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desire (dÈsir) Lacan's term, dÈsir, is the term used in the French transla-
tions of Freud to translate Freud's term Wunsch, which is translated as 'wish'
by Strachey in the Standard Edition. Hence English translators of Lacan are
faced with a dilemma; should they translate dÈsir by 'wish', which is closer to
Freud's Wunsch, or should they translate it as 'desire', which is closer to the
French term, but which lacks the allusion to Freud? All of Lacan's English
translators have opted for the latter, since the English term 'desire' conveys,
like the French term, the implication of a continuous force, which is essential
to Lacan's concept. The English term also carries with it the same allusions to
Hegel's Begierde as are carried by the French term, and thus retains the
philosophical nuances which are so essential to Lacan's concept of dÈsir and
which make it 'a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by
Freud himself' (Macey, 1995: 80).
If there is any one concept which can claim to be the very centre of Lacan's
thought, it is the concept of desire. Lacan follows Spinoza in arguing that
'desire is the essence of man' (Sll, 275; see Spinoza, 1677: 128); desire is
simultaneously the heart of human existence, and the central concern of
psychoanalysis. However, when Lacan talks about desire, it is not any kind
of desire he is referring to, but always unconscious desire. This is not because
Lacan sees conscious desire as unimportant, but simply because it is uncon-
scious desire that forms the central concern of psychoanalysis. Unconscious
desire is entirely sexual; 'the motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to
sexual desire . . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not
represented' (E, 142).
The aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to recognise
the truth about his desire. However, it is only possible to recognise one's desire
when it is articulated in speech: 'It is only once it is formulated, named in the
presence of the other, that desire, whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense
of the term' (Sl, 183).
Hence in psychoanalysis 'what's important is to teach the subject to name,
to articulate, to bring this desire into existence' (S2, 228). However, it is not a
question of seeking a new means of expression for a given desire, for this
would imply a expressionist theory of language. On the contrary, by articulat-
ing desire in speech, the analysand brings it into existence:
That the subject should come to recognise and to name his desire; that is the
efficacious action of analysis. But it isn't a question of recognising some-
thing which would be entirely given. . . . In naming it, the subject creates,
brings forth, a new presence in the world.
(S2, 228-9)
However, there is a limit to how far desire can be articulated in speech because
of a fundamental 'incompatibility between desire and speech' (E, 275); it is
this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the unconscious (i.e.
the fact that the unconscious is not that which is not known, but that which
cannot be known). Although the truth about desire is present to some degree in
all speech, speech can never articulate the whole truth about desire; whenever
speech attempts to articulate desire, there is always a leftover, a surplus, which
exceeds speech.
One of Lacan's most important criticisms of the psychoanalytic theories of
his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of desire with the related
concepts of DEMAND and NEED. In opposition to this tendency, Lacan insists on
distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge
in his work in 1957 (see S4, 100-1, 125), but only crystallises in 1958 (Lacan,
1958c).
Need is a purely biological INSTINCT, an appetite which emerges according to
the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only
temporarily) when satisfied. The human subject, being born in a state of
helplessness, is unable to satisfy its own needs, and hence depends on the
Other to help it satisfy them. In order to get the Other's help, the infant must
express its needs vocally; need must be articulated in demand. The primitive
demands of the infant may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring
the Other to minister to the infant's needs. However, the presence of the Other
soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the
satisfaction of need, since this presence symbolises the Other's love. Hence
demand soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of
need and as a demand for love. However, whereas the Other can provide the
objects which the subject requires to satisfy his needs, the Other cannot
provide that unconditional love which the subject craves. Hence even after
the needs which were articulated in demand have been satisfied, the other
aspect of demand, the craving for love, remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is
desire. 'Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love,
but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second'
(E, 287).
Desire is thus the surplus produced by the articulation of need in demand;
'Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated
from need' (E, 311). Unlike a need, which can be satisfied and which then
ceases to motivate the subject until another need arises, desire can never be
satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal. The realisation of desire
does not consist in being 'fulfilled', but in the reproduction of desire as such.
Lacan's distinction between need and desire, which lifts the concept of
desire completely out of the realm of biology, is strongly reminiscent of
KojËve's distinction between animal and human desire; desire is shown to
be distinctively human when it is directed either toward another desire, or to an
object which is 'perfectly useless from the biological point of view' (KojËve,
1947: 6).
It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives. Although they
both belong to the field of the Other (as opposed to love), desire is one whereas
the drives are many. In other words, the drives are the particular (partial)
manifestations of a single force called desire (although there may also be
desires which are not manifested in the drives: see S1l, 243). There is only
one object of desire, OBJETPETITA, and this is represented by a variety of partial
objects in different partial drives. The OBJET PETIT A iS not the object towards
which desire tends, but the cause of desire. Desire is not a relation to an object,
but a relation to a LACK.
One of Lacan's most oft-repeated formulas is: 'man's desire is the desire of
the Other' (Sll, 235). This can be understood in many complementary ways,
of which the following are the most important.
1. Desire is essentially 'desire of the Other's desire', which means both
desire to be the object of another's desire, and desire for recognition by
another. Lacan takes this idea from Hegel, via KojËve, who states:
Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the
other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather,
'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthro-
pogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.
(KojËve, 1947: 6)
KojËve goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that in order to achieve the
desired recognition, the subject must risk his own life in a struggle for pure
prestige (see MASTER). That desire is essentially desire to be the object of
another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the Oedipus com-
plex, when the subject desires to be the phallus for the mother.
2. It is qua Other that the subject desires (E, 312): that is, the subject desires
from the point of view of another. The effect of this is that 'the object of man's
desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else' (Lacan, 1951b:
12). What makes an object desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in
itself but simply the fact that it is desired by another. The desire of the Other is
thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this 'tends to diminish
the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it
brings into view the existence of objects without number' (Lacan, 1951b: 12).
This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that
'Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is
"mediated" by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is
human to desire what others desire, because they desire it' (KojËve, 1947: 6).
The reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire being
desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the
other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other
recognise my superiority over him (KojËve, 1947: 40).
This universal feature of desire is especially evident in hysteria; the hysteric
is one who sustains another person's desire, converts another's desire into her
own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus
appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138; see Freud, 1905e). Hence what
is important in the analysis of a hysteric is not to find out the object of her
desire but to discover the place from which she desires (the subject with whom
she identifies).
3. Desire is desire for the Other (playing on the ambiguity of the French
preposition de). The fundamental desire is the incestuous desire for the mother,
the primordial Other (S7, 67).
4. Desire is always 'the desire for something else' (E, 167), since it is
impossible to desire what one already has. The object of desire is continually
deferred, which is why desire is a METONYMY (E, 175).
5. Desire emerges originally in the field of the Other; i.e. in the unconscious.
The most important point to emerge from Lacan's phrase is that desire is a
social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always
constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other
subjects.
The first person to occupy the place of the Other is the mother, and at first
the child is at the mercy of her desire. It is only when the Father articulates
desire with the law by castrating the mother that the subject is freed from
subjection to the whims of the mother's desire (see CASTRATION COMPLEX).
== def ==
In [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]], the term '''desire''' designates the impossible relation that a [[subject (philosophy)|subject]] has with [[objet petit a]]. According to Lacan, desire proper (in contrast with [[demand (psychoanalysis)|demand]]) can never be fulfilled.
