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Structure (Structure) When Lacan uses the term 'structure' in his early
work of the 1930s, it is to refer to 'social structures', by which he means a
specific set of affective relations between family members. The child perceives
these relations much more profoundly than the adult, and internalises them in
the COMPLEX (Ec, 89). The term serves as a peg upon which Lacan can hang his
own views of the 'relational' nature of the psyche, in opposition to the
atomistic theories then current in psychology (Lacan, 1936). From this point
on, the term 'structure' retains this sense of something both intersubjective and
intrasubjective, the internal representation of interpersonal relations. This
remains a key point throughout Lacan's work, in which the emphasis on
structure is a constant reminder that what determines the subject is not some
supposed 'essence' but simply his position with respect to other subjects and
other signifiers. Already in 1938, we find Lacan arguing that 'the most notable
defect of analytic doctrine' at that time was that it tended 'to ignore structure
in favour of a dynamic approach' (Lacan, 1938: 58). This anticipates his later
emphasis on the symbolic order as the realm of structure which analysts have
ignored in favour of the imaginary; 'social structures are symbolic' (Ec, 132).
In the mid-1950s, when Lacan begins to reformulate his ideas in terms
borrowed from Saussurean structural linguistics, the term 'structure' comes
to be increasingly associated with Saussure's model of LANGUAGE. Saussure
analysed language (la langue) as a system in which there are no positive terms,
only differences (Saussure, 1916: 120). It is this concept of a system in which
each unit is constituted purely by virtue of its differences from the other units
which comes to constitute the core meaning of the term 'structure' in Lacan's
work from this point on. Language is the paradigmatic structure, and Lacan's
famous dictum, 'the unconscious is structured like a language', is therefore
tautologous, since 'to be structured' and 'to be like a language' mean the same
thing.
Saussure's structural approach to linguistics was developed further by
Roman Jakobson, who developed phoneme theory; Jakobson's work was
then taken up by the French anthropologist, Claude LÈvi-Strauss, who used
the structural phonemic model to analyse non-linguistic cultural data such as
kinship relations and myth. This application of structural analysis to anthro-
pology launched the structuralist movement by showing how the Saussurean
concept of structure could be applied to an object of enquiry other than
language. Lacan was heavily influenced by all three of these thinkers, and in
this sense he can be seen as part of the structuralist movement. However,
Lacan prefers to dissociate himself from this movement, arguing that his
approach differs in important ways from the structuralist approach (S20, 93).
Alongside the references to language, Lacan also refers the concept of
structure tO MATHEMATICS, principally to set theory and TOPOLOGY. In 1956,
for example, he states that 'a structure is in the first place a group of elements
forming a covariant set' (S3, 183). Two years later he again links the concept
of structure with mathematical set theory, and adds a reference to topology
(Ec, 648-9). By the 1970s, topology has replaced language as the principal
paradigm of structure for Lacan. He now argues that topology is not a mere
metaphor for structure; it is that structure itself (Lacan, 1973b).
The concept of structure is often taken to imply an opposition between
surface and depth, between directly observable phenomena and 'deep struc-
tures' which are not the object of immediate experience. Such would seem to
be the opposition implied in the distinction Lacan draws between SYMPTOMS
(surface) and structures (depth). However, Lacan does not in fact agree that
such an opposition is implicit in the concept of structure (Ec, 649). On the one
hand, he rejects the concept of 'directly observable phenomena', arguing that
observation is always already theoretical. On the other hand, he also rejects the
idea that structures are somehow 'deep' or distant from experience, arguing
that they are present in the field of experience itself; the unconscious is on the
surface, and looking for it in 'the depths' is to miss it. As with many other
binary oppositions, the model Lacan prefers is that of the moebius strip; just as
the two sides of the strip are in fact continuous, so structure is continuous with
phenomena.
The most important feature of structural analysis is not, then, any supposed
distinction between surface and depth, but, as LÈvi-Strauss shows in his
structural analysis of myth, the discovery of fixed relations between loci
which are themselves empty (LÈvi-Strauss, 1955). In other words, whatever
elements may be placed in the positions specified by a given structure, the
relations between the positions themselves remain the same. Thus the ele-
ments interact not on the basis of any inherent or intrinsic properties they
possess, but simply on the basis of the positions which they occupy in the
structure.
