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<center>{| cellpadding="2" cellspacing="5" align="center" style="border:1px solid #aaaaaa;text-align:center;margin:6px -8px;align:center;vertical-align:top;width:90%;background-color:#fcfcfc"|style="text-align:center;color:#000;line-height:2em;width:100%;";|This article is currently undergoing major editing. It's a mess right now, but will be fixed soon.|}</center>{{TopTopppp}}désir]]''|-|| [[German]]: ''[[Wunsch{{Bottom}}

The concept of [[Desiredesire]] is at the center of [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]] as a major theoretical, ethical and clinical point of reference. Theoretically, Lacan's elaboration of the concept is supported by, yet goes beyond, its Freudian origins. From an ethical perspective, Lacan has examined in an original way the relationship between desire and the [[law]], and its implications for [[treatment|psychoanalytic praxis]].<!-- he concept of [[desire]] is the central concern of [[psychoanalytic theory]].-->

The concept ==Sigmund Freud==<!--[[Freud]]'s ''[[Interpretation of Dreams]]'' established the basis for the psychoanalytic conception of desire (including Lacan's own contributions), even if the Freudian ''[[Wunsch]]'' (translated as 'wish' in the ''[[Standard Edition]]'') does not exactly coincide with Lacan's desire.<ref>(Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 256-7)</ref>-->[[Lacan]]'s term, ''[[désir]]'', is the term used in the [[French]] translations of [[Freud]] to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Wunsch]]'', which is translated as "[[wish]]" in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''. <!-- Hence English translators of [[Lacan]] are faced with a dilemma; should they translate ''[[désir]]'' by "[[wish]]", which is closer to [[Freud]]'s ''[[Wunsch]]'', or should they translate it as "[[desire]]", which is closer to the [[French]] term, but which lacks the allusion to [[Freud]]? All of [[Lacan]]'s [[English]] translators have opted for the latter, since the [[English]] term "[[desire]] " conveys, like the [[French]] term, the implication of a ''continuous force'', which is essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept. The [[English]] term also carries with it the central concern same allusions to [[Hegel]]'s ''[[Begierde]]'' as are carried by the [[French]] term, and thus retains the philosophical nuances which are so essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept of ''[[psychoanalytic theorydésir]]'' and which make it "a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]]himself." -->

[[Lacan]]'s termBy shifting the object of study from the imagery of the manifest content of the dream to its unconscious determinants in the dreaming subject, ''[[désir]]''Freud unveiled the structure of both the dream and the subject. Beyond the preconscious wishes attached to a number of desirable objects that the dream-work utilizes, is there lies the term used unconscious wish — indestructible, infantile in its origins, the French translations product of Freud to translate Freud's term Wunschrepression, which is translated as 'wish' by Strachey permanently insisting in reaching fulfilment through the dream and the other formations of the Standard Editionunconscious.

Hence English translators of [[Lacan]] are faced with a dilemma; should they translate ''désir'' by 'The indestructibility that Freud attributes to the unconscious wish', which is closer to [[Freud]]'s ''Wunsch'', or should they translate a property of its structural position: it as "[[desire]]", which is closer to the [[French]] termnecessary, but which lacks not contingent, effect of a fundamental gap in the allusion to [[subject's psyche; the gap left by a lost satisfaction (cf. the seventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams; Freud]]? , 1953, pp. 509-621).

All Such a structural gap in the subject is of [[Lacan]]'s [[English]] translators have opted for a sexual order; it corresponds ultimately to a loss of sexual jouissance due to the latter, since fact of the [[English]] term "[[desire]]" conveys, like prohibition to which sexuality is subjected in the [[French]] termhuman being. This prohibition is a structural cultural necessity, the implication of not a continuous forcecontingency, and its subjective correlate is the Oedipus complex — which is essential to [[Lacan]]'s concepta normative organization, rather than a more or less typical set of psychological manifestations.

