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</p><p><i><b>Editors' Note: Slavoj</b> [[Zizek]], a leading [[intellectual ]] in the new [[social ]] movements of Eastern and Central [[Europe]], is a researcher at the Institute of [[Sociology ]] at the [[University ]] of [[Ljubljana]], [[Slovenia]]. He is the [[author ]] of numerous books including </i>[[Looking ]] Away: An Introduction to Jacques [[Lacan ]] Through Popular [[Culture]]<i>. Zizek also ran as a pro-reform candidate for the presidency of the republic of Slovenia, then part of [[Yugoslavia]], in 1990.</i> </p><p><b>CTHEORY:</b> Let's [[speak ]] [[about ]] the [[role ]] of intellectuals. Before 1989, there was a strange [[relationship ]] among intellectuals and those in [[power ]] in Eastern Europe. Both bureaucrats and [[dissidents ]] had some sort of relationship with [[politics]]. Even now, this is partly the [[case]]. In [[Western Europe ]] this

</p><p><b>Zizek:</b> Partially this is [[true]]. For me what was partially so attractive, so sympathetic about [[real ]] [[socialism]], despite [[being ]] a corrupt, cynical [[system]], was the [[belief ]] in the power of the spoken [[word]]. Some twenty years ago, I was editor of a small art-[[theoretical ]] journal with a [[circulation ]] of 3,400. Once we published a small, obscure [[poem]], incomprehensibly modern, but between the lines there was a dissident [[message]]. If the power would have ignored the poem, [[nothing ]] would have happened. But there was an extraordinary [[session ]] of the Central Committee. Okay, this is [[repression]], but what I like about it is that the [[communist ]] power took the potential, detonating force of the spoken word

take an [[artist ]] like Tarkovski, who was half dissident. He was half allowed to [[work]], even if they suppressed some of his [[films]]. They were impressed, they bothered. Fredric [[Jameson ]] made a nice point about this: we are only now becoming aware that what we liked about East-European dissidents like [[Havel ]] is only

</p><p>Our influence, beginning in the mid-eighties, was at that [[time ]] incredibly large, especially the [[philosophers]], sociologists, [[literary ]] theoreticians. But this was a very limited conjunction. Now there is the pure [[ignorance ]] of the [[regime]], which is simply not interested in [[ideological ]] questions. I feel sorry

Serbia, where this nationalist [[madness ]] was fabricated by writers. Even in

[[moment]]. There are a lot of controversies in Ljubljiana about your involvement in the governing party and the fact that you write speeches for [[them]]. </p><p><b>Zizek:</b> There is a messianic [[complex ]] with intellectuals in Eastern

this messianic [[vision ]] of intellectuals is combined with a vulgar anti-Americanism, which is a very popular [[political ]] attitude of [[right ]] wingers. America for them means no national [[solidarity]], filthy [[liberalism]], multi-culturalism, individualism, the [[market]]. They are afraid of a pluralistic [[democracy ]] and there is a proto-fascistic potential in it. This combination of nationalist writers, whose [[obsession ]] is how to retain national [[identity]], and an anti-[[capitalist ]] [[right-wing ]] movement is very dangerous. </p><p>I did something for which I lost almost all my friends, what no [[good ]] [[leftist ]]

leftist friends [[hate ]] me and of course the [[whole ]] right wing. What the [[liberal ]] [[Democratic Party|democratic party ]] did was a miracle. Five years ago we were the [[remainder ]] of the new social movements, like [[feminist ]] and ecological groups. At that time everybody [[thought ]] that we would be vanishing mediators. We made some slyly corrupted, but good moves and now we are the strongest party. I [[think ]] it was our party that saved Slovenia from the fate of the [[other ]] former Yugoslav republics, where they have the one-party [[model]]. Either right wing like in Croatia or [[left ]] wing like in Serbia, which hegemonized in the [[name ]] of the national interest. With us it's a really diverse, pluralist [[scene]], open towards [[foreigners ]] (of

