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[[Freud]]'s [[Sigmund Freud:Bibliography|work ]] is [[full ]] of references to [[biology]].   [[Freud]] regarded [[biology]] as a [[model ]] of [[scientific]] rigour rigor on which to base the new [[science]] of [[psychoanalysis]].

[[Lacan]], however, is strongly opposed to any attempt to [[construct ]] [[psychoanalysis]] upon a [[biology|biological model]], arguing that the direct application of [[biological]] (or [[nature|ethological]]/[[psychology|psychological]]) [[:category:concepts|concepts]] (such as [[adaptation]]) to [[psychoanalysis]] will inevitably be misleading and will obliterate the essential distinciton between [[naturedistinction]] and between [[culture]]. Such [[biology|biologizing explanations]] of [[human|human behavior]] ignore, according to [[Lacan]], the primacy of the [[symbolic order]] in [[human]] [[existence]]. [[Lacan]] sees this "[[biology|biologism]]" in the work of those [[psychoanalyst]]s who have confused [[desire]] with [[neednature]], and [[drives]] with [[instinct]]s, [[:category:concepts|concepts]] which he insists on distinguishing. ==Complex==These arguments are evident from the very earliest of [[Lacan]]'s [[psychoanalytic]] [[Works of Jacques Lacan|writings]]. In his 1938 work on the [[family]], for example, he rejects any attempt to explain [[family]] [[structure]]s on the basis of purely biological data, and argues that [[human]] [[psychology]] is regulated by [[complex]]es rather than by [[instinct]]s.<ref>{{1938}} pp. 23-4</ref> ==Science==[[Lacan]] argues that his refusal of [[biology|biological reductionism]] is not a contradiction of [[Freud]] but a [[returnculture]] to the essence of [[Freud]]'s [[Works of Sigmund Freud|work]]. When [[Freud]] used [[biology|biological models]], he did so because [[biology]] was at that time a model of [[science|scientific rigour]] in general, and because the [[science|conjectural science]]s had not then achieved the same degree of rigour. [[Freud]] certainly did not confuse [[psychoanalysis]] with [[biology]] or any other exact [[science]], and when he borrowed [[:category:concepts|concepts]] from [[biology]] (such as the [[:category:concepts|concept]] of the [[drive]) he reworked them in such a radical way that they become totally new [[:category:concepts|concepts]].  For example, the [[:category:concepts|concept]] of the [[death instinct]] "is not a question of biology."<ref>{{E}} p. 102</ref>  [[Lacan]] expresses this point with a paradox:<blockquote>"Freudian biology has nothing to do with biology."<ref>{{S2}} p. 75</ref></blockquote> ==Phallus==[[Lacan]], like [[Freud]], uses [[:category:concepts|concepts]] borrowed from [[biology]] (i.e. [[imago]], dehiscence), and then reworks them in an entirely [[symbolic]] framework/ Perhaps the most significant example of this is [[Lacan]]'s concept of the [[phallus]], which he conceives as a [[signifier]] and not as a bodily organ.

Thus while Such [[Freudbiology|biologizing explanations]] conceives of the [[castration complexhuman|human behavior]] and ignore, according to [[sexual differenceLacan]] in terms , the ''primacy'' of the [[presencesymbolic order]] and in [[absencehuman]] of the [[penisexistence]], . [[Lacan]] theorizes them in sees this "[[biology|non-biologicalbiologism]]" in the [[work]] of those [[psychoanalyst]], s who have confused [[biology|non-anatomicaldesire]] terms -- the with [[presenceneed]] , and [[absencedrives]] with [[instinct]] of the s, [[phallus:category:concepts|concepts]]which he insists on distinguishing.