The [[English]] term also carries with model of the unconscious wish elucidated by Freud in his monumental work on dreams remained his guide for the rest of his theoretical and clinical production; in pa rticular, it continued to inform, until the same allusions to Hegelend, Freud's Begierde as are carried by clinical interventions — interpretations and constructions in analysis — and his rationale for them. This model is inseparable from the form of discourse that Freud created: the [[French]] termrule of free association, and thus retains the philosophical nuances which are so essential to [[Lacan]]subject's concept of ''désir'' speech, reveals his/her desire and which make the essential gap that constitutes it "a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]] himself."<ref>Macey, 1995: 80</ref>

==Human Desire==If there is any one concept which can claim to be the very center of [[Lacan]]'s thoughtelaboration of the praxis (theory and practice) of desire extends over his half-century of work in psychoanalysis, and attempting to abbreviate it is or replace the concept necessary reading with a summary would be imprudent and misleading. Therefore, we can only indicate some suggestions for further reading (in Lacan's works) and further lines of [[desire]]enquiry.

[[A first ingredient of the concept of desire in Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] in arguing that "[['s work contains a Hegelian reference, according to which desire]]" is bound to its being recognized — even if later on Lacan emphasized the essence of mandifference between his and Hegel's positions (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp."<ref>{{S11}} p292-325). 275</ref>

[[Desire]] But the reference to Freud's analysis of desire as revealed in the dream is simultaneously from the heart start highly significant. Lacan emphasized that the analysis of [[human]] [[existence]] the dream is in fact an analysis of the dreamer, that is, a subject who tells the dream to an other (with whom the subject is engaged in a transference-relation). In 'The function and the central concern field of [[speech and language in psychoanalysis]].' (1953), Lacan writes:

However, when [[Lacan]] talks about [[:Nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire finds its meaning in the desire]]of the other, it is not any kind so much because the other holds the key to the object desired, as because the first object of [[desire]] he is referring tobe recognized by the other. (Lacan, but always 1977 [[unconscious]] [[desire]1959], p.58)

This is not because [[That the other holds the key to the object desired takes on added value later in Lacan]] sees [[conscious]] [['s work. Yet that desire]] as unimportantemerges in a relationship with the other which is dialectical, but simply because it that is, which is embedded in discourse, is an essential property of human desire. Human desire is [[unconscious]] [[the desire]] of the Other (over and above the others who are concrete incarnations of the Other), not 'natural', endogenous appetites or tendencies that forms would push the central concern subject in one direction or another irrespective of [[psychoanalysis]]his/her relations with the Other; desire is always inscribed in and mediated by language (cf. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, which is an essential reference in its entirety; Lacan, 1977).

[[Unconscious]] [[Lacan's study of the dialectical nature of desire]] led to his distinction between desire, need and demand. The three terms describe lacks in the subject; yet it is indispensable to identify each of these lacks, and their interrelations. The satisfaction of vital needs is entirely [[sexuality|sexual]]:subject to demand, and makes the subject dependent on speech and language.

<blockquote>"The motives least noisy appeal of the unconscious are limited infant is already inscribed in language, as it is interpreted by the 'significant' others as speech, not as a mere cry. . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desireThis primordial discursive circuit makes of the infant already a speaking being, that a subject of hungerspeech, even at the stage in which he/she is not representedstill infant."<ref>{{E}} pThis subordination to the Other through language marks the human forever.142</ref></blockquote>Lacan writes:

:The phenomenology that emerges from analytic experience is certainly of a kind to demonstrate in desire the paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric, even scandalous character by which it is distinguished from need [...]:Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls for. It is demand of a presence or of an absence — which is what is manifested in the primordial relation to the mother, pregnant with that Other to be situated short of the needs that it can satisfy.:Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of satisfying needs, that is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied [...].:In this way, demand annuls (''aufhebt'') the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced (''sich erniedrigt'') to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.:Thus desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung). (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 286---7)

[[Desire]] is This residual status of desire constitutes its essence; at this point the heart question of [[human]] [[existence]], fundamental to every aspect the object of the [[psychic]] [[life]] desire acquires crucial importance. Lacan considered his theory of the [[individual]] and this object to be his only original contribution to the [[social]] [[system]] in which the [[individual]] finds him or herself embeddedpsychoanalysis.

