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− | <span style="font-size: 14pt;">Freud, Lacan and the psychoanalytic drive</span><span style="text-decoration: none;"> </span></u></b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" align="center"><b>By Matthew James, M.A.</b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"><b> </b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: left; margin-left: 0.5in;" align="center">
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− | <font size="2">After an interval the man spoke to me. He said that my friend was
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− | a very rough boy and asked did he get whipped often at school. I was going to reply indignantly that we were not
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− | National School boys to be <i>whipped</i> as he called it, but I remained
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− | silent. He began to speak on the subject of chastising boys. <i>His mind, as if
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− | magnetized again by his speech, seemed to circle slowly round and round its new
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− | centre</i>. He said that when boys were that kind they ought to be whipped and
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− | well whipped. When a boy was rough and unruly there was nothing would do him any
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− | good but a good sound whipping. A slap on the hand or a box on the ear was no
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− | good: what he wanted was to get a nice warm whipping. I was surprised at this
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− | sentiment and involuntarily glanced at his face. As I did so I met the gaze of a
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− | pair of bottle-green eyes peering at me from under a twitching forehead. I
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− | turned my eyes away again.</font></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: right; margin-left: 0.5in;" align="center">
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− | </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: right; margin-left: 0.5in;" align="center">
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− | <font size="2">James Joyce, ‘An Encounter’</font></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"><b><u>The Freudian
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− | drive</u></b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b> </b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b>The drive is a mythological concept</b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b> </b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><font size="2">The theory of the
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− | drives is so to say our mythology. Drives are mythical entities, magnificent in
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− | their indefiniteness. (Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis)</font></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"><font size="2"> </font></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">The concept of the drive is a hypothesis, a strategic
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− | assumption, a myth. Along with the related concepts of the unconscious and
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− | transference, it represents Freud’s (perhaps unwitting) attempt to move from the
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− | objective natural sciences of his time - physics, biology, and chemistry -
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− | towards a theory based on subjective discourse and speech, dreams, fantasies and
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− | symptoms.</p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><font size="2">The forces which we
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− | <i>assume</i> to exist behind the tensions caused by the needs of the id are
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− | called drives. (Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis)</font></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 11pt;"> </span></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">Freud’s technique was to forge theory from practice,
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− | knowledge from observation and interaction. Real phenomena such as bodily
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− | symptoms, repetitive phrases, and apparently bungled actions form the basis of
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− | theoretical constructions. <i>Ça parle</i>, as Lacan says - it, the unconscious,
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− | speaks. Thus the idea that psychoanalysis itself was born from hysteria, the
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− | hysteric’s discourse of Anna O. as addressed to Freud <i>qua </i>analyst.</p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><font size="2">We have often heard
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− | it maintained that sciences should be built up on clear and sharply defined
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− | basic concepts. In actual fact no science, not even the most exact, begins with
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− | such definitions. The true beginning of scientific activity consists rather in
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− | describing phenomena and then in proceeding to group, classify, and correlate
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− | them. Even at the stage of description it is not possible to avoid applying
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− | certain abstract ideas to the material in hand, ideas derived from somewhere or
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− | other but certainly not from the new observations alone. (Freud, Instincts and
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− | their Vicissitudes)</font></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">Freud’s analytic theory represents the application of
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− | subjectivity to science, which is precisely what science defines itself in
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− | opposition to. In this way, Lacan will say that psychoanalysis represents
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− | Freud’s <i>desire</i>.</p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b>The drive is not an instinct</b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">We might start by making, with Freud, a provisional
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− | distinction between animal instincts, ‘instinkts’, based on hereditary patterns
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− | and corresponding to organic needs, with ‘triebe’, specifically human, and
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− | dynamically variable, drives. </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">Laplanche and Pontalis provide a useful gloss on the two
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− | German terms. Instinkt is “traditionally a hereditary pattern peculiar to an
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− | animal species, varying little from one member of this species to another and
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− | unfolding in accordance with a temporal scheme which is generally resistant to
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− | change and apparently geared to a purpose.” Trieb “retains overtones suggestive
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− | of pressure (<i>treiben</i>, to push); the use of ‘Trieb’ indicates not so much
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− | a precise goal as a general orientation, and draws attention to the irresistible
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− | nature of the pressure rather than to the stability of its aim and object.”</p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">The so-called ‘hunger instinct’, the need to eat, would
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− | thus not be the same as what Freud calls the oral drive. A better example is the
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− | disjunction between the ‘reproductive instinct’, with its fixed aim and object,
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− | and the panopoly of human sexual drives. The point here is not to claim that
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− | humans are immune from the influence of instinct and biological need, but to
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− | propose that these ‘instincts’ are mutable, colored by individual experience.
