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<center>{| cellpadding="2" cellspacing="5" align="center" style="border:1px solid #aaaaaa;text-align:center;margin:6px -8px;align:center;vertical-align:top;width:90%;background-color:#fcfcfc"|style="text-align:center;color:#000;line-height:2em;width:100%;";|This article is currently undergoing major editing. It's a mess right now, but will be fixed soon.|}</center>{{TopTopppp}}désir]]''|-|| [[German]]: ''[[Wunsch{{Bottom}}

The concept of [[Desiredesire]] is at the center of [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]] as a major theoretical, ethical and clinical point of reference. Theoretically, Lacan's elaboration of the concept is supported by, yet goes beyond, its Freudian origins. From an ethical perspective, Lacan has examined in an original way the relationship between desire and the [[law]], and its implications for [[treatment|psychoanalytic praxis]].<!-- he concept of [[desire]] is the central concern of [[psychoanalytic theory]].-->

The concept ==Sigmund Freud==<!--[[Freud]]'s ''[[Interpretation of Dreams]]'' established the basis for the psychoanalytic conception of desire (including Lacan's own contributions), even if the Freudian ''[[Wunsch]]'' (translated as 'wish' in the ''[[Standard Edition]]'') does not exactly coincide with Lacan's desire.<ref>(Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 256-7)</ref>-->[[Lacan]]'s term, ''[[désir]]'', is the term used in the [[French]] translations of [[Freud]] to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Wunsch]]'', which is translated as "[[wish]]" in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''. <!-- Hence English translators of [[Lacan]] are faced with a dilemma; should they translate ''[[désir]]'' by "[[wish]]", which is closer to [[Freud]]'s ''[[Wunsch]]'', or should they translate it as "[[desire]]", which is closer to the [[French]] term, but which lacks the allusion to [[Freud]]? All of [[Lacan]]'s [[English]] translators have opted for the latter, since the [[English]] term "[[desire]] " conveys, like the [[French]] term, the implication of a ''continuous force'', which is essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept. The [[English]] term also carries with it the central concern same allusions to [[Hegel]]'s ''[[Begierde]]'' as are carried by the [[French]] term, and thus retains the philosophical nuances which are so essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept of ''[[psychoanalytic theorydésir]]'' and which make it "a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]]himself." -->

[[Lacan]]The indestructibility that Freud attributes to the unconscious wish is a property of its structural position: it is the necessary, not contingent, effect of a fundamental gap in the subject's term, ''[[désir]]'', is psyche; the term used in gap left by a lost satisfaction (cf. the [[French]] translations seventh chapter of [[The Interpretation of Dreams; Freud]] to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Wunsch]]'', which is translated as "[[wish]]" in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''1953, pp. 509-621).

Hence English translators Such a structural gap in the subject is of [[Lacan]] are faced with a dilemmasexual order; should they translate ''[[désir]]'' by "[[wish]]", it corresponds ultimately to a loss of sexual jouissance due to the fact of the prohibition to which sexuality is subjected in the human being. This prohibition is closer to [[Freud]]'s ''[[Wunsch]]''a structural cultural necessity, or should they translate it as "[[desire]]"not a contingency, and its subjective correlate is the Oedipus complex — which is closer to the [[French]] terma normative organization, but which lacks the allusion to [[Freud]]? rather than a more or less typical set of psychological manifestations.

All The model of [[Lacan]]'s [[English]] translators have opted the unconscious wish elucidated by Freud in his monumental work on dreams remained his guide for the latterrest of his theoretical and clinical production; in pa rticular, since it continued to inform, until the [[English]] term "[[desire]]" conveysend, like Freud's clinical interventions — interpretations and constructions in analysis — and his rationale for them. This model is inseparable from the [[French]] termform of discourse that Freud created: the rule of free association, the implication of a ''continuous force'subject's speech, which is reveals his/her desire and the essential to [[Lacan]]'s conceptgap that constitutes it.

