Difference between revisions of "Desire"

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[[Desire]] is a major concept of [[psychoanalytic theory]].
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The concept of [[desire]] is the central concern of [[psychoanalytic [theory]].
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==Human Desire==
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[[Lacan]], following [[Spinoza]], argues that "[[desire]]" is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p.275</ref>
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[[Desire]] is the heart of [[human]] [[existence]], fundamental to every aspect of the [[psychic]] [[life]] of the [[individual]] and to the [[social]] [[system]] in which the [[individual]] finds him or herself embedded.
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[[Desire]] provides the [[subject]] with its primary motivation and [[frustration]].
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==Desire, Need and Demand==
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[[Lacan]] distinguishes between three related concepts:
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* [[desire]]
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* [[need]] (''besoin'')
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* [[demand]] (''demande'')
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==Need==
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The [[human]] [[infant]] is born with certain [[biological]] [[need]]s that require (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]].
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The [[human]] [[infant]] has certain [[biological]] [[need]]s which are satisfied by certain [[object]]s.
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[[Need]] is a [[biological]] [[instinct]] that requires (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]].
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[[Need]] emerges according to the requirements of the organism and abates completely (even if only temporarily) when [[satisfied]].
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The [[human]] [[infant]] is born into a state of [[helplessness]], and is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[biological]] [[needs]].
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The [[infant]], unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[needs]], must depend on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them.
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The [[Other]] can help to [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s of the [[infant]].
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The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s.
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==Demand==
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The function of [[demand]] is to serve as an articulation of [[need]].
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The [[infant]], in order to get help from the [[Other]], must articulate (express) its [[need]]s (vocally) in (the form of a) [[demand]].
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The [[demand]] serves to bring the [[Other]] to help [[satisfy]] the [[needs]] of the [[infant]].
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[[Demand]] is also a [[demand]] for [[love]] (beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]]).
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The [[presence]] of the [[Other]] (becomes important in itself) [[symbolizes]] the [[Other]]'s [[love]].
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The [[biological]] [[need]]s of the [[infant]] becomes subordinated to the [[demand]] for the [[recognition]] and [[love]] of the [[Other]].
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The [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]].
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The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, but cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[infant]] craves.
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The [[Other]] (can [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s that are articulated in the [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] but) cannot [[satisfy]] the [[infant]]'s [[demand]] for [[love]].
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Even after the [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]], [[demand]] (as the [[demand]] for [[love]]) remains [[unsatisfied]]
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This leftover is [[desire]].
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==Desire==
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[[Desire]] is what remains of [[demand]] after the [[need]]s which are articulated in that [[demand]] are [[satisfied]].
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<blockquote>"[[Desire]] is neither the appetite for [[satisfaction]], nor the [[demand]] for [[love]], but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."<ref>{{E}} p.287</ref></blockquote>
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[[Desire]] is the [[surplus]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]].
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<blockquote>"[[Desire]] begins to take shape in the margin in which [[demand]] becomes separated from [[need]]."<ref>{{E}} p.311</ref></blockquote>
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[[Desire]], unlike [[need]], can never be [[satisfied]].
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A [[need]] (that is [[satisfied]]) ceases to motivate the [[infant]] until another [[need]] arises.
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[[Desire]] is constant in its pressure, and eternal.
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==Desire of the Other==
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[[Lacan]] asserted that [[desire]] is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]].
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[[Desire]] is [[human]] when it is directed toward another [[desire]].
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<blockquote>"[[Man]]'s [[desire]] is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]].<ref>{{S11}} p.235</ref></blockquote>
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The statement provides the basis for our consideration of [[desire]] in [[Lacan]]’s conception of [[subjectivity]] and points to the fundamentally social character of [[desire]].
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==Object of the Other's Desire==
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[[Desire]] is the [[desire]] for the [[Other]]'s [[desire]], that is, the [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of the [[Other]]'s [[desire]].
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[[Desire]] is a [[desire]] for '[[recognition]]' (by another).
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The [[Oedipus complex]] illustrates the [[desire]] of the [[subject]] to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]].
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==Object Desired by Others==
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<blockquote>"The [[object]] of [[man]]'s [[desire]] ... is essentially an [[object]] [[desire]]d by someone else."<ref>Lacan. 1951b. p.12</ref></blockquote>
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The [[object]] is [[desirable]] (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because [[other]]s [[desire]] it.
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It is qua [[Other]] that the [[subject]] [[desire]]s.<ref>{{E}} p.312</ref>
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It is [[human]] to [[desire]] what others [[desire]] because they [[desire]] it.
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==Desire for the Other==
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[[Desire]] is [[desire]] for the [[Other]].
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The fundamental [[desire]] is the [[incestuous]] [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p.67</ref>
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==Impossible Desire==
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<blockquote>[[Desire]] is always "the [[desire]] for something else," because it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.<ref>{{E}} p.167</ref></blockquote>
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The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref>
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==Social Desire==
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[[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]], that is, in the [[unconscious]].
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[[Desire]] is a social product.
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[[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be, but is always constituted in a [[dialectical]] relationship with the perceived [[desire]]s of others.
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<blockquote>The most important point to emerge from Lacan’s phrase [that "the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects."<ref>Evans 39</ref></blockquote>
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OBJET A
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The [[objet petit a]] is represented by a variety of [[partial object]]s in diffent partial [[drive]]s.
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The [[objet petit a]] is not the object towards which [[desire]] tends, but the cause of desire.
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[[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].
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==Desire and Prohibition==
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<blockquote>The [[law]] (or [[prohibition]]) "creates [[desire]] in the first place by creating interdiction. [[Desire]] is essentially the [[desire]] to [[transgress]], and for there to be [[transgression]] it is first necessary for there to be [[prohibition]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p.99</ref></blockquote>
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The [[law]] gives rise to [[desire]] as that which circulates endlessly around a [[prohibited]] core (of ''[[jouissance]]'').
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(The [[prohibition]] establishes [[desire]] as the ultimate motivational force in [[subjectivity]].)
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==Desire and Psychoanalytic Treatment==
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The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his or her [[desire]].
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It is only possible to recognize one's [[desire]] when it is articulate in [[speech]].
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<blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p.183</ref></blockquote>
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<blockquote>In [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p.228</ref></blockquote>
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There is a limit to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]]."<ref>{{E}} p.275</ref>
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The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]].
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<blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious action of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[subject]] creates, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p.228-9</ref></blockquote>
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<blockquote>"Although the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is present to some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]], there is always a leftover, a [[surplus]], which exceeds [[speech]]."<ref>Evans 36</ref></blockquote>
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==Desire and Language==
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[[Desire]] is created at the moment of the [[infant]]'s accession to the [[symbolic]] [[order]].
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[[Desire]] is inseparable from the [[symbolic]] [[order]] and thus inhabits all (inheres in) [[signification]] (as such).
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[[Desire]] is inscribed in the [[signifying chain]] in its essential [[metonymy]].
 +
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<blockquote>"[[Man]]’s [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]]. [...] [[Desire]] is a [[metonymy]]."<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref></blockquote>
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The perpetual reference of one [[signifer]] to another in an eternal deferral of [[meaning]] is a formulation of the ceaseless movement of [[desire]].
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==Impossible Desire==
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According to [[Lacan]], [[desire]] is by its very nature [[insatiable]]; it can never be fulfilled.
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Any attempt to [[satisfy]] [[desire]] is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable.
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[[Desire]] designates the impossible relation that a [[subject]] has with [[objet petit a]]. 
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The core around which [[desire]] circulates is [[prohibited]].
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==Desire and Impossibility==
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The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility.
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The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossible.
 +
 +
The paternal interdiction only formalises this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with the compensation of symbolisation.
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 +
The prohibitive aspect of the [[law]] is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental [[impossibility]] at the heart of desire.
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No [[object]] can ever fulfil [[desire]].
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==Desire and the Death Drive==
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[[Lacan]] posits a distinction between [[desire]] and [[drive]].
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It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.
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The [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]].
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==See Also==
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* [[Need]]
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* [[Drive]]
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* [[Demand]]
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==References==
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<references/>
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[[Category:Jacques Lacan]]
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[[Category:Terms]]
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[[Category:Concepts]]
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[[Category:Psychoanalysis]]
  