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− | </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">Freud’s authorized English translator, James Strachey,
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− | renders both ‘instinkt’ and ‘trieb’ by the English ‘instinct’, a strategy which
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− | later translators have for the most part also adopted. Thus the distinction
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− | between the two German terms can be somewhat hard to grasp, a distinction Lacan
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− | will take as the starting point for his work on the drive. </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b>The structure of the Freudian drive</b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">In his 1915 paper ‘Instincts and their Vicissitudes’, Freud
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− | outlines the four components of his drive: pressure, source, aim, and object.</p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">Laplanche and Pontalis describe the relations between these
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− | terms by stating that the drive is “a dynamic process consisting in a <i>
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− | pressure</i> (charge of energy, motricity factor) which directs the organism
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− | towards an aim. According to Freud, a drive has its <i>source</i> in a bodily
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− | stimulus; its <i>aim</i> is to eliminate the state of tension obtaining at the
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− | instinctual source; and it is in the <i>object</i>, or thanks to it, that the
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− | drive may achieve its aim.”</p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">In defining the drive, Freud goes on to differentiate
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− | between a singular external stimulus (i.e. the sight of a predator) which can be
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− | assuaged by the body through muscular activity (i.e. fight or flight), and
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− | internal stimuli of a more constant nature which must be regulated by the mind -
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− | “an internal <i>alteration</i> of the source of stimulation” (Instincts and
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− | their Vicissitudes) - rather than
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− | eradicated. These responses to excitation are in accordance with Freud’s
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− | economic principle of equilibrium, the pleasure principle, which is based on the
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− | discharge of tension. </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">Freud is somewhat vague on the origins of such constant,
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− | internal excitation - he has not yet indexed its status as fundamentally <i>
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− | beyond</i> the pleasure principle - but admits that “there is naturally nothing
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− | to prevent our supposing that the drives [i.e. the internal stimuli] themselves
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− | are, at least in part, precipitates of the effects of external stimulation”
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− | (Instincts and their Vicissitudes). The
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− | idea, as Freud expresses it earlier, in his ‘Project for a Scientific
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− | Psychology’ of 1895, is that an intelligent organism faced with an array of
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− | confusing sensations and experiences must effectively filter and regulate this
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− | sensory data in order to survive. </p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">The psychic apparatus thus intervenes as a method of
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− | defense, to ‘alter’ or redirect the internal stimulus, the instinctual drive
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− | which cannot be mastered by the body alone, i.e. by fight or flight. The drive
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− | “appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and somatic, as
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− | the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism
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− | and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in
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− | consequence of its connection with the body” (Instincts and their
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− | Vicissitudes). The ‘psychical representative’ of the drive, the representation
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− | of that energetic pressure which the body redirects towards the mind, is
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− | localized by Freud in his concept of the unconscious. The somatic pressure
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− | itself, split off from its bodily origins, becomes manifest to consciousness as
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− | an ‘unmoored’ quota of affective energy. Thus the essential <i>Spaltung</i>,
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− | or splitting, which defines Freud’s model of the psyche.</p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">The psychical transformations and displacements of the
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− | pure, somatic instinct are the only means Freud has to conceptualize his ideas
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− | on the drive: </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><font size="2">I am indeed of
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− | the opinion that the antithesis of conscious and unconscious does not hold for
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− | drives. A drive can never be an object of consciousness - only the idea that
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− | represents the drive. Even in the unconscious, moreover, it can only be
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− | represented by the idea. If the drive did not attach itself to an idea or
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− | manifest itself as an affective state, we could know nothing about it. (Freud,
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− | The Unconscious)</font></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">The psychical aspects of the drive, its representations,
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− | become a necessary foundation for Freud’s theoretical framework. This sets the
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− | stage for the basis of Lacan’s reading of the Freudian drive as defined by its
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− | place in a language-system, or signifying structure to use his terms.</p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in; text-indent: 0.5in;"><b> </b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"><b><u>Drive theory
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− | in the Freudian field</u></b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b> </b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b>Lacan and the truth of Freud</b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">It is worth briefly examining the conceptual development of
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− | the drive in psychoanalytic theory after Freud because, especially in his early
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− | work, this is where Lacan himself begins. His self-proclaimed ‘return to Freud’,
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− | by which he means a return to the truth of the Freudian analytic experience, is
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− | characterized in part by a series of commentaries on the work of other analysts
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− | and analytic movements he perceives as deviations from this truth. </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><font size="2">I am not, for all
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− | that, denouncing the anti-Freudian aspects of contemporary psychoanalysis.