The [[English]] term also carries with it the same allusions to [[Hegel]]Lacan's ''[[Begierde]]'' as are carried by elaboration of the [[French]] termpraxis (theory and practice) of desire extends over his half-century of work in psychoanalysis, and thus retains attempting to abbreviate it or replace the philosophical nuances which are so essential to [[necessary reading with a summary would be imprudent and misleading. Therefore, we can only indicate some suggestions for further reading (in Lacan]]'s concept works) and further lines of ''[[désir]]'' and which make it "a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]] himselfenquiry."<ref>Macey, 1995: 80</ref>

=====''Unconscious'' Desire=====If there is any one A first ingredient of the concept which can claim to be the very center of [[desire in Lacan]]'s thoughtwork contains a Hegelian reference, it according to which desire is bound to its being recognized — even if later on Lacan emphasized the concept of difference between his and Hegel's positions (Lacan, 1977 [[desire]1959], pp. 292-325).

[[But the reference to Freud's analysis of desire as revealed in the dream is from the start highly significant. Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] emphasized that the analysis of the dream is in arguing fact an analysis of the dreamer, that "[[desire]] is , a subject who tells the essence dream to an other (with whom the subject is engaged in a transference-relation). In 'The function and field of man."<ref>{{S11}} p. 275</ref>speech and language in psychoanalysis' (1953), Lacan writes:

[[Desire]] is simultaneously :Nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire finds its meaning in the heart desire of [[human]] [[existence]] and the central concern other, not so much because the other holds the key to the object desired, as because the first object of desire is to be recognized by the other. (Lacan, 1977 [[psychoanalysis]1959], p.58)

However, when [[That the other holds the key to the object desired takes on added value later in Lacan]] talks about [['s work. Yet that desire]]emerges in a relationship with the other which is dialectical, that is, which is embedded in discourse, it is not any kind an essential property of [[human desire. Human desire]] he is referring tothe desire of the Other (over and above the others who are concrete incarnations of the Other), but always not 'natural'[[unconscious]]'' [[, endogenous appetites or tendencies that would push the subject in one direction or another irrespective of his/her relations with the Other; desire]]is always inscribed in and mediated by language (cf. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, which is an essential reference in its entirety; Lacan, 1977).

This is not because [[Lacan]] sees [[conscious]] [['s study of the dialectical nature of desire led to his distinction between desire]] as unimportant, but simply because need and demand. The three terms describe lacks in the subject; yet it is [[unconscious]] [[desire]] that forms indispensable to identify each of these lacks, and their interrelations. The satisfaction of vital needs is subject to demand, and makes the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]subject dependent on speech and language.

[[Unconscious]] [[desire]] The least noisy appeal of the infant is already inscribed in language, as it is entirely [[sexuality|sexual]]; <blockquote>"interpreted by the motives 'significant' others as speech, not as a mere cry. This primordial discursive circuit makes of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desireinfant already a speaking being, that a subject of hungerspeech, even at the stage in which he/she is not representedstill infant."<ref>{{E}} pThis subordination to the Other through language marks the human forever. 142</ref></blockquote>Lacan writes:

=====Truth and Desire=====:The phenomenology that emerges from analytic experience is certainly of a kind to demonstrate in desire the paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric, even scandalous character by which it is distinguished from need [[aim]...] :Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls for. It is demand of a presence or of an absence — which is what is manifested in the primordial relation to the mother, pregnant with that Other to be situated short of the needs that it can satisfy.:Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] satisfying needs, that is to lead say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied [[analysand]...] .:In this way, demand annuls (''aufhebt'') the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced (''sich erniedrigt'') to recognize the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.:Thus desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung). (Lacan, 1977 [[truth]] about his [[desire]1959], pp.286-7)

It is This residual status of desire constitutes its essence; at this point the question of the object of desire acquires crucial importance. Lacan considered his theory of this object to be his only possible original contribution to recognize one's [[desire]] when it is articulate in [[speech]]psychoanalysis.

