<blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p. 183</ref></blockquote>
=====More=====
Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref>
On the contrary, by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], the [[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]].
(The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]].)
<blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious action of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[subject]] creates, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228-9</ref></blockquote>
---
The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]].
---
However, there is a limit to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]];"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the [[unconscious]] (i.e. the fact the the [[unconscious]] is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known'').
"Although the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is present to some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]], there is always a leftover, a [[surplus]], which exceeds [[speech]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p. 36</ref>
---=====Criticism=====
One of [[Lacan]]'s most important criticisms of the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]] of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire]] with the related concepts of [[demand]] and [[need]].
=====Alexandre Kojève=====
[[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the [[biology|biological]] point of view."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>
[[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].
---=====Desire of the Other=====
One of [[Lacan]]'s most oft-repeated formulas is: "man's desire is the desire of the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref>
This can be understood in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.
---=====More=====
1. [[Desire]] is essentially "desire of the Other's desire", which means both [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]], and [[desire]] for recognition by another.
[[Lacan]] takes this idea from [[Hegel]], via [[Kojève]], who states: --- <blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.<ref>KojËve, 1947: 6</ref></blockquote> ---
KojËve goes on <blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to argue (still following Hegel) that in order say, if he wants to achieve the be 'desired recognition' or 'loved', or, rather, the subject must risk 'recognised' in his own life in human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a struggle function of the desire for pure prestige 'recognition'.<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (see MASTER1947 [1933-39])''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>
That desire is essentially desire to be the object =====Object of anotherAnother's desire is clearly illustrated Desire=====[[Kojève]] goes on to argue (still following [[Hegel]]) that in order to achieve the first 'time' of the Oedipus complex[[desire]]d recognition, when the [[subject desires to be the phallus ]] must risk his own life in a struggle for the motherpure prestige (see [[master]]).
---That [[desire]] is essentially [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]] is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the [[Oedipus complex]], when the [[subject]] desires to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]].
=====Two=====
2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[desire]]s from the point of view of another.
The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref>
What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]]d by another.
The [[desire]] of the [[Other]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref> This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that:
<blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object This idea too is human only to the extent taken from [[Kojève]]'s reading of [[Hegel]]; [[Kojève]] argues that it is "mediated" by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>KojËve, 1947: 6</ref>
<blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is 'mediated' by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933---39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>
<blockquote>The reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>KojËve[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947[1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 40</ref></blockquote>
---=====Hysteria=====
This universal feature of [[desire]] is especially evident in [[hysteria]]; the [[hysteric]] is one who sustains another person's [[desire]], converts another's [[desire]] into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire; ).<ref>{{S4, }} p. 138; see Freud, {{F}} (1905e)"[[{{FB}}|Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria]]." [[SE]] VII, 3. </ref>
Hence what is important in the [[analysis]] of a [[hysteric]] is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she [[desire]]s (the [[subject]] with whom she identifies).
---=====Desire for the Other=====
# [[Desire]] is [[desire ]] ''for '' the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition ''de). The fundamental [[desire]] is the incestuous [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial Other (S7, 67'').
The fundamental [[desire]] is the incestuous [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p. 67</ref>
# [[Desire]] is always "the desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.
# [[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]]; i.e. in the [[unconscious]].
--- The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]]'s phrase is that desire is a social product. =====Social Product=====
The most important point to emerge from [[DesireLacan]] 's phrase is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other that [[subjectdesire]]sis a social product.
---[[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a [[dialectic|dialectical relationship]] with the perceived [[desire]]s of other [[subject]]s.
=====(M)other=====
The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the child is at the mercy of her [[desire]].
It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by castrating the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to the whims of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]].
==Desire, Need and Demand==
[[Lacan]] distinguishes between three related concepts:
* [[desire]]
* [[need]] (''besoin'')
* [[demand]] (''demande'')
==Need==
The [[human]] [[infant]] is born with certain [[biological]] [[need]]s that require (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]].
The [[human]] [[infant]] has certain [[biological]] [[need]]s which are satisfied by certain [[object]]s.
[[Need]] is a [[biological]] [[instinct]] that requires (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]].
[[Need]] emerges according to the requirements of the organism and abates completely (even if only temporarily) when [[satisfied]].
The [[human]] [[infant]] is born into a state of [[helplessness]], and is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[biological]] [[needs]].
The [[infant]], unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[needs]], must depend on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them.
The [[Other]] can help to [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s of the [[infant]].
The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s.
==Demand==
The function of [[demand]] is to serve as an articulation of [[need]].
The [[infant]], in order to get help from the [[Other]], must articulate (express) its [[need]]s (vocally) in (the form of a) [[demand]].
The [[demand]] serves to bring the [[Other]] to help [[satisfy]] the [[needs]] of the [[infant]].
[[Demand]] is also a [[demand]] for [[love]] (beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]]).
The [[presence]] of the [[Other]] (becomes important in itself) [[symbolizes]] the [[Other]]'s [[love]].
The [[biological]] [[need]]s of the [[infant]] becomes subordinated to the [[demand]] for the [[recognition]] and [[love]] of the [[Other]].
The [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]].