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− | Indeed, we should be grateful to the partisans of the latter for throwing down
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− | their mask in this regard, priding themselves, as they do, on going beyond what
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− | they, in fact, know nothing about, having retained just enough of Freud’s
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− | doctrine to sense how significantly what they are led to enunciate about their
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− | experience diverges from it. (Lacan, The direction of the treatment)</font></p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">Lacan alludes here to a certain ‘not wanting to know’, an
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− | effect of (in this case perhaps social and moral) repression which separates the
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− | subject of the enunciation, the speaking subject which experiences analytic
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− | truth, from the subject of the statement, the contemporary analytic ego through which
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− | it is repressed. </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b>The Freudian field</b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">The concept of the drive, and in particular Freud’s
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− | insistence on the sexual nature of the drive, was to prove a divisive issue for
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− | psychoanalysis. Psychology, the science from which Freud sought to differentiate
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− | his own discipline while at the same craving its acknowledgement, would attempt
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− | to ignore Freud’s discoveries, and then discredit them - sexuality and the body
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− | were seen as incidental if not irrelevant to a science of the mind. Alfred
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− | Adler, one of the first analysts to break from Freud, rejected the sexual basis
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− | of the drive in favor of a more aggressive human principle, a drive towards
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− | knowledge and self-perfection. Jung would propose a more symbolic, archetypal
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− | notion of the unconscious than his mentor, and rethink the human drive, and
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− | analysis itself, as a form of spiritual quest. </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">Moving forward in time, Melanie Klein will accept the
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− | centrality of sexuality and the drives, yet according to Lacan, she imposes her
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− | own, partially erroneous theoretical structure on top of Freud’s - one
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− | over-emphasizing imaginary relations and the role of the mother. In America,
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− | with the rise of object-relations theory, there is the movement from a so-called
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− | 1 person to 2 person psychology, a move away - in Lacan’s view - from the
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− | Freudian subject of the unconscious towards a model based more on communication,
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− | construction, and intersubjectivity. More recently, the idea of a sexual drive
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− | innately connected to the body has been questioned by gender theorists
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− | emphasizing the performative, and therefore potentially renegotiable, nature of
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− | sexuality. </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">By contrast, Lacan will claim for himself a more
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− | conservative role, repeatedly stating his fidelity to the texts of Freud and
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− | their clinical implications. Whilst this claim is a matter of some debate, it is
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− | nevertheless useful to think of the Lacanian drive as a reaction to, and a
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− | rebuttal of, certain developments in post-Freudian psychoanalysis. </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"><b><u>The Lacanian
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− | drive</u></b></p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: center;" align="center"><b> </b></p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">The drive has a central place in Lacan’s work - along with
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− | the unconscious, repetition, and transference, it is one of the Four Fundamental
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− | Concepts of Psychoanalysis which he proposes in his 11<sup>th</sup> annual
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− | Seminar of 1964. In a conference paper given that same year, Lacan introduces
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− | the concept of the drive thus: </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><font size="2">The drive, as it
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− | is constructed by Freud on the basis of the experience of the unconscious,
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− | prohibits psychologizing thought from resorting to “instinct” by which it masks
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− | its ignorance through the supposition of morals in nature. It can never be often
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− | enough repeated, given the obstinacy of psychologists who, on the whole and per
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− | se, are in the service of technocratic exploitation, that the drive - the
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− | Freudian drive - has nothing to do with instinct (none of Freud’s expressions
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− | allows for confusion). (Lacan, On Freud’s <i>Trieb</i> and the Psychoanalysts
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− | Desire)</font></p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">In order to define what the drive <i>is</i> for Lacan, as
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− | opposed to what it is not, a little theoretical groundwork is involved.</p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b>Need, Demand, Desire</b></p>
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− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b> </b></p>
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− |
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− | <p class="MsoNormal">Lacan substitutes Freud’s myth of the intelligent organism
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− | besieged by potentially harmful stimuli with his own image of a helpless child
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− | before its mother. The child, like other animals, is subject to what Lacan terms
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− | need, a series of biological instincts (for example hunger) which can be
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− | satisfied by certain objects (for example milk). Lacan theorizes (non-human)
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− |
| |
− | animal communication in terms of a code based on signs, which can be transmitted
| |
− |
| |
− | and received with no risk of misinterpretation - i.e. a certain type of cry (as
| |
− |
| |
− | defined by pitch, volume, time of day or some other consistent variable) would
| |
− |
| |
− | convey a specific need for food, rather than say warmth or water, to the parent.