[[society ]] are not yet lost. </p><p>It's typical that this [[position ]] triggers an enormous [[hatred ]] against me. Slovene [[media ]] absolutely ignore me, there is never an article about me. On the

dark, ominous, plotting, political manipulator, a role I [[enjoy ]] immensely and

simple, professional [[choice]]. Now politics is becoming business-as-usual in

[[theory ]] or politics? What I hate most are the beautiful souls of the left wing

good old days of the original, [[left-wing ]] [[dissidence]]? No, you must accept the rules of the [[game]]. Svetlana Slapzak (from Belgrade, now Ljubljana - GL) and the group around her [[present ]] themselves as marginalized victims. But her groups [[control ]] two departments and the most powerful publishing house. They get the most [[money ]] from the ministry of [[science]]. And via the Soros Foundation they are selling the story of being surrounded by [[nationalism]].

abroad, in [[France ]] and in America. I never taught at any university in Slovenia,

money in [[order ]] to survive. My answer to Svetlana Slapzak would be: why did she become a Slovenian [[citizen]]? Her very position is a [[contradiction ]] of what she says. In a [[state ]] of less than 2 million we offered 100,000 non-Slovenians permanent [[citizenship]], against terrible nationalistic [[resistance]]. There were no dirty tricks involved, like a [[test ]] if you knew Slovenian. We are still in an intermediate [[stage]]. When a new political [[logic ]] imposes itself, the <i>Sittlichkeit</i>, the unwritten rules are still unsure, [[people ]] are still searching for a model. The question is: will we become just [[another ]] small,

And all compromises are worth it for this [[goal]].

[[concept ]] of an "open society"?

keeping the theoretical and social [[sciences ]] spirit alive. These countries are

[[Heideggerian ]] nationalists. But the Soros people have this [[ethic ]] of the bad state vs. good civic, independent [[structures]]. But sorry, in Slovenia I am for the state and against [[civil society]]! In Slovenia, civil society is equal to the

a network of [[moral ]] majority, conservatives and nationalist pressure groups, against abortion, [for] [[religious ]] education in [[schools]]. A real pressure from

</p><p>For me the open society means something very [[practical]]: the unwritten rules of the political [[space]]. For example, if you oppose the present [[government ]] or the

fundamental hopes in a socialist [[revolution ]] or whatever. We have several big crises coming: the ecological, the developed against the underdeveloped [[world ]] and the [[loss ]] of the [[sense ]] of [[reality ]] in the face of all the rapid changes. I don't underestimate the social impact of the loss of [[stability]]. Is the [[frame ]] of liberal [[capitalism ]] able to solve this [[antagonism]]? Unfortunately my answer is no.

like half of L.A., is far stronger than the [[Marxist ]] [[class ]] [[struggle]]. At least both [[workers ]] and capitalists still participated in legality and the state,

</p><p>A lot of [[times]], this Soros approach of [[openness ]] indulges in its own [[species ]] of covered [[racism]]. Recently at a conference in Amsterdam, Press Now asked whether it was possible to find a [[universal ]] [[language ]] so that intellectuals from

cliché extremely dangerous, because it comes from an [[idea ]] of the Balkans as the phantasmatic space of nationalistic madness. This [[phantasy ]] is very well manipulated and expressed in some popular works of art, like Kusturica's [[film ]] <cite>Underground</cite>. He said himself, in <cite>Cahiers du [[Cinema]]</cite>, that in the Balkans, war is a [[natural ]] phenomenon, nobody [[knows ]] when it will

suspicious. I would like to quote [[Hegel ]] here: "The true [[evil ]] is an attitude which perceives evil everywhere." I am very suspicious about this [[apparent ]] multi-[[cultural]], neutral, liberal attitude, which only sees nationalistic madness around itself. It posits itself in a [[witness ]] role. The post-Yugoslav war is strictly the result of European cultural dynamics. We don't [[need ]] this simplistic

power [[analysis]].

specifically allows the West to maintain its position as an excluded [[observer]]. What you should do is what I call a [[phenomenological ]] <i>reduction a l'envers</i>. You should not try to [[understand ]] it. Like TV, the funny effect when you disconnect the [[voice]], you only have these stupid gestures. Cut off the [[meaning ]] and then you'll get the pure power battle. The Balkans are a [[symptom ]] of

[[utopian ]] [[notion ]] of the European [[Community ]] itself. What is the [[dream]]? A kind of neutral, purely technocratic Brussels [[bureaucracy]]. They [[project ]] their [[mirror ]] [[image ]] on the Balkans. What they both have in common is the [[exclusion ]] of the proper political [[antagonisms]].

