Difference between revisions of "Affect"

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affect (affect)          In Freud's work, the term 'affect' stands in opposition to
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{{Top}}emotion|affect{{Bottom}}
  
the term 'idea'. The opposition between the affective and the intellectual is one
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==Intellect==
 +
===Sigmund Freud===
 +
In [[Freud]]'s [[work]], the term "[[affect]]" stands in opposition to the term "[[idea]]". The opposition between the [[affect|affective]] and the [[affect|intellectual]] is one of the oldest themes in [[philosophy]], and made its way into [[Freud]]'s [[vocabulary]] via [[German]] [[psychology]].
  
of the oldest themes in philosophy, and made its way into Freud's vocabulary
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===Jacques Lacan===
 +
For [[Lacan]], however, the opposition between the [[affective]] and the [[intellectual]] is not valid in the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic field]].
  
via German psychology.
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<blockquote>"This opposition is one of the most contrary to [[analytic]] [[experience]] and most unenlightening when it comes to [[understanding]] it."<ref>{{S1}} p.274</ref></blockquote>
  
    For Lacan, however, the opposition between the affective and the intellec-
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Thus, in response to those who accuse [[Lacan]] of [[being]] [[affect|over-intellectual]] and of neglecting the [[role]] of [[affect]], it can be pointed out that this criticism is based on what [[Lacan]] saw as a [[false]] opposition.<ref>[[Lacan]] also argued that criticisms of being over-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy [[thinking]]. {{E}} p.171</ref>
  
tual is not valid in the psychoanalytic field. 'This opposition is one of the most
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====Treatment====
 +
[[Psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is based on the [[symbolic]] [[order]], which transcends the opposition between [[affect]] and [[affect|intellect]].  On the one hand, [[psychoanalytic]] experience "is not that of an affective smoochy-woochy."<ref>{{S1}} p.55</ref>  On the other hand, nor is [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] an intellectual affair.
  
contrary to analytic experience and most unenlightening when it comes to
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<blockquote>"We are not dealing here with an intellectual [[dimension]]."<ref>{{S1}} p.274</ref></blockquote>
  
understanding it' (Sl, 274).
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====Resistance====
 +
The [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalyst]] must thus be aware of the ways in which both "affective smoochy-woochy" and intellectualisation can be [[resistance]]s to [[analysis]], [[imaginary]] [[lure]]s of the [[ego]].  [[Anxiety]] is the only [[affect]] that is not [[truth|deceptive]].
  
    Thus, in response to those who accuse Lacan of being over-intellectual and
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====Separate====
 +
[[Lacan]] is opposed to those [[analyst]]s who have taken the [[affect]]ive realm as primary, for the [[affect]]ive is not a [[separate]] realm opposed to the [[intellectual]].
  
of neglecting the role of affect, it can be pointed out that this criticism is based
+
<blockquote>"The affective is not like a special density which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be found in a [[mythical]] beyond of the production of the [[symbol]] which would precede the discursive formulation."<ref>{{S1}} p.57</ref></blockquote>
  
on what Lacan saw as a false opposition (Lacan also argued that criticisms of
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However, he rejects accusations of neglecting the role of [[affect]], pointing to the fact that a [[whole]] year of the [[seminar]] is dedicated precisely to discussing [[anxiety]].<ref>{{TV}} p. 38</ref>
  
being over-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy thinking      - see E,
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==Treatment==
 +
===Symbolic===
 +
[[Lacan]] does not propose a general [[theory]] of [[affect]]s, but only touches on [[them]] insofar as they impinge on [[psychoanalytic treatment]].  He insists on the [[relationship]] of [[affect]] to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]; [[affect]] means that the [[subject]] is affected by his relation with the [[Other]].  He argues that [[affect]]s are not [[signifier]]s but [[signal]]s,<ref>{{S7}} p. 102-3</ref> and emphasizes [[Freud]]'s [[position]] that [[repression]] does not bear upon the [[affect]] (which can only be transformed or [[displacement|displaced]]) but upon the ideational [[representative]] (which is, in [[Lacan]]'s [[terms]], the [[signifier]]).<ref>{{Ec}} p. 714</ref>
  
171). Psychoanalytic treatment is based on the symbolic order, which trans-
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===Practice===
 +
[[Lacan]]'s comments on the [[concept]] of [[affect]] have important implications in [[clinical]] [[practice]].
  
