Difference between revisions of "Biology"

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biology (biologie)              Freud's work is full of references to biology. Freud
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{{Topp}}biologie{{Bottom}}
  
regarded biology as a model of scientific rigour on which to base the new
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==Sigmund Freud==
 +
[[Freud]]'s [[Sigmund Freud:Bibliography|work]] is [[full]] of references to [[biology]].  [[Freud]] regarded [[biology]] as a [[model]] of [[scientific]] rigor on which to base the new [[science]] of [[psychoanalysis]].
  
science of psychoanalysis. Lacan, however, is strongly opposed to any attempt
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==Jacques Lacan==
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[[Lacan]], however, is strongly opposed to any attempt to [[construct]] [[psychoanalysis]] upon a [[biology|biological model]], arguing that the direct application of [[biological]] (or [[nature|ethological]]/[[psychology|psychological]]) [[:category:concepts|concepts]] (such as [[adaptation]]) to [[psychoanalysis]] will inevitably be misleading and will obliterate the essential [[distinction]] between [[nature]] and [[culture]].
  
to construct psychoanalysis upon a biological model, arguing that the direct
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Such [[biology|biologizing explanations]] of [[human|human behavior]] ignore, according to [[Lacan]], the ''primacy'' of the [[symbolic order]] in [[human]] [[existence]]. [[Lacan]] sees this "[[biology|biologism]]" in the [[work]] of those [[psychoanalyst]]s who have confused [[desire]] with [[need]], and [[drives]] with [[instinct]]s,  [[:category:concepts|concepts]] which he insists on distinguishing.
  
application of biological (or ethological/psychological) concepts (such              as
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===History===
 +
These arguments are evident from the very earliest of [[Lacan]]'s [[psychoanalytic]] [[Works of Jacques Lacan|writings]].  In his [[{{Y}}|1938]] [[Jacques Lacan:Bibliography|work]] on the [[family]], for example, he rejects any attempt to explain [[family]] [[structure]]s on the basis of purely [[science|biological data]], and argues that [[human]] [[psychology]] is regulated by [[complex]]es rather than by [[instinct]]s.<ref>{{1938}} pp.  23-4</ref>
  
ADAPTATION) to psychoanalysis will inevitably be misleading and will obliter-
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====Science====
 +
[[Lacan]] argues that his [[refusal]] of [[science|biological reductionism]] is not a ''[[contradiction]]'' of [[Freud]] but a ''[[return]]'' to the [[essence]] of [[Freud]]'s [[Works of Sigmund Freud|work]].When [[Freud]] used [[biology|biological models]], he did so because [[biology]] was at that [[time]] a model of [[science|scientific rigor]] in general, and because the [[science|conjectural science]]s had not then achieved the same degree of rigor.
  
ate the essential distinction between        NATURE and culture. Such biologising
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[[Freud]] certainly did not confuse [[psychoanalysis]] with [[biology]] or any [[other]] exact [[science]], and when he borrowed [[:category:concepts|concepts]] from [[biology]] (such as the [[:category:concepts|concept]] of the [[drive]]) he reworked [[them]] in such a radical way that they become totally new [[:category:concepts|concepts]]. For example, the [[:category:concepts|concept]] of the [[death instinct]] "is not a question of biology."<ref>{{E}} p. 102</ref>  [[Lacan]] expresses this point with a [[paradox]]:
 +
<blockquote>"[[Freudian]] biology has [[nothing]] to do with biology."<ref>{{S2}} p. 75</ref></blockquote>
  
explanations of human behaviour ignore, according to Lacan, the primacy of
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=====Phallus=====
 +
[[Lacan]], like [[Freud]], uses [[:category:concepts|concepts]] borrowed from [[biology]] (i.e. [[imago]], dehiscence), and then reworks them in an entirely [[symbolic]] framework.  Perhaps the most significant example of this is [[Lacan]]'s [[concept]] of the [[phallus]], which he conceives as a [[signifier]] and not as a [[body|bodily organ]].  Thus while [[Freud]] conceives of the [[castration complex]] and [[sexual difference]] in [[terms]] of the [[presence]] and [[absence]] of the [[penis]], [[Lacan]] theorizes them in [[biology|non-biological]], [[biology|non-anatomical]] terms -- the [[presence]] and [[absence]] of the [[phallus]].  This has been one of the main attractions of [[Lacan]]ian [[theory]] for certain [[feminist]] writers who have seen it as a way of constructing a [[biology|non-essentialist]] account of gendered [[subjectivity]].
  
