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desire (dÈsir) Lacan<center>{| cellpadding="2" cellspacing="5" align="center" style="border:1px solid #aaaaaa;text-align:center;margin:6px -8px;align:center;vertical-align:top;width:90%;background-color:#fcfcfc"|style="text-align:center;color:#000;line-height:2em;width:100%;";|This article is currently undergoing major editing. It's terma mess right now, dÈsir, is the term used in the French translabut will be fixed soon.|}</center>{{Topppp}}désir]]''|-|| [[German]]: ''[[Wunsch{{Bottom}}

tions The concept of Freud to translate Freud[[desire]] is at the center of [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]] as a theoretical, ethical and clinical point of reference. Theoretically, Lacan's term Wunschelaboration of the concept is supported by, yet goes beyond, its Freudian origins. From an ethical perspective, Lacan has examined in an original way the relationship between desire and the [[law]], which and its implications for [[treatment|psychoanalytic praxis]].<!-- he concept of [[desire]] is translated as 'wish'the central concern of [[psychoanalytic theory]]. -->

by Strachey ==Sigmund Freud==<!--[[Freud]]'s ''[[Interpretation of Dreams]]'' established the basis for the psychoanalytic conception of desire (including Lacan's own contributions), even if the Freudian ''[[Wunsch]]'' (translated as 'wish' in the ''[[Standard Edition]]'') does not exactly coincide with Lacan's desire.<ref>(Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 256-7)</ref>-->[[Lacan]]'s term, ''[[désir]]'', is the term used in the [[French]] translations of [[Freud]] to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Wunsch]]'', which is translated as "[[wish]]" in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''. <!-- Hence English translators of [[Lacan]] are faced with a dilemma; should they translate ''[[désir]]'' by "[[wish]]", which is closer to [[Freud]]'s ''[[Wunsch]]'', or should they translate it as "[[desire]]", which is closer to the [[French]] term, but which lacks the allusion to [[Freud]]? All of [[Lacan]]'s [[English]] translators have opted for the latter, since the [[English]] term "[[desire]]" conveys, like the [[French]] term, the implication of a ''continuous force'', which is essential to [[Lacan ]]'s concept. The [[English]] term also carries with it the same allusions to [[Hegel]]'s ''[[Begierde]]'' as arecarried by the [[French]] term, and thus retains the philosophical nuances which are so essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept of ''[[désir]]'' and which make it "a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]] himself." -->

faced with By shifting the object of study from the imagery of the manifest content of the dream to its unconscious determinants in the dreaming subject, Freud unveiled the structure of both the dream and the subject. Beyond the preconscious wishes attached to a dilemma; should they translate dÈsir by 'number of desirable objects that the dream-work utilizes, there lies the unconscious wish'— indestructible, which is closer toinfantile in its origins, the product of repression, permanently insisting in reaching fulfilment through the dream and the other formations of the unconscious.

The indestructibility that Freudattributes to the unconscious wish is a property of its structural position: it is the necessary, not contingent, effect of a fundamental gap in the subject's Wunschpsyche; the gap left by a lost satisfaction (cf. the seventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams; Freud, or should they translate it as 'desire'1953, which is closer to thepp. 509-621).

French termSuch a structural gap in the subject is of a sexual order; it corresponds ultimately to a loss of sexual jouissance due to the fact of the prohibition to which sexuality is subjected in the human being. This prohibition is a structural cultural necessity, not a contingency, but and its subjective correlate is the Oedipus complex — which lacks the allusion to Freud? All is a normative organization, rather than a more or less typical set of Lacan's Englishpsychological manifestations.

translators have opted The model of the unconscious wish elucidated by Freud in his monumental work on dreams remained his guide for the latterrest of his theoretical and clinical production; in pa rticular, since it continued to inform, until the English term end, Freud'desires clinical interventions — interpretations and constructions in analysis — and his rationale for them. This model is inseparable from the form of discourse that Freud created: the rule of free association, the subject' conveyss speech,reveals his/her desire and the essential gap that constitutes it.

like Lacan's elaboration of the French termpraxis (theory and practice) of desire extends over his half-century of work in psychoanalysis, and attempting to abbreviate it or replace the implication of necessary reading with a continuous forcesummary would be imprudent and misleading. Therefore, which is essentialwe can only indicate some suggestions for further reading (in Lacan's works) and further lines of enquiry.