<blockquote>"It Although an exaggeration in reality, Lacan's position is only once it is formulated, named justified because with that theory he introduced in the [[presence]] psychoanalysis a conception of the [[other]], object that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in genuinely revolutionary and that makes possible a rational critique of the full sense notion of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p'object relations' and its clinical applications. 183</ref></blockquote>

Hence in [[psychoanalysis]]For what Lacan emphasized was the illusory nature of any object that appears to fulfil desire, while the gap, "what's important the original splitting which is to teach constitutive of the [[subject]] to name, to articulateis real; and it is in this gap that the object a, to bring this [[the object cause of desire]] into [[existence]], installs itself."<ref>{{S2}} p(Lacan 1977; in particular, chapter 20). 228</ref>

HoweverDesire requires the support of the fantasy, which operates as its ''mise en scène'', it is not a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given [where the fading subject faces the lost object thatcauses his/her desire (Lacan 1977 [desire]1959], for this would imply p. 313). This fading of the subject in the fantastic scenario that supports his/her desire is what makes desire opaque to the subject him-/herself. Desire is a expressionist theory of [[language]]metonymy (p. 175) because the object that causes it, constituted as lost, makes it displace permanently, from object to object, as no one object can really satisfy it.

On This permanent displacement of desire follows the logic of the unconscious; thus Lacan could say that desire is its interpretation, as it moves along the contrarychain of unconscious signifiers, without ever being captured by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]]any particular signifier (cf. Seminar VI, 'Desire and its Interpretation'; Lacan, the [[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]]1958-59).

<blockquote>"That In the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[analytic experience, desire]]; that 'must be taken literally', as it is through the efficacious action unveiling of [[analysis]]. But the signifiers that support it (albeit never exhausting it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would ) that its real cause can be entirely given. ... In naming itcircumscribed (Lacan, the [1977 [subject]1959] creates, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the worldpp."<ref>{{S2}} p256-77). 228-9</ref></blockquote>

Desire is the other side of the law: the contributions of psychoanalysis to ethical reflection and practice have started off by recognizing this principle (Lacan, 1990; 1992). Desire opposes a barrier to jouissance -the jouissance of the drive (always partial, not in relation to the body considered as a totality, but to the organic function to which it is attached and from which it detaches), and that of the super--ego (with its implacable command to enjoy; Lacan, 1977 [1959], p. 319).

The [[analysand]]Thus, by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]]appears to be on the side of life preservation, as it opposes the lethal dimension of jouissance (does the partiality of the drive, which disregards the requirements of the living organism, and the demands of the superego - that `senseless law' - which result in the self-destructive unconscious sense of guilt). But desire itself is not simply give expression to without a prestructural relation with death: death at the heart of the speaking being's lack-existing [[desire]] but ratherin-being (manqué à l'être) brings ; death in the mortifying effect of those objects of the world that [[entice desire]] into [[existence]], inducing its alienation, without ever satisfying any promise.

There is no Sovereign Good that would sustain the `right' orientation of desire, or guarantee the subject's well---being. As a consequence, the ethics of psychoanalysis require that the analyst does not pretend to embody or to deliver any Sovereign Good; it rather prescribes for the analyst that `the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one's desire' (Lacan, 1992, p. 319).

HoweverThe analyst's desire, there is 'a limit desire to how far [[desire]] can be articulated obtain absolute difference', is the original Lacanian concept that defines the position of the analyst in [[speech]] because analytic discourse, and represents a culmination of his elucidationof a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]];"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility function of the [[unconscious]] desire in psychoanalysis (iLacan, 1977, p.e. the fact the the [[unconscious]] is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known''276; 1991).

