Changes

Lacan's term, dÈsir, is the term used in the French translations The concept of Freud to translate Freud's term Wunsch, which [[desire]] is translated as 'wish' by Strachey in at the Standard Edition. Hence English translators center of [[Lacan are faced with ]]ian [[psychoanalysis]] as a dilemma; should they translate dÈsir by 'wish'theoretical, which is closer to Freud's Wunschethical and clinical point of reference. Theoretically, or should they translate it as 'desire', which is closer to the French term, but which lacks the allusion to Freud? All of Lacan's English translators have opted for elaboration of the latterconcept is supported by, since the English term 'desire' conveysyet goes beyond, like the French term, the implication of a continuous forceits Freudian origins. From an ethical perspective, which is essential to Lacan's concept. The English term also carries with it has examined in an original way the same allusions to Hegel's Begierde as are carried by relationship between desire and the French term[[law]], and thus retains its implications for [[treatment|psychoanalytic praxis]].<!-- he concept of [[desire]] is the philosophical nuances which are so essential to Lacan's concept central concern of dÈsir and which make it 'a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by Freud himself' (Macey, 1995: 80)[[psychoanalytic theory]].-->

If there is any one concept which can claim to be ==Sigmund Freud==<!--[[Freud]]'s ''[[Interpretation of Dreams]]'' established the basis for the very centre psychoanalytic conception of desire (including Lacan's thoughtown contributions), it is even if the Freudian ''[[Wunsch]]'' (translated as 'wish' in the concept of desire. ''[[Standard Edition]]'') does not exactly coincide with Lacan follows Spinoza in arguing that 's desire is the essence of man' .<ref>(SllLacan, 275; see Spinoza1977 [1959], 1677: 128pp. 256-7); desire </ref>-->[[Lacan]]'s term, ''[[désir]]'', is simultaneously the heart term used in the [[French]] translations of human existence[[Freud]] to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Wunsch]]'', and which is translated as "[[wish]]" in the central concern ''[[Standard Edition]]''. <!-- Hence English translators of psychoanalysis. However, when [[Lacan talks about desire]] are faced with a dilemma; should they translate ''[[désir]]'' by "[[wish]]", it is not any kind of desire he which is referring closer to[[Freud]]'s ''[[Wunsch]]'', but always unconscious or should they translate it as "[[desire. This ]]", which is not because Lacan sees conscious desire as unimportantcloser to the [[French]] term, but simply because it is unconscious desire that forms which lacks the central concern allusion to [[Freud]]? All of psychoanalysis. Unconscious desire is entirely sexual; [[Lacan]]'s [[English]] translators have opted for the motives of latter, since the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic [[English]] term "[[desire]]" conveys, like the [[French]] term, that the implication of hungera ''continuous force'', which is not representedessential to [[Lacan]]' (E, 142)s concept. The aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead [[English]] term also carries with it the analysand to recognise the truth about his desire. However, it is only possible same allusions to recognise one[[Hegel]]'s desire when it is articulated in speech: 'It is only once it is formulated, named in '[[Begierde]]'' as are carried by the presence of the other[[French]] term, that desire, whatever it is, is recognised in and thus retains the full sense philosophical nuances which are so essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept of the term' (Sl, 183)'[[désir]]'' and which make it "a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]] himself." -->

Hence in psychoanalysis 'what's important is to teach By shifting the subject to name, to articulate, to bring this desire into existence' (S2, 228). However, it is not a question object of seeking a new means study from the imagery of expression for a given desire, for this would imply a expressionist theory the manifest content of language. On the contrary, by articulating desire dream to its unconscious determinants in speechthe dreaming subject, Freud unveiled the analysand brings it into existence:That structure of both the subject should come to recognise dream and to name his desire; that is theefficacious action of analysissubject. But it isn't Beyond the preconscious wishes attached to a question number of recognising somedesirable objects that the dream-thing which would be entirely given. . . . In naming itwork utilizes, there lies the subject createsunconscious wish — indestructible, infantile in its origins,brings forththe product of repression, a new presence permanently insisting in reaching fulfilment through the dream and the other formations of the worldunconscious. (S2, 228-9)