A first ingredient of the concept of desire in Lacan's work contains a Hegelian reference, according to which desire is bound to its being recognized — even if later on Lacanemphasized the difference between his and Hegel's conceptpositions (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 292-325). The English term also carries with it the same allusions to

HegelBut the reference to Freud's Begierde analysis of desire as are carried by revealed in the dream is from the start highly significant. Lacan emphasized that the French termanalysis of the dream is in fact an analysis of the dreamer, that is, a subject who tells the dream to an other (with whom the subject is engaged in a transference-relation). In 'The function and field of speech and thus retains thelanguage in psychoanalysis' (1953), Lacan writes:

philosophical nuances which are :Nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire finds its meaning in the desire of the other, not so essential much because the other holds the key to the object desired, as because the first object of desire is to be recognized by the other. (Lacan's concept of dÈsir and, 1977 [1959], p. 58)

Freud himselfAlthough an exaggeration in reality, Lacan's position is justified because with that theory he introduced in psychoanalysis a conception of the object that is genuinely revolutionary and that makes possible a rational critique of the notion of 'object relations' (Macey, 1995: 80)and its clinical applications.

If there is For what Lacan emphasized was the illusory nature of any one concept object that appears to fulfil desire, while the gap, the original splitting which can claim to be is constitutive of the subject, is real; and it is in this gap that the object a, the very centre object cause of desire, installs itself. (Lacan's1977; in particular, chapter 20).

thoughtDesire requires the support of the fantasy, it is which operates as its ''mise en scène'', where the fading subject faces the concept lost object thatcauses his/her desire (Lacan 1977 [1959], p. 313). This fading of the subject in the fantastic scenario that supports his/her desireis what makes desire opaque to the subject him-/herself. Desire is a metonymy (p. Lacan follows Spinoza in arguing 175) because the object thatcauses it, constituted as lost, makes it displace permanently, from object to object, as no one object can really satisfy it.

'This permanent displacement of desire follows the logic of the unconscious; thus Lacan could say that desire is its interpretation, as it moves along the essence chain of man' unconscious signifiers, without ever being captured by any particular signifier (Sllcf. Seminar VI, 275'Desire and its Interpretation'; see SpinozaLacan, 1677: 1281958-59); desire is.

simultaneously In the heart of human existenceanalytic experience, desire 'must be taken literally', and as it is through the central concern unveiling ofthe signifiers that support it (albeit never exhausting it) that its real cause can be circumscribed (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 256-77).

Desire is the other side of the law: the contributions of psychoanalysisto ethical reflection and practice have started off by recognizing this principle (Lacan, 1990; 1992). HoweverDesire opposes a barrier to jouissance - the jouissance of the drive (always partial, when Lacan talks about desirenot in relation to the body considered as a totality, but to the organic function to which it is not any kindattached and from which it detaches), and that of the super-ego (with its implacable command to enjoy; Lacan, 1977 [1959], p. 319).

of Thus, desire he is referring appears tobe on the side of life preservation, as it opposes the lethal dimension of jouissance (the partiality of the drive, but always which disregards the requirements of the living organism, and the demands of the superego - that `senseless law' - which result in the self-destructive unconscious sense of guilt). But desire. This itself is not becausewithout a structural relation with death: death at the heart of the speaking being's lack-in-being (manqué à l'être); death in the mortifying effect of those objects of the world that entice desire, inducing its alienation, without ever satisfying any promise.