[[Desire]] provides Although an exaggeration in reality, Lacan's position is justified because with that theory he introduced in psychoanalysis a conception of the object that is genuinely revolutionary and that makes possible a rational critique of the [[subject]] with notion of 'object relations' and its primary motivation and [[frustration]]clinical applications.

==Desire and Psychoanalytic Treatment====Truth For what Lacan emphasized was the illusory nature of Desire in Psychoanalytic Treatment==The [[aim]] any object that appears to fulfil desire, while the gap, the original splitting which is constitutive of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] the subject, is real; and it is to lead in this gap that the [[analysand]] to recognize object a, the [[truth]] about his or her [[object cause of desire]], installs itself. (Lacan 1977; in particular, chapter 20).

It Desire requires the support of the fantasy, which operates as its ''mise en scène'', where the fading subject faces the lost object thatcauses his/her desire (Lacan 1977 [1959], p. 313). This fading of the subject in the fantastic scenario that supports his/her desire is what makes desire opaque to the subject him-/herself. Desire is only possible a metonymy (p. 175) because the object that causes it, constituted as lost, makes it displace permanently, from object to recognize object, as no one's [[desire]] when object can really satisfy it is articulate in [[speech]].

<blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in This permanent displacement of desire follows the [[presence]] logic of the [[other]], unconscious; thus Lacan could say that [[desire]]is its interpretation, whatever as it is, is recognised in moves along the full sense chain of the termunconscious signifiers, without ever being captured by any particular signifier (cf."<ref>{{S1}} pSeminar VI, 'Desire and its Interpretation'; Lacan, 1958-59). 183</ref></blockquote>

Hence in [[psychoanalysis]]In the analytic experience, "whatdesire 's important must be taken literally', as it is to teach through the unveiling of the signifiers that support it (albeit never exhausting it) that its real cause can be circumscribed (Lacan, 1977 [[subject]1959] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]pp."<ref>{{S2}} p256-77). 228</ref>

However, it Desire is not a question the other side of the law: the contributions of seeking psychoanalysis to ethical reflection and practice have started off by recognizing this principle (Lacan, 1990; 1992). Desire opposes a new means barrier to jouissance - the jouissance of expression for the drive (always partial, not in relation to the body considered as a given [[desire]]totality, but to the organic function to which it is attached and from which it detaches), for this would imply a expressionist theory and that of the super-ego (with its implacable command to enjoy; Lacan, 1977 [[language]1959], p. 319).

On Thus, desire appears to be on the side of life preservation, as it opposes the lethal dimension of jouissance (the partiality of the drive, which disregards the requirements of the contraryliving organism, by articulating [[and the demands of the superego - that `senseless law' - which result in the self-destructive unconscious sense of guilt). But desire]] itself is not without a structural relation with death: death at the heart of the speaking being's lack-in [[speech]]-being (manqué à l'être); death in the mortifying effect of those objects of the world that entice desire, the [[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]]inducing its alienation, without ever satisfying any promise.

<blockquote>"That There is no Sovereign Good that would sustain the `right' orientation of desire, or guarantee the [[subject]] should come 's well-being. As a consequence, the ethics of psychoanalysis require that the analyst does not pretend to recognise and embody or to name his [[desire]]deliver any Sovereign Good; it rather prescribes for the analyst that is `the efficacious action of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question only thing of [[recognising]] something which would one can be entirely guilty is of having given. ... In naming itground relative to one's desire' (Lacan, the [[subject]] creates1992, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the worldp."<ref>{{S2}} p319). 228-9</ref></blockquote>

The [[analysand]]This position is structural, by articulating [[desire]] constitutive of analytic discourse - not a psychological state of the analyst. It is his/her lack-in -being, rather than any 'positive' mode of being that orients the analyst's direction of the treatment (Lacan, 1977 [[speech]1959], (does not simply give expression to p. 230). This means that the analyst cannot incarnate an ideal for the analysand, and that he/she occupies a pre-existing [[position of semblant of the cause of desire]] but rather(Lacan, 1991; 1998) brings that [[. Only in this way may the analyst's desire become the instrument of the analysand's access to his/her own desire]] into [[existence]].

