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===Philosophical Death=======Hegel and Heidegger====

===="Absolute Master"====From [[Hegel]] (via [[Kojève]]), [[Lacan]] takes the idea that [[death]] is both constitutive of [[man]]'s [[freedom]] and "[[Master|the absolute Master]]."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] ''[[Kojève|Introduction to the Reading of Hegel]]'', trans. James H. Nichols Jr., New York and London: Basic Books, 1969. [1933-39] p. 21</ref> [[Death]] plays a crucial part in the [[Hegelian]] [[dialectic]] of the [[master]] and the [[slave]] where it is intimately linked with [[desire]], since the [[master]] only affirms himself for others by means of a [[desire]] for [[death]].<ref>{{E}} p. 105</ref>

[[Death]] plays a crucial part in the [[Hegelian]] [[dialectic]] of the [[master]] and the [[slave]] where it is intimately linked with [[desire]], since the [[master]] only affirms himself for others by means of a [[desire]] for [[death]].<ref>{{E}} p. 105</ref> ===="Being-For-Death"====From [[Heidegger]], [[Lacan]] takes the idea that [[human]] [[existence]] only takes on [[meaning]] by virtue of the finite limit set by [[death]], so that the [[human]] [[subject]] is properly a "[[death|being-for-death]]". This corresponds to [[Lacan]]'s view that the [[analysand]] should come, via the [[treatment|analytic process]], to assume his own [[mortality]].<ref>{{E}} pp. 104-5</ref>