking]] is entirely being, a subject of speech, even at the [[sexuality|sexualstage]]; <blockquote>"in which he/she is still infant. This subordination to the motives of Other through language marks the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire human forever. . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p. 142</ref></blockquote>Lacan writes:

=====Truth and Desire=====:The [[aimphenomenology]] that emerges from [[analytic]] [[experience]] is certainly of a kind to demonstrate in desire the paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric, even scandalous [[psychoanalyticcharacter]] by which it is distinguished from need [...]:Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls for. It is demand of a presence or of an [[treatmentabsence]] — which is what is manifested in the primordial relation to lead the mother, pregnant with that Other to be situated short of the needs that it can satisfy.:Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of [[analysandsatisfying]] needs, that is to recognize say, the [[truthpower]] of depriving them of that alone by which they are [[satisfied]] about his [...].:In this way, demand annuls (''aufhebt'') the [[particularity]] of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced (''sich erniedrigt'') to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.:Thus desireis neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the phenomenon of their [[splitting]] ([[Spaltung]]). (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp.286-7)

It is only possible to recognize one's This residual status of desire constitutes its [[desireessence]] when it is articulate in ; at this point the question of the [[speechObject of Desire|object of desire]]acquires crucial importance. Lacan considered his theory of this object to be his only original contribution to psychoanalysis.

<blockquote>"It Although an exaggeration in [[reality]], Lacan's position is only once it is formulated, named justified because with that theory he introduced in psychoanalysis a conception of the object that is genuinely revolutionary and that makes possible a [[presencerational]] critique of the [[othernotion]], that of '[[desireobject relations]], whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p' and its clinical applications. 183</ref></blockquote>

Hence in For what Lacan emphasized was the [[psychoanalysisillusory]]nature of any object that appears to fulfil desire, "what's important while the gap, the original splitting which is constitutive of the subject, is [[real]]; and it is to teach in this gap that the [[subjectobject a]] to name, to articulate, to bring this the object [[cause of desire]] into , installs itself. (Lacan 1977; in [[existenceparticular]], chapter 20)."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref>

However, it is not a question of seeking a new means Desire requires the support of expression for a given the [[desirefantasy]], for this would imply a expressionist theory of which operates as its ''mise en scène'', where the [[fading]] subject faces the [[languagelost object]]thatcauses his/her desire (Lacan 1977 [1959], p. 313). This fading of the subject in the fantastic scenario that supports his/her desire is what makes desire opaque to the subject him-/herself. Desire is a metonymy (p. 175) because the object that causes it, constituted as lost, makes it displace permanently, from object to object, as no one object can really satisfy it.

On This permanent [[displacement]] of desire follows the [[logic]] of the contraryunconscious; thus Lacan could say that desire is its interpretation, by articulating as it moves along the [[desirechain]] in of unconscious [[speechsignifiers]], the without ever being [[captured]] by any particular [[signifier]] (cf. [[analysandSeminar]] brings it into VI, '[[existenceDesire and its Interpretation]]'; Lacan, 1958-59).

<blockquote>"That In the [[subjectanalytic experience]] should come to recognise and to name his [[, desire]]; that 'must be taken literally', as it is through the efficacious action unveiling of [[analysis]]. But the signifiers that support it (albeit never exhausting it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would ) that its real cause can be entirely given. ... In naming itcircumscribed (Lacan, the 1977 [[subject]1959] creates, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the worldpp."<ref>{{S2}} p256-77). 228-9</ref></blockquote>

Desire is the other side of the law: the contributions of psychoanalysis to ethical [[reflection]] and practice have started off by recognizing this [[principle]] (Lacan, 1990; 1992). Desire opposes a [[barrier]] to jouissance -the jouissance of the drive (always [[partial]], not in relation to the [[body]] considered as a [[totality]], but to the [[organic]] function to which it is attached and from which it detaches), and that of the [[super--ego]] (with its implacable command to [[enjoy]]; Lacan, 1977 [1959], p. 319).