However, there The indestructibility that Freud attributes to the unconscious wish is a limit to how far desire can be articulated in speech because property of its structural position: it is the necessary, not contingent, effect of a fundamental gap in the subject'incompatibility between desire and speech' (E, 275)s psyche; it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the unconscious gap left by a lost satisfaction (i.ecf. the fact that the unconscious is not that which is not known, but that which cannot be known). Although the truth about desire is present to some degree in all speech, speech can never articulate the whole truth about desireseventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams; whenever speech attempts to articulate desireFreud, there is always a leftover1953, a surplus, which exceeds speechpp. 509-621).

One Such a structural gap in the subject is of Lacan's most important criticisms of the psychoanalytic theories a sexual order; it corresponds ultimately to a loss of his day was that they tended sexual jouissance due to confuse the concept fact of desire with the related concepts of DEMAND and NEED. In opposition prohibition to this tendency, Lacan insists on distinguishing between these three conceptswhich sexuality is subjected in the human being. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957 (see S4prohibition is a structural cultural necessity, 100-1not a contingency, 125)and its subjective correlate is the Oedipus complex — which is a normative organization, but only crystallises in 1958 (Lacan, 1958c)rather than a more or less typical set of psychological manifestations.

Need is a purely biological INSTINCT, an appetite which emerges according to the requirements The model of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The human subject, being born unconscious wish elucidated by Freud in a state his monumental work on dreams remained his guide for the rest of helplessness, is unable to satisfy its own needs, his theoretical and hence depends on the Other to help it satisfy them. In order to get the Other's help, the infant must express its needs vocallyclinical production; need must be articulated in demand. The primitive demands of the infant may only be inarticulate screamspa rticular, but they serve it continued to bring the Other to minister to the infant's needs. Howeverinform, until the presence of the Other soon acquires an importance in itselfend, an importance that goes beyond the satisfaction of need, since this presence symbolises the OtherFreud's love. Hence demand soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of need clinical interventions — interpretations and constructions in analysis — and as a demand for love. However, whereas the Other can provide the objects which the subject requires to satisfy his needs, the Other cannot provide that unconditional love which the subject craves. Hence even after the needs which were articulated in demand have been satisfied, the other aspect of demand, the craving rationale for love, remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is desirethem. 'Desire This model is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results inseparable from the subtraction form of discourse that Freud created: the first from the second' (E, 287).Desire is thus the surplus produced by the articulation rule of need in demand; ''Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need' (E, 311). Unlike a needfree association, which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the subject until another need arises's speech, reveals his/her desire can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal. The realisation of desire does not consist in being 'fulfilled', but in the reproduction of desire as suchessential gap that constitutes it.

Lacan's distinction between need elaboration of the praxis (theory and desire, which lifts the concept practice) of desire completely out extends over his half-century of the realm of biologywork in psychoanalysis, is strongly reminiscent of KojËve's distinction between animal and human desire; desire is shown attempting to be distinctively human when abbreviate it is directed either toward another desire, or to an object which is 'perfectly useless from replace the biological point of viewnecessary reading with a summary would be imprudent and misleading. Therefore, we can only indicate some suggestions for further reading (in Lacan' (KojËve, 1947: 6s works)and further lines of enquiry.

It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives. Although they both belong to the field A first ingredient of the Other (as opposed to love), desire is one whereas the drives are many. In other words, the drives are the particular (partial) manifestations concept of a single force called desire (although there may also be desires which are not manifested in the drives: see S1lLacan's work contains a Hegelian reference, 243). There is only one object of according to which desire, OBJETPETITA, and this is represented by a variety of partial objects in different partial drives. The OBJET PETIT A iS not bound to its being recognized — even if later on Lacan emphasized the object towards which desire tendsdifference between his and Hegel's positions (Lacan, 1977 [1959], but the cause of desirepp. Desire is not a relation to an object, but a relation to a LACK292-325).

