Changes

{{Top}}emotion|affect{{Bottom}}

In ===Jacques Lacan===For [[FreudLacan]]'s work, however, the term "opposition between the [[affectaffective]]" stands and the [[intellectual]] is not valid in opposition to the term "[[ideapsychoanalysis|psychoanalytic field]]".

The <blockquote>"This opposition between the affective and the intellectual is one of the oldest themes in most contrary to [[philosophyanalytic]], and made its way into [[Freudexperience]]'s vocabulary via and most unenlightening when it comes to [[German]] [[psychologyunderstanding]]it."<ref>{{S1}} p.274</ref></blockquote>

Thus, in response to those who accuse [[Lacan]] of [[being]] [[affect|over-intellectual]] and of neglecting the [[role]] of [[affect]], it can be pointed out that this criticism is based on what [[Lacan]] saw as a [[false]] opposition.<ref>[[Lacan]] also argued that criticisms of being over-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy [[thinking]]. {{E}} p.171</ref>

For ====Treatment====[[LacanPsychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is based on the [[symbolic]] [[order]], however, which transcends the opposition between the [[affectiveaffect]] and [[affect|intellect]]. On the one hand, [[intellectualpsychoanalytic]] experience "is not valid in that of an affective smoochy-woochy."<ref>{{S1}} p.55</ref> On the other hand, nor is [[psychoanalytic field]] [[treatment]] an intellectual affair.

<blockquote>"This opposition is one of the most contrary to analytic experience and most unenlightening when it comes to understanding itWe are not dealing here with an intellectual [[dimension]]."<ref>{{S1}} p.274</ref></blockquote>

====Resistance====The [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalyst]] must thus be aware of the ways in which both "affective smoochy--woochy" and intellectualisation can be [[resistance]]s to [[analysis]], [[imaginary]] [[lure]]s of the [[ego]]. [[Anxiety]] is the only [[affect]] that is not [[truth|deceptive]].

Thus, in response ====Separate====[[Lacan]] is opposed to those who accuse [[Lacananalyst]] of being over-s who have taken the [[intellectualaffect]] and of neglecting ive realm as primary, for the role of [[affect]], it can be pointed out that this criticism ive is based on what not a [[Lacanseparate]] realm opposed to the [[intellectual]] saw as a false opposition.

(<blockquote>"The affective is not like a special density which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be found in a [[Lacanmythical]] also argued that criticisms beyond of being over-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy thinkingthe production of the [[symbol]] which would precede the discursive formulation."<ref>{{ES1}} p.17157</ref></blockquote>

However, he rejects accusations of neglecting the role of [[Psychoanalyticaffect]] , pointing to the fact that a [[treatmentwhole]] is based on year of the [[symbolicseminar]] is dedicated precisely to discussing [[orderanxiety]], which transcends the opposition between [[affect]] and intellect. <ref>{{TV}} p. 38</ref>

On the one hand==Treatment=====Symbolic===[[Lacan]] does not propose a general [[theory]] of [[affect]]s, but only touches on [[them]] insofar as they impinge on [[psychoanalytictreatment]]. He insists on the [[relationship]] of [[affect]] to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]; [[affect]] means that the [[subject]] experience "is affected by his relation with the [[Other]]. He argues that [[affect]]s are not [[signifier]]s but [[signal]]s,<ref>{{S7}} p. 102-3</ref> and emphasizes [[Freud]]'s [[position]] that of an affective smoochy-woochy[[repression]] does not bear upon the [[affect]] (which can only be transformed or [[displacement|displaced]]) but upon the ideational [[representative]] (which is, in [[Lacan]]'s [[terms]], the [[signifier]])."<ref>{{S1Ec}} p.55714</ref>

On ===Practice===[[Lacan]]'s comments on the other hand, nor is [[psychoanalyticconcept]] of [[affect]] have important implications in [[clinical]] [[treatmentpractice]] an intellectual affair.

<blockquote>"We are not dealing here with an intellectual dimension=====Structure=====Firstly, all the [[:Category:Concepts|concept]]s in [[psychoanalysis]] which have traditionally been conceived in terms of [[affect]]s, such as the [[transference]], must be rethought in terms of their [[symbolic]] [[structure]], if the [[analyst]] is to direct the [[treatment]] correctly."<ref>{{S1}} p.274</ref></blockquote>

The =====Lure=====Secondly, the [[Lacanaffect]]ian s are [[psychoanalystlure]] must thus be aware of the ways in s which both "affective smoochy-woochy" and intellectualisation can be deceive the [[resistanceanalyst]]s to , and hence the [[analysisanalyst]], must be wary of being tricked by his own [[imaginaryaffect]] s. This does not mean that the [[lureanalyst]]s of must disregard his own feelings for the [[egopatient]], but simply that he must [[know]] how to make adequate use of them.

=====Truth=====Finally, it follows that the aim of [[psychoanalytic]] [[Anxietytreatment]] is not the only reliving of [[past]] experiences, nor the [[abreaction]] of [[affect]] that is not deceptive, but the articulation in [[speech]] of the [[truth]] [[about]] [[desire]].

--====Passion====[[Lacan]] is opposed to those [[analyst]]s who have taken the [[affect]]ive realm as primary, for the [[affect]]ive is not a separate realm opposed to the [[intellectual]]. <blockquote>"The affective is not like a special density which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be found in a mythical beyond of the production of the symbol which would precede the discursive formulation."<ref>{{S1}} p.57</ref></blockquote> However, he rejects accusations of neglecting the role of [[affect]], pointing to the fact that a whole year of the [[seminar]] is dedicated precisely to discussing [[anxietyAnother]].<ref>Lacan, 1973a: 38</ref> -- [[Lacan]] does not propose a general theory of affects, but only touches on them insofar as they impinge on psychoanalytic treatment.  He insists on the relationship of [[affect]] to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]; [[affect]] means that the [[subject]] is affected by his relation with the [[Other]].  He argues that [[affect]]s are not [[signifier]]s but [[signal]]s (S7, 102-3), and emphasises [[Freud]]'s position that [[repression]] does not bear upon the [[affect]] (which can only be transformed or [[displacement|displaced]]) but upon the ideational representative (which is, in [[Lacan]]'s terms, the [[signifier]]) (Ec, 714). -- [[Lacan]]'s comments on the concept of [[affect]] have important implications in [[clinical]] [[practice]].  Firstly, all the concepts in [[psychoanalysis]] which have traditionally been conceived in terms of [[affect]]s, such as the [[transference]], must be rethought in terms of their [[symbolic]] [[structure]], if the [[analyst]] is to direct the [[treatment]] correctly. -- Secondly, the [[affect]]s are [[lure]]s which can deceive the [[analyst]], and hence the [[analyst]] must be wary of being tricked by his own [[affect]]s.  This does not mean that the [[analyst]] must disregard his own feelings for the [[patient]], but simply that he must know how to make adequate use of them. -- Finally, it follows that the aim of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is not the reliving of [[past]] experiences, nor the [[abreaction]] of [[affect]], but the articulation in [[speech]] of the [[truth]] about [[desire]]. -- Another term in [[Lacan]]'s [[discourse]], related to but distinct from "[[affect]]," is the term "[[passion]]."   [[Lacan]] speaks of the '"[[three ]] fundamental passions'": [[love]], [[hate]] and [[ignorance]].<ref>{{S1}} p.271</ref>  This is a reference to Buddhist [[thought]].<ref>{{E}} p.94</ref> These [[passion]]s are not [[imaginary|imaginary phenomena]] phenomena, but located at the junctions between the three [[order|three order]]s.