The Thus, desire appears to be on the side of [[analysandlife]]preservation, by articulating as it opposes the lethal [[dimension]] of jouissance (the partiality of the drive, which disregards the requirements of the [desire[living]] organism, and the [[demands]] of the [[superego]] - that `[[senseless]] law' - which result in the [[speechself]], (does -destructive unconscious [[sense]] of [[guilt]]). But desire itself is not simply give expression to without a pre-existing structural relation with [[death]]: death at the heart of the [[desirespeaking being]] but rather's lack-in-being (manqué à l'être) brings that ; death in the mortifying effect of those objects of the [[desireworld]] into that entice desire, inducing its [[existencealienation]], without ever satisfying any promise.

There is no Sovereign [[Good]] that would sustain the `right' orientation of desire, or [[guarantee]] the subject's well---being. As a consequence, the [[ethics]] of psychoanalysis require that the [[analyst]] does not pretend to embody or to deliver any Sovereign Good; it rather prescribes for the analyst that `the only [[thing]] of which one can be [[guilty]] is of having given ground relative to one's desire' (Lacan, 1992, p. 319).

HoweverThe analyst's desire, there is 'a limit desire to how far obtain absolute difference', is the original [[desireLacanian]] can be articulated concept that defines the position of the analyst in [[speechanalytic discourse]] because , and represents a culmination of his elucidationof a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]];"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility function of the [[unconscious]] desire in psychoanalysis (iLacan, 1977, p.e. the fact the the [[unconscious]] is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known''276; 1991).

"Although the This position is structural, constitutive of analytic discourse - not a psychological [[truth]] about [[desirestate]] of the analyst. It is present to some degree his/her lack-in all -being, rather than any 'positive' mode of being that orients the analyst's [[speechDirection of the Treatment|direction of the treatment]](Lacan, 1977 [[speech1959]] can never articulate , p. 230). This means that the whole analyst cannot incarnate an [[truthideal]] about for the analysand, and that he/she occupies a position of [[desiresemblant]]of the cause of desire (Lacan, 1991; whenever 1998). Only in this way may the analyst's desire become the [[speechinstrument]] attempts of the analysand's access to articulate [[his/her own desire]], there is always a leftover, a [[surplus]], which exceeds [[speech]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p. 36</ref>

One of References[[LacanFreud, S.]](1953) [1900a]'s most important criticisms of the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theoriesThe Interpretation of Dreams]] . Standard Edition of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desireComplete]] with the related concepts Psychological Works of [[demandSigmund Freud]] and , Vols 4 & 5. [[needLondon]]: Hogarth Press.

In opposition to this tendency#Lacan, J. (1958-59) `Le désir et son interpretation' (seven sessions, ed. by J.-A. [[Miller]]). [[Ornicar]]? 24 (1981):7-31; 25 (1982):13-36; 26/27 (1983):7-44. The final three sessions appeared as `Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in [[Hamlet]]'. Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977):11-52. There are unedited transcripts of the [[whole]] seminar available in French and English.#Lacan, J. (1977) [1959] Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock.#Lacan, J. (1977) The [[Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis]]. London: Tavistock.# Lacan, J. (1990) `[[Kant]] with [[Sade]]'. October 51. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.# Lacan, J. (1991) Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, L'envers de la [[psychanalyse]], 1969-1970. [[Paris]]: Seuil.# Lacan, J. (1992) [[The Seminar]], Book VII, [[The Ethics of Psychoanalysis]], 1959-1960. New York: W.W. Norton; London: Routledge.# Lacan, J. (1998) The Seminar, Book XX, [[Encore]] insists on distinguishing between these three concepts, 1972-1973, On [[Feminine]] Sexuality: The Limits of Love and [[Knowledge]]. New York: W.W. Norton. [[Leonardo]] S. Rodriguez