One of Lacan's most oft-repeated formulas is: 'manBut the reference to Freud's analysis of desire as revealed in the dream is from the start highly significant. Lacan emphasized that the analysis of the desire dream is in fact an analysis of the Other' dreamer, that is, a subject who tells the dream to an other (Sll, 235with whom the subject is engaged in a transference-relation). This can be understood In 'The function and field of speech and language in many complementary wayspsychoanalysis' (1953), of which the following are the most important.Lacan writes:

1. Desire is essentially :Nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire finds its meaning in the desire of the Other's desire'other, which means both desire not so much because the other holds the key to be the object desired, as because the first object of another's desire, and desire for recognition is to be recognized by anotherthe other. (Lacan takes this idea from Hegel, via KojËve1977 [1959], who states:p. 58)

Desire is human only if That the one desires, not other holds the body, but key to the Desire of object desired takes on added value later in Lacan's work. Yet that desire emerges in a relationship with the other . . . which is dialectical, that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' which is embedded in his human value. . . . In other wordsdiscourse, all is an essential property of human, anthropogenetic Desire . . desire. Human desire isthe desire of the Other (over and above the others who are concrete incarnations of the Other), finallynot 'natural', a function endogenous appetites or tendencies that would push the subject in one direction or another irrespective of his/her relations with the Other; desire for 'recognition'is always inscribed in and mediated by language (cf. (KojËveThe Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, which is an essential reference in its entirety; Lacan, 1947: 61977).

KojËve goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that The least noisy appeal of the infant is already inscribed in order to achieve language, as it is interpreted by the desired recognition'significant' others as speech, the subject must risk his own life in not as a struggle for pure prestige (see MASTER)mere cry. That desire is essentially desire to be the object This primordial discursive circuit makes of another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' infant already a speaking being, a subject of the Oedipus complexspeech, when even at the subject desires stage in which he/she is still infant. This subordination to be the phallus for Other through language marks the motherhuman forever.Lacan writes:

2:The phenomenology that emerges from analytic experience is certainly of a kind to demonstrate in desire the paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric, even scandalous character by which it is distinguished from need [...]:Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls for. It is qua demand of a presence or of an absence — which is what is manifested in the primordial relation to the mother, pregnant with that Other to be situated short of the needs that it can satisfy.:Demand constitutes the subject desires (EOther as already possessing the 'privilege' of satisfying needs, 312): that isto say, the subject desires from the point power of view depriving them of anotherthat alone by which they are satisfied [. The effect ..].:In this way, demand annuls (''aufhebt'') the particularity of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of this is love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced (''sich erniedrigt'') to the object level of man's being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.:Thus desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung). . . is essentially an object desired by someone else' (Lacan, 1951b:1977 [1959], pp. 286-7)

12). What makes an object desirable is not any intrinsic quality This residual status of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is desired by another. The desire of the Other is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeableconstitutes its essence; at this 'tends to diminish point the special significance question of any one particular the object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number' (desire acquires crucial importance. Lacan, 1951b: 12).This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading considered his theory of Hegel; KojËve argues that 'Desire directed toward a natural this object is human to be his only original contribution to the extent that it is "mediated" by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it' (KojËve, 1947: 6)psychoanalysis.

The reason for this goes back to Although an exaggeration in reality, Lacan's position is justified because with that theory he introduced in psychoanalysis a conception of the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring object that is genuinely revolutionary and that which another desires, I can make makes possible a rational critique of the other recognise my right to possess that notion of 'object, relations' and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him (KojËve, 1947: 40)its clinical applications.

This universal feature For what Lacan emphasized was the illusory nature of any object that appears to fulfil desire , while the gap, the original splitting which is especially evident in hysteria; constitutive of the hysteric subject, is one who sustains another person's desire, converts another's desire into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138real; see Freud, 1905e). Hence what and it is important in this gap that the analysis of object a hysteric is not to find out , the object cause of her desire but to discover the place from which she desires , installs itself. (the subject with whom she identifiesLacan 1977; in particular, chapter 20).