HoweverReferencesFreud, there is a limit to how far S. (1953) [[desire]] can be articulated in [[speech]1900a] because The Interpretation of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]];"<ref>{{E}} pDreams. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains Standard Edition of the irreducibility Complete Psychological Works of the [[unconscious]] (i.eSigmund Freud, Vols 4 & 5. the fact the the [[unconscious]] is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known'')London: Hogarth Press.

"Although #Lacan, J. (1958-59) `Le désir et son interpretation' (seven sessions, ed. by J.-A. Miller). Ornicar? 24 (1981):7-31; 25 (1982):13-36; 26/27 (1983):7-44. The final three sessions appeared as `Desire and the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is present to some degree Interpretation of Desire in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate Hamlet'. Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977):11-52. There are unedited transcripts of the whole seminar available in French and English.#Lacan, J. (1977) [[truth]] about [[desire]1959]Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock.#Lacan, J. (1977) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. London: Tavistock.# Lacan, J. (1990) `Kant with Sade'. October 51. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.# Lacan, J. (1991) Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, L'envers de la psychanalyse, 1969-1970. Paris: Seuil.# Lacan, J. (1992) The Seminar, Book VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960. New York: W.W. Norton; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]]London: Routledge.# Lacan, J. (1998) The Seminar, Book XX, there is always a leftoverEncore, a [[surplus]]1972-1973, which exceeds [[speech]]On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge. New York: W.W. Norton."<ref>{{Evans}} pLeonardo S. 36</ref>Rodriguez

=====''Unconscious'' Desire=====<!--If there is any one concept which can claim to be the very center of [[Lacan]]'s thought, it is the concept of [[desire]]. -->[[Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] in arguing that "[[desire]] is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p. 275</ref> [[Desire]] is simultaneously the heart of [[human]] [[existence]] and the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. However, when [[Lacan]] talks about [[desire]], it is not any kind of [[desire]] he is referring to, but always ''[[unconscious]]'' [[desire]]. This is not because [[Lacan]] sees [[conscious]] [[desire]] as unimportant, but simply because it is [[unconscious]] [[desire]] that forms the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. <!-- [[Unconscious]] [[desire]] is entirely [[sexuality|sexual]]; <blockquote>"the motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p. 142</ref></blockquote> -->

One =====Truth and Desire=====The [[aim]] of Lacan[[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his [[desire]]. It is only possible to recognize one's most important criticisms [[desire]] when it is articulate in [[speech]]. <!-- <blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the psychoanalytic theories of his day was [[other]], that they tended to confuse [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the concept full sense of desire with the related concepts of DEMAND and NEEDterm."<ref>{{S1}} p. 183</ref></blockquote> -->

In opposition =====Existence=====Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to name, to articulate, to bring this tendency[[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref> However, Lacan insists on distinguishing between these three conceptsit is not a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given [[desire]], for this would imply a expressionist theory of [[language]]. On the contrary, by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], the [[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]]. (The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]]. )

This distinction begins <blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to emerge in recognise and to name his work in 1957 (see S4[[desire]]; that is the efficacious action of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, 100-1the [[subject]] creates, 125)brings forth, but only crystallises a new [[presence]] in 1958 (Lacan, 1958c)the world."<ref>{{S2}} p.228-9</ref></blockquote>

Need is a purely "Although the [[biologicaltruth]] about [[instinctdesire]] is present to some degree in all [[speech]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied.  The [[humanspeech]] can never articulate the whole [[subjecttruth]], being born in a state of about [[helplessnessdesire]], is unable to ; whenever [[satisfyspeech]] its own attempts to articulate [[needdesire]]s, and hence depends on the there is always a leftover, a [[Othersurplus]] to help it , which exceeds [[satisfyspeech]] them. "<ref>{{Evans}} p. 36</ref>