[[Seeing ]] that any Western [[intervention ]] already came too late, it states that, for

the shift of [[balance ]] and the stronger [[Russia]], this is no longer possible. At

Bosnians didn't [[want ]] to prepare for war, they were slower, more careful and

from the Yugoslav [[army]], despite all the guarantees. And then, after the attack,

[[guilty]], and primordial passions. </p><p>I don't cry too much for Yugoslavia. The moment [[Milosevic ]] took over and

filtered through this [[poisoning ]] hatred, from everyday crime to [[economics]]. But this was not the origin of the [[conflict]]. That was the calculation from the power [[elite ]] to maintain power. </p><p>If you define independence in [[terms ]] of not being supported or controlled by

Impartial, independent information can [[help ]] a lot, but don't expect too much of

</p><p><b>CTHEORY:</b> In your [[speech ]] during the Ars Electronica conference, you emphasized the fact that after a [[phase ]] of introduction, the [[seduction ]] of the new media will be over and so will "[[virtual ]] sex." So the [[desire ]] to be wired will be

virtual phenomena [[retroactively ]] enable us to discover to what extent our [[self ]] has always been virtual. Even the most [[physical ]] self-[[experience ]] has a [[symbolic]], virtual element in it. For example playing sex [[games]]. What fascinates me is that the possibility of [[satisfaction ]] already counts as an actual satisfaction. A lot

typing your phantasies is the [[fascination ]] itself. In [[the symbolic ]] order the potentiality already gives actual satisfaction. In [[psychoanalytic ]] theory the notion of symbolic [[castration ]] is often misunderstood. The [[threat ]] of castration as to its effects, [[acts ]] as a castration. Or in power relations, where the potential [[authority ]] forms the actual threat. Take Margaret Thatcher. Her point was that if you don't rely on state support but on your [[individual ]] resources,

during the [[sexual ]] act that a [[woman ]] tells a man some dirty phantasies. It is not

practices. You never go to the end, you just [[repeat ]] a certain foreplay. Virtual

director of your own game. What fascinates me is this <i>[[Spaltung]]</i>, this gap

[[enjoyment ]] makes it even more intense. Here I see great possibilities for the VR

</p><p>In the computer I see virtuality, in the sense of symbolic [[fiction]], collapsing. This notion has a long [[tradition]]. In [[Bentham]]'s panopticon we find virtuality at its purest. You never [[know ]] if somebody is there in the centre. If

</p><p><b>CTHEORY:</b> You are famous for your film [[analyses]]. But can you imagine

or using [[television ]] [[material]]?

<cite>Tarrying with the [[Negative]]</cite>, I use some fragments of [[Hitchcock]]. How nice it would be to have it included in the [[text]]. But concerning film, I am indeed rather [[conservative]]. At this moment I am [[working ]] on the theme of the role of [[music ]] in cinema. The idea is that in the mid-thirties, when the classical Hollywood [[code ]] was established, it was strictly Wagnerian, pure accompanying music, radical underscoring, determining your [[subjective ]] perspective. It's a classical case of a conservative revolution. As [[Wagner ]] said about his

inconsistent fragments. The [[unity ]] is no longer established at the [[visual ]] level.

faiths, contingently hitting each other. Very Deleuzean: [[global ]] nonsense where

it you discover Leni Riefenstahl. I am not interested in direct [[content ]] analysis, but the kind of purely [[formal ]] changes in how we relate to the physicality of the film and the shifts in the notions of [[subjectivity]]. Of course

that is the [[traumatic ]] point, the cry or even the song. The point where you lose

interests me at the political level is how the [[discourse ]] machinery, in order to function, has to rely on the [[obscene ]] voice. What appears to be a carnivalesque [[subversion]], this eruption of obscene [[freedom]], really serves the power. But these

of the last two years was a book on [[Schelling ]] that I just finished.

condition of current [[film theory]]? What will come after the critical, semiological and [[gender ]] approaches? It is still useful to see film as a unity or