Lacan sees conscious There is no Sovereign Good that would sustain the `right' orientation of desire as unimportant, but simply because or guarantee the subject's well-being. As a consequence, the ethics of psychoanalysis require that the analyst does not pretend to embody or to deliver any Sovereign Good; it rather prescribes for the analyst that `the only thing of which one can be guilty is uncon-of having given ground relative to one's desire' (Lacan, 1992, p. 319).

scious The analyst's desire , 'a desire to obtain absolute difference', is the original Lacanian concept that forms defines the central concern position of the analyst in analytic discourse, and represents a culmination of his elucidationof the function of desire in psychoanalysis(Lacan, 1977, p. 276; 1991). Unconscious

desire This position is structural, constitutive of analytic discourse - not a psychological state of the analyst. It is entirely sexual; his/her lack-in-being, rather than any 'positive'mode of being that orients the motives analyst's direction of the unconscious are limited treatment (Lacan, 1977 [1959], p. 230). This means that the analyst cannot incarnate an ideal for the analysand, and that he/she occupies a position of semblant of the cause of desire (Lacan, 1991; 1998). Only in this way may the analyst's desire become the instrument of the analysand's access tohis/her own desire.

sexual desire . . . The other great generic desireSee also: [[jouissance]], that of hunger, is not[[subject]]

represented' ReferencesFreud, S. (E1953) [1900a] The Interpretation of Dreams. Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 142)Vols 4 & 5. London: Hogarth Press.

#Lacan, J. (1958-59) `Le désir et son interpretation' (seven sessions, ed. by J.-A. Miller). Ornicar? 24 (1981):7-31; 25 (1982):13-36; 26/27 (1983):7-44. The aim final three sessions appeared as `Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet'. Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977):11-52. There are unedited transcripts of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to recognisewhole seminar available in French and English.#Lacan, J. (1977) [1959] Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock.#Lacan, J. (1977) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. London: Tavistock.# Lacan, J. (1990) `Kant with Sade'. October 51. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.# Lacan, J. (1991) Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, L'envers de la psychanalyse, 1969-1970. Paris: Seuil.# Lacan, J. (1992) The Seminar, Book VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960. New York: W.W. Norton; London: Routledge.# Lacan, J. (1998) The Seminar, Book XX, Encore, 1972-1973, On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge. New York: W.W. Norton. Leonardo S. Rodriguez

=====''Unconscious'' Desire=====<!-- If there is any one concept which can claim to be the very center of [[Lacan]]'s thought, it is the truth about his concept of [[desire]]. -->[[Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] in arguing that "[[desire]] is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p. 275</ref> [[Desire]] is simultaneously the heart of [[human]] [[existence]] and the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. However, when [[Lacan]] talks about [[desire]], it is only possible not any kind of [[desire]] he is referring to recognise one, but always ''[[unconscious]]''s [[desire]]. This is not because [[Lacan]] sees [[conscious]] [[desire]] as unimportant, but simply because it is [[unconscious]] [[desire]] that forms the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. <!-- [[Unconscious]] [[desire]] is entirely [[sexuality|sexual]]; <blockquote>"the motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p. 142</ref></blockquote> -->

=====Truth and Desire=====The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his [[desire]]. It is only possible to recognize one's [[desire]] when it is articulated articulate in [[speech: ']]. <!-- <blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the[[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p. 183</ref></blockquote> -->

presence of =====Existence=====Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the other[[subject]] to name, that to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref> However, whatever it isnot a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given [[desire]], is recognised for this would imply a expressionist theory of [[language]]. On the contrary, by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], the full sense[[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]]. (The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]].)

<blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious action of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the term' (Sl[[subject]] creates, brings forth, 183)a new [[presence]] in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p.228-9</ref></blockquote>

Hence However, there is a limit to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in psychoanalysis [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]];"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the [[unconscious]] (i.e. the fact the the [[unconscious]] is not that which 'what's important is to teach the subject to namenot known'',but that which ''cannot be known'').