cends the opposition between affect and intellect. On the one hand, psycho-
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=====Structure=====
 +
Firstly, all the [[:Category:Concepts|concept]]s in [[psychoanalysis]] which have traditionally been conceived in terms of [[affect]]s, such as the [[transference]], must be rethought in terms of their [[symbolic]] [[structure]], if the [[analyst]] is to direct the [[treatment]] correctly.
  
analytic experience 'is not that of an affective smoochy-woochy' (Sl, 55). On
+
=====Lure=====
 +
Secondly, the [[affect]]s are [[lure]]s which can deceive the [[analyst]], and hence the [[analyst]] must be wary of being tricked by his own [[affect]]s.  This does not mean that the [[analyst]] must disregard his own feelings for the [[patient]], but simply that he must [[know]] how to make adequate use of them.
  
the other hand, nor is psychoanalytic treatment an intellectual affair; 'we are
+
=====Truth=====
 +
Finally, it follows that the aim of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is not the reliving of [[past]] experiences, nor the [[abreaction]] of [[affect]], but the articulation in [[speech]] of the [[truth]] [[about]] [[desire]].
  
not dealing here with      an intellectual dimension' (Sl, 274). The Lacanian
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====Passion====
 +
[[Another]] term in [[Lacan]]'s [[discourse]], related to but distinct from "[[affect]]," is the term "[[passion]]."  [[Lacan]] speaks of the "[[three]] fundamental passions": [[love]], [[hate]] and [[ignorance]].<ref>{{S1}} p. 271</ref>  This is a reference to Buddhist [[thought]].<ref>{{E}} p. 94</ref> These [[passion]]s are not [[imaginary|imaginary phenomena]], but located at the junctions between the [[order|three order]]s.
  
psychoanalyst must thus be        aware of the ways in which both 'affective
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==See Also==
 
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{{See}}
smoochy-woochy'    and intellectualisation      can be resistances      to analysis,
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* [[Analyst]]
 
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* [[Desire]]
imaginary lures of the ego. Anxiety is the only affect that is not deceptive.
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* [[Ego]]
 
+
||
    Lacan is opposed to those analysts who have taken the affective realm as
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* [[Imaginary]]
 
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* [[Love]]
primary, for the affective is not a separate realm opposed to the intellectual;
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* [[Lure]]
 
+
||
'The affective is not like a special density which would escape an intellectual
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* [[Repression]]
 
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* [[Resistance]]
accounting. It is not to be found in a mythical beyond of the production of the
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* [[Signifier]]
 
+
||
symbol which would precede the discursive formulation' (Sl, 57). However,
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* [[Speech]]
 
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* [[Structure]]
he rejects accusations of neglecting the role of affect, pointing to the fact that a
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* [[Symbolic]]
 
+
||
whole year of the seminar is dedicated precisely to discussing anxiety (Lacan,
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* [[Transference]]
 
+
* [[Treatment]]
1973a: 38).
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* [[Truth]]
 
+
{{Also}}
    Lacan does not propose a general theory of affects, but only touches on them
 
 
 
insofar as they impinge on psychoanalytic treatment. He insists on the relation-
 
 
 
ship of affect to the symbolic order; affect means that the subject is affected by
 
 
 
his relation with the Other. He argues that affects are not signifiers but signals
 
 
 
(S7, 102-3), and emphasises Freud's position that repression does not bear
 
 
 
upon the affect (which can only be transformed or displaced) but upon the
 
 
 
ideational representative (which is, in Lacan's terms, the signifier) (Ec, 714).
 
 
 
      Lacan's comments on the concept of affect have important implications in
 
 
 
clinical practice. Firstly, all the concepts in psychoanalysis which have
 
 
 
traditionally been conceived in terms of affects, such            as the transference,
 
 
 
must be rethought in terms of their symbolic structure, if the analyst is to
 
 
 
direct the treatment correctly.
 
 
 
      Secondly, the affects are lures which can deceive the analyst, and hence the
 
 
 
analyst must be wary of being tricked by his own affects. This does not mean
 
 
 
    that the analyst must disregard his own feelings for the patient, but simply that
 
 
 
    he must know how to make adequate use of them (see COUNTERTRANSFERENCE).
 
 
 
      Finally, it follows that the aim of psychoanalytic treatment is not the reliving
 
 
 
    of past experiences, nor the abreaction of affect, but the articulation in speech
 
 
 
    of the truth about desire.
 
 
 
      Another term in Lacan's discourse, related to but distinct from 'affect', is
 
 
 
    the term 'passion'. Lacan speaks of the 'three fundamental passions': love,
 
 
 
    hate and ignorance (Sl, 271); this is a reference to Buddhist thought (E, 94).
 
