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Object
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It is clear from [[Freud went to on distinguish between two types ]]'s account that the [[object of object: an object that relates specifically to the drive (]] is not necessarily a [[whole]] person, and that it may be a part of a person, a the [[body]] or [[part-object]], a fantasmatic suhc as the [[penis]] or the [[breast]].Although [[Karl Abraham]] speaks of "[[partial]] [[incorporation]] of the object) " and a total of "[[partial object]]-[[love]], an " it is [[Klein]] who really develops the theory of [[part-object of love or hatred]]s. At the very beginning [[Part-object]]s are essential features of psychic life, the external [[fantasy]] [[world, ]] constructed by the object[[child]], and what is hated are identical (endowed with '[[good]]' and '[[bad]]' qualities thanks to the object emerges in hatred)[[mechanism]] of [[projection]]. WhenProjecting the [[ambivalence]] it feels towards its [[mother]], following the purely narcissistic stage, [[child]] typically fantasizes the object is recognized as [[existence]] of a source of pleasure, it can become an object of love, being loved and incorporated into the ego. In "Instincts good [[breast]] which offers comfort and Their Vicissitudesnourishment," Freud writes that the terms "love" and "hatred" should not be used for the relation of drives to their objects but reserved for the relations of the total ego with the objects. The concept of "object choice" (object choice a bad [[breast]] which denies or narcissistic object choice) thus refers to withdraws the object of love or hatred and not to the object of the drive[[instinct]]ual [[satisfaction]] it seeks.
==Definition==The [[concept]] of the object in psychoanalysis proves to be an enigmatic one, because of its mobile and polysemic aspect and constantly changing [[character]]; there always remains an unknown zone that nurtures the object-[[cathexis]] and is therefore necessary for its continuation. The object in psychoanalysis is constituted of fluctuating impulses of [[unconscious]], [[preconscious]], and [[conscious]] [[cathexes]], that are exchanged on a reciprocal basis. The object is neither a [[thing]] or a person, nor the [[fantasmatic]] [[content]] or a [[bodily]] zone of that person, although it relates to these throughout the [[analytic]] [[work]]. The concept of the object is a tool of [[understanding]] for the [[analyst]] and a notion that would become meaningless if it were studied as an independently existing entity. It is the unconscious element that lends some continuity to the cathexis of the various kinds of representations that are evoked by the [[patients]]' [[words]], provided that the analyst constructs this continuity through the bi-vocal melody to which he is [[listening]]. The term object can be used only from the [[moment]] when analytic work is possible, however early this may be (Diatkine, 1989). There is a polysemy to the term object, as it flows into the part-object; the [[total]], [[narcissistic]], [[internal]], and [[external]] objects; the [[self]]-object; the object [[relationship]]; object choice; and [[others]]. This semantic richness reflects the complexity of the connections to [[other]] [[people]] in the [[psyche]]; it also can lead to confusion. In his study of the [[drives]] ("[[Instincts]] and Their Vicissitudes," 1915c), [[Sigmund Freud]] explores a connection between the object and the drive: the drive [[excitation]] comes from [[inside]] the organism (pressure) and it corresponds to a need that is assuaged by the satisfaction (aim of the drive). The object is therefore the means by which the drive can attain this aim. Freud already emphasizes, however, that the object is the most valuable element of the drive and also that is it not intrinsically connected with it; the link is therefore something that has to be constructed. He adds that the object is not necessarily an unfamiliar object; it can be anything that is susceptible to cathexis, including therefore the [[subject]]'s own body through the forms of [[auto-erotism]] (object-cathexis, narcissistic cathexis). Between 1905 and 1924, Freud described a series of [[pregenital]] [[stages]] that are to be [[understood]] less in genetic [[terms]] than as something defined by partial (or component) drives; the satisfaction of each is linked with an [[erogenous zone]] ([[oral]], [[anal]], [[phallic]]), and thus also by their corresponding oral, anal or phallic object relationship. The concept of "[[part object]]" was introduced by [[Melanie Klein]], but the concept of the "part" already [[exists]] in Freud within the "[[partial drive]]" concept. The object choice that unifies the [[sexual life]] under the aegis of genitality and orientates it definitively towards others does not therefore occur until [[puberty]]. Freud went to on distinguish between two types of object: an object that relates specifically to the drive (a person, part of a person, a part-object, a fantasmatic object) and a total object, an object of love or [[hatred]]. At the very beginning of [[psychic]] life, the external world, the