| |
− |
| |
− | By contrast, the human animal can only express his need through speech, and a
| |
− |
| |
− | symbolic language-system based on signifiers, which do not correspond to any
| |
− |
| |
− | ‘real’ object of need, but only achieve a semblance of meaning in their relation
| |
− |
| |
− | to, and difference from, other signifiers. Ferdinand de Saussure, the Swiss
| |
− |
| |
− | linguist whose work Lacan draws on here, gives the example of the signifier
| |
− |
| |
− | ‘cat’, whose ‘catness’, as it were, is constructed from the cumulative premises
| |
− |
| |
− | that it is not a dog, or a horse, or a windmill, or any other signifier. Thus
| |
− |
| |
− | Lacan will propose that ‘the signifier represents the subject for another
| |
− |
| |
− | signifier’ in a potentially infinite signifying chain. </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">The human child, then, can express himself only through a
| |
− |
| |
− | demand, which is by nature inarticulate - he is without the linguistic means to
| |
− |
| |
− | articulate what he wants. For Lacan, this is equivalent to saying he does not
| |
− |
| |
− | know what he wants. The child is alienated from his body, he cannot speak it.
| |
− |
| |
− | Thus his cry, his demand to satiate whatever it is that is troubling him, to be
| |
− |
| |
− | given whatever it is that he wants, is destined always to be misinterpreted - or
| |
− |
| |
− | rather to be overwritten, inferred, decided for him, in a process not unlike
| |
− |
| |
− | that of analytic suggestion, by his mother, or whoever first takes this place of
| |
− |
| |
− | guardian, listener, analyst, which Lacan terms the Other. </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"><i>What do you want of me?</i> Are you hungry, thirsty,
| |
− |
| |
− | tired, wet? The Other, unable to comprehend, or thus to satisfy, the child’s
| |
− |
| |
− | abstract demand, provides a series of substitute objects for him. Oh, you must
| |
− |
| |
− | need ‘x' - the breast, the bottle, the toy. The child in his turn determines
| |
− |
| |
− | these responses as demands <i>from</i> the Other, answers to his primordial
| |
− |
| |
− | questions, pointers to his place in the world. <i>What do you want of me?</i>
| |
− |
| |
− | Oh, you must want me to suck, crawl, speak, shit. The signifier is thus reduced
| |
− |
| |
− | to a sign in these primitive encounters with the demand of the Other. Lacan
| |
− |
| |
− | theorizes demand as essentially a demand for love, an impossible, narcissistic
| |
− |
| |
− | demand for access to a ‘real’ object in the Other, unmediated by language, which
| |
− |
| |
− | would act as a sign of love, a gift bringing complete satisfaction.</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b> </b></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><font size="2">
| |
− |
| |
− | Demand in itself bears on something other than
| |
− |
| |
− | the satisfactions it calls for. It is a demand of a presence or of an absence -
| |
− |
| |
− | which is what is manifested in the primordial relation to the mother. Demand
| |
− |
| |
− | constitutes the Other as already possessing the ‘privilege’ of satisfying needs,
| |
− |
| |
− | that is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are
| |
− |
| |
− | satisfied. This privilege of the Other thus outlines the radical form of the
| |
− |
| |
− | gift of that which the Other does not have, namely, its love. In this way,
| |
− |
| |
− | demand annuls the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting
| |
− |
| |
− | it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are
| |
− |
| |
− | reduced to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.
| |
− |
| |
− | (Lacan, The Signification of the Phallus)</font></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: 150%;"><b> </b></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">This closed, circuit-like structure of demand bears very
| |
− |
| |
− | closely on the drive, as we shall see. The mutual co-dependency of mother and
| |
− |
| |
− | child, subject and object, cosseted in a womblike world which attempts to suture
| |
− |
| |
− | over the cuts of language, Lacan will term imaginary, a retroactively
| |
− |
| |
− | constructed fantasy created by the ego. This fantasy enables the speaking
| |
− |
| |
− | subject, the subject of language, some partial and temporary access to what
| |
− |
| |
− | Lacan names <i>jouissance</i>, the satisfaction, or complete enjoyment, which
| |
− |
| |
− | language denies him by separating him from his body, and thus the body of the
| |
− |
| |
− | Other. However, as a mode of being, a way to live in the world, such a fantasy
| |
− |
| |
− | is untenable, or, strictly speaking, impossible in the Lacanian sense - an
| |
− |
| |
− | existence ‘in the real’ without the supporting structure of a symbolic
| |
− |
| |
− | language-system, a Wittgenstinian private-language game. Such is the Lacanian
| |
− |
| |
− | definition of psychosis. </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">The way out of such a traumatic dead-end, and the entry
| |
− |
| |
− | into a signifying system which alienates while providing a necessary structure,
| |
− |
| |
− | is theorized by Lacan as an acceptance of, or at least a confrontation with,
| |
− |
| |
− | what he calls the <i>Nom du Père</i>, to be heard as both the ‘name’ and ‘no’ of
| |
− |
| |
− | the father. This localization of the Freudian Oedipus and castration complexes<i>
| |
− |
| |
− | </i>in the signifier of paternity and the law bears the essential function of a
| |
− |
| |
− | prohibition. The child is forbidden its secret trysts with the maternal
| |
− |
| |
− | love-object, its games of signs and seductions, and forced to recognize the
| |
− |
| |
− | existence of a third term in its dyadic universe, and thus by expansion the
| |
− |
| |
− | potentially infinite number of such terms. This paternal ‘metaphor’, as Lacan
| |
− |
| |
− | calls it, acts as the catalyst which will transform the child’s signs into
| |
− |
| |
− | signifiers, allow him to negotiate with the world and be negotiated by it,
| |
− |
| |
− | experience acceptance and rejection, love and loss - in short to enter the
| |
− |
| |
− | symbolic system as a <i>desiring</i> subject. The infantilizing trajectory from
| |
− |
| |
− | need to demand and back is thus dialecticized by what Lacan terms desire, which
| |
− |
| |
− | he defines as that which is left over when need is subtracted from demand, i.e.