In line with many other psychoanalysts, Lacan distinguishes three principal
nosographic categories; NEUROSIS, PSYCHOSIs and PERVERSION. His originality lies
in the fact that he regards these categories as structures rather than simply as
collections of symptoms. (N.B. Lacan prefers to speak in terms of 'Freudian
structures' rather than 'clinical structures', but the latter term is the one which
predominates in the writings of Lacanian psychoanalysts today.)
Lacanian nosography is a categorical classification system based on a
discrete series, rather than a dimensional system based on a continuum. The
three major clinical structures are therefore mutually exclusive; a subject
cannot be both neurotic and psychotic, for example. The three major clinical
structures together constitute all the three possible positions of the subject in
relation to the Other; every subject encountered in psychoanalytic treatment
can therefore be diagnosed as either neurotic, or psychotic, or perverse. Each
structure is distinguished by a different operation: neurosis by the operation of
repression, perversion by the operation of disavowal, and psychosis by the
operation of foreclosure. Lacan follows Freud in arguing that the classical
method of psychoanalytic treatment (involving free association and the use of
the couch) is only appropriate for neurotic subjects and perverse subjects, and
not for psychotics. Thus when Lacanian analysts work with psychotic patients,
they use a substantially modified method of treatment.
One of the most fundamental axioms of psychoanalysis is that the subject's
clinical structure is determined by his experiences in the nrst years of life. In
this sense, psychoanalysis is based on a 'critical period hypothesis'; the first
years of life are the critical period in which the subject's structure is deter-
mined. Although it is not clear how long this critical period lasts, it is held that
after this critical period the clinical structure is fixed for ever and cannot be
changed. Neither psychoanalytic treatment nor anything else can, for example,
turn a psychotic into a neurotic.Within each of the three major clinical
structures Lacan distinguishes various subdivisions. For example within the
clinical structure of neurosis, he distinguishes two kinds of neurosis (obses-
sional neurosis and hysteria), and within the clinical structure of psychosis he
distinguishes between paranoia, schizophrenia and manic-depressive psycho-
SlS.
== References ==
<references/>
[[Category:Lacan]]
[[Category:Terms]]
[[Category:Concepts]]
[[Category:Psychoanalysis]]
work of the 1930s, it is to refer to 'social structures', by which he means a
specific set of affective relations between family members. The child perceives
these relations much more profoundly than the adult, and internalises them in
the COMPLEX (Ec, 89). The term serves as a peg upon which Lacan can hang his
own views of the 'relational' nature of the psyche, in opposition to the
atomistic theories then current in psychology (Lacan, 1936). From this point
on, the term 'structure' retains this sense of something both intersubjective and
intrasubjective, the internal representation of interpersonal relations. This
remains a key point throughout Lacan's work, in which the emphasis on
structure is a constant reminder that what determines the subject is not some
supposed 'essence' but simply his position with respect to other subjects and
other signifiers. Already in 1938, we find Lacan arguing that 'the most notable
defect of analytic doctrine' at that time was that it tended 'to ignore structure
in favour of a dynamic approach' (Lacan, 1938: 58). This anticipates his later
emphasis on the symbolic order as the realm of structure which analysts have
ignored in favour of the imaginary; 'social structures are symbolic' (Ec, 132).
In the mid-1950s, when Lacan begins to reformulate his ideas in terms
borrowed from Saussurean structural linguistics, the term 'structure' comes
to be increasingly associated with Saussure's model of LANGUAGE. Saussure
analysed language (la langue) as a system in which there are no positive terms,
only differences (Saussure, 1916: 120). It is this concept of a system in which
each unit is constituted purely by virtue of its differences from the other units
which comes to constitute the core meaning of the term 'structure' in Lacan's
work from this point on. Language is the paradigmatic structure, and Lacan's
famous dictum, 'the unconscious is structured like a language', is therefore
tautologous, since 'to be structured' and 'to be like a language' mean the same
thing.
Saussure's structural approach to linguistics was developed further by
Roman Jakobson, who developed phoneme theory; Jakobson's work was
then taken up by the French anthropologist, Claude LÈvi-Strauss, who used
the structural phonemic model to analyse non-linguistic cultural data such as
kinship relations and myth. This application of structural analysis to anthro-
pology launched the structuralist movement by showing how the Saussurean
concept of structure could be applied to an object of enquiry other than
language. Lacan was heavily influenced by all three of these thinkers, and in
this sense he can be seen as part of the structuralist movement. However,
Lacan prefers to dissociate himself from this movement, arguing that his
approach differs in important ways from the structuralist approach (S20, 93).