The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, but cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[infant]] craves.
The [[Other]] (can [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s that are articulated in the [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] but) cannot [[satisfy]] the [[infant]]'s [[demand]] for [[love]].
Even after the [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]], [[demand]] (as the [[demand]] for [[love]]) remains [[unsatisfied]]
This leftover is [[desire]].
==Desire==
[[Desire]] is what remains of [[demand]] after the [[need]]s which are articulated in that [[demand]] are [[satisfied]].
<blockquote>"[[Desire]] is neither the appetite for [[satisfaction]], nor the [[demand]] for [[love]], but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."<ref>{{E}} p.287</ref></blockquote>
[[Desire]] is the [[surplus]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]].
<blockquote>"[[Desire]] begins to take shape in the margin in which [[demand]] becomes separated from [[need]]."<ref>{{E}} p.311</ref></blockquote>
[[Desire]], unlike [[need]], can never be [[satisfied]].
A [[need]] (that is [[satisfied]]) ceases to motivate the [[infant]] until another [[need]] arises.
[[Desire]] is constant in its pressure, and eternal.
==Desire of the Other==
[[Lacan]] asserted that [[desire]] is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]].
[[Desire]] is [[human]] when it is directed toward another [[desire]].
<blockquote>"[[Man]]'s [[desire]] is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]].<ref>{{S11}} p.235</ref></blockquote>
The statement provides the basis for our consideration of [[desire]] in [[Lacan]]’s conception of [[subjectivity]] and points to the fundamentally social character of [[desire]].
==Object of the Other's Desire==
[[Desire]] is the [[desire]] for the [[Other]]'s [[desire]], that is, the [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of the [[Other]]'s [[desire]].
[[Desire]] is a [[desire]] for '[[recognition]]' (by another).
The [[Oedipus complex]] illustrates the [[desire]] of the [[subject]] to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]].
==Object Desired by Others==
<blockquote>"The [[object]] of [[man]]'s [[desire]] ... is essentially an [[object]] [[desire]]d by someone else."<ref>Lacan. 1951b. p.12</ref></blockquote>
The [[object]] is [[desirable]] (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because [[other]]s [[desire]] it.
It is qua [[Other]] that the [[subject]] [[desire]]s.<ref>{{E}} p.312</ref>
It is [[human]] to [[desire]] what others [[desire]] because they [[desire]] it.
==Desire for the Other==
[[Desire]] is [[desire]] for the [[Other]].
The fundamental [[desire]] is the [[incestuous]] [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p.67</ref>
==Impossible Desire==
<blockquote>[[Desire]] is always "the [[desire]] for something else," because it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.<ref>{{E}} p.167</ref></blockquote>
The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref>
==Social Desire==
[[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]], that is, in the [[unconscious]].
[[Desire]] is a social product.
[[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be, but is always constituted in a [[dialectical]] relationship with the perceived [[desire]]s of others.
<blockquote>The most important point to emerge from Lacan’s phrase [that "the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects."<ref>Evans 39</ref></blockquote>
OBJET A
The [[objet petit a]] is represented by a variety of [[partial object]]s in diffent partial [[drive]]s.
The [[objet petit a]] is not the object towards which [[desire]] tends, but the cause of desire.
[[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].
==Desire and Prohibition==
<blockquote>The [[law]] (or [[prohibition]]) "creates [[desire]] in the first place by creating interdiction. [[Desire]] is essentially the [[desire]] to [[transgress]], and for there to be [[transgression]] it is first necessary for there to be [[prohibition]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p.99</ref></blockquote>
The [[law]] gives rise to [[desire]] as that which circulates endlessly around a [[prohibited]] core (of ''[[jouissance]]'').
(The [[prohibition]] establishes [[desire]] as the ultimate motivational force in [[subjectivity]].)
==Desire and Language==
[[Desire]] is created at the moment of the [[infant]]'s accession to the [[symbolic]] [[order]].
[[Desire]] is inseparable from the [[symbolic]] [[order]] and thus inhabits all (inheres in) [[signification]] (as such).
[[Desire]] is inscribed in the [[signifying chain]] in its essential [[metonymy]].
<blockquote>"[[Man]]’s [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]]. [...] [[Desire]] is a [[metonymy]]."<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref></blockquote>
The perpetual reference of one [[signifer]] to another in an eternal deferral of [[meaning]] is a formulation of the ceaseless movement of [[desire]].
==Impossible Desire==
According to [[Lacan]], [[desire]] is by its very nature [[insatiable]]; it can never be fulfilled.
Any attempt to [[satisfy]] [[desire]] is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable.
[[Desire]] designates the impossible relation that a [[subject]] has with [[objet petit a]].
The core around which [[desire]] circulates is [[prohibited]].
==Desire and Impossibility==
The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility.
The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossible.
The paternal interdiction only formalises this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with the compensation of symbolisation.
The prohibitive aspect of the [[law]] is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental [[impossibility]] at the heart of desire.
No [[object]] can ever fulfil [[desire]].
==Desire and the Death Drive==
[[Lacan]] posits a distinction between [[desire]] and [[drive]].
It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.
The [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]].
==See Also==
