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That one is well in evil, or if one prefers, that the eternal [[feminine]] does not draw one upward, one could say that this turn was taken upon a philological remark: namely that what had theretofore been admitted, that one is well in the good [‘’qu'on est bien dans le bien’’], rests on a homonym which the [[German]] [[language]] does not allow: ‘’Man fühlt sich wohl im Guten’’. This is how Kant introduces us to his ‘’Practical Reagon’’.
The [[pleasure principle]] is the law of the good which is the ‘’wohl’’, let us say well-[[being]] [‘’bien-être’’]. In [[practice]], it would submit the [[subject]] to the same phenomenal succession which determines its [[objects]]. The objection that Kant poses to it is, [[true]] to his rigorous style, intrinsic. No phenomenon can [[claim]] for itself a constant relation to pleasure. Thus no law of such a good can be [[enunciated]] which would define as will [[The Subject|the subject ]] who would introduce it into his practice.
The pursuit of the good would thus be an [[impasse]] if it were not reborn as ‘’das Gute’’, the good which is the object of the [[moral]] law. It is indicated to us by our [[experience]] of [[listening]] within oursb&es to commandments, whose imperative presents itself as categorical, that is, unconditional.
In which the Sadian maxim, by pronouncing itself from the mouth of the Other, is more honest than appealing to the voice within, since it unmasks the splitting, usually conjured away, of the subject.
The [[Subject of the Enunciation|subject of the enunciation ]] detaches itself here just as clearly as from "Long live Poland!" where only that fun which is always evoked by its manifestation is isolated.
In order to confirm this perspective one need only refer back to the [[doctrine]] upon which Sade himself founds the reign of his principle. It is that of the [[Rights of Man|rights of man]]. It is because no man can be the property of another man, nor in any way be his privilege, that he cannot make this the pretext to suspend the right of all to enjoyment over him [‘’droit de tous à jouir de lui’’], each according to his taste.<ref>Cf. the edition of Sade under review, vol. III, pp. 501-502.</ref> The constraint he would undergo would not be so much one of vioÏence as one of principle, the difficulty for whoever makes it a judgment, being not so much to make him consent to it, as to pronounce it in his [[place]].
It is thus indeed the Other as free, it is the [[freedom]] of the Other, which the [[discourse]] of the right to ‘’jouissance’’ poses as the subject of its enunciation, and not in a manner which differs from the ‘’You are’’ [‘’Tu es’’] which is evoked in the murderous [[capital]] [‘’fonds tuant’’] of any imperative.
Such vocal phenomena, notably those of [[psychosis]], indeed have this aspect of the object. And [[psychoanalysis]] was not far in its dawn from referring the voice of conscience to them.
One sees what motivates Kant to hold this object as having eluded any determination any the [[transcendental]] aesthetic, even if it does not fail to appear in some protrubéfance of the phenomenal [[veil]], [[lacking]] neither hearth nor home, nor time in intuition, lacking neither a mode which is situated in the unreal, nor effect in [[reality]]: it is not only that Kant's [[phenomenology]] is in default here, but that the voice, however mad, imposes the [[idea]] of the subject, and that the object of the law must not [[suggest]] a malignity of [[The Real|the real ]] God.
Assuredly [[Christianity]] has educated men to pay little attention to the ‘’jouissance’’ of God, and that is how Kant slips by his voluntarism of the Law-for-the-Law, which really piles it on, 40 to [[speak]], with respect to the ataraxia of Stoic experience. One might [[think]] that Kant is under pressure from what he hears too closely, not from Sade, but from some [[mystic]] nearer to home, in the sigh which stifies what he glimpses beyond having seen that his God is faceless: ‘’Grimmigkeit’’?
The requirement, in the [[figure]] of the victims, for a beauty always classed as incomparable (as well as inalterable, as we have just said) is another affair, which cannot be taken care of with some banal postulates, quickly fabricated, on [[sexual]] attraction. One will rather see in it the grimace of what we have demonstrated, in [[tragedy]], about the function of beauty: a [[barrier]] so extreme as to forbid access to a fundamental [[horror]]. Dream of the ‘’Antigone’’ of [[Sophocles]] and of the moment when the Epoç AvtXare µdXav<ref> [[Antigone]], verse 78 I .</ref> explodes.
This excursion would not be appropriate here, if it did not introduce what could be called the discordance of [[Two Deaths|two deaths]], introduced by the [[existence]] of condemnation. The between-two-deaths of this side [‘’l'en-deço’’] is essential to show us that it is none other than the one by which the beyond [‘’l'au-delà’’] sustains itself.
It can be clearly seen in the paradox which Sade's position with respect to hell constitutes. The idea of hell, a hundred [[times]] refuted by him and damned as the means of subjection used by [[religious]] tyranny, curiously returns to motivate the actions of one of his heroes, nevertheless among those most enamoured with libertine subversion in its reasonable form, namely the hideous Saint-Fond.<ref> Cf. Histoire de Juliette, published by Jean-Jacques Pauvert, vol. II, pp. 196ff.</ref> The practices whpge utmost tortures he imposes upon his victims are founded on the [[belief]] that he can render the torment they cause eternal for them in the beyond. A conduct and a belief whose authenticity the character underlines by his concealment of the former from the [[gaze]] of his accomplices, and by his difficulty in explaining the latter. Thus we hear him a few pages later attempt to render them plausible in his discourse by the [[myth]] of an attraction tending to bring together the "particles of evil."