"Although the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is present to some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate, the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to bring this articulate [[desire into existence' (S2]], 228). Howeverthere is always a leftover, it is not a[[surplus]], which exceeds [[speech]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p. 36</ref>

question =====Criticism=====One of seeking a new means [[Lacan]]'s most important criticisms of expression for a given the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]] of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire]] with the related concepts of [[demand]] and [[need]]. In opposition to this tendency, [[Lacan]] insists on distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957,<ref>{{S4}} pp. 100-1, 125</ref>, but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} (1958c) "[[The Signification of the Phallus|La signification du phallus]]." ''[[Écrits]]''. Paris: Seuil, for this1966: 685-95 ["[[The Signification of the Phallus|The signification of the phallus]]". Trans. [[Alan Sheridan]] ''[[Écrits: A Selection]]''. London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977: 281-91].</ref>

would imply =====Need=====[[Need]] is a expressionist theory purely [[biological]] [[instinct]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The [[human]] [[subject]], being born in a state of [[helplessness]], is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and hence depends on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them. In order to get the [[Other]]'s help, the [[infant]] must express its [[need]]s vocally; need must be articulated in [[demand]]. The primitive [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the [[Other]] to minister to the [[infant]]'s [[need]]s. However, the [[presence]] of the [[Other]] soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the [[satisfaction]] of language[[need]], since this [[presence]] [[symbolize]]s the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. On Hence [[demand]] soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of [[need]] and as a [[demand]] for [[love]]. However, whereas the contrary[[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, by articulat-the [[Other]] cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[subject]] craves. Hence even after the [[need]]s which were articulated in [[demand]] have been satisfied, the other aspect of [[demand]], the craving for [[love]], remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is [[desire]].

ing desire in speech<blockquote>"Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the analysand brings it into existence:second."<ref>{{E}} p. 287</ref></blockquote>

That =====Demand=====[[Desire]] is thus the [[surplus]] produced by the subject should come to recognise and to name his desirearticulation of [[need]] in [[demand]]; that is the

efficacious action of analysis<blockquote>"Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which [[demand]] becomes separated from need. But it isn't a question of recognising some-"<ref>{{E}} p. 311</ref></blockquote>

thing Unlike a [[need]], which can be satisfied and which would then ceases to motivate the [[subject]] until another [[need]] arises, [[desire]] can never be entirely givensatisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal. . . . In naming it The realisation of [[desire]] does not consist in being "fulfilled", but in the subject creates,reproduction of [[desire]] as such.

brings forth=====Alexandre Kojève=====[[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], a new presence in which lifts the worldconcept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the [[biology|biological]] point of view."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>

=====Desire and Drive=====It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s. Although they both belong to the field of the [[Other]] (S2as opposed to [[love]]), [[desire]] is one whereas the [[drive]]s are many. In other words, 228-9the [[drive]]s are the particular (partial)manifestations of a single force called [[desire]] (although there may also be [[desire]]s which are not manifested in the [[drive]]s).<ref>{{S11}} p. 243</ref> There is only one [[object]] of [[desire]], [[object (petit) a]], and this is represented by a variety of partial objects in different partial [[drive]]s. The [[object (petit) a]] is not the [[object]] towards which [[desire]] tends, but the [[cause]] of [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].

However=====Object of Another's Desire=====[[Kojève]] goes on to argue (still following [[Hegel]]) that in order to achieve the [[desire]]d recognition, there the [[subject]] must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see [[master]]). That [[desire]] is a limit essentially [[desire]] to how far be the [[object]] of another's [[desire can ]] is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the [[Oedipus complex]], when the [[subject]] desires to be articulated in speech becausethe [[phallus]] for the [[mother]].

=====Two=====2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[desire]]s from the point of view of a fundamental another. The effect of this is that "the object of man'incompatibility between s desire and speech . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ' (E, 275); 'International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref> What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is[[desire]]d by another.

The [[desire]] of the [[Other]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this incompatibility which explains "tends to diminish the irreducibility special significance of any one particular object, but at the unconscious (isame time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol.e34.1953[1951b]: 12</ref>

the fact that the unconscious is not that which This idea too is not known, but taken from [[Kojève]]'s reading of [[Hegel]]; [[Kojève]] argues that which:

cannot be known). Although <blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is 'mediated' by the Desire of another directed towards the truth about same object: it is human to desire is present what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to some degree inthe Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>

all speech, speech can never articulate <blockquote>The reason for this goes back to the whole truth former point about human desire being desirefor recognition; wheneverby desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 40</ref></blockquote>

speech attempts to articulate =====Hysteria=====This universal feature of [[desire]] is especially evident in [[hysteria]]; the [[hysteric]] is one who sustains another person's [[desire]], converts another's [[desire]] into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, there is always thus appropriating his perceived desire).<ref>{{S4}} p. 138; {{F}} (1905e) "[[{{FB}}|Fragment of an Analysis of a leftoverCase of Hysteria]]." [[SE]] VII, 3.</ref> Hence what is important in the [[analysis]] of a surplus, [[hysteric]] is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from whichshe [[desire]]s (the [[subject]] with whom she identifies).