the symbolic order in human existence. Lacan sees this 'biologism' in the work
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=====Culture=====
 +
However, while [[Lacan]] consistently rejects all forms of [[science|biological reductionism]], he also rejects the [[culture|culturalist]] [[position]] which completely ignores the relevance of [[biology]]. If "[[biology|biologizing]]" is [[understood]] correctly (that is, not as the reduction of [[psychic]] phenomena to crude [[biology|biological determination]], but as discerning the precise way in which biological data impact on the [[psychical]] field), then [[Lacan]] is all in favor of [[biology|biologizing thought]].<ref>{{Ec}} p. 723</ref>  The clearest examples of this are [[Lacan]]'s appeals to examples from [[animal]] [[nature|ethology]] to demonstrate the [[power]] of [[image]]s to act as releasing mechanisms; hence [[Lacan]]'s references to pigeons and locusts in his account of the [[mirror stage]],<ref>{{E}} p. 3</ref> and to crustaceans in his account of [[mimicry]].<ref>{{S11}} p. 99</ref>  Thus in his account of [[sexual difference]], [[Lacan]] follows [[Freud]]'s [[rejection]] of the [[false]] dichotomy between "anatomy or convention".<ref>{{F}} ''[[Works of Sigmund Freud|New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis]]'', [[SE]] XXII, 1933a. p. 114</ref>
  
of those psychoanalysts who have confused desire with need, and drives with
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==See Also==
 +
{{See}}
 +
* [[Absence]]
 +
* [[Adaptation]]
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* [[Castration complex|Castration]]
 +
||
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* [[Complex]]
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* [[Death drive]]
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* [[Desire]]
 +
||
 +
* [[Drive]]
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* [[Imago]]
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* [[Instinct]]
 +
||
 +
* [[Mirror stage]]
 +
* [[Nature]]
 +
* [[Need]]
 +
||
 +
* [[Phallus]]
 +
* [[Science]]
 +
* [[Sexual difference]]
 +
{{Also}}
  
instincts, concepts which he insists on distinguishing.
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==References==
 +
<div style="font-size:11px" class="references-small">
 +
<references/>
 +
</div>
  
    These arguments    are evident from the very earliest of Lacan's psycho-
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{{OK}}
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[[Category:Freudian psychology]]
 +
[[Category:Science]]
 +
[[Category:Sexuality]]
  
analytic writings. In his 1938 work on the family, for example, he rejects
+
__NOTOC__
 
 
any attempt to explain family structures on the basis of purely biological data,
 
 
 
and argues that human psychology is regulated by complexes rather than by
 
 
 
instincts (Lacan, 1938: 23-4).
 
 
 
    Lacan argues that his refusal of biological reductionism is not a contra-
 
 
 
diction of Freud but a return to the essence of Freud's work. When Freud used
 
 
 
biological models, he did so simply because biology was at that time a model
 
 
 
of scientific rigour in general, and because the conjectural sciences had not
 
 
 
then achieved the      same degree of rigour. Freud certainly did not confuse
 
 
 
psychoanalysis with biology or any other exact science, and when he bor-
 
 
 
rowed concepts from biology (such as the concept of the drive) he reworked
 
 
 
them in such      a radical way that they become totally        new concepts. For
 
 
 
example, the concept of the death instinct 'is not a question of biology' (E,
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  102). Lacan expresses his point with a paradox: 'Freudian biology has nothing
 
 
 
  to do with biology' (S2, 75).
 
 
 
      Lacan, like Freud,      uses concepts borrowed from biology (e.g. imago,
 
 
 
dehiscence), and then reworks them in              an entirely symbolic framework.
 
 
 
Perhaps the      most significant example of this is Lacan's concept of the
 
 
 
  PHALLUS, which he conceives as a signifier and not as a bodily organ. Thus
 
 
 
    while Freud conceives of the castration complex and sexual difference in terms
 
 
 
  of the presence and absence of the penis, Lacan theorises them in                non-
 
 
 
biological, non-anatomical terms (the presence and absence of the phallus).
 
 
 
  This has been    one of the main attractions of Lacanian theory for certain
 
 
 
  feminist writers who have seen it as a way of constructing a non-essentialist
 
 
 
  account of gendered subjectivity.
 
