Existence
existence (existence) The term 'existence' is employed by Lacan in
various ways (see éiûek, 1991: 136-7):
e Existence in the symbolic This sense of existence is to be understood in
the context of Freud's discussion of the 'judgement of existence', by which the
existence of an entity is affirmed prior to attributing any quality to it (see
Freud, 1925h; see BEJAHUNG). Only what is integrated in the symbolic order
fully 'exists' in this sense, since 'there is no such thing as a prediscursive
reality' (S20, 33). It is in this sense that Lacan argues that 'woman does not
exist' (Lacan, 1973a: 60); the symbolic order contains no signifier for femi-
ninity, and hence the feminine position cannot be fully symbolised.
It is important to note that, in the symbolic order, 'nothing exists except on
an assumed foundation of absence. Nothing exists except insofar as it does not
exist' (Ec, 392). In other words, everything that exists in the symbolic order
only exists by virtue of its difference to everything else. It was Saussure who
first pointed this out when he argued that in language there are no positive
terms, only differences (Saussure, 1916).
e Existence in the real In this sense, it is only that which is impossible to
symbolise that exists: the impossible Thing at the heart of the subject. 'There is
in effect something radically unassimilable to the signifier. It's quite simply
the subject's singular existence' (S3, 179). This is the existence of the subject
of the unconscious, S, which Lacan describes as an 'ineffable, stupid exis-
tence' (E, 194).
This second sense of the term existence is exactly the opposite of existence
in the first sense. Whereas existence in the first sense is synonymous with
Lacan's use of the term BEING, existence in the second sense is opposed to
being.
Lacan coins the neologism ex-sistence to express the idea that the heart of
our being (Kern unseres Wesen) is also radically Other, strange, outside (Ec,
l1); the subject is decentred, his centre is outside of himself, he is ex-centric.
Lacan also speaks of the 'ex-sistence (Entstellung) of desire in the dream' (E,
264), since the dream cannot represent desire except by distorting it.