"Although This position is structural, constitutive of analytic discourse - not a psychological state of the [[truth]] about [[desire]] analyst. It is present to some degree his/her lack-in all [[speech]]-being, [[speech]] can never articulate rather than any 'positive' mode of being that orients the analyst's direction of the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [treatment (Lacan, 1977 [speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]1959], there is always a leftoverp. 230). This means that the analyst cannot incarnate an ideal for the analysand, and that he/she occupies a [[surplus]]position of semblant of the cause of desire (Lacan, which exceeds [[speech]]1991; 1998)."<ref>{{Evans}} pOnly in this way may the analyst's desire become the instrument of the analysand's access to his/her own desire. 36</ref>

One of ReferencesFreud, S. (1953) [[Lacan]1900a]'s most important criticisms The Interpretation of the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]] Dreams. Standard Edition of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire]] with the related concepts Complete Psychological Works of [[demand]] and [[need]]Sigmund Freud, Vols 4 & 5. London: Hogarth Press.

In opposition to this tendency#Lacan, J. (1958-59) `Le désir et son interpretation' (seven sessions, ed. by J.-A. Miller). Ornicar? 24 (1981):7-31; 25 (1982):13-36; 26/27 (1983):7-44. The final three sessions appeared as `Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet'. Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977):11-52. There are unedited transcripts of the whole seminar available in French and English.#Lacan, J. (1977) [[1959] Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock.#Lacan, J. (1977) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. London: Tavistock.# Lacan, J. (1990) `Kant with Sade'. October 51. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.# Lacan, J. (1991) Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, L'envers de la psychanalyse, 1969-1970. Paris: Seuil.# Lacan, J. (1992) The Seminar, Book VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960. New York: W.W. Norton; London: Routledge.# Lacan]] insists on distinguishing between these three concepts, J. (1998) The Seminar, Book XX, Encore, 1972-1973, On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge. New York: W.W. Norton. Leonardo S. Rodriguez

This distinction begins =====''Unconscious'' Desire=====<!-- If there is any one concept which can claim to emerge be the very center of [[Lacan]]'s thought, it is the concept of [[desire]]. -->[[Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] in his work in 1957,arguing that "[[desire]] is the essence of man."<ref>{{S4S11}} ppp. 100-1, 125275</ref>, but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} (1958c) " [[The Signification Desire]] is simultaneously the heart of [[human]] [[existence]] and the Phallus|La signification du phalluscentral concern of [[psychoanalysis]]." However, when [[Lacan]] talks about [[desire]], it is not any kind of [[desire]] he is referring to, but always ''[[Écritsunconscious]]''[[desire]]. Paris: Seuil This is not because [[Lacan]] sees [[conscious]] [[desire]] as unimportant, 1966: 685-95 but simply because it is [["unconscious]] [[The Signification of desire]] that forms the Phallus|The signification central concern of the phallus[[psychoanalysis]]". Trans. <!-- [[Unconscious]] [[Alan Sheridandesire]] ''is entirely [[Écrits: A Selectionsexuality|sexual]]''; <blockquote>"the motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W .W. Norton & CoThe other great generic desire, that of hunger, 1977: 281-91]is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p.142</ref></blockquote> -->

=====NeedTruth and Desire=====The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his [[desire]]. It is only possible to recognize one's [[Needdesire]] when it is a purely articulate in [[biologicalspeech]] . <!-- <blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[instinctpresence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], an appetite which emerges according to whatever it is, is recognised in the requirements full sense of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfiedterm."<ref>{{S1}} p. 183</ref></blockquote> -->

The =====Existence=====Hence in [[humanpsychoanalysis]] , "what's important is to teach the [[subject]]to name, being born in to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref> However, it is not a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given [[desire]], for this would imply a state expressionist theory of [[helplessnesslanguage]]. On the contrary, is unable to by articulating [[satisfydesire]] its own in [[needspeech]]s, and hence depends on the [[Otheranalysand]] brings it into [[existence]]. (The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to help it a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[satisfyexistence]] them. )

In order <blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to get name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious action of [[Otheranalysis]]. But it isn's help, the t a question of [[infantrecognising]] must express its something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[needsubject]]s vocally; need must be articulated in creates, brings forth, a new [[demandpresence]]in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228-9</ref></blockquote>

The primitive However, there is a limit to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in [[demandspeech]]s because of the a fundamental "incompatibility between [[infantdesire]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the and [[Otherspeech]] to minister to ;"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the [[infantunconscious]]'s (i.e. the fact the the [[needunconscious]]sis not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known'').