 
 
    These passions are not imaginary phenomena, but located at the junctions
 
 
 
    between the three orders.
 
  
 
== References ==
 
== References ==
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<div style="font-size:11px" class="references-small">
 
<references/>
 
<references/>
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</div>
  
[[Category:Lacan]]
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[[Category:Psychoanalysis]]
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[[Category:Jacques Lacan]]
 +
[[Category:Symbolic]]
 +
[[Category:Practice]]
 +
[[Category:Treatment]]
 +
[[Category:Dictionary]]
 +
[[Category:Concepts]]
 
[[Category:Terms]]
 
[[Category:Terms]]
[[Category:Concepts]]
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{{OK}}
[[Category:Psychoanalysis]]
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 +
__NOTOC__

Latest revision as of 01:02, 24 May 2019

French: affect

Intellect

Sigmund Freud

In Freud's work, the term "affect" stands in opposition to the term "idea". The opposition between the affective and the intellectual is one of the oldest themes in philosophy, and made its way into Freud's vocabulary via German psychology.

Jacques Lacan

For Lacan, however, the opposition between the affective and the intellectual is not valid in the psychoanalytic field.

"This opposition is one of the most contrary to analytic experience and most unenlightening when it comes to understanding it."[1]

Thus, in response to those who accuse Lacan of being over-intellectual and of neglecting the role of affect, it can be pointed out that this criticism is based on what Lacan saw as a false opposition.[2]

Treatment

Psychoanalytic treatment is based on the symbolic order, which transcends the opposition between affect and intellect. On the one hand, psychoanalytic experience "is not that of an affective smoochy-woochy."[3] On the other hand, nor is psychoanalytic treatment an intellectual affair.

"We are not dealing here with an intellectual dimension."[4]

Resistance

The Lacanian psychoanalyst must thus be aware of the ways in which both "affective smoochy-woochy" and intellectualisation can be resistances to analysis, imaginary lures of the ego. Anxiety is the only affect that is not deceptive.

Separate

Lacan is opposed to those analysts who have taken the affective realm as primary, for the affective is not a separate realm opposed to the intellectual.

"The affective is not like a special density which would escape an intellectual accounting. It is not to be found in a mythical beyond of the production of the symbol which would precede the discursive formulation."[5]

However, he rejects accusations of neglecting the role of affect, pointing to the fact that a whole year of the seminar is dedicated precisely to discussing anxiety.[6]

Treatment

Symbolic

Lacan does not propose a general theory of affects, but only touches on them insofar as they impinge on psychoanalytic treatment. He insists on the relationship of affect to the symbolic order; affect means that the subject is affected by his relation with the Other. He argues that affects are not signifiers but signals,[7] and emphasizes Freud's position that repression does not bear upon the affect (which can only be transformed or displaced) but upon the ideational representative (which is, in Lacan's terms, the signifier).[8]

Practice

Lacan's comments on the concept of affect have important implications in clinical practice.

Structure

Firstly, all the concepts in psychoanalysis which have traditionally been conceived in terms of affects, such as the transference, must be rethought in terms of their symbolic structure, if the analyst is to direct the treatment correctly.

Lure

Secondly, the affects are lures which can deceive the analyst, and hence the analyst must be wary of being tricked by his own affects. This does not mean that the analyst must disregard his own feelings for the patient, but simply that he must know how to make adequate use of them.

Truth

Finally, it follows that the aim of psychoanalytic treatment is not the reliving of past experiences, nor the abreaction of affect, but the articulation in speech of the truth about desire.

Passion

Another term in Lacan's discourse, related to but distinct from "affect," is the term "passion." Lacan speaks of the "three fundamental passions": love, hate and ignorance.[9] This is a reference to Buddhist thought.[10] These passions are not imaginary phenomena, but located at the junctions between the three orders.

See Also

References

  1. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-54. Trans. John Forrester. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p.274
  2. Lacan also argued that criticisms of being over-intellectual were often merely excuses for sloppy thinking. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.171
  3. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-54. Trans. John Forrester. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p.55
  4. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-54. Trans. John Forrester. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p.274
  5. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-54. Trans. John Forrester. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p.57
  6. Lacan, Jacques. Télévision, Paris: Seuil, 1973. Television: A Challenge to the Psychoanalytic Establishment, ed. Joan Copjec, trans. Denis Hollier, Rosalind Krauss and Annette Michelson, New York: Norton, 1990]. p. 38
  7. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-60. Trans. Dennis Porter. London: Routledge, 1992. p. 102-3
  8. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. p. 714
  9. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-54. Trans. John Forrester. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p. 271
  10. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 94