| |
− |
| |
− | the specifically human <i>wunschen</i> or wishes which suture over the
| |
− |
| |
− | frustration of an impossible demand.</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b>The drive as the relation of the speaking subject to the
| |
− |
| |
− | demand of the Other</b></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">During the late 1950s, Lacan formulates his first attempts
| |
− |
| |
− | at a visual topography of the subject in a series of ‘graphs of desire’. The
| |
− |
| |
− | final version of the graph, as detailed in the 1960 conference paper ‘The
| |
− |
| |
− | Subversion of the Subject’, defines the drive as ($<>D) - the relation of (<>) the speaking
| |
− |
| |
− | subject ($) to the demand of the Other (D). As we have seen, this relation forms
| |
− |
| |
− | a circuit-like structure, based on a mutual co-dependency of terms. The drive
| |
− |
| |
− | might be described as a compromise formation in that both subject and Other
| |
− |
| |
− | depend upon each other to exist, to be recognized as existing. Thus the absolute
| |
− |
| |
− | subjection to demand implies the dissolution of the subject into an object - an
| |
− |
| |
− | object which <i>makes the Other exist</i>, exemplified in Schreber’s psychotic
| |
− |
| |
− | delusion that he was the target of neuron rays sent by God to impregnate him.
| |
− |
| |
− | And in turn the freedom of the subject from the demand of the Other - this is
| |
− |
| |
− | one way in which Lacan theorizes the aim of analysis - requires the <i>
| |
− |
| |
− | dissolution</i> <i>of the Other</i> as existing, its dematerialization as a
| |
− |
| |
− | locus of meaningful signifiers.</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">The speaking subject - which we can specify here as the
| |
− |
| |
− | subject who comes to speak in analysis (we might say that the psychotic, rather
| |
− |
| |
− | than speaking, is <i>spoken</i>) - exists in a sort of limbo between these
| |
− |
| |
− | two extremes, pure subjectivity and pure objectivity, and is thus for Lacan
| |
− |
| |
− | fundamentally split, fissured, lacking in substance. The subject of the
| |
− |
| |
− | unconscious exists only as the gap, the alterity, between the signifiers which
| |
− |
| |
− | represent it to consciousness. If desire can be theorized as the metonymical
| |
− |
| |
− | attempt to sustain these signifiers, to condense and displace them, break them
| |
− |
| |
− | up and put them back together again, then demand, by contrast, can be thought of
| |
− |
| |
− | as an oppositional process which attempts to mortify the signifier, fixating it
| |
− |
| |
− | in the unconscious as a sign. The drive is precisely the orbital movement around
| |
− |
| |
− | such a sign <i>qua</i> drive-object.</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">The following case vignette by the Lacanian analyst Marie-Hélène Brousse provides a clinical application of the ideas we have just
| |
− |
| |
− | been discussing:</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><font size="2">I have a patient who is
| |
− |
| |
− | grappling with her mother’s desire because she can’t decide whether or not to
| |
− |
| |
− | have a baby. In reference to her mother’s desire she can only remember one
| |
− |
| |
− | sentence. It’s a memory of her mother being furious with her children, running
| |
− |
| |
− | after them saying ‘I’m going to kill you’. The signifier of her mother’s desire
| |
− |
| |
− | is ‘I’m going to kill you’. In a sense, my patient was constituted on the basis
| |
− |
| |
− | of those signifiers, to kill a child. It’s her interpretation of the Other’s
| |
− |
| |
− | demand. The Other’s demand is ‘die’!</font></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><font size="2">In the case of my patient
| |
− |
| |
− | and her mother, the Other’s demand is quite simple: the definitive silence of
| |
− |
| |
− | the children. She demands that they be quiet, and that is the ultimate
| |
− |
| |
− | consequence. In that case, the mother’s demand, ‘be quiet’, can be understood as
| |
− |
| |
− | ‘be dead’ – the object of the patient’s fantasy. In her fantasy she always
| |
− |
| |
− | appears as disappearing. What is her object? Her own disappearance as an object.