  

Revision as of 03:19, 24 August 2006

French: désir


Desire is a major concept of psychoanalytic theory.

The concept of desire is the central concern of [[psychoanalytic [theory]].


Human Desire

Lacan, following Spinoza, argues that "desire" is the essence of man."[1]

Desire is the heart of human existence, fundamental to every aspect of the psychic life of the individual and to the social system in which the individual finds him or herself embedded.

Desire provides the subject with its primary motivation and frustration.


Desire, Need and Demand

Lacan distinguishes between three related concepts:


Need

The human infant is born with certain biological needs that require (constant or periodic) satisfaction.

The human infant has certain biological needs which are satisfied by certain objects.

Need is a biological instinct that requires (constant or periodic) satisfaction.

Need emerges according to the requirements of the organism and abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied.

The human infant is born into a state of helplessness, and is unable to satisfy its own biological needs.

The infant, unable to satisfy its own needs, must depend on the Other to help it satisfy them.

The Other can help to satisfy the needs of the infant.

The Other can provide the objects which the subject requires to satisfy his needs.


Demand

The function of demand is to serve as an articulation of need.

The infant, in order to get help from the Other, must articulate (express) its needs (vocally) in (the form of a) demand.

The demand serves to bring the Other to help satisfy the needs of the infant.

Demand is also a demand for love (beyond the satisfaction of need).

The presence of the Other (becomes important in itself) symbolizes the Other's love.

The biological needs of the infant becomes subordinated to the demand for the recognition and love of the Other.