=====Criticism=====One of [[Lacan]]'s most important criticisms of the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]] of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire]] with the related concepts of [[demand]] and [[need]]. In order opposition to get this tendency, [[Lacan]] insists on distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957,<ref>{{S4}} pp. 100-1, 125</ref>, but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} (1958c) "[[The Signification of the Phallus|La signification du phallus]]." ''[[OtherÉcrits]]'s help'. Paris: Seuil, the 1966: 685-95 ["[[infantThe Signification of the Phallus|The signification of the phallus]] must express its ". Trans. [[needAlan Sheridan]]s vocally; need must be articulated in ''[[demandÉcrits: A Selection]]''. London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977: 281-91]. </ref>

=====Need=====[[Need]] is a purely [[biological]] [[instinct]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The [[human]] [[subject]], being born in a state of [[helplessness]], is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and hence depends on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them. In order to get the [[Other]]'s help, the [[infant]] must express its [[need]]s vocally; need must be articulated in [[demand]]. The primitive [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the [[Other]] to minister to the [[infant]]'s [[need]]s.   However, the [[presence]] of the [[Other]] soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]], since this [[presence]] [[symbolize]]s the [[Other]]'s [[love]].   Hence [[demand]] soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of [[need]] and as a [[demand]] for [[love]].   However, whereas the [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, the [[Other]] cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[subject]] craves.   Hence even after the [[need]]s which were articulated in [[demand]] have been satisfied, the other aspect of [[demand]], the craving for [[love]], remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is [[desire]].

---=====Demand=====[[Desire]] is thus the [[surplus ]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]];

Unlike a [[need]], which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the [[subject]] until another [[need]] arises, [[desire]] can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal.   The realisation of [[desire]] does not consist in being "fulfilled", but in the reproduction of [[desire]] as such. --- [[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of Kojève's distinction between animal and human [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively human when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the biological point of view."<ref>Kojève, 1947: 6</ref> --- It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.  Although they both belong to the field of the [[Other]] (as opposed to [[love]]), [[desire]] is one whereas the [[drive]]s are many.  In other words, the [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]] (although there may also be [[desire]]s which are not manifested in the [[drive]]s).<ref>{{S11}} p. 243</ref>  There is only one [[object]] of [[desire]], [[object (petit) a]], and this is represented by a variety of partial objects in different partial [[drive]]s.  The [[object (petit) a]] is not the [[object]] towards which [[desire]] tends, but the [[cause]] of [[desire]].  [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].

=====Alexandre Kojève=====[[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the [[biology|biological]] point of view."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933---39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>

One =====Desire and Drive=====It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s. Although they both belong to the field of the [[LacanOther]] (as opposed to [[love]]), [[desire]] is one whereas the [[drive]]'s most oft-repeated formulas is: "man'are many. In other words, the [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire is the ]] (although there may also be [[desire of ]]s which are not manifested in the Other[[drive]]s)."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235243</ref> There is only one [[object]] of [[desire]], [[object (petit) a]], and this is represented by a variety of partial objects in different partial [[drive]]s. The [[object (petit) a]] is not the [[object]] towards which [[desire]] tends, but the [[cause]] of [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].

=====Desire of the Other=====One of [[Lacan]]'s most oft-repeated formulas is: "man's desire is the desire of the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref> This can be understood in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important. ---

[[Lacan]] takes this idea from Hegel, via Kojève, who states: --- <blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.<ref>KojËve, 1947: 6</ref></blockquote> --- KojËve goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that in order to achieve the desired recognition, the subject must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see MASTER).  That desire is essentially desire to be the object of another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the Oedipus complex, when the subject desires to be the phallus for the mother. --- 2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subjectHegel]] , via [[desire]]s from the point of view of another.  The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} 1951b: 12</ref>  What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desireKojève]]d by another.  The [[desire]] of the [[Other]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} 1951b: 12</ref> This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that: <blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is "mediated" by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>KojËve, 1947who states: 6</ref> ---

<blockquote>The reason for this goes back to Desire is human only if the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another one desires, I can make not the body, but the Desire of the other recognise my right . . . that is to say, if he wants to possess that objectbe 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, and thus make a function of the other recognise my superiority over himdesire for 'recognition'.<ref>KojËve[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947[1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 406</ref></blockquote>

This universal feature of =====Two=====2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[desiresubject]] is especially evident in [[hysteriadesire]]; s from the point of view of another. The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} "[[hystericSome Reflections on the Ego]] is one who sustains another person." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''s . Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref> What makes an [[desireobject]], converts another's desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]] into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138; see Freud, 1905e)d by another.