 
 
      However, while Lacan consistently rejects all forms of biological reduction-
 
 
 
ism, he also rejects the culturalist position which completely ignores the
 
 
 
  relevance of biology (Ec, 723). If 'biologising' is understood correctly (that
 
 
 
is, not as the reduction of psychic phenomena to crude biological determi-
 
 
 
nation, but as discerning the precise way in which biological data impact on
 
 
 
  the psychical field), then Lacan is all in favour of biologising thought (Ec,
 
 
 
723). The clearest examples of this        are Lacan's appeals to examples from
 
 
 
  animal ethology to demonstrate the power of images to act              as releasing
 
 
 
mechanisms; hence Lacan's references to pigeons and locusts in his account
 
 
 
  of the mirror stage (E, 3), and to crustaceans in his account of mimicry (Sll,
 
 
 
99) (see GESTALT).
 
 
 
      Thus in his account of sexual difference, Lacan follows Freud's rejection of
 
 
 
  the false dichotomy between 'anatomy or convention' (Freud, 1933a: SE XXII,
 
 
 
114). Lacan's concern is not to privilege either term but to show how both
 
 
 
interact in complex ways in the process of assuming a sexual position.
 

Latest revision as of 23:14, 23 May 2019

French: biologie

Sigmund Freud

Freud's work is full of references to biology. Freud regarded biology as a model of scientific rigor on which to base the new science of psychoanalysis.

Jacques Lacan

Lacan, however, is strongly opposed to any attempt to construct psychoanalysis upon a biological model, arguing that the direct application of biological (or ethological/psychological) concepts (such as adaptation) to psychoanalysis will inevitably be misleading and will obliterate the essential distinction between nature and culture.

Such biologizing explanations of human behavior ignore, according to Lacan, the primacy of the symbolic order in human existence. Lacan sees this "biologism" in the work of those psychoanalysts who have confused desire with need, and drives with instincts, concepts which he insists on distinguishing.

History

These arguments are evident from the very earliest of Lacan's psychoanalytic writings. In his 1938 work on the family, for example, he rejects any attempt to explain family structures on the basis of purely biological data, and argues that human psychology is regulated by complexes rather than by instincts.[1]

Science

Lacan argues that his refusal of biological reductionism is not a contradiction of Freud but a return to the essence of Freud's work.When Freud used biological models, he did so because biology was at that time a model of scientific rigor in general, and because the conjectural sciences had not then achieved the same degree of rigor.

Freud certainly did not confuse psychoanalysis with biology or any other exact science, and when he borrowed concepts from biology (such as the concept of the drive) he reworked them in such a radical way that they become totally new concepts. For example, the concept of the death instinct "is not a question of biology."[2] Lacan expresses this point with a paradox:

"Freudian biology has nothing to do with biology."[3]

Phallus

Lacan, like Freud, uses concepts borrowed from biology (i.e. imago, dehiscence), and then reworks them in an entirely symbolic framework. Perhaps the most significant example of this is Lacan's concept of the phallus, which he conceives as a signifier and not as a bodily organ. Thus while Freud conceives of the castration complex and sexual difference in terms of the presence and absence of the penis, Lacan theorizes them in non-biological, non-anatomical terms -- the presence and absence of the phallus. This has been one of the main attractions of Lacanian theory for certain feminist writers who have seen it as a way of constructing a non-essentialist account of gendered subjectivity.

Culture

However, while Lacan consistently rejects all forms of biological reductionism, he also rejects the culturalist position which completely ignores the relevance of biology. If "biologizing" is understood correctly (that is, not as the reduction of psychic phenomena to crude biological determination, but as discerning the precise way in which biological data impact on the psychical field), then Lacan is all in favor of biologizing thought.[4] The clearest examples of this are Lacan's appeals to examples from animal ethology to demonstrate the power of images to act as releasing mechanisms; hence Lacan's references to pigeons and locusts in his account of the mirror stage,[5] and to crustaceans in his account of mimicry.[6] Thus in his account of sexual difference, Lacan follows Freud's rejection of the false dichotomy between "anatomy or convention".[7]

See Also

References

  1. Lacan, Jacques. Les complexes familiaux dans la formation de l'individu. Essai d'analyse d'une fonction en psychologie, Paris: Navarin, 1984 [1938]. pp. 23-4
  2. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 102
  3. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988. p. 75
  4. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. p. 723
  5. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 3
  6. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p. 99
  7. Freud, Sigmund. New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, SE XXII, 1933a. p. 114