Alongside the references to language, Lacan also refers the concept of
structure tO MATHEMATICS, principally to set theory and TOPOLOGY. In 1956,
for example, he states that 'a structure is in the first place a group of elements
forming a covariant set' (S3, 183). Two years later he again links the concept
of structure with mathematical set theory, and adds a reference to topology
(Ec, 648-9). By the 1970s, topology has replaced language as the principal
paradigm of structure for Lacan. He now argues that topology is not a mere
metaphor for structure; it is that structure itself (Lacan, 1973b).
The concept of structure is often taken to imply an opposition between
surface and depth, between directly observable phenomena and 'deep struc-
tures' which are not the object of immediate experience. Such would seem to
be the opposition implied in the distinction Lacan draws between SYMPTOMS
(surface) and structures (depth). However, Lacan does not in fact agree that
such an opposition is implicit in the concept of structure (Ec, 649). On the one
hand, he rejects the concept of 'directly observable phenomena', arguing that
observation is always already theoretical. On the other hand, he also rejects the
idea that structures are somehow 'deep' or distant from experience, arguing
that they are present in the field of experience itself; the unconscious is on the
surface, and looking for it in 'the depths' is to miss it. As with many other
binary oppositions, the model Lacan prefers is that of the moebius strip; just as
the two sides of the strip are in fact continuous, so structure is continuous with
phenomena.
The most important feature of structural analysis is not, then, any supposed
distinction between surface and depth, but, as LÈvi-Strauss shows in his
structural analysis of myth, the discovery of fixed relations between loci
which are themselves empty (LÈvi-Strauss, 1955). In other words, whatever
elements may be placed in the positions specified by a given structure, the
relations between the positions themselves remain the same. Thus the ele-
ments interact not on the basis of any inherent or intrinsic properties they
possess, but simply on the basis of the positions which they occupy in the
structure.
In line with many other psychoanalysts, Lacan distinguishes three principal
nosographic categories; NEUROSIS, PSYCHOSIs and PERVERSION. His originality lies
in the fact that he regards these categories as structures rather than simply as
collections of symptoms. (N.B. Lacan prefers to speak in terms of 'Freudian
structures' rather than 'clinical structures', but the latter term is the one which
predominates in the writings of Lacanian psychoanalysts today.)
Lacanian nosography is a categorical classification system based on a
discrete series, rather than a dimensional system based on a continuum. The
three major clinical structures are therefore mutually exclusive; a subject
cannot be both neurotic and psychotic, for example. The three major clinical
structures together constitute all the three possible positions of the subject in
relation to the Other; every subject encountered in psychoanalytic treatment
can therefore be diagnosed as either neurotic, or psychotic, or perverse. Each
structure is distinguished by a different operation: neurosis by the operation of
repression, perversion by the operation of disavowal, and psychosis by the
operation of foreclosure. Lacan follows Freud in arguing that the classical
method of psychoanalytic treatment (involving free association and the use of
the couch) is only appropriate for neurotic subjects and perverse subjects, and
not for psychotics. Thus when Lacanian analysts work with psychotic patients,
they use a substantially modified method of treatment.
One of the most fundamental axioms of psychoanalysis is that the subject's
clinical structure is determined by his experiences in the nrst years of life. In
this sense, psychoanalysis is based on a 'critical period hypothesis'; the first
years of life are the critical period in which the subject's structure is deter-
mined. Although it is not clear how long this critical period lasts, it is held that
after this critical period the clinical structure is fixed for ever and cannot be
changed. Neither psychoanalytic treatment nor anything else can, for example,
turn a psychotic into a neurotic.Within each of the three major clinical
structures Lacan distinguishes various subdivisions. For example within the
clinical structure of neurosis, he distinguishes two kinds of neurosis (obses-
sional neurosis and hysteria), and within the clinical structure of psychosis he
distinguishes between paranoia, schizophrenia and manic-depressive psycho-
SlS.
== References ==
<references/>
[[Category:Lacan]]
[[Category:Terms]]
[[Category:Concepts]]
[[Category:Psychoanalysis]]