This distinction begins =====''Unconscious'' Desire=====<!-- If there is any one concept which can [[claim]] to emerge be the very center of [[Lacan]]'s [[thought]], it is the concept of [[desire]]. -->[[Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] in his work in 1957,arguing that "[[desire]] is the essence of man."<ref>{{S4S11}} ppp. 100-1, 125275</ref>, but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} (1958c) " [[The Signification Desire]] is simultaneously the heart of [[human]] [[existence]] and the Phallus|La signification du phalluscentral concern of [[psychoanalysis]]." However, when [[Lacan]] talks [[about]] [[desire]], it is not any kind of [[desire]] he is referring to, but always ''[[Écritsunconscious]]''[[desire]]. Paris: Seuil This is not because [[Lacan]] sees [[conscious]] [[desire]] as unimportant, 1966: 685-95 but simply because it is [["unconscious]] [[The Signification of desire]] that forms the Phallus|The signification central concern of the phallus[[psychoanalysis]]". Trans. <!-- [[Unconscious]] [[Alan Sheridandesire]] ''is entirely [[Écrits: A Selectionsexuality|sexual]]''; <blockquote>"the motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W .W. Norton & CoThe other great generic desire, that of hunger, 1977: 281-91]is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p.142</ref></blockquote> -->

=====NeedTruth and Desire=====The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his [[desire]]. It is only possible to recognize one's [[Needdesire]] when it is a purely articulate in [[biologicalspeech]] . <!-- <blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[instinctother]], an appetite which emerges according to that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the requirements [[full]] sense of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfiedterm."<ref>{{S1}} p. 183</ref></blockquote> -->

The =====Existence=====Hence in [[humanpsychoanalysis]] , "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to [[name]], being born in to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref> However, it is not a question of seeking a state new means of expression for a given [[helplessnessdesire]], is unable to for this would imply a expressionist theory of [[language]]. On the contrary, by articulating [[satisfydesire]] its own in [[needspeech]]s, and hence depends on the [[Otheranalysand]] brings it into [[existence]]. (The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]] , (does not simply give expression to help it a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[satisfyexistence]] them. )

In order <blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to get name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious [[Otheraction]]of [[analysis]]. But it isn's help, the t a question of [[infantrecognising]] must express its something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[needsubject]]s vocally; need must be articulated in creates, brings forth, a new [[demandpresence]]in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228-9</ref></blockquote>

The primitive However, there is a [[limit]] to how far [[demanddesire]]s can be articulated in [[speech]] because of the a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[infantspeech]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring ;"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the [[Otherirreducibility]] to minister to of the [[infantunconscious]]'s (i.e. the fact the the [[needunconscious]]sis not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known'').

However, "Although the [[presencetruth]] about [[desire]] of the is [[Otherpresent]] soon acquires an importance to some degree in itselfall [[speech]], an importance that goes beyond [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[satisfactiontruth]] of about [[needdesire]], since this ; whenever [[presencespeech]] attempts to articulate [[symbolizedesire]]s the , there is always a leftover, a [[Othersurplus]]'s love, which exceeds [[speech]]. "<ref>{{Evans}} p. 36</ref>

Hence =====Criticism=====One of [[Lacan]]'s most important criticisms of the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]] of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire]] with the related concepts of [[demand]] soon takes and [[need]]. In opposition to this tendency, [[Lacan]] insists on a double functiondistinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957, serving both as an articulation <ref>{{S4}} pp. 100-1, 125</ref>, but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} (1958c) "[[The Signification of the Phallus|La signification du phallus]]." ''[[needÉcrits]]''. Paris: Seuil, 1966: 685-95 ["[[The Signification of the Phallus|The signification of the phallus]] and as a ". Trans. [[demandAlan Sheridan]] for ''[[loveÉcrits: A Selection]]''. London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977: 281-91]. </ref>