The needs which are articulated in demands are satisfied.

The Other can provide the objects which the subject requires to satisfy his needs, but cannot provide that unconditional love which the infant craves.

The Other (can satisfy the needs that are articulated in the demands of the infant but) cannot satisfy the infant's demand for love.

Even after the needs which are articulated in demands are satisfied, demand (as the demand for love) remains unsatisfied

This leftover is desire.


Desire

Desire is what remains of demand after the needs which are articulated in that demand are satisfied.

"Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."[2]

Desire is the surplus produced by the articulation of need in demand.

"Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need."[3]

Desire, unlike need, can never be satisfied.

A need (that is satisfied) ceases to motivate the infant until another need arises.

Desire is constant in its pressure, and eternal.


Desire of the Other

Lacan asserted that desire is the desire of the Other.

Desire is human when it is directed toward another desire.

"Man's desire is the desire of the Other.[4]

The statement provides the basis for our consideration of desire in Lacan’s conception of subjectivity and points to the fundamentally social character of desire.


Object of the Other's Desire

Desire is the desire for the Other's desire, that is, the desire to be the object of the Other's desire.

Desire is a desire for 'recognition' (by another).

The Oedipus complex illustrates the desire of the subject to be the phallus for the mother.


Object Desired by Others

"The object of man's desire ... is essentially an object desired by someone else."[5]

The object is desirable (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because others desire it.

It is qua Other that the subject desires.[6]

It is human to desire what others desire because they desire it.

Desire for the Other

Desire is desire for the Other.

The fundamental desire is the incestuous desire for the mother, the primordial Other.[7]


Impossible Desire

Desire is always "the desire for something else," because it is impossible to desire what one already has.[8]

The object of desire is continually deferred, which is why desire is metonymy.[9]


Social Desire

Desire emerges originally in the field of the Other, that is, in the unconscious.

Desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be, but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of others.

The most important point to emerge from Lacan’s phrase [that "the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects."[10]

OBJET A The objet petit a is represented by a variety of partial objects in diffent partial drives.

The objet petit a is not the object towards which desire tends, but the cause of desire.

Desire is not a relation to an object, but a relation to a lack.


Desire and Prohibition

The law (or prohibition) "creates desire in the first place by creating interdiction. Desire is essentially the desire to transgress, and for there to be transgression it is first necessary for there to be prohibition."[11]

The law gives rise to desire as that which circulates endlessly around a prohibited core (of jouissance).

(The prohibition establishes desire as the ultimate motivational force in subjectivity.)

Desire and Psychoanalytic Treatment

The aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to recognize the truth about his or her desire.

It is only possible to recognize one's desire when it is articulate in speech.

"It is only once it is formulated, named in the presence of the other, that desire, whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."[12]

In psychoanalysis, "what's important is to teach the subject to name, to articulate, to bring this desire into existence."[13]

There is a limit to how far desire can be articulated in speech because of a fundamental "incompatibility between desire and speech."[14]

The analysand, by articulating desire in speech, (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing desire but rather) brings that desire into existence.

"That the subject should come to recognise and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn't a question of recognising something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world."[15]

"Although the truth about desire is present to some degree in all speech, speech can never articulate the whole truth about desire; whenever speech attempts to articulate desire, there is always a leftover, a surplus, which exceeds speech."[16]

Desire and Language

Desire is created at the moment of the infant's accession to the symbolic order.

Desire is inseparable from the symbolic order and thus inhabits all (inheres in) signification (as such).

Desire is inscribed in the signifying chain in its essential metonymy.

"Man’s desire is a metonymy. [...] Desire is a metonymy."[17]

The perpetual reference of one signifer to another in an eternal deferral of meaning is a formulation of the ceaseless movement of desire.

Impossible Desire

According to Lacan, desire is by its very nature insatiable; it can never be fulfilled.

Any attempt to satisfy desire is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable.

Desire designates the impossible relation that a subject has with objet petit a.

The core around which desire circulates is prohibited.

Desire and Impossibility

The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility.

The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossible.

The paternal interdiction only formalises this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with the compensation of symbolisation.

The prohibitive aspect of the law is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental impossibility at the heart of desire.

No object can ever fulfil desire.

Desire and the Death Drive

Lacan posits a distinction between desire and drive.

It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives.

The drives are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called desire.


See Also

References

  1. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p.275
  2. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.287
  3. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.311
  4. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p.235
  5. Lacan. 1951b. p.12
  6. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.312
  7. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book VII. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-60. Trans. Dennis Porter. London: Routledge, 1992. p.67
  8. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.167
  9. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.175
  10. Evans 39
  11. Evans, Dylan. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis. 2003. New York: Brunner-Routledge. p.99
  12. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-54. Trans. John Forrester. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p.183
  13. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988. p.228
  14. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.275
  15. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book II. The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. Sylvana Tomaselli. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge Unviersity Press, 1988. p.228-9
  16. Evans 36
  17. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p.175