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[[Anamorphosis|ANAMORPHOSIS]]<br>
</center></h3><br>
<dl><dd><i>Of the foundation of [[consciousness ]] - The privilege of the [[gaze ]] as </i>[[objet ]] a -<br></dd><dd><i>The [[optics ]] of the blind - The [[phallus ]] in the picture</i><p><br>
</p></dd><dd><i>Vainement ton [[image ]] arrive a ma rencontre</i><br>
</dd><dd><i>Et ne m'entre ou je suis quz' seutement la montre</i><br>
</dd><dd><i>Toz te tournant vers moi tu ne saurats trouver</i><br>
</dd><dd><i>Au mur de mon [[regard ]] que ton ombre rivie</i><p>
</p></dd><dd><i>Je suis ce malheureux comparable aux </i>mzroz'rs<br>
</dd><dd><i>Qui, peuvent réflichir mais ne peuvent pas [[voir]]</i><br>
</dd><dd><i>Comme eux mon oeil est vide et comme eux habiti</i><br>
</dd><dd><i>De l'[[absence ]] de toi qui fait sa cicite1</i><br><br>
<br>
</dd></dl> [[You May|You may ]] [[remember ]] that, in one of my earlier lectures, I began by quoting the [[poem]], <i>Contrechant, </i>from [[Aragon]]'s <i>Le Fou</i> <i>d'Elsa. </i>I did not realize at the [[time ]] that I would be developing the [[subject ]] of [[The Gaze|the gaze ]] to such an extent. I was diverted into doing so by the way in which I presented the [[concept ]] of [[repetition ]] in [[Freud]].<p>
We cannot deny that it is within the explanation of repetition that this digression on the scopic function is situated -no doubt by Maurice Merleau-Ponty's recently published work, <i>Le</i> <i>Visible et l'invisible. </i>Moreover ' it seemed to me that, if an encounter were to be found there, it was a happy one, one destined to stress, as I shall try to do today, how, in the perspective of the unconscious, we can situate consciousness.</p><p>
</p><center>I<br>
</center><br>
<i>I saw mysef [[seeing ]] myself, </i>young Parque says somewhere. Certainly, this [[statement ]] has rich and [[complex ]] implications in relation to the theme developed in <i>La Jeune Parque, </i>that of [[femininity]]-but we haven't got there yet. We are dealing with the [[philosopher]], who apprehends something that is one of the essential correlates of consciousness in its relation to [[representation]], and which is designated as <i>I see mysef seeing mysef. </i> What evidence can we really attach to this [[formula]]? How is it that it remains, in fact, correlative with that fundamental mode to which we referred in the [[Cartesian ]] <i>[[cogito]], </i>by which [[The Subject|the subject ]] appreliends himself as [[thought]]?<br>
<br>
What isolates this apprehension of thought by itself is a sort of doubt, which has been called methodological doubt, which concerns whatever might give support to thought in representation. How is it, then, that the <i>I see mysef seeing mysef </i> remains its envelope and base, and, perhaps more than one thinks, grounds its certainty? For, <i>I warm mysef by warming</i> <i>mysefis </i>a reference to the<b> </b>body as body-I feel that sensation of warmth which, from some point inside me, is diffused and locates me as body. Whereas in the <i>I see myself seeing myself,</i> there is no -such sensation of being absorbed by vision.Furthermore, the phenomenologists have succeeded in articulating with precision, and in the most disconcerting way, that it is quite clear that I<b> <i></i></b><i>see outside, </i>that perception is not in me, that it is on the objects that it apprehends. And yet I apprehend the world in a perception that seems to concern the immanence of the <i>I see myself seeing myself. </i>The privilege of the subject seems to be established here from that bipolar reflexive relation by which, as soon as I perceive, my representations belong to me.<br>
<br>
I will now pass around something that dates from a hundred<br>
years earlier, from I533, a reproduction of a painting that, I [[think]], you all [[know]]-[[Hans ]] [[Holbein]]'s <i>[[The Ambassadors]]. </i>It will serve to refresh the [[memories ]] of those who know the picture well. Those who do not should examine it attentively. I shall come back to it shortly.<br>
<br>
Vision is ordered according to a mode that may generally be called the function of images. This function is defined by a point-by-point correspondence of two unities in space. Whatever optical intermediaries may be used to establish their relation, whether their image is virtual, or real, the point-bypoint correspondence is essential. That which is of the mode of the image in the field of vision is therefore reducible to the simple schema that enables us to establish anamorphosis, that is to say, to the relation of an image, in so far as it is linked to a surface, with a certain point that we shall call the 'geometral' point. Anything that is determined by this method, in which the straight line plays its role of being the path of light, can be called an image.</p><p>
<br>
All this shows that at the very heart of the period in which the subject emerged and geometral optics was an object of research, Holbein makes visible for us here something that is simply the subject as annihilated-annihilated in the form<br>
that is, strictly [[speaking]], the imaged embodiment of the <i>minus-phi [(-O)] </i>of [[castration]], which for us, centres the [[whole ]] organization of the desires through the framework of the fundamental [[drives]].</p><p>
But it is further still that we must seek the function of vision. e shall then see emerging on the basis of vision, not the phallic symbol, the anamorphic ghost, but the gaze as such, in its pulsatile, dazzling and spread out function, as it is in this picture.</p><p>
L A C A N : If one does not stress the dialectic of desire one does not understand why the gaze of others should.disorganize the field of perception. It is because the subject in question is not that of the reflexive consciousness, but that of desire. One thinks it is a question of the geometral eye-point, whereas it is a question of a quite different eye-that which flies in the foreground of <i>The Ambassadors.</i></p><p>
WAHL: <i>But I don't understand how others will reappear in your</i> <i>discourse </i>...</p><p>
L A C A N Look, the main [[thing ]] is that I don't come a cropper!<br>
<br>
W A H L<i>I would also like to say that, when you [[speak ]] of the subject</i>
<i>and of the [[real]], one is tempted, onfirst hearing, to consider the [[terms ]] in</i> <i>themselves. But gradually one realizes that the are to be [[understood ]] in</i> <i>their relation to one [[another]], and that they have a [[topological ]] definition</i> <i>-subject and real are to be situated on either side of the [[split]], in the</i> <i>resi . stance Of the [[phantasy]]. [[The Real|The real ]] is, in a way, an [[experience ]] of</i> <i>[[resistance]].</i><br>
LACAN: My discourse proceeds, in the following way: each term is sustained only in its topological relation with the others, and the subject of the <i>cogito </i>is treated in exactly the same way.</p><p>
W A H L<i>: </i>Is [[topology ]] for you a method of discovery or of exposition ?</p><p>
LACAN: It is the mapping of the topology proper to our experience as analysts, which may later be taken in a metaphysical perspective. I think Merleau-Ponty was moving in this direction-see the second part of the book, his reference to the <i>Wof Man </i>and to the finger of a glove.</p><p>
P. K A U F M A N N <i>: </i>you have provided us with a typical structure of <i>the gaze, but you have said nothing of the dilation of light.<br>