However, "Although the [[presencetruth]] of the about [[Otherdesire]] soon acquires an importance is present to some degree in itselfall [[speech]], an importance that goes beyond [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[satisfactiontruth]] of about [[needdesire]], since this ; whenever [[presencespeech]] attempts to articulate [[symbolizedesire]]s the , there is always a leftover, a [[Othersurplus]]'s love, which exceeds [[speech]]. "<ref>{{Evans}} p. 36</ref>

Hence =====Criticism=====One of [[Lacan]]'s most important criticisms of the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]] of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire]] with the related concepts of [[demand]] soon takes and [[need]]. In opposition to this tendency, [[Lacan]] insists on a double functiondistinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957, serving both as an articulation <ref>{{S4}} pp. 100-1, 125</ref>, but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} (1958c) "[[The Signification of the Phallus|La signification du phallus]]." ''[[needÉcrits]]''. Paris: Seuil, 1966: 685-95 ["[[The Signification of the Phallus|The signification of the phallus]] and as a ". Trans. [[demandAlan Sheridan]] for ''[[loveÉcrits: A Selection]]''. London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977: 281-91]. </ref>

=====Need=====[[Need]] is a purely [[biological]] [[instinct]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The [[human]] [[subject]], being born in a state of [[helplessness]], is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and hence depends on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them. In order to get the [[Other]]'s help, the [[infant]] must express its [[need]]s vocally; need must be articulated in [[demand]]. The primitive [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the [[Other]] to minister to the [[infant]]'s [[need]]s. However, the [[presence]] of the [[Other]] soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]], since this [[presence]] [[symbolize]]s the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. Hence [[demand]] soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of [[need]] and as a [[demand]] for [[love]]. However, whereas the [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, the [[Other]] cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[subject]] craves.   Hence even after the [[need]]s which were articulated in [[demand]] have been satisfied, the other aspect of [[demand]], the craving for [[love]], remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is [[desire]].

Unlike a [[need]], which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the [[subject]] until another [[need]] arises, [[desire]] can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal.   The realisation of [[desire]] does not consist in being "fulfilled", but in the reproduction of [[desire]] as such.

It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.   Although they both belong to the field of the [[Other]] (as opposed to [[love]]), [[desire]] is one whereas the [[drive]]s are many.   In other words, the [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]] (although there may also be [[desire]]s which are not manifested in the [[drive]]s).<ref>{{S11}} p. 243</ref>   There is only one [[object]] of [[desire]], [[object (petit) a]], and this is represented by a variety of partial objects in different partial [[drive]]s.   The [[object (petit) a]] is not the [[object]] towards which [[desire]] tends, but the [[cause]] of [[desire]].   [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]]. --- One of [[Lacan]]'s most oft-repeated formulas is: "man's desire is the desire of the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref>

=====Desire of the Other=====One of [[Lacan]]'s most oft-repeated formulas is: "man's desire is the desire of the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref> This can be understood in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important. ---

[[Lacan]] takes this idea from Hegel, via Kojève, who states: --- <blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.<ref>KojËve, 1947: 6</ref></blockquote> --- KojËve goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that in order to achieve the desired recognition, the subject must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see MASTER).  That desire is essentially desire to be the object of another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the Oedipus complex, when the subject desires to be the phallus for the mother. --- 2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subjectHegel]] , via [[desire]]s from the point of view of another.  The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} 1951b: 12</ref>  What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desireKojève]]d by another.  The [[desire]] of the [[Other]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} 1951b: 12</ref> This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that: <blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is "mediated" by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>KojËve, 1947who states: 6</ref> ---

<blockquote>The reason for this goes back to Desire is human only if the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another one desires, I can make not the body, but the Desire of the other recognise my right . . . that is to say, if he wants to possess that objectbe 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, and thus make a function of the other recognise my superiority over himdesire for 'recognition'.<ref>KojËve[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947[1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 406</ref></blockquote>

This universal feature of =====Two=====2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[desiresubject]] is especially evident in [[hysteriadesire]]; s from the point of view of another. The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} "[[hystericSome Reflections on the Ego]] is one who sustains another person." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''s . Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref> What makes an [[desireobject]], converts another's desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]] into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138; see Freud, 1905e)d by another.