=====Need=====[[Need]] is a purely [[biological]] [[instinct]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The [[human]] [[subject]], being [[born]] in a state of [[helplessness]], is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and hence depends on the [[Other]] to [[help]] it [[satisfy]] them. In order to get the [[Other]]'s help, the [[infant]] must express its [[need]]s vocally; need must be articulated in [[demand]]. The [[primitive]] [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the [[Other]] to minister to the [[infant]]'s [[need]]s. However, the [[presence]] of the [[Other]] soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]], since this [[presence]] [[symbolize]]s the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. Hence [[demand]] soon takes on a [[double]] function, serving both as an articulation of [[need]] and as a [[demand]] for [[love]]. However, whereas the [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, the [[Other]] cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[subject]] craves.   Hence even after the [[need]]s which were articulated in [[demand]] have been satisfied, the other aspect of [[demand]], the craving for [[love]], remains [[unsatisfied]], and this leftover is [[desire]].

Unlike a [[need]], which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the [[subject]] until another [[need]] arises, [[desire]] can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal.   The realisation of [[desire]] does not consist in being "fulfilled", but in the reproduction of [[desire]] as such.

 [[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the [[biology|biological]] point of view."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. [[James ]] H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>

It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.   Although they both belong to the field of the [[Other]] (as opposed to [[love]]), [[desire]] is one whereas the [[drive]]s are many.   In other [[words]], the [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]] (although there may also be [[desire]]s which are not manifested in the [[drive]]s).<ref>{{S11}} p. 243</ref> There is only one [[object]] of [[desire]], [[object (petit) a]], and this is represented by a variety of [[partial objects]] in different partial [[drive]]s. The [[object (petit) a]] is not the [[object]] towards which [[desire]] tends, but the [[cause]] of [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].

There is only one [[object]] =====Desire of the Other=====One of [[desireLacan]], 's most oft-repeated [[object (petit) aformulas]], and this is represented by a variety : "man's desire is the desire of partial objects in different partial the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref> This can be [[driveunderstood]]sin many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.

The =====More=====1. [[object (petit) aDesire]] is not essentially "desire of the Other's desire", which means both [[desire]] to be the [[object]] towards which of another's [[desire]] tends, but the and [[causedesire]] of for [[desirerecognition]]by another.

[[DesireLacan]] is not a relation to an takes this [[objectidea]] from [[Hegel]], but a relation to a via [[lackKojève]]., who states:

<blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933---39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>

One =====Object of Another's Desire=====[[Kojève]] goes on to argue (still following [[Hegel]]) that in order to achieve the [[desire]]d recognition, the [[subject]] must risk his own life in a [[struggle]] for pure prestige (see [[Lacanmaster]]). That [[desire]]'s most oft-repeated formulas is: "manessentially [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire ]] is clearly illustrated in the desire first '[[time]]' of the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p[[Oedipus complex]], when the [[subject]] desires to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]]. 235</ref>

This can be understood in many complementary ways=====Two=====2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[desire]]s from the point of view of another. The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of which Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref> What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of [[the following are thing]] in itself but simply the most importantfact that it is [[desire]]d by another.

1. This idea too is taken from [[DesireKojève]] is essentially "desire of the Other's desire", which means both [[desire]] to be the [[object]] reading of another's [[desireHegel]], and ; [[desireKojève]] for recognition by another. argues that:

<blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is 'mediated' by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>[[LacanAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]](1947 [1933-39] takes this idea from ) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, via Kojève, who states1969:6</ref></blockquote>

<blockquote>The [[reason]] for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933---39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 40</ref></blockquote>

<blockquote>Desire =====Hysteria=====This [[universal]] feature of [[desire]] is human only if especially evident in [[hysteria]]; the [[hysteric]] is one desireswho sustains another person's [[desire]], not the body, but the Desire of the other converts another's [[desire]] into her own (e. g. . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved'[[Dora]] desires Frau K because she [[identifies]] with Herr K, or, rather, 'recognised' in thus appropriating his human valueperceived desire). . <ref>{{S4}} p. 138; {{F}} (1905e) "[[{{FB}}|Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria]]. In other words, all human" [[SE]] VII, anthropogenetic Desire . 3. </ref> . Hence what is, finally, important in the [[analysis]] of a function [[hysteric]] is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the [[place]] from which she [[desire for 'recognition']]s (the [[subject]] with whom she identifies).<ref>KojËve, 1947: 6</ref></blockquote>

