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Cynicism as a [[Form ]] of [[Ideology]]

The most elementary definition of ideology is probably the well-known phrase from [[Marx]]'s [[Capital]]: 'Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es' -- 'they do not [[know ]] it, but they are doing it'. The very [[concept ]] of ideology implies a kind of basic, constitutive naivety: the [[misrecognition ]] of its own presuppositions, of its own effective [[conditions]], a distance, a divergence between so-called [[social ]] [[reality ]] and our distorted [[representation]], our [[false ]] [[consciousness ]] of it. That is why such a 'naive consciousness' can be submitted to a critical-[[ideological ]] procedure. The aim of this procedure is to lead the naive ideological consciousness to a point at which it can recognize its own effective conditions, the [[social reality ]] that it is distorting, and through this very act dissolve itself. In the more sophisticated versions of the critics of ideology -- that developed by the Frankfurt [[School]], for example -- it is not just a question of [[seeing ]] things (that is, social reality) as they 'really are', of throwing away the distorting spectacles of ideology; the main point is to see how the reality itself cannot reproduce itself without this so-called [[ideological mystification]]. The mask is not simply hiding the [[real ]] [[state ]] of things; the ideological [[distortion ]] is written into its very [[essence]].

We find, then, the [[paradox ]] of a [[being ]] which can reproduce itself only in so far as it is misrecognized and overlooked: the [[moment ]] we see it 'as it really is', this being dissolves itself into nothingness or, more precisely, it changes into [[another ]] kind of reality. That is why we must avoid the simple metaphors of demasking, of throwing away the veils which are supposed to hide the naked reality.

But all this is already well known: it is the classic concept of ideology as 'false consciousness', misrecognition of the social reality which is part of this reality itself. Our question is: Does this concept of ideology as a naive consciousness still apply to today's [[world]]? Is it still operating today? In the Critique of Cynical [[Reason]], a great bestseller in [[Germany]],<ref>Peter Sloterdijk, Kritik der zynischen Vernunft, Frankfurt 1983; translated as Critique of Cynical Reason, [[London ]] 1988.</ref> Peter Sloterdijk puts forward the [[thesis ]] that ideology's dominant mode of functioning is cynical, which renders [[impossible ]] -- or, more precisely, vain -- the classic critical-ideological procedure. The cynical [[subject ]] is quite aware of the distance between the ideological mask and the social reality, but he none the less still insists upon the mask. The [[formula]], as proposed by Sloterdijk, would then be: 'they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it'. Cynical reason is no longer naive, but is a paradox of an enlightened false consciousness: one [[knows ]] the falsehood very well, one is well aware of a [[particular ]] interest hidden behind an ideological [[universality]], but still one does not [[renounce ]] it.

We must distinguish this cynical [[position ]] strictly from what Sloterdijk calls kynicism. Kynicism represents the popular, plebeian [[rejection ]] of the [[official ]] [[culture ]] by means of irony and sarcasm: the classical kynical procedure is to confront the pathetic phrases of the ruling official ideology -- its solemn, grave tonality -- with everyday banality and to hold [[them ]] up to ridicule, thus exposing behind the [[sublime ]] noblesse of the ideological phrases the egotistical interests, the [[violence]], the brutal claims to [[power]]. This procedure, then, is more pragmatic than argumentative: it subverts the official proposition by confronting it with the [[situation ]] of its [[enunciation]]; it proceeds ad hominem (for example, when a politician preaches the [[duty ]] of patriotic sacrifice, kynicism exposes the personal gain he is making from the sacrifice of [[others]]).

Cynicism is the answer of the ruling culture to this kynical [[subversion]]: it recognizes, it takes into account, the particular interest behind the ideological universality, the distance between the ideological mask and the reality, but it still finds reasons to retain the mask. This cynicism is not a direct position of [[immorality]], it is more like [[morality ]] itself put in the service of immorality -- the [[model ]] of cynical wisdom is to conceive probity, integrity, as a supreme form of dishonesty, and morals as a supreme form of profligacy, the [[truth ]] as the most effective form of a lie. This cynicism is therefore a kind of perverted '[[negation ]] of the negation' of the official ideology: confronted with illegal enrichment, with robbery, the cynical reaction consists in saying that [[legal ]] enrichment is a lot more effective and, moreover, protected by the law. As Bertolt [[Brecht ]] puts it in his Threepenny [[Opera]]: 'what is the robbery of a bank compared to the founding of a new bank?'

It is clear, therefore, that confronted with such cynical reason, the traditional critique of ideology no longer works. We can no longer subject the ideological [[text ]] to 'symptomatic [[reading]]', confronting it with its blank spots, with what it must [[repress ]] to organize itself, to preserve its consistency -- cynical reason takes this distance into account in advance. Is then the only issue [[left ]] to us to affirm that, with the reign of cynical reason, we find ourselves in the so-called post-ideological world? Even [[Adorno ]] came to this conclusion, starting from the premiss that ideology is, strictly [[speaking]], only a [[system ]] which makes a [[claim ]] to the truth -- that is, which is not simply a lie but a lie experienced as truth, a lie which pretends to be taken seriously. Totalitarian ideology no longer has this pretension. It is no longer meant, even by its authors, to be taken seriously -- its status is just that of a means of manipulation, purely [[external ]] and instrumental; its rule is secured not by its truth [[value ]] but by simple extra-ideological violence and promise of gain.

It is here, at this point, that the [[distinction ]] between [[symptom ]] and

[[fantasy ]] must be introduced in [[order ]] to show how the [[idea ]] that we live in a post-ideological [[society ]] proceeds a little too quickly: cynical reason, with all its ironic detachment, leaves untouched the fundamental level of ideological fantasy, the level on which ideology [[structures ]] the social reality itself.