Changes

In [[Freud]]'s work, the term "[[{{Top}}emotion|affect]]" stands in opposition to the term "[[idea]]". {{Bottom}}

==Intellect=====Sigmund Freud===In [[Freud]]'s [[work]], the term "[[affect]]" stands in opposition to the term "[[idea]]". The opposition between the [[affect|affective ]] and the [[affect|intellectual ]] is one of the oldest themes in [[philosophy]], and made its way into [[Freud]]'s [[vocabulary ]] via [[German]] [[psychology]].

For <blockquote>"This opposition is one of the most contrary to [[Lacananalytic]], however, the opposition between the [[affectiveexperience]] and the most unenlightening when it comes to [[intellectualunderstanding]] is not valid in the psychoanalytic fieldit."<ref>{{S1}} p. 274</ref></blockquote>

"This opposition is one Thus, in response to those who accuse [[Lacan]] of [[being]] [[affect|over-intellectual]] and of neglecting the most contrary to analytic experience and most unenlightening when it comes to understanding [[role]] of [[affect]], itcan be pointed out that this criticism is based on what [[Lacan]] saw as a [[false]] opposition."<ref>[[Lacan]] also argued that criticisms of being over-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy [[thinking]]. {{S1E}} p.274171</ref>

====Treatment====[[Psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is based on the [[symbolic]] [[order]], which transcends the opposition between [[affect]] and [[affect|intellect]]. On the one hand, [[psychoanalytic]] experience "is not that of an affective smoochy--woochy."<ref>{{S1}} p.55</ref> On the other hand, nor is [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] an intellectual affair.

Thus, in response to those who accuse [[Lacan]] of being over-[[<blockquote>"We are not dealing here with an intellectual]] and of neglecting the role of [[affectdimension]], it can be pointed out that this criticism is based on what [[Lacan]] saw as a false opposition."<ref>{{S1}} p.274</ref></blockquote>

(====Resistance====The [[Lacan]] also argued that criticisms ian [[psychoanalyst]] must thus be aware of being overthe ways in which both "affective smoochy-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy thinkingwoochy" and intellectualisation can be [[resistance]]s to [[analysis]], [[imaginary]] [[lure]]s of the [[ego]].<ref>{{E}} p [[Anxiety]] is the only [[affect]] that is not [[truth|deceptive]].171</ref>

====Separate====[[PsychoanalyticLacan]] is opposed to those [[treatmentanalyst]] is based on s who have taken the [[affect]]ive realm as primary, for the [[symbolicaffect]] ive is not a [[orderseparate]], which transcends realm opposed to the opposition between [[affectintellectual]] and intellect.

On <blockquote>"The affective is not like a special density which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be found in a [[mythical]] beyond of the production of the one hand, [[psychoanalyticsymbol]] experience "is not that of an affective smoochy-woochywhich would precede the discursive formulation."<ref>{{S1}} p.5557</ref></blockquote>

On However, he rejects accusations of neglecting the other handrole of [[affect]], nor is pointing to the fact that a [[whole]] year of the [[psychoanalyticseminar]] is dedicated precisely to discussing [[treatmentanxiety]] an intellectual affair.<ref>{{TV}} p. 38</ref>

<blockquote>"We are ==Treatment=====Symbolic===[[Lacan]] does not dealing here propose a general [[theory]] of [[affect]]s, but only touches on [[them]] insofar as they impinge on [[psychoanalytic treatment]]. He insists on the [[relationship]] of [[affect]] to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]; [[affect]] means that the [[subject]] is affected by his relation with an intellectual dimensionthe [[Other]]." He argues that [[affect]]s are not [[signifier]]s but [[signal]]s,<ref>{{S1S7}} p.274102-3</ref>and emphasizes [[Freud]]'s [[position]] that [[repression]] does not bear upon the [[affect]] (which can only be transformed or [[displacement|displaced]]) but upon the ideational [[representative]] (which is, in [[Lacan]]'s [[terms]], the [[signifier]]).<ref>{{Ec}} p. 714</blockquoteref>

The ===Practice===[[Lacan]]ian 's comments on the [[psychoanalystconcept]] must thus be aware of the ways in which both "affective smoochy-woochy" and intellectualisation can be [[resistanceaffect]]s to have important implications in [[analysis]clinical], [[imaginary]] [[lure]]s of the [[egopractice]].

=====Structure=====Firstly, all the [[:Category:Concepts|concept]]s in [[psychoanalysis]] which have traditionally been conceived in terms of [[affect]]s, such as the [[transference]], must be rethought in terms of their [[symbolic]] [[Anxietystructure]], if the [[analyst]] is to direct the only [[affecttreatment]] that is not deceptivecorrectly.

=====Truth=====Finally, it follows that the aim of [[psychoanalytic]] [[Lacantreatment]] is opposed to those not the reliving of [[analystpast]]s who have taken experiences, nor the [[abreaction]] of [[affect]]ive realm as primary, for but the articulation in [[affectspeech]]ive is not a separate realm opposed to of the [[intellectualtruth]] [[about]] [[desire]].

<blockquote>"The affective is not like a special density which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be found in a mythical beyond of the production of the symbol which would precede the discursive formulation."<ref>{{S1}} p.57</ref></blockquote>====Passion====However, he rejects accusations of neglecting the role of [[affect]], pointing to the fact that a whole year of the [[seminar]] is dedicated precisely to discussing [[anxiety]].<ref>Lacan, 1973a: 38</ref> -- [[Lacan]] does not propose a general theory of affects, but only touches on them insofar as they impinge on psychoanalytic treatment.  He insists on the relationship of [[affect]] to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]; [[affect]] means that the [[subject]] is affected by his relation with the [[Other]].  He argues that [[affect]]s are not [[signifier]]s but [[signal]]s (S7, 102-3), and emphasises [[Freud]]'s position that [[repression]] does not bear upon the [[affect]] (which can only be transformed or [[displacement|displaced]]) but upon the ideational representative (which is, in [[Lacan]]'s terms, the [[signifier]]) (Ec, 714). -- [[Lacan]]'s comments on the concept of [[affect]] have important implications in [[clinical]] [[practice]].  Firstly, all the concepts in [[psychoanalysis]] which have traditionally been conceived in terms of [[affect]]s, such as the [[transference]], must be rethought in terms of their [[symbolic]] [[structure]], if the [[analyst]] is to direct the [[treatment]] correctly. -- Secondly, the [[affectAnother]]s are [[lure]]s which can deceive the [[analyst]], and hence the [[analyst]] must be wary of being tricked by his own [[affect]]s.  This does not mean that the [[analyst]] must disregard his own feelings for the [[patient]], but simply that he must know how to make adequate use of them. -- Finally, it follows that the aim of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is not the reliving of [[past]] experiences, nor the [[abreaction]] of [[affect]], but the articulation in [[speech]] of the [[truth]] about [[desire]]. -- Another term in [[Lacan]]'s [[discourse]], related to but distinct from "[[affect]]," is the term "[[passion]]."   [[Lacan]] speaks of the '"[[three ]] fundamental passions'": [[love]], [[hate]] and [[ignorance]].<ref>{{S1}} p.271</ref>  This is a reference to Buddhist [[thought]].<ref>{{E}} p.94</ref> These [[passion]]s are not [[imaginary|imaginary phenomena]] phenomena, but located at the junctions between the three [[order|three order]]s.