3. Desire is desire for requires the support of the Other (playing on fantasy, which operates as its ''mise en scène'', where the ambiguity of fading subject faces the French preposition delost object thatcauses his/her desire (Lacan 1977 [1959], p. 313). The fundamental This fading of the subject in the fantastic scenario that supports his/her desire is what makes desire opaque to the incestuous desire for subject him-/herself. Desire is a metonymy (p. 175) because the motherobject that causes it, constituted as lost, the primordial Other (S7makes it displace permanently, from object to object, 67)as no one object can really satisfy it.

4. Desire is always 'This permanent displacement of desire follows the logic of the unconscious; thus Lacan could say that desire for something else' (Eis its interpretation, 167), since as it is impossible to desire what one already has. The object moves along the chain of desire is continually deferredunconscious signifiers, which is why desire is a METONYMY without ever being captured by any particular signifier (Ecf. Seminar VI, 'Desire and its Interpretation'; Lacan, 1751958-59).

5. Desire emerges originally in In the analytic experience, desire 'must be taken literally', as it is through the field unveiling of the Other; i.e. in the unconscious. The most important point to emerge from Lacan's phrase is signifiers that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair support it (albeit never exhausting it appears to ) that its real cause can be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjectscircumscribed (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 256-77).

The first person to occupy Desire is the place other side of the Other is law: the mothercontributions of psychoanalysis to ethical reflection and practice have started off by recognizing this principle (Lacan, and at first the child is at 1990; 1992). Desire opposes a barrier to jouissance - the mercy jouissance of her desire. It is only when the Father articulates desire with drive (always partial, not in relation to the law by castrating body considered as a totality, but to the mother that the subject organic function to which it is freed attached and from subjection to the whims which it detaches), and that of the mother's desire super-ego (see CASTRATION COMPLEXwith its implacable command to enjoy; Lacan, 1977 [1959], p. 319).== def ==

In [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]]Thus, desire appears to be on the side of life preservation, as it opposes the lethal dimension of jouissance (the partiality of the drive, which disregards the requirements of the living organism, and the term demands of the superego - that `senseless law'''desire''' designates - which result in the impossible relation that a [[subject (philosophyself-destructive unconscious sense of guilt)|subject]] has with [[objet petit a]]. According to Lacan, But desire proper (itself is not without a structural relation with death: death at the heart of the speaking being's lack-in contrast with [[demand -being (psychoanalysismanqué à l'être)|demand]]) can never be fulfilled; death in the mortifying effect of those objects of the world that entice desire, inducing its alienation, without ever satisfying any promise.

Desire The analyst's desire, 'a desire to obtain absolute difference', is the Desire original Lacanian concept that defines the position of the Otheranalyst in analytic discourse, and represents a culmination of his elucidationof the function of desire in psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1977, p. 276; 1991).