Hence what is important in the The [[analysisdesire]] of a the [[hystericOther]] is not thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to find out diminish the special significance of any one particular object of her desire , but to discover at the same time it brings into view the place from which she existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} "[[desireSome Reflections on the Ego]]s (the [." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[subject1951b]] with whom she identifies).: 12</ref>

# [[<blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is 'mediated' by the Desire]] of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire for the what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>[[OtherAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (playing on 1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the ambiguity Reading of the French preposition de)Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>

<blockquote>The fundamental [[reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire]] is the incestuous [[being desire]] for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>[[motherAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]], the primordial Other (S7, 671947 [1933-39])''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H.Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 40</ref></blockquote>

=====Desire for the Other=====# [[Desire]] is always "[[desire]] ''for'' the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition ''de''). The fundamental [[desire ]] is the incestuous [[desire]] for something elsethe [[mother]],"the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{ES7}} p. 16767</ref> since it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.

# [[Desire]] is always "the desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has. The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p. 175</ref>

--- The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]]'s phrase is that desire is a social product.  [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other [[subject]]s. --- The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the child is at the mercy of her [[desire]].  It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by castrating the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to the whims of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]]. ==Desire, Need and Demand==[[Lacan]] distinguishes between three related concepts:* [[desire]]* [[need]] (''besoin'')* [[demand]] (''demande'')  =Social Product=Need==The [[human]] [[infant]] is born with certain [[biological]] [[need]]s that require (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]]. The [[human]] [[infant]] has certain [[biological]] [[need]]s which are satisfied by certain [[object]]s. [[Need]] is a [[biological]] [[instinct]] that requires (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]]. [[Need]] emerges according to the requirements of the organism and abates completely (even if only temporarily) when [[satisfied]]. The [[human]] [[infant]] is born into a state of [[helplessness]], and is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[biological]] [[needs]]. The [[infant]], unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[needs]], must depend on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them. The [[Other]] can help to [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s of the [[infant]]. The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s. ==Demand==The function of [[demand]] is to serve as an articulation of [[need]]. The [[infant]], in order to get help from the [[Other]], must articulate (express) its [[need]]s (vocally) in (the form of a) [[demand]]. The [[demand]] serves to bring the [[Other]] to help [[satisfy]] the [[needs]] of the [[infant]]. [[Demand]] is also a [[demand]] for [[love]] (beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]]). The [[presence]] of the [[Other]] (becomes most important in itself) [[symbolizes]] the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. The [[biological]] [[need]]s of the [[infant]] becomes subordinated point to the [[demand]] for the [[recognition]] and [[love]] of the [[Other]].  The [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]]. The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, but cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[infant]] craves.  The [[Other]] (can [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s that are articulated in the [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] but) cannot [[satisfy]] the [[infant]]'s [[demand]] for [[love]]. Even after the [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]], [[demand]] (as the [[demand]] for [[love]]) remains [[unsatisfied]] This leftover is [[desire]]. ==Desire==[[Desire]] is what remains of [[demand]] after the [[need]]s which are articulated in that [[demand]] are [[satisfied]]. <blockquote>"[[Desire]] is neither the appetite for [[satisfaction]], nor the [[demand]] for [[love]], but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."<ref>{{E}} p.287</ref></blockquote> [[Desire]] is the [[surplus]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]]. <blockquote>"[[Desire]] begins to take shape in the margin in which [[demand]] becomes separated emerge from [[need]]."