KojËve goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that in order to achieve the desired recognition, the subject must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see MASTER).  That desire is essentially desire to be the object of another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the Oedipus complex, when the subject desires to be the phallus for the mother. --- 2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[desire]]s from the point of view of another.  The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} 1951b: 12</ref>  What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]]d by another.  The [[desire]] of the [[Other]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} 1951b: 12</ref> This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that: <blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is "mediated" by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>KojËve, 1947: 6</ref> --- <blockquote>The reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>KojËve, 1947: 40</ref></blockquote> --- This universal feature of [[desire]] is especially evident in [[hysteria]]; the [[hysteric]] is one who sustains another person's [[desire]], converts another's [[desire]] into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138; see Freud, 1905e).  Hence what is important in the [[analysis]] of a [[hysteric]] is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she [[desire]]s (the [[subject]] with whom she identifies). --- # [[Desire]] is desire for the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition de).  The fundamental [[desire]] is the incestuous [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial Other (S7, 67).  # [[Desire]] is always "the desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is [[impossible ]] to [[desire]] what one already has.   The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p. 175</ref>

--- The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]]'s phrase is that desire is a social product.  [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other [[subject]]s. --- The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the child is at the mercy of her [[desire]].  It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by castrating the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to the whims of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]]. ==Desire, Need and Demand==[[Lacan]] distinguishes between three related concepts:* [[desire]]* [[need]] (''besoin'')* [[demand]] (''demande'')  =Social Product=Need==The [[human]] [[infant]] is born with certain [[biological]] [[need]]s that require (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]]. The [[human]] [[infant]] has certain [[biological]] [[need]]s which are satisfied by certain [[object]]s. [[Need]] is a [[biological]] [[instinct]] that requires (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]]. [[Need]] emerges according to the requirements of the organism and abates completely (even if only temporarily) when [[satisfied]]. The [[human]] [[infant]] is born into a state of [[helplessness]], and is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[biological]] [[needs]]. The [[infant]], unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[needs]], must depend on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them. The [[Other]] can help to [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s of the [[infant]]. The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s. ==Demand==The function of [[demand]] is to serve as an articulation of [[need]]. The [[infant]], in order to get help from the [[Other]], must articulate (express) its [[need]]s (vocally) in (the form of a) [[demand]]. The [[demand]] serves to bring the [[Other]] to help [[satisfy]] the [[needs]] of the [[infant]]. [[Demand]] is also a [[demand]] for [[love]] (beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]]). The [[presence]] of the [[Other]] (becomes most important in itself) [[symbolizes]] the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. The [[biological]] [[need]]s of the [[infant]] becomes subordinated point to the [[demand]] for the [[recognition]] and [[love]] of the [[Other]].  The [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]]. The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, but cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[infant]] craves.  The [[Other]] (can [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s that are articulated in the [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] but) cannot [[satisfy]] the [[infant]]'s [[demand]] for [[love]]. Even after the [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]], [[demand]] (as the [[demand]] for [[love]]) remains [[unsatisfied]] This leftover is [[desire]]. ==Desire==[[Desire]] is what remains of [[demand]] after the [[need]]s which are articulated in that [[demand]] are [[satisfied]]. <blockquote>"[[Desire]] is neither the appetite for [[satisfaction]], nor the [[demand]] for [[love]], but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."<ref>{{E}} p.287</ref></blockquote> [[Desire]] is the [[surplus]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]]. <blockquote>"[[Desire]] begins to take shape in the margin in which [[demand]] becomes separated emerge from [[need]]."