| |
− |
| |
− | (Brousse, The Drive II)</font></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b> </b></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b>All drives are partial drives</b></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b> </b></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">Lacan follows Freud in stating that the object of the drive
| |
− |
| |
− | is variable, which is to say it has no natural object:</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><font size="2">This is what Freud tells us.
| |
− |
| |
− | Let us look at what he says - as far as the object in the drive is concerned,
| |
− |
| |
− | let it be clear that it is, strictly speaking, of no importance. It is a matter
| |
− |
| |
− | of total indifference…How should one conceive of the drive, so that one can say
| |
− |
| |
− | that, in the drive, whatever it may be, it is indifferent? As far as the oral
| |
− |
| |
− | drive is concerned, for example, it is obvious that it is not a question of
| |
− |
| |
− | food, nor of the memory of food, nor the echo of food, nor the mother’s care,
| |
− |
| |
− | but of something that is called the breast…If Freud makes a remark to the effect
| |
− |
| |
− | that the object in the drive is of no importance, it is probably because the
| |
− |
| |
− | breast, in its function as object, is to be revised in its entirety. (Lacan,
| |
− |
| |
− | Seminar XI)</font></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">For Lacan, this function of the object is to mark the place
| |
− |
| |
− | of a primordial lack or void created by the subject’s accession to language, a
| |
− |
| |
− | piece or fragment of the real body which eludes both imaginary representation
| |
− |
| |
− | and symbolic elucidation. Thus the breast will be theorized in terms of a lost
| |
− |
| |
− | object, an absence for the subject to recreate in his fantasy. Lacan writes this
| |
− |
| |
− | lost object as <i>a </i>(<i>autre</i>, or 'other'), defining it as the object-cause of desire, the
| |
− |
| |
− | traumatic object of separation which the subject ($) attempts to refind in a
| |
− |
| |
− | fantasized image ($<><i>a</i>) and thus annul. Its horizon is that of a cut at
| |
− |
| |
− | the edges of the body, where the subject attempts to define inside and outside,
| |
− |
| |
− | subjectivity and Otherness:</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><font size="2">Let us note that this
| |
− |
| |
− | characteristic of the cut is no less obviously prevalent in the object described
| |
− |
| |
− | by analytic theory: the mamilla, the feces, the phallus (as an imaginary
| |
− |
| |
− | object), and the urinary flow. (An unthinkable list, unless we add, as I do, the
| |
− |
| |
− | phoneme, the gaze, the voice…and the nothing). For isn’t it plain to see that
| |
− |
| |
− | the characteristic of being partial, rightly emphasized in objects, is
| |
− |
| |
− | applicable not because these objects are part of a total object, which the body
| |
− |
| |
− | is assumed to be, but because they only partially represent the function that
| |
− |
| |
− | produces them. A common characteristic of these objects as I formulate them is
| |
− |
| |
− | that they have no specular image, in other words, no alterity. It is to this
| |
− |
| |
− | object that cannot be grasped in the mirror that the specular image lends its
| |
− |
| |
− | clothes. (Lacan, The Subversion of the Subject)</font></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">The object <i>a</i>, as a hollow, an empty husk at the
| |
− |
| |
− | limits of the body, can thus be represented in the drive by any specular object
| |
− |
| |
− | of consciousness, but this representation remains partial, incomplete, in the
| |
− |
| |
− | same way that the 1 can only partially represent the 0, and the signifier can
| |
− |
| |
− | only partially represent the real. In a sense, every drive-object is by nature
| |
− |
| |
− | fetishistic in its veiling of the anxiety-provoking object <i>a </i>which it
| |
− |
| |
− | embodies. This essential disjunction between the object and its function leads
| |
− |
| |
− | Lacan to rethink the hypothesis of a series of partial ‘component’ sexual drives
| |
− |
| |
− | (i.e. oral, anal, etc) which integrate to form a ‘developmentally mature’ genital
| |
− |
| |
− | drive in the subject. In place of this teleology, denounced variously as a
| |
− |
| |
− | normalizing social construct and an idealistic fantasy, Lacan affirms the logic
| |
− |
| |
− | of Freud’s ‘polymorphous perversion’. Any part of the body can become
| |
− |
| |
− | sexualized. All drives are partial to the extent that they ‘know nothing’ about
| |
− |
| |
− | the imaginary unity of the subject (or indeed the ‘sexual responsibilities’
| |
− |
| |
− | instated by his super-ego) - instead of this ‘Gestalt’ they form a ‘montage’ of
| |
− |
| |
− | discontinuous elements which in Seminar XI Lacan compares to a Surrealist
| |
− |
| |
− | painting. </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b>The structure of the Lacanian drive</b></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b> </b></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">If the drives are not a product of nature, if they are
| |
− |
| |
− | ‘constructed’ in some way, this is not to say that they are therefore
| |
− |
| |
− | ‘malleable’, that they can be changed or reformulated at will. We touch here on
| |
− |
| |
− | the Lacanian critique of recent gender theory such as the work of Judith Butler.