object, and what is hated are identical (the object emerges in hatred). When, following the purely narcissistic [[stage]], the object is recognized as a source of [[pleasure]], it can become an object of love, [[being]] loved and incorporated into the ego. In "[[Instincts and Their Vicissitudes]]," Freud writes that the terms "love" and "hatred" should not be used for the relation of drives to their objects but reserved for the relations of the total ego with the objects. The concept of "object choice" (object choice or narcissistic object choice) thus refers to the object of love or hatred and not to the object of the drive. When Freud refers to the [[libido]] of the ego as opposed to the libido of the object, the object in this expression is understood in the restricted sense of an external object that does not include the ego; furthermore, it nevertheless clearly transpires that Freud generally focuses on psychic [[reality]] and the intrapsychic in his metapsychological theory. His theory of [[anaclisis]] required [[nothing]] more from the object than its [[necessity]] for ensuring self-preservation; here it was the child who was "[[responsible]]," based on the satisfaction of their bodily [[needs]], for developing auto-erotisms in [[order]] to prepare for their existing and [[future]] [[sexuality]]. However, Freud was evidently well aware "that there is no such thing as a [[baby]] without a mother" (as Donald [[Winnicott]] was later to say) when he wrote in The Ego and [[the Id]], albeit in a footnote: "The effects of the first identifications made in earliest childhood will be general and lasting. This leads us back to the origin of the ego [[ideal]]; for behind it there lies hidden an individual's first and most important [[identification]], his identification with the [[father]] in his own personal [[prehistory]] (Perhaps it would be safer to say 'with the [[parents]]'; for before a child has arrived at definite [[knowledge]] of the [[difference]] between the [[sexes]], the [[lack]] of a penis, it does not distinguish in [[value]] between its father and its mother). This is apparently not in the first instance the consequence or outcome of an object-cathexis; it is a direct and immediate identification and takes [[place]] earlier than any object-cathexis" (1923b, p. 31). How then should we [[understand]] the relation between the parents, or those who perform this function, as people, as against the father or mother as "objects" used in the [[psychoanalytic]] work? The psyches of mother and father clearly play an essential [[role]] in the creation of the [[human]] being's representational [[system]] from the very beginning of life. By conferring a [[meaning]] on the very young child's [[activity]], the capacity for "[[maternal]] reverie" (Wilfred Bion) does not introduce this meaning into their psyche, but rather harmoniously or discordantly modulates stimulations and "calming" attitudes or temporary abandonments that are constructed by the child. The meaning given by the mother produces [[another]] meaning in the subject, each of which becomes interconnected in a [[process]] that is as [[complex]] as the process that gives rise to the bi-vocal melody in the analytic [[treatment]]. Following on from Freud and Karl [[Abraham]], Melanie Klein, in her study of archaic states of functioning, attributes to the psyche from the outset a [[primitive]] ego (self), an external-internal boundary, a (part) object and the capacity for [[splitting]] and projecting; like Freud, she uses footnotes to take account of external objects. With reference to Sándor Ferenczi, she [[notes]] that it may be that complex mechanisms ([[living]] organisms) cannot continue as [[stable]] entities independently of the influence of external [[conditions]]. When these conditions become unfavorable, the organism disintegrates. "Integration and [[adaptation]] to reality depend essentially on the [[infant]]'s [[experience]] of the mother's love and care." [[Donald Winnicott]], a contemporary of Klein and a highly innovative [[author ]] who theorized the bond between object and subject, attributes prime importance to the object's response in the creation of this vital [[illusion ]] to be shared between mother and child, namely the transitional [[space]], of which the [[transitional object ]] is only one of the [[signs]]. The "use of the object" is at the heart of this author's concerns and he gives precedence to the access to [[subjectivation]], "first being," over the [[economy ]] of drives. For him, this [[hallucination ]] occurs in response to the increase in tension, always independently of the reality of the object; the problem of primary binding (that is, the object's binding of the hallucination or the drive excitation) arises as follows: if the object is [[absent]], the drive excitation and the hallucination are dealt with either by evacuative [[discharge ]] or by a mode of binding and fusion in statu nascendi, primary masochistic binding. It is essential that the object's [[absence ]] or [[separation ]] (creating the excitation) should not continue for a period that exceeds the subject's capacities to re-establish through