exceeds speech=====Desire for the Other=====# [[Desire]] is [[desire]] ''for'' the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition ''de'').The fundamental [[desire]] is the incestuous [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p. 67</ref>

One of Lacan's most important criticisms of # [[Desire]] is always "the psychoanalytic theories desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has. The [[object]] of[[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p. 175</ref>

his day was that they tended to confuse # [[Desire]] emerges originally in the concept field of desire with the related[[Other]]; i.e. in the [[unconscious]].

concepts =====Social Product=====The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]]'s phrase is that [[desire]] is a social product. [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a [[dialectic|dialectical relationship]] with the perceived [[desire]]s of DEMAND and NEEDother [[subject]]s. In opposition to this tendency, Lacan insists on

distinguishing between these three concepts=====(M)other=====The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the child is at the mercy of her [[desire]]. This distinction begins It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by castrating the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to emergethe whims of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]].

     Need is a purely biological INSTINCT, an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The human subject, being born in a state of helplessness, is unable to satisfy its own needs, and hence depends on the Other to help it satisfy them. In order to get the Other's help, the infant must express its needs vocally; need must be articulated in demand. The primitive demands of the infant may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the Other to minister to the infant's needs. However, the presence of the Other  soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the satisfaction of need, since this presence symbolises the Other's love. Hence demand soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of need and as a demand for love. However, whereas the Other can provide the objects which the subject requires to satisfy his needs, the Other cannot provide that unconditional love which the subject craves. Hence even after the needs which were articulated in demand have been satisfied, the other aspect of demand, the craving for love, remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is desire. 'Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second' (E, 287).  Desire is thus the surplus produced by the articulation of need in demand;  'Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need' (E, 311). Unlike a need, which can be satisfied and which then  ceases to motivate the subject until another need arises, desire can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal. The realisation of desire does not consist in being 'fulfilled', but in the reproduction of desire as such.  Lacan's distinction between need and desire, which lifts the concept of desire completely out of the realm of biology, is strongly reminiscent of KojËve's distinction between animal and human desire; desire is shown to be distinctively human when it is directed either toward another desire, or to an object which is 'perfectly useless from the biological point of view' (KojËve, 1947: 6).  It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives. Although they both belong to the field of the Other (as opposed to love), desire is one whereas the drives are many. In other words, the drives are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called desire (although there may also be desires which are not manifested in the drives: see S1l, 243). There is only  one object of desire, OBJETPETITA, and this is represented by a variety of partial objects in different partial drives. The OBJET PETIT A iS not the object towards which desire tends, but the cause of desire. Desire is not a relation to an object, but a relation to a LACK.  One of Lacan's most oft-repeated formulas is: 'man's desire is the desire of the Other' (Sll, 235). This can be understood in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.  1. Desire is essentially 'desire of the Other's desire', which means both     desire to be the object of another's desire, and desire for recognition by another. Lacan takes this idea from Hegel, via KojËve, who states:  Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the  other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather,  'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthro-  pogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.  (KojËve, 1947: 6)     KojËve goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that in order to achieve the desired recognition, the subject must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see MASTER). That desire is essentially desire to be the object of another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the Oedipus com- plex, when the subject desires to be the phallus for the mother.  2. It is qua Other that the subject desires (E, 312): that is, the subject desires from the point of view of another. The effect of this is that 'the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else' (Lacan, 1951b: 12). What makes an object desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is desired by another. The desire of the Other is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this 'tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number' (Lacan, 1951b: 12).  