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The [[distinction ]] between doubt as an [[instrument ]] of [[rational ]] [[thought ]] and pathological doubt was known to [[philosophers ]] ([[Descartes]], [[Spinoza]]) long before [[Freud]], and had long been studied as a [[symptom ]] or syndrome in [[psychiatry]]. Théodule Ribot defined doubt as "a [[conflict ]] between two tendencies in thought, incompatible and antagonistic, without any possible reconciliation, into a succession of positive and [[negative ]] judgments [[about ]] the same [[subject ]] that does not culminate in a conclusion" (1925). In his study on [[obsessional ]] [[neurosis]], Freud noted that "[a]nother [[mental ]] [[need ]] . . . [[obsessional neurotics ]] . . . is the need for uncertainty in their [[life]], or for doubt" (1909d, p. 232).

Freud first discussed doubt in his [[work ]] on [[dreams ]] where he saw it as a mark of [[resistance ]] and an indication to the [[analyst ]] of the [[significance ]] of the [[repressed ]] element to which it related. But for the most part Freud considered doubt in the context of [[Obsessional Neurosis|obsessional neurosis]], where it applied to events that had already occurred, and could be seen above all as an expression of [[ambivalence]], a [[repudiation ]] of the [[instinct ]] for [[mastery ]] as sublimated into an instinct for [[knowledge ]] (1913i, p. 324).

The etiology of doubt as a symptom is [[analyzed ]] at length in the [[case ]] [[history ]] of the "[[Rat Man]]" (1909d). Freud summarized it in a [[letter ]] of April 21, 1918, to Lou Andreas-Salomé: "The tendency to doubt arises not from any occasion for doubt, but is the continuation of the powerful ambivalent tendencies in the [[pregenital ]] [[phase]], which from then on become attached to every pair of opposites that [[present ]] themselves" (1966/1972, p. 77).

Obsessional thought, however, to characterize it more accurately, has [[three ]] somewhat different aspects: uncertainty, [[hesitation]], and doubt. Uncertainty can be viewed as that voluntary blurring of references, which underpins the aversion for watches, for example. Doubt, for its part, is an [[internal ]] [[perception ]] of indecision, which just like hesitation is associated with the volitional sphere, whereas uncertainty belongs to the cognitive and doubt to the [[affective]]. These three aspects do not necessarily function simultaneously, as [[witness ]] the fact that we can be certain yet unable to decide on [[action]]; at the same [[time]], action can overcome hesitation in the [[absence ]] of the slightest certainty about the reasonableness of that decision. The [[essence ]] of wisdom would be to achieve certainty before abandoning hesitation—the precise attribute obsessionals find it so hard to adopt (Mijolla-Mellor, 1992).

Apropos of the [[Rat man|Rat Man]], Freud mentions the "predilection for uncertainty" of obsessional neurotics who turn their [[thoughts ]] to "those [[subjects ]] upon which all mankind are uncertain and upon which our knowledge and judgments must necessarily remain open to doubt" (1909d, p. 232-33). This tendency extends to easily accessible knowledge, seemingly as a [[form ]] of protection against the risk of [[knowing]]. In fact the obsessive neutralizes any [[idea]], any decision, by evoking its opposite. Thus hesitation and the predilection for uncertainty constitute the cognitive aspect of the [[impossibility ]] of choosing, an attitude that serves to delay action indefinitely. The obsessive is paralyzed by ambivalence, immobilized by two [[instinctual ]] impulses directed at the same [[object]].

What is the source of this ambivalence? Since it is too general a [[concept ]] to determine the "[[choice ]] of neurosis," Freud offered a hypothesis based on constitutional factors: "The [[sadistic ]] components of [[love ]] have, from constitutional causes, been exceptionally strongly developed." And in [[terms ]] of [[individual ]] history, these "have consequently undergone a premature and all too thorough [[suppression]]" (1909d, p. 240).

Serge Leclaire (1971) has made significant contributions to our [[understanding ]] of the [[nature ]] of doubt in the obsessive individual, which he sums up rather laconically as "He doubts because he [[knows]]."

# [[Freud, Sigmund]]. (1909d). [[Notes ]] upon a case of obsessional neurosis. SE, 10: 151-318.# ——. (1913i). The disposition to obsessional neurosis: a contribution to the problem of [[Choice of Neurosis|choice of neurosis]]. SE, 12: 311-326.# Freud, Sigmund, and Andreas-Salomé, Lou. (1972). [[Sigmund Freud ]] and Lou Andreas-Salomé; letters. (Ernst Pfeiffer, Ed. and William and Elaine Robson-Scott, Trans.). New York: Harcourt Brace. (Original work published 1966)