| |
− |
| |
− | The relation of the subject to <i>jouissance</i>, to the satisfaction produced
| |
− |
| |
− | by the drive, is for Lacan a very intimate one, and on an unconscious level it
| |
− |
| |
− | is often a relation the subject wants to know nothing about, let alone change.
| |
− |
| |
− | Let us recall Freud’s image of the mind as the site of an ongoing archeological
| |
− |
| |
− | excavation, the deepest layers being all but inaccessible to consciousness. We
| |
− |
| |
− | might speak of a subject ‘in thrall’ to, and ‘enthralled by’, the drive. This
| |
− |
| |
− | notion of servitude, ‘thralldom’, indexes the degree of attachment which bonds
| |
− |
| |
− | the subject of the drive to the Other.</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">In neurosis, there exists an unconscious equation between
| |
− |
| |
− | demand and lack. To demand something is to be without it. As far as the neurotic
| |
− |
| |
− | is concerned, the demand of the Other, as expressed in its signifiers, thus
| |
− |
| |
− | indicates the nature of its lack. However, according to the logic of the
| |
− |
| |
− | signifier, this nature is destined to remain opaque to the subject, mysterious,
| |
− |
| |
− | always represented by another signifier - we might say that it is experienced as
| |
− |
| |
− | the desire of the Other (What does the Other want?). This desire is precisely
| |
− |
| |
− | what is intolerable for the obsessional, who always does his best to reduce it
| |
− |
| |
− | to a demand, and thus himself to an object. By contrast the hysteric cannot bear
| |
− |
| |
− | the intransigence of the Other’s demand, depending instead on the
| |
− |
| |
− | desire of the Other in order to exist as a subject. </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">Lacan will formulate the desire of the Other as S(<s>O</s>),
| |
− |
| |
− | the signifier of a lack in the Other. A signifier is always missing, the
| |
− |
| |
− | signifier which would complete the subject by allowing him to satisfy the
| |
− |
| |
− | Other’s demand (<i>That’s</i> what the Other wants). The subject of the drive
| |
− |
| |
− | attempts to locate this missing signifier in the Other’s demand by <i>
| |
− |
| |
− | identifying with the object of that demand </i>(i.e. by ‘being dead’ in the case
| |
− |
| |
− | of Brousse’s patient). The logic of the drive resides in this movement of
| |
− |
| |
− | identification, a reflexive movement from subject to object and back again,
| |
− |
| |
− | whose aim is to return to its source.</p>
| |
− |
| |
− |
| |
− |
| |
− | [[Image:Goal.jpg|center]]
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" align="center"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" align="center"> <span style="font-size: 11pt;">
| |
− |
| |
− | (Lacan, Seminar XI)</span></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"><i>La pulsion en fait le tour</i> as Lacan says in French,
| |
− |
| |
− | the drive always misses its object - precisely because the object itself is a
| |
− |
| |
− | lack, it has no corresponding signifier. We might say that the pervert takes the
| |
− | http://www.nosubject.com/Special:Upload
| |
− | Upload file
| |
− | neurotic’s identification to its logical conclusion and <i>becomes</i> the
| |
− |
| |
− | object of the Other’s demand, working ceaselessly to make of the Other a pure
| |
− |
| |
− | subject of <i>jouissance</i>. Lacan will write the perverse fantasy as an
| |
− |
| |
− | ‘inverse’ neurosis (<i>a</i><>$) - freed of neurotic guilt, the pervert is thus
| |
− |
| |
− | all the more certain of his own satisfaction. </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">In Seminar XI, Lacan draws on Freud’s work ‘A Child is
| |
− |
| |
− | Being Beaten’ to underscore the grammatical edifice of the drive, its existence
| |
− |
| |
− | as a combinatory of subject ($), verb (<>), and object (D) - in this way it
| |
− |
| |
− | embodies dialectically the logical structure of fantasy ($<><i>a</i>). The
| |
− |
| |
− | alternating status of the verb, represented by the lozenge, as both active and
| |
− |
| |
− | passive is rendered in French as ‘se faire’ - to make oneself be (seen, heard,
| |
− |
| |
− | shitted, sucked etc). There are thus two moments to the drive - the scopic
| |
− |
| |
− | drive is both voyeuristic (making oneself be seen by the Other) and
| |
− |
| |
− | exhibitionist (making the Other be seen by oneself). The masochist enjoys his
| |
− |
| |
− | own pain from the position of the sadist, and the sadist enjoys the pain of his
| |
− |
| |