This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that 'Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is  "mediated" by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it' (KojËve, 1947: 6). The reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him (KojËve, 1947: 40).  This universal feature of desire is especially evident in hysteria; the hysteric is one who sustains another person's desire, converts another's desire into her  own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138; see Freud, 1905e). Hence what is important in the analysis of a hysteric is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she desires (the subject with whom she identifies).  3. Desire is desire for the Other (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition de). The fundamental desire is the incestuous desire for the mother, the primordial Other (S7, 67).  4. Desire is always 'the desire for something else' (E, 167), since it is impossible to desire what one already has. The object of desire is continually deferred, which is why desire is a METONYMY (E, 175).  5. Desire emerges originally in the field of the Other; i.e. in the unconscious.     The most important point to emerge from Lacan's phrase is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects.  The first person to occupy the place of the Other is the mother, and at first the child is at the mercy of her desire. It is only when the Father articulates desire with the law by castrating the mother that the subject is freed from subjection to the whims of the mother's desire (see CASTRATION COMPLEX).== def == In [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]], the term '''desire''' designates the impossible relation that a [[subject (philosophy)|subject]] has with [[objet petit a]]. According to Lacan, desire proper (in contrast with [[demand (psychoanalysis)|demand]]) can never be fulfilled. == Desire is the Desire of the Other It is on the basis of this fundamental understanding of identity that Lacan maintained throughout his career that desire is the desire of the Other. What is meant by him in this formulation is not the triviality that humans desire others, when they sexually desire (an observation which is not universally true). Again developing Freud's theorisation of sexuality, Lacan's contention is rather that what psychoanalysis reveals is that human-beings need to learn how and what to desire. Lacanian theory does not deny that infants are always born into the world with basic biological needs that need constant or periodic satisfaction. Lacan's stress, however, is that, from a very early age, the child’s attempts to satisfy these needs become caught up in the dialectics of its exchanges with others. Because its sense of self is only ever garnered from identifying with the images of these others (or itself in the mirror, as a kind of other), Lacan argues that it demonstrably belongs to humans to desire- directly- as or through another or others. We get a sense of his meaning when we consider such social phenomena as fashion. As the squabbling of children more readily testifies, it is fully possible for an object to become desirable for individuals because they perceive that others desire it, such that when these others' desire is withdrawn, the object also loses its allure. Lacan articulates this 'decentring' of desire when he contends that what has happened to the biological needs of the individual is that they have become inseparable from, and importantly subordinated to, the vicissitudes of its demand for the recognition and love of other people. Events as apparently 'natural' as the passing or holding back of stool, he remarks in Ecrits, become episodes in the chronicle of the child's relationship with its parents, expressive of its compliance or rebellion. A hungry child may even refuse to eat food if it perceives that this food is offered less as a token of love than one of its parents' dissatisfaction or impatience.In this light, Lacan's important recourse to game theory also becomes explicable. For game theory involves precisely the attempt to formalise the possibilities available to individuals in situations where their decisions concerning their wants can in principle both affect and be affected by the decisions of others. As Lacan's article in the Ecrits on the "Direction of the Treatment" spells out, he takes it that the analytic situation, as theorised by Freud around the notion of transference (see Part 2), is precisely such a situation. In that essay, Lacan focuses on the dream of the butcher's wife in Freud's Interpretation of Dreams. The said 'butcher’s wife’ thought that she had had a dream which was proof of the invalidity of Freud's theory that dreams are always encoded wish-fulfilments. As Freud comments, however, this dream becomes explicable when one considers how, after a patient has entered into analysis, her wishes are constructed (at least in part) in relation to the perceived wishes of the analyst. In this case, at least one of the wishes expressed by the dream was the woman's wish that Freud’s desire (for his theory to be correct) be thwarted. In the same way, Lacan details how the deeper unconscious wish expressed in the manifest content of the dream (which featured the woman attempting to stage a dinner party with only one piece of smoked salmon) can only be comprehended as the coded fulfilment of a desire that her husband would not fulfil her every wish, and leave her with an unsatisfied desire.  [[Category:Lacan]]{{OK}}[[Category:TermsSymbolic]][[Category:ConceptsReal]][[Category:PsychoanalysisMess]]