This has been one ===History===These arguments are evident from the very earliest of the main attractions [[Lacan]]'s [[psychoanalytic]] [[Works of Jacques Lacan|writings]]. In his [[{{Y}}|1938]] [[Jacques Lacan:Bibliography|work]]ian on the [[theoryfamily]] , for certain example, he rejects any attempt to explain [[family]] [[feministstructure]] writers who have seen it as a way s on the basis of constructing a purely [[biologyscience|non-essentialistbiological data]], and argues that [[human]] [[psychology]] is regulated by [[complex]] account of gendered es rather than by [[subjectivityinstinct]]s.<ref>{{1938}} pp. 23-4</ref>

==Culture==Science====However, while [[Lacan]] consistently rejects all forms argues that his [[refusal]] of [[science|biological reductionism]] is not a ''[[contradiction]]'' of [[Freud]] but a ''[[return]]'' to the [[essence]] of [[Freud]]'s [[Works of Sigmund Freud|work]].When [[Freud]] used [[biology|biological reductionismmodels]], he also rejects did so because [[biology]] was at that [[time]] a model of [[science|scientific rigor]] in general, and because the culturalist position which completely ignores the relevance of [[biologyscience|conjectural science]]s had not then achieved the same degree of rigor.

If "[[Freud]] certainly did not confuse [[psychoanalysis]] with [[biology]] or any [[other]] exact [[science]], and when he borrowed [[:category:concepts|biologizingconcepts]] from [[biology]]" is understood correctly (that is, not such as the reduction [[:category:concepts|concept]] of psychic phenomena to crude the [[drive]]) he reworked [[them]] in such a radical way that they become totally new [[biology:category:concepts|biological determinationconcepts]]. For example, but as discerning the precise way in which biological data impact on [[:category:concepts|concept]] of the psychical field), then [[Lacandeath instinct]] "is all in favor not a question of biology."<ref>{{E}} p. 102</ref> [[Lacan]] expresses this point with a [[paradox]]:<blockquote>"[[Freudian]] biology|biologizing thoughthas [[nothing]]to do with biology."<ref>{{EcS2}} p. 72375</ref></blockquote>

The clearest examples =====Phallus=====[[Lacan]], like [[Freud]], uses [[:category:concepts|concepts]] borrowed from [[biology]] (i.e. [[imago]], dehiscence), and then reworks them in an entirely [[symbolic]] framework. Perhaps the most significant example of this are is [[Lacan]]'s appeals to examples from [[animalconcept]] of the [[phallus]], which he conceives as a [[signifier]] and not as a [[naturebody|ethologybodily organ]] to demonstrate . Thus while [[Freud]] conceives of the power [[castration complex]] and [[sexual difference]] in [[terms]] of the [[presence]] and [[absence]] of the [[imagepenis]]s to act as releasing mechanisms; hence , [[Lacan]]'s references to pigeons theorizes them in [[biology|non-biological]], [[biology|non-anatomical]] terms -- the [[presence]] and locusts in his account [[absence]] of the [[mirror stagephallus]],<ref>{{E}} p. 3</ref> and to crustaceans in his This has been one of the main attractions of [[Lacan]]ian [[theory]] for certain [[feminist]] writers who have seen it as a way of constructing a [[biology|non-essentialist]] account of gendered [[mimicrysubjectivity]].<ref>{{S11}} p. 99</ref>

==Sexual Difference===Culture=====However, while [[Lacan]] consistently rejects all forms of [[science|biological reductionism]], he also rejects the [[culture|culturalist]] [[position]] which completely ignores the relevance of [[biology]]. If "[[biology|biologizing]]" is [[understood]] correctly (that is, not as the reduction of [[psychic]] phenomena to crude [[biology|biological determination]], but as discerning the precise way in which biological data impact on the [[psychical]] field), then [[Lacan]] is all in favor of [[biology|biologizing thought]].<ref>{{Ec}} p. 723</ref> The clearest examples of this are [[Lacan]]'s appeals to examples from [[animal]] [[nature|ethology]] to demonstrate the [[power]] of [[image]]s to act as releasing mechanisms; hence [[Lacan]]'s references to pigeons and locusts in his account of the [[mirror stage]],<ref>{{E}} p. 3</ref> and to crustaceans in his account of [[mimicry]].<ref>{{S11}} p. 99</ref> Thus in his account of [[sexual difference]], [[Lacan]] follows [[Freud]]'s [[rejection ]] of the [[false ]] dichotomy between "anatomy or convention".<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis]]'', [[SE]] XXII, 1933a. p. 114</ref>