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Affect
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In [[Freud]]'s work, the term '"[[affect]]' " stands in opposition to the term '"[[idea]]'".
The opposition between the affective and the intellectual is one of the oldest themes in [[philosophy]], and made its way into [[Freud]]'s vocabulary via [[German]] [[psychology]].
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For [[Lacan]], however, the opposition between the [[affective]] and the [[intellectual]] is not valid in the psychoanalytic field.
Thus, in response to those who accuse [[Lacan]] of being over-[[intellectual]] and of neglecting the role of [[affect]], it can be pointed out that this [[criticism]] is based on what [[Lacan]] saw as a false opposition.
[[Psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is based on the [[symbolic]] [[order]], which transcends the opposition between [[affect]] and [[intellect]].
On the one hand, [[psychoanalytic]] experience '"is not that of an affective smoochy-woochy' (Sl."<ref>{{S1}} p.55</ref> On the other hand, 55)nor is [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] an intellectual affair.
The [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalyst]] must thus be aware of the ways in which both '"affective smoochy-woochy' " and intellectualisation can be [[resistance]]s to [[analysis]], [[imaginary]] [[lure]]s of the [[ego]].
[[Anxiety]] is the only [[affect]] that is not deceptive.
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[[Lacan]] is opposed to those [[analyst]]s who have taken the [[affect]]ive realm as primary, for the [[affect]]ive is not a separate realm opposed to the [[intellectual]].
However, he rejects accusations of neglecting the role of [[affect]], pointing to the fact that a whole year of the [[seminar]] is dedicated precisely to discussing [[anxiety]] (.<ref>Lacan, 1973a: 38).</ref> --
[[Lacan]] does not propose a general theory of affects, but only touches on them insofar as they impinge on psychoanalytic treatment.
He argues that [[affect]]s are not [[signifier]]s but [[signal]]s (S7, 102-3), and emphasises [[Freud]]'s position that [[repression]] does not bear upon the [[affect]] (which can only be transformed or [[displacement|displaced]]) but upon the ideational representative (which is, in [[Lacan]]'s terms, the [[signifier]]) (Ec, 714).
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[[Lacan]]'s comments on the concept of [[affect]] have important implications in [[clinical]] [[practice]].
Firstly, all the concepts in [[psychoanalysis]] which have traditionally been conceived in terms of [[affect]]s, such as the [[transference]], must be rethought in terms of their [[symbolic]] [[structure]], if the [[analyst]] is to direct the [[treatment]] correctly.
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Secondly, the [[affect]]s are [[lure]]s which can deceive the [[analyst]], and hence the [[analyst]] must be wary of being tricked by his own [[affect]]s.
This does not mean that the [[analyst]] must disregard his own feelings for the [[patient]], but simply that he must know how to make adequate use of them.
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Finally, it follows that the aim of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is not the reliving of [[past]] experiences, nor the [[abreaction]] of [[affect]], but the articulation in [[speech]] of the [[truth]] about [[desire]].
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Another term in [[Lacan]]'s [[discourse]], related to but distinct from '[[affect]]', is the term '[[passion]]'.
These [[passion]]s are not [[imaginary]] phenomena, but located at the junctions between the three [[order]]s.
== References ==
<references/>
[[Category:Psychoanalysis]][[Category:Dictionary]][[Category:Jacques Lacan]][[Category:Concepts]]
[[Category:Terms]]