the hallucination the psychic continuity that is necessary to the sense of continuity of being. If, on the contrary, the object is [[present ]] and if its response is "granted" to this [[hallucinatory ]] process, it instigates the "created-found" aspect of the object and the transformation of the hallucination into an illusion. The [[threat ]] that will inevitably be posed to the primary illusion (the lover's [[censure]], decrease in primary maternal concern) then triggers an upsurge of destructivity connected with distress and rage at the object's lack of attunement. It is here that Winnicott introduces a further element into the theory: whereas classically the object was discovered in hatred as a result of frustrations, Winnicott accords a primordial [[position ]] to the object's response in the child's [[symbolization ]] process. To be discovered, the object has to "survive" the destructive activity and has to allow itself to be "used." Winnicott refers here to [[three ]] fundamental characteristics of object response: an absence of [[withdrawal]], a lack of reprisals or retaliation, and a capacity to be manifestly creative and vital.
It is the object's response to the destructivity, through the gap that it creates against the background of its primary adaptation to the subject's needs and thus through a support that is introduced, that opens up the field of experience through which the complex process of symbolization will begin. The concept of the "good enough mother" is thus defined in its connection with the object's pre-symbolizing function.
More recently, with reference to Winnicott, René Roussillon (1997) has sought to explore in more depth what he refers to as the object relationship that can allow representational activity and symbolization. He established symbolizing objects of the "malleable medium type" as a term by describing the qualitative characteristics of the relationship of primary attunement, and formulated a preliminary [[outline ]] of the future attributes of the symbolization [[apparatus ]] (hardness/malleability, indestructibility, tangibility, transformability, sensitivity, availability, reversibility, loyalty, and constancy). Melanie Klein's successors developed in new directions and reassessed her premises, including in the field of [[object relations]] and of projective identification as a primary mode of [[exchange]]. Esther Bick introduced the concept of adhesive identification and "psychic skin," but it was principally Wilfred R. Bion who created new models for the relationship between two psyches. He defined the relationship between container and contained, and then [[analyzed]] this relationship using a complex [[mathematical]] system. During the maternal reverie, the alpha function psychically [[processes]] the beta elements, drives, and drive-derivatives that the child is unable to assimilate individually, in order to enable [[them]] to process these psychically, and then to [[introject]] this function itself. This is very much a theory of psychic transmission. In [[France]], Maurice Bouvet made Freud's concept of the object relationship the main focus of his work, exploring it in more depth between [[1948]] and 1960 and developing it into a [[true]] concept. He and his students studied the object relationship in [[clinical]] [[practice]] (addressing [[hysteria]], [[phobia]], [[obsessional]] [[neurosis]], and [[depersonalization]]) and went on to address the subject-subject relationship: the [[dual]] and reciprocal object relationship existing between ego-[[subjects]]. Addressing [[psychopathology]] in terms of the psychic object provides some ways of gaining a new perspective on the [[structural]] approach and produces a better understanding of difficult cases. [[French]] [[psychoanalysts]] have preferred to address the successive description of the two psyches to account for the way in which the mother's psyche contributes to the child's psychic [[constitution]]. Denise Braunschweig and Michel Fain theorize "the lover's censure" (1975), in which the mother's experiences during pregnancy, her experience of childbirth, and the experiences relating to the almost total erotism with the newborn give way [[retroactively]] to the fantasmatic elaboration of an incestuous [[erotic]] fulfillment in which the unconscious [[oedipal]] bedrock is evident. This [[conflict]] leads her to convey a censure to the child in a prelude to the fantasmatic life of the human being, in order to protect the child from the desire of and for the father, a two-fold desire that incorporates both the desire for her as a [[woman]] and the desire for the father's penis in the child's unconscious. The confused [[perception]] of these psychic realities then imposes on the mother the necessity of duping the child. Jacques [[Lacan]] holds a distinctly opposing view, with his [[structural theory]] of the contribution of the [[symbolic]] [[register]] and of [[language]] as an organizer of the psychic; for him, there can be no discussion of drives that does not establish a "circuit of the drive" passing through the other; using a different term from that of the object, this [[big Other]]/little other