<ref>{{E}} p.311</ref></blockquote> [[Desire]], unlike [[need]], can never be [[satisfied]]. A [[need]] (that is [[satisfied]]) ceases to motivate the [[infant]] until another [[need]] arises. [[Desire]] is constant in its pressure, and eternal.   ==Desire of the Other==[[Lacan]] asserted that [[desire]] is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]]. [[Desire]] is [[human]] when it is directed toward another [[desire]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]'s [[desire]] phrase is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]].<ref>{{S11}} p.235</ref></blockquote> The statement provides the basis for our consideration of [[desire]] in [[Lacan]]’s conception of [[subjectivity]] and points to the fundamentally social character of [[desire]].  ==Object of the Other's Desire==[[Desire]] is the [[desire]] for the [[Other]]'s [[desire]], that is, the [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of the [[Other]]'s [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is a [[desire]] for '[[recognition]]' (by another). The [[Oedipus complex]] illustrates the [[desire]] of the [[subject]] to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]]. ==Object Desired by Others==<blockquote>"The [[object]] of [[man]]'s [[desire]] ... is essentially an [[object]] [[desire]]d by someone else."<ref>Lacan. 1951b. p.12</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] is [[desirable]] (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because [[other]]s [[desire]] it. It is qua [[Other]] that the [[subject]] [[desire]]s.<ref>{{E}} p.312</ref> It is [[human]] to [[desire]] what others [[desire]] because they [[desire]] it. ==Desire for the Other==[[Desire]] is [[desire]] for the [[Other]]. The fundamental [[desire]] is the [[incestuous]] [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p.67</ref>  ==Impossible Desire==<blockquote>[[Desire]] is always "the [[desire]] for something else," because it is impossible to [[desiresocial]] what one already has.<ref>{{E}} p.167</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref>  ==Social Desire==[[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]], that is, in the [[unconscious]]. [[Desire]] is a social product. [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be, but is always constituted in a [[dialectic|dialecticalrelationship]] relationship with the perceived [[desire]]s of others. <blockquote>The most important point to emerge from Lacan’s phrase [that "the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects."<ref>Evans 39</ref></blockquote> OBJET AThe [[objet petit a]] is represented by a variety of [[partial object]]s in diffent partial [[drive]]s. The [[objet petit a]] is not the object towards which [[desire]] tends, but the cause of desire. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].  ==Desire and Prohibition==<blockquote>The [[law]] (or [[prohibition]]) "creates [[desire]] in the first place by creating interdiction. [[Desire]] is essentially the [[desire]] to [[transgress]], and for there to be [[transgression]] it is first necessary for there to be [[prohibition]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p.99</ref></blockquote> The [[law]] gives rise to [[desire]] as that which circulates endlessly around a [[prohibited]] core (of ''[[jouissance]]''). (The [[prohibition]] establishes [[desire]] as the ultimate motivational force in [[subjectivity]].)   ==Desire and Language== [[Desire]] is created at the moment of the [[infant]]'s accession to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]. [[Desire]] is inseparable from the [[symbolic]] [[order]] and thus inhabits all (inheres in) [[signification]] (as such). [[Desire]] is inscribed in the [[signifying chain]] in its essential [[metonymy]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]’s [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]]. [...] [[Desire]] is a [[metonymy]]."<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref></blockquote> The perpetual reference of one [[signifer]] to another in an eternal deferral of [[meaning]] is a formulation of the ceaseless movement of [[desire]]. ==Impossible Desire== According to [[Lacan]], [[desire]] is by its very nature [[insatiable]]; it can never be fulfilled. Any attempt to [[satisfy]] [[desire]] is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable. [[Desire]] designates the impossible relation that a [[subject]] has with [[objet petit a]].  The core around which [[desire]] circulates is [[prohibited]]. ==Desire and Impossibility==The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility.  The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossible. The paternal interdiction only formalises this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with the compensation of symbolisation. The prohibitive aspect of the [[law]] is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental [[impossibility]] at the heart of desire.  No [[object]] can ever fulfil [[desire]].  ==Desire and the Death Drive== [[Lacan]] posits a distinction between [[desire]] and [[drive]]. It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.  The [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]].

 __NOTOC__[[Category:Mess]]