</p><p><b>Zizek:</b> [[Fredric Jameson ]] has already made this point. What goes on in

are a lot of [[others]], the whole [[domain ]] of cultural criticism in America is basically cinema theory. What attracts me, is the axis between [[gaze ]] and voice

me the principal axis. Cinema is for me a kind of [[condensation]]. On the one hand

</p><p>The only [[change ]] I can think of is that up until twenty years ago, going to

how we experience ourselves. Cinema is still the easiest way, like for [[Freud ]] [[dreams ]] were the royal way to the [[unconscious]].

is modern film theory really about? Its ultimate [[object ]] are nostalgic films from

use examples from cinema. I would still [[claim ]] that there is an inherent logic of

[[literature ]] played in the nineteenth century.

Japan. What I do have, as every Western intellectual, are the [[myths ]] of reference. There is the old, right-wing image of the [[Samurai ]] code, fighting to [[death]], the absolute, [[ethical ]] Japan. Then there is the leftist image, from Eisenstein: the semiotic Japan. The empty [[signs]], no Western [[metaphysics ]] of [[presence]]. It's a no less phantasmatic Japan then the first one. We know that

</p><p>Then there is Bertolt [[Brecht ]] as an exception. He took over elements like

Brecht was seen as someone introducing a fanatic Eastern [[morality]]. But now

</p><p>Then there is the capitalist Japan and its different [[stages]]. There is the [[myth ]] of non-original Japan taking over, but developing better: Philips for the

round. Then there is the Kojevian Japan. First, for [[Kojeve ]] the end of [[history ]] was Russia and America, the realisation of the [[French ]] Revolution. Then he noticed that something was [[missing]]. He found the answer in Japan, in the little [[surplus]]. If everything only functions, as in America, you would kill yourself. In the snobbism, drinking tea in a nice way, he found that [[life ]] still had a

</p><p>But there is another Japan, the [[psycho]]-[[analytic]]. For the multi-[[culturalist ]] approach, the almost standard example is Japan and its way of <i>[[Verneinung]]</i>,

no to a [[child ]] in another way. There is not one [[negation]]. There is a small [[Lacanian ]] volume, <cite>La [[chose ]] japonaise</cite>. They elaborate the borrowing of other [[languages]], all these ambiguities. Didn't Lacan say that Japanese do not

you and repels you. Let's not forget the [[psychological ]] cliche of Japan: you

really want? There's also the idea of the Japanese as the "ersatz" [[Jews ]] for the Americans. The Japanese governments together with two or [[three ]] mega companies,

read in Japan, as for example George [[Lukacs]].

capitalism, while maintaining some firm traditional [[structure ]] of authority. And

</p><p>What I liked there, in restaurants and subway stations, is the [[absence ]] of [[English]]. You don't have this self-humiliating, disgusting, pleasing attitude.

Stephen King's novel? This is America at its worst. Three people, a [[family]], in a

when it's half [[full]], you would have this horrifying experience of the absolute proximity of the Other. What I liked about the [[Foucault ]] conference in Tokyo I

</p><p>Every [[nation ]] in Europe has this fanaticism, conceiving itself as the true,

</p><p>I recently read a book on Kurosawa. It is said that <cite>[[Rashomon]]</cite> was

[[reading]], the problem of the lost [[mother]], the mother's voice reaching the son,

It's the old Marxist notion of buying the whole [[chain]], from the hardware until

It's a mystery for Western sociologists who say that you need Protestant [[ethics ]]

which may appear superficial and unnecessary has a much deeper [[structural ]] function. A Western approach would be: who [[needs ]] this? But a totally ridiculous [[thing ]] at a deeper level might play a stabilizing function we are not aware of.

the civilizations of [[guilt ]] versus civilizations of [[shame]]. The Jews and their inner guilt and the [[Greeks ]] with their culture of shame. The usual cliche now is that Japan is the ultimate [[civilization ]] of shame. What I despise in America is

that behind the mask there is some [[truth]]. In Japan, and I hope that this is not only a myth, even if something is merely an [[appearance]], politeness is not simply insincere. There is a [[difference ]] between saying "Hello, how are you?" and the

surfaces [[You May|you may ]] lose a lot more than you think. You shouldn't play with [[rituals]]. Masks are never simply mere masks. Perhaps that's why Brecht became