− | victim from the position of the masochist.</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">In a sense, the circular nature of the drive offers no way
| |
− |
| |
− | forward, its logic is binary. The ‘constant pressure’ is resolved by an
| |
− |
| |
− | alternation between two terms - everything and nothing. Thus Lacan states that
| |
− |
| |
− | every drive is a manifestation of the death drive, its compulsion to repeat
| |
− |
| |
− | encapsulated in the image of a serpent chasing its own tail.</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> <a></a></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b>Conclusion: from Drive to Desire</b></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b> </b></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">In concluding I would like to refer to a distinction
| |
− |
| |
− | Jacques-Alain Miller draws between drive and desire in a commentary on one of
| |
− |
| |
− | Lacan’s papers: </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-left: 0.5in;"><font size="2">The subject is happy. The
| |
− |
| |
− | want-to-be is on the side of desire. But on the side of the drive, there is no
| |
− |
| |
− | want-to-be. What Freud calls the drive is an activity which always comes off. It
| |
− |
| |
− | leads to sure success, whereas desire leads to a sure unconscious formation,
| |
− |
| |
− | namely, a bungled action or slip: ‘I missed my turn, ‘I forgot my keys’, etc.
| |
− |
| |
− | That is desire. The drive, on the contrary, always has its keys in its hand.
| |
− |
| |
− | (Miller, Commentary on Lacan’s ‘On Freud’s <i>Trieb</i> and the Psychoanalysts
| |
− |
| |
− | Desire’)</font></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal">Implicit in this distinction is an opposition between old
| |
− |
| |
− | and new. If the drive succeeds, it is because it has nowhere to go, it has been
| |
− |
| |
− | there before, its route is already decided. Desire, on the other hand, can
| |
− |
| |
− | always take a detour, reformulate its signifiers, interpret its own mistakes. In
| |
− |
| |
− | this sense, it can function as a learning experience, allowing the subject, in
| |
− |
| |
− | the words of the writer Samuel Beckett, to ‘fail again...fail better’.<a></a></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"> <a></a><a></a></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" align="center"><u><b>Bibliography</b></u></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"><b> </b></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><i>Brousse, Marie-Helene</i>
| |
− |
| |
− | ‘The Drive (I)’ and ‘The Drive (II)’ in <u>Reading Seminar XI</u>, in R.
| |
− |
| |
− | Feldstein, B. Fink, M. Jaanus (eds.), <u>Reading Seminar XI</u>, State
| |
− |
| |
− | University of New York Press, 1996</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal"><i> </i></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><i>Freud, Sigmund </i>
| |
− |
| |
− | <font color="#000000" face="Times New Roman,Times,Times NewRoman"><u>
| |
− |
| |
− | The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, 24 volumes</u>,
| |
− |
| |
− | ed. James Strachey et al., The Hogarth Press and the Institute of
| |
− |
| |
− | Psychoanalysis, 1953-74</font></p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><i>Lacan, Jacques </i> <u>Écrits: A Selection</u>,
| |
− |
| |
− | trans. Alan Sheridan, Routledge, 1977</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><i>Ibid.</i> <u>The Seminar.
| |
− |
| |
− | Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis</u>, trans. Alan
| |
− |
| |
− | Sheridan, Hogarth Press, 1977</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><i>Ibid.</i> ‘On Freud’s “<i>Trieb</i>”
| |
− |
| |
− | and the psychoanalyst’s desire’, trans. Bruce Fink, in R. Feldstein, B. Fink, M.
| |
− |
| |
− | Jaanus (eds.), <u>Reading Seminar XI</u>, State University of New York Press,
| |
− |
| |
− | 1996</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><i>Laplanche, Jean </i>and <i>
| |
− |
| |
− | Pontalis, Jean-Bertrand </i><u>The Language of Psychoanalysis</u>, Karnac Books,
| |
− |
| |
− | 1996</p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"> </p>
| |
− |
| |
− | <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify;"><i>Miller, Jacques-Alain </i>
| |
− |
| |
− | ‘Commentary on Lacan’s ‘On Freud’s “<i>Trieb</i>” and the psychoanalyst’s
| |
− |
| |
− | desire’’, trans. Bruce Fink, in R. Feldstein, B. Fink, M. Jaanus (eds.), <u>
| |
− |
| |
− | Reading Seminar XI</u>, State University of New York Press, 1996<a></a><a></a><a></a><a></a><a></a></p>
| |
| | | |
| == References == | | == References == |