<ref>{{E}} p.311</ref></blockquote> [[Desire]], unlike [[need]], can never be [[satisfied]]. A [[need]] (that is [[satisfied]]) ceases to motivate the [[infant]] until another [[need]] arises. [[Desire]] is constant in its pressure, and eternal.   ==Desire of the Other==[[Lacan]] asserted that [[desire]] is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]]. [[Desire]] is [[human]] when it is directed toward another [[desire]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]'s [[desire]] phrase is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]].<ref>{{S11}} p.235</ref></blockquote> The statement provides the basis for our consideration of [[desire]] in [[Lacan]]’s conception of [[subjectivity]] and points to the fundamentally social character of [[desire]].  ==Object of the Other's Desire==[[Desire]] is the [[desire]] for the [[Other]]'s [[desire]], that is, the [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of the [[Other]]'s [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is a [[desire]] for '[[recognition]]' (by another). The [[Oedipus complex]] illustrates the [[desire]] of the [[subject]] to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]]. ==Object Desired by Others==<blockquote>"The [[object]] of [[man]]'s [[desire]] ... is essentially an [[object]] [[desire]]d by someone else."<ref>Lacan. 1951b. p.12</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] is [[desirable]] (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because [[other]]s [[desire]] it. It is qua [[Other]] that the [[subject]] [[desire]]s.<ref>{{E}} p.312</ref> It is [[human]] to [[desire]] what others [[desire]] because they [[desire]] it. ==Desire for the Other==[[Desire]] is [[desire]] for the [[Other]]. The fundamental [[desire]] is the [[incestuous]] [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p.67</ref>  ==Impossible Desire==<blockquote>[[Desire]] is always "the [[desire]] for something else," because it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.<ref>{{E}} p.167</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref>  ==Social Desire==[[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]], that is, in the [[unconscious]]. [[Desire]] is a social product. [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be, but is always constituted in a [[dialectic|dialecticalrelationship]] relationship with the perceived [[desire]]s of others. <blockquote>The most important point to emerge from Lacan’s phrase [that "the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects."<ref>Evans 39</ref></blockquote> OBJET AThe [[objet petit a]] is represented by a variety of [[partial object]]s in diffent partial [[drive]]s. The [[objet petit a]] is not the object towards which [[desire]] tends, but the cause of desire. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].  ==Desire and Prohibition==<blockquote>The [[law]] (or [[prohibition]]) "creates [[desire]] in the first place by creating interdiction. [[Desire]] is essentially the [[desire]] to [[transgress]], and for there to be [[transgression]] it is first necessary for there to be [[prohibition]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p.99</ref></blockquote> The [[law]] gives rise to [[desire]] as that which circulates endlessly around a [[prohibited]] core (of ''[[jouissance]]''). (The [[prohibition]] establishes [[desire]] as the ultimate motivational force in [[subjectivity]].)   ==Desire and Language== [[Desire]] is created at the moment of the [[infant]]'s accession to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]. [[Desire]] is inseparable from the [[symbolic]] [[order]] and thus inhabits all (inheres in) [[signification]] (as such). [[Desire]] is inscribed in the [[signifying chain]] in its essential [[metonymy]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]’s [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]]. [...] [[Desire]] is a [[metonymy]]."<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref></blockquote> The perpetual reference of one [[signifer]] to another in an eternal deferral of [[meaning]] is a formulation of the ceaseless movement of [[desire]]. ==Impossible Desire== According to [[Lacan]], [[desire]] is by its very nature [[insatiable]]; it can never be fulfilled. Any attempt to [[satisfy]] [[desire]] is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable. [[Desire]] designates the impossible relation that a [[subject]] has with [[objet petit a]].  The core around which [[desire]] circulates is [[prohibited]]. ==Desire and Impossibility==The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility.  The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossible. The paternal interdiction only formalises this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with the compensation of symbolisation. The prohibitive aspect of the [[law]] is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental [[impossibility]] at the heart of desire.  No [[object]] can ever fulfil [[desire]].  ==Desire and the Death Drive== [[Lacan]] posits a distinction between [[desire]] and [[drive]]. It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.  The [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]].

 __NOTOC__[[Category:Mess]]