Hence what is important in the The [[analysisdesire]] of a the [[hystericOther]] is not thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to find out diminish the special significance of any one particular object of her desire , but to discover at the same time it brings into view the place from which she existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} "[[desireSome Reflections on the Ego]]s (the [." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[subject1951b]] with whom she identifies).: 12</ref>

# [[<blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is 'mediated' by the Desire]] of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire for the what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>[[OtherAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (playing on 1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the ambiguity Reading of the French preposition de)Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>

<blockquote>The fundamental [[reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire]] is the incestuous [[being desire]] for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>[[motherAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]], the primordial Other (S7, 671947 [1933-39])''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H.Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 40</ref></blockquote>

=====Desire for the Other=====# [[Desire]] is always "[[desire]] ''for'' the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition ''de''). The fundamental [[desire ]] is the incestuous [[desire]] for something elsethe [[mother]],"the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{ES7}} p. 16767</ref> since it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.

# [[Desire]] is always "the desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has. The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p. 175</ref>

--- The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]]'s phrase is that desire is a social product.  [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other [[subject]]s. --- The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the child is at the mercy of her [[desire]].  It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by castrating the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to the whims of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]]. ==Desire, Need and Demand==[[Lacan]] distinguishes between three related concepts:* [[desire]]* [[need]] (''besoin'')* [[demand]] (''demande'')  =Social Product=Need==The [[human]] [[infant]] is born with certain [[biological]] [[need]]s that require (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]]. The [[human]] [[infant]] has certain [[biological]] [[need]]s which are satisfied by certain [[object]]s. [[Need]] is a [[biological]] [[instinct]] that requires (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]]. [[Need]] emerges according to the requirements of the organism and abates completely (even if only temporarily) when [[satisfied]]. The [[human]] [[infant]] is born into a state of [[helplessness]], and is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[biological]] [[needs]]. The [[infant]], unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[needs]], must depend on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them. The [[Other]] can help to [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s of the [[infant]]. The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s. ==Demand==The function of [[demand]] is to serve as an articulation of [[need]]. The [[infant]], in order to get help from the [[Other]], must articulate (express) its [[need]]s (vocally) in (the form of a) [[demand]]. The [[demand]] serves to bring the [[Other]] to help [[satisfy]] the [[needs]] of the [[infant]]. [[Demand]] is also a [[demand]] for [[love]] (beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]]). The [[presence]] of the [[Other]] (becomes most important in itself) [[symbolizes]] the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. The [[biological]] [[need]]s of the [[infant]] becomes subordinated point to the [[demand]] for the [[recognition]] and [[love]] of the [[Other]].  The [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]]. The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, but cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[infant]] craves.  The [[Other]] (can [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s that are articulated in the [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] but) cannot [[satisfy]] the [[infant]]'s [[demand]] for [[love]]. Even after the [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]], [[demand]] (as the [[demand]] for [[love]]) remains [[unsatisfied]] This leftover is [[desire]]. ==Desire==[[Desire]] is what remains of [[demand]] after the [[need]]s which are articulated in that [[demand]] are [[satisfied]]. <blockquote>"[[Desire]] is neither the appetite for [[satisfaction]], nor the [[demand]] for [[love]], but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."<ref>{{E}} p.287</ref></blockquote> [[Desire]] is the [[surplus]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]]. <blockquote>"[[Desire]] begins to take shape in the margin in which [[demand]] becomes separated emerge from [[need]]."