This incoherence in Sade, neglected by Sadian specialists, who are sort of hagiographers themselves, would be clarified by noting the term, formally expressed in his [[writing]], of the [[second death]]. The assurance which he expects from it against the horrific routine of nature (the one which, to listen to him elsewhere, crime has the function of breaking) would require it to be pushed to an extremity where the fainting of the subject would be doubled: with which he symbolizes in the [[wish]] that the decomposed element of our body, in order not to reassemble, be themselves annihilated.
That Freud should nevertheless recognize the dynamism of this wish<ref>Subjective dynamism: [[physical]] death gives its object to the wish of the second death.</ref> in certain cases of his practice, that he should clearly, perhaps too clearly, reduce its function to an analogy with the [[Pleasure Principle|pleasure principle]], regulating it upon a "death" "drive" (demand), this is what will not be consented to, especially by someone who has not even been able to learn in the [[technique]] which he owes to Freud, any more than in his schooling, that language has an effect which is not utilitarian, or ornamental at the very most. For him, Freud is useful in congresses. Doubtless, in the eyes of such puppets, the millions of men for whom the pain of existing is the original evidence for the practices of salvation which they establish in their [[faith]] in [[Buddha]], must be underdeveloped; or rather, as for Buloz, director of ‘’La revue des deux mondes’’, who puts it quite clearly to Renan<ref>Cf. Renan's preface to his Nouvelles études d'histoire religieuse of 1884.</ref> when refusing his article on [[Buddhism]], this after Burnouf, or some time in the '50s (of the last century), for them it is "[[impossible]] that there are [[people]] that dumb."
Have they not, if they think they have a better ear than the rest of psychiatrists, heard this pain in the pure [[state]] mould the song of some [[patients]], who are called melancholics?
But also to draw upon ourselves the frowns of those who don't find it very nourishing. They are numerous these days. A renewal of the [[conflict]] between [[needs]] and desires, where as if by [[chance]] it is the Law which empties the shell.
For the move which would check the Kantian apolo ue, [[Courtly Love|courtly love ]] offers no less tempting a path, but one which requires being erudite. Being erudite by position, one draws the erudite upon oneself, and as for the erudite in this field, bring on the clowns.
Already Kant would for next to nothing make us lose our seriousness, for lack of the least sense of the comic (the proof is what he says of it in its place).
But if the advantage which we have allowed the ‘’Critique’’ to take from the alacrity of its argumentation owed something to our desire to know what it wanted to get at, could not the ambiguay of this success turn back its movement toward a revision of the extorted concessions?
Such as, for example, the disgrace which, somewhat hastily, was brought upon all objects that propose themselves as goods, as being incapable of causing the [[harmony]] of wills: simply by introducing competition. Thus Milan, in which Charles V and François I knew what it cost them both to see the same good. This is indeed to misrecognize the nature of the [[Object of Desire|object of desire]].
Which we can only introduce here by recalling what we teach about desire, to be formulated as desire of the Other, since it is originally desire of its desire. Which makes the harmony of desires conceivable, but not without [[danger]]. For the reason that in linking up in a chain which resembles Breughel's procession of the blind, they may indeed all be holding hands, but none knows where all are going.
Would the solution consonant with practical Reason then be that they all go round in circles?
Even lacking, [[The Gaze|the gaze ]] is there indeed an object which presents each desire with its universal rule by materializing its cause, by binding it to the division "between center and [[absence]]" of the subject.
Let us thenceforth limit ourselves to saying that a practice such as psychoanalysis, which recognizes in desire the truth of the subject, cannot misrecognize what follows without demonstrating what it represses.
For these [[human]] pyramids, fabulously demonstrating ‘’jouissance’’ in its cascading nature, these tiered fountains of desire built for ‘’jouissance’’ to cast upon the d'Este gardens the iridescence of a baroque voluptousness, the higher they make it gush into the sky, the closer we are drawn by the question of what is dripping there.
Of the unpredicatable quanta with which the love-[[hate]] atom shimmers near [[The thing|the Thing ]] whence man emerges with a cry, what is felt, beyond certain limits, has nothing to do with what supports desire in fantasy, which is precisely constituted by these limits.
These limits, we know that in his life Sade went beyond them.
Bewilderment and shadows, such is, contrary to the [[joke]] ‘’mot d'esprit’’<ref> One knows how Freud takes off from the "bewilderment and illumination" of Heymans.</ref> the conjunction whose carbon brillance fascinates us in these scenes.
This [[tragic]] is of the type which will sharpen its image later in [[The Century|the century ]] in more than one work, [[erotic]] novel or religious drama. We would call it the senile Sic, of which it was not known before us, except in schoolboys' jokes, that it was within a stone's-throw of the noble tragic. One should refer, to understand us to [[Claudel]]'s trilogy of the ‘’Père humilié’’. (To understand us, one should also know thèt we have shown in this work the traits of the most authentic tragedy. It is Melpomene who is age-ridden, with Clio, without anyone seeing which one will bury the other.)
Thus we are in a position to interrogate the Sade, mon prochain whose invocation we owe to the perspicacity of Pierre Klossowski. Extreme, it dispenses him from having to play the wit [‘’des recours du bel esprit’’].<ref> This phrase was addressed to a [[future]] academician, himself an expert in maliciousnesses, whom I have perceived to recognize himself in the one which opens this article.</ref>