demonstrates the [[theoretical]] shift from the intrapsychic to the interpsychic. Following on from Lacan, Piera Aulagnier, with the "[[violence]] of [[interpretation]]" refers to the foundational violence that the "[[word]]-bearer" exerts over the infant and reintroduces [[temporality]] and a subject, the I, which is re-evaluated with reference to Lacan's emphasis on the [[subject of the unconscious]] to the detriment of the ego. With his theory of the child's "[[seduction]]" by the mother's "enigmatic [[signifiers]]" as the origin of psychic life, [[Jean Laplanche]] does not restrict the object's contribution to language but extends his theory to the object's drives. In a different way, Didier Anzieu returns, through his [[metaphor]] of the "skin ego," to a theory of a psychic [[formation]] based on the mother's care and cathexis that is close to Esther Bick's theory of "psychic skin." With his concept of "fantasmatic interactions," Serge Lebovici, who took a [[particular]] interest in early mother-infant relations, provides an analytic version of the concept of interaction, which is too often influenced by [[objective]] reality. This is where Daniel Stern diverges from psychoanalysis: Although we may accept his concept of "emotional attunement," his convictions regarding a neurophysiological evidence of perception lack the subtlety of Winnicott's "created-found" and the importance of cathexis and hallucination for access to perception in [[Freudian]] theory. Let us further mention the originality of Christopher Bollas with his concept of the "transformational object": the object is [[identified]] based on what the child feels is modifying his experience of the self. Rather than being perceived as an object, the mother is experienced as a process of transformation. For several authors, the need for the object to be inaccessible is a central focus of concern. For Jean Guillaumin, the object in psychoanalysis is postulated and targeted through the [[insistence]] of the drive but never actually given: We apprehend it as such only through our sense of that aspect of it which remains concealed to us. The rhythm of the mother's absence-[[presence]] and Winnicott's holding and handling can allow the experience of the hallucinatory satisfaction of desire theorized by Freud as an experience that establishes the drive orientation towards an object. However, the concept of the object corresponds to the experience of non-fulfillment because when it is found, attained, and mastered, it ceases to have any clinically observable psychic existence. This evident fact is irksome because it constitutes a [[paradox]] for [[logical]] [[thought]]; the [[nature]] of the total object can be described as something that necessarily includes a component of [[otherness]] that eludes the subject's [[control]]. This point is explored in more depth by Klein, who makes it the main focus of her essential reflections on the depressive position. According to André Green, the concept of the object inevitably creates some [[philosophical]] difficulties, namely the [[impossibility]] of defining an object other than for a subject that constitutes it as an object and is constituted by it. This paradox is insurmountable. Subject and object are reciprocal terms: eliminating the object always means eliminating the [[libidinal]] subject and sexuality. According to Green, who therefore maintains the Freudian [[model]], the object is primarily an object for the drive. However, there is an essential and constituent asymmetry between the pole of the subject (Green refers to the "ego-subject" because object and drive lead to the concept of the ego rather than of the subject) and the pole of the object in any consideration of the relationship with the other that introduces the [[third]] or "the other of the object." As concerns the link between the external object and the internal object: Whatever its indisputable reality (objective, objectal), the external object remains unknowable and it is only ever possible to work with its representatives. Psychoanalysis has nothing to say [[about]] this, unless it is by including a [[displacement]] in terms of function; if the object is described in these terms, it becomes possible to consider every process as an object. André Green introduced the concept of the "objectalizing function": if the ego is characterized by certain appropriations of the object (incorporation, [[introjection]], and beyond this, every [[form]] of [[internalization]] and identification), it transforms the status of the object with which it enters into a relationship, but above all it creates objects itself based on drive activity. What corresponds to the objectalizing function, an expression of the sexual drive, is its opposite and its [[negative]]: a disobjectalizing function, an expression of the [[death]] drive. Symbolization is placed here in the service of destructivity as the dramatization is transformed into an actualization. The disobjectalizing function operates to withdraw from the object the cathexes that are attached to it or even to move the object cathexes towards the narcissistic cathexes, narrowing the field of otherness.