<ref>{{E}} p.311</ref></blockquote> [[Desire]], unlike [[need]], can never be [[satisfied]]. A [[need]] (that is [[satisfied]]) ceases to motivate the [[infant]] until another [[need]] arises. [[Desire]] is constant in its pressure, and eternal.   ==Desire of the Other==[[Lacan]] asserted that [[desire]] is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]]. [[Desire]] is [[human]] when it is directed toward another [[desire]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]'s [[desire]] phrase is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]].<ref>{{S11}} p.235</ref></blockquote> The statement provides the basis for our consideration of [[desire]] in [[Lacan]]’s conception of [[subjectivity]] and points to the fundamentally social character of [[desire]].  ==Object of the Other's Desire==[[Desire]] is the [[desire]] for the [[Other]]'s [[desire]], that is, the [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of the [[Other]]'s [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is a [[desire]] for '[[recognition]]' (by another). The [[Oedipus complex]] illustrates the [[desire]] of the [[subject]] to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]]. ==Object Desired by Others==<blockquote>"The [[object]] of [[man]]'s [[desire]] ... is essentially an [[object]] [[desire]]d by someone else."<ref>Lacan. 1951b. p.12</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] is [[desirable]] (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because [[other]]s [[desire]] it. It is qua [[Other]] that the [[subject]] [[desire]]s.<ref>{{E}} p.312</ref> It is [[human]] to [[desire]] what others [[desire]] because they [[desire]] it. ==Desire for the Other==[[Desire]] is [[desire]] for the [[Other]]. The fundamental [[desire]] is the [[incestuous]] [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p.67</ref>  ==Impossible Desire==<blockquote>[[Desire]] is always "the [[desire]] for something else," because it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.<ref>{{E}} p.167</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref>  ==Social Desire==[[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]], that is, in the [[unconscious]]. [[Desire]] is a social product. [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be, but is always constituted in a [[dialectic|dialecticalrelationship]] relationship with the perceived [[desire]]s of others. <blockquote>The most important point to emerge from Lacan’s phrase [that "the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects."<ref>Evans 39</ref></blockquote> OBJET AThe [[objet petit a]] is represented by a variety of [[partial object]]s in diffent partial [[drive]]s. The [[objet petit a]] is not the object towards which [[desire]] tends, but the cause of desire. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].  ==Desire and Prohibition==<blockquote>The [[law]] (or [[prohibition]]) "creates [[desire]] in the first place by creating interdiction. [[Desire]] is essentially the [[desire]] to [[transgress]], and for there to be [[transgression]] it is first necessary for there to be [[prohibition]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p.99</ref></blockquote> The [[law]] gives rise to [[desire]] as that which circulates endlessly around a [[prohibited]] core (of ''[[jouissance]]''). (The [[prohibition]] establishes [[desire]] as the ultimate motivational force in [[subjectivity]].)   ==Desire and Language== [[Desire]] is created at the moment of the [[infant]]'s accession to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]. [[Desire]] is inseparable from the [[symbolic]] [[order]] and thus inhabits all (inheres in) [[signification]] (as such). [[Desire]] is inscribed in the [[signifying chain]] in its essential [[metonymy]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]’s [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]]. [...] [[Desire]] is a [[metonymy]]."<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref></blockquote> The perpetual reference of one [[signifer]] to another in an eternal deferral of [[meaning]] is a formulation of the ceaseless movement of [[desire]]. ==Impossible Desire== According to [[Lacan]], [[desire]] is by its very nature [[insatiable]]; it can never be fulfilled. Any attempt to [[satisfy]] [[desire]] is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable. [[Desire]] designates the impossible relation that a [[subject]] has with [[objet petit a]].  The core around which [[desire]] circulates is [[prohibited]]. ==Desire and Impossibility==The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility.  The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossible. The paternal interdiction only formalises this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with the compensation of symbolisation. The prohibitive aspect of the [[law]] is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental [[impossibility]] at the heart of desire.  No [[object]] can ever fulfil [[desire]].  ==Desire and the Death Drive== [[Lacan]] posits a distinction between [[desire]] and [[drive]]. It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.  The [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]].

 __NOTOC__[[Category:Mess]]