For Lacan (and, by implication, psychoanalysis in general) psychopathology arises when the mismatch between [[the Symbolic]], Imaginary, and Real intrudes on and disrupts the unfolding of a life story. It is not unusual for people to put symbolic labels to things when those labels poorly [[represent]] those things or even to idealize things and experiences because they do not fulfill the significations ideally associated with them. If Uncle Joe was an abuser and yet the child symbolizes Uncle Joe in a good light because of the residues of [[speech]] by other trusted people (Mum and Dad), then there is a mismatch close to the center of the child's being. The mismatch is at a strategic point where the entire [[narrative]] needs to be coherent in the [[right]] kind of way. For Uncle Joe's [[victim]] the sexual abuse escapes into l'autre because it has no place in legitimate narratives around here.
Unacceptable experiences can end up confined to l'autre without any symbolic markers to fix them in the [[memory]] explicitly or in any recoverable form. It is as if the ego says, "That experience was nothing important, I'd be silly to take too much from that." But the unconscious "[[knows]]" otherwise. Despite the conscious [[message]] that that man does not really have anything to do with me, there is associated but inchoate psychic [[material]] conveying a very different message [End Page 70] (on the basis of a psychic [[association]] with a tuché from my [[past]]). We might understand something like "[[repression]]," in this kind of circumstance, by exploiting Lacan's [[analysis]].See also: Abandonment; [[Addiction]]; [[Alienation]]; Allergic object relationship; Amae, concept of; Ambivalence; Anaclisis/anaclictic; Antilibidinal ego/internal [[saboteur]]; Asthma; [[Autism]]; Bizarre object; Cathexis; Childhood; Counter-identification; Counterphobic; [[Cruelty]]; [[Dead ]] mother complex; Depersonalization; Depression; Depressive position; Drive/instinct; Ego; [[Envy]]; Envy and Gratitude; Externalization-internalization; [[Female ]] sexuality; [[Femininity]]; [[Fetishism]]; Hatred; [[Idealization]]; Identification; Internal object; Libidinal stage; [[Lost object]]; Love-[[hate]]-knowledge (L/H/K [[links]]); Manic defenses; [[Mastery]], instinct for; Maternal; [[Melancholia]]; "[[Mourning ]] and Melancholia"; Narcissistic withdrawal; Object a; Object, [[change ]] of/choice of; [[Object relations theory]]; Orality; [[Pain]]; [[Paranoid ]] position; Paranoid-schizoid position; Partial drive; [[Passion]]; Pictogram; Primary object; Projection; [[Psychosexual ]] development; ; Reparation; [[Rivalry]]; Self-hatred; Self-object; Splitting; [[Splitting of the object]]; Subject; [[Sublimation]]; [[Substitute]]/substitute-formation; Symbiosis, symbiotic relationship; [[Symbolization, process of]]; [[Transference ]] relationship; Transitional object; Transitional object, space; Transitional phenomena; [[Turning around ]] upon the subject's own self.[[Bibliography]]
==more==* [[Freud, Sigmund]]. (1915c). Instincts and their vicissitudes. SE, 14: 109-140.
* ——. (1923b). The ego and the id. SE, 19: 1-66.