It This position is on the basis structural, constitutive of this fundamental understanding of identity that Lacan maintained throughout his career that desire is the desire analytic discourse - not a psychological state of the Otheranalyst. What It is meant by him his/her lack-in this formulation is not the triviality that humans desire others-being, when they sexually desire (an observation which is not universally true). Again developing Freudrather than any 'positive's theorisation mode of sexuality, Lacan's contention is rather that what psychoanalysis reveals is that human-beings need to learn how and what to desire. Lacanian theory does not deny being that infants are always born into orients the world with basic biological needs that need constant or periodic satisfaction. Lacananalyst's stress, however, is that, from a very early age, the child’s attempts to satisfy these needs become caught up in the dialectics direction of its exchanges with others. Because its sense of self is only ever garnered from identifying with the images of these others treatment (or itself in the mirrorLacan, as a kind of other)1977 [1959], Lacan argues that it demonstrably belongs to humans to desire- directly- as or through another or othersp. We get a sense of his meaning when we consider such social phenomena as fashion230). As This means that the squabbling of children more readily testifies, it is fully possible for analyst cannot incarnate an object to become desirable ideal for individuals because they perceive that others desire it, such that when these others' desire is withdrawn, the object also loses its allure. Lacan articulates this 'decentring' of desire when he contends that what has happened to the biological needs of the individual is that they have become inseparable fromanalysand, and importantly subordinated to, the vicissitudes of its demand for the recognition and love of other people. Events as apparently 'natural' as the passing or holding back of stool, that he remarks in Ecrits, become episodes in the chronicle of the child's relationship with its parents, expressive of its compliance or rebellion. A hungry child may even refuse to eat food if it perceives that this food is offered less as /she occupies a token position of love than one semblant of its parents' dissatisfaction or impatience.In this light, Lacan's important recourse to game theory also becomes explicable. For game theory involves precisely the attempt to formalise the possibilities available to individuals in situations where their decisions concerning their wants can in principle both affect and be affected by the decisions cause of others. As desire (Lacan's article in the Ecrits on the "Direction of the Treatment" spells out, he takes it that the analytic situation, as theorised by Freud around the notion of transference (see Part 21991; 1998), is precisely such a situation. In that essay, Lacan focuses on the dream of the butcher's wife Only in Freud's Interpretation of Dreams. The said 'butcher’s wife’ thought that she had had a dream which was proof of the invalidity of Freud's theory that dreams are always encoded wish-fulfilments. As Freud comments, however, this dream becomes explicable when one considers how, after a patient has entered into analysis, her wishes are constructed (at least in part) in relation to the perceived wishes of way may the analyst. In this case, at least one of the wishes expressed by the dream was the woman's wish that Freud’s desire (for his theory to be correct) be thwarted. In become the same way, Lacan details how the deeper unconscious wish expressed in the manifest content instrument of the dream (which featured the woman attempting analysand's access to stage a dinner party with only one piece of smoked salmon) can only be comprehended as the coded fulfilment of a desire that her husband would not fulfil her every wish, and leave his/her with an unsatisfied own desire.

ReferencesFreud, S. (1953) [1900a] The Interpretation of Dreams. Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vols 4 & 5. London: Hogarth Press. #Lacan, J. (1958-59) `Le désir et son interpretation' (seven sessions, ed. by J.-A. Miller). Ornicar? 24 (1981):7-31; 25 (1982):13-36; 26/27 (1983):7-44. The final three sessions appeared as `Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet'. Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977):11-52. There are unedited transcripts of the whole seminar available in French and English.#Lacan, J. (1977) [1959] Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock.#Lacan, J. (1977) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. London: Tavistock.# Lacan, J. (1990) `Kant with Sade'. October 51. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.# Lacan, J. (1991) Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, L'envers de la psychanalyse, 1969-1970. Paris: Seuil.# Lacan, J. (1992) The Seminar, Book VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960. New York: W.W. Norton; London: Routledge.# Lacan, J. (1998) The Seminar, Book XX, Encore, 1972-1973, On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge. New York: W.W. Norton. Leonardo S. Rodriguez =====''Unconscious'' Desire=====<!-- If there is any one concept which can claim to be the very center of [[Lacan]]'s thought, it is the concept of [[desire]]. -->[[Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] in arguing that "[[desire]] is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p. 275</ref> [[Desire]] is simultaneously the heart of [[human]] [[existence]] and the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. However, when [[Lacan]] talks about [[desire]], it is not any kind of [[desire]] he is referring to, but always ''[[unconscious]]'' [[desire]]. This is not because [[Lacan]] sees [[conscious]] [[desire]] as unimportant, but simply because it is [[unconscious]] [[desire]] that forms the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. <!-- [[Unconscious]] [[desire]] is entirely [[sexuality|sexual]]; <blockquote>"the motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p. 142</ref></blockquote> --> =====Truth and Desire=====The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his [[desire]]. It is only possible to recognize one's [[desire]] when it is articulate in [[speech]]. <!-- <blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p. 183</ref></blockquote> --> =====Existence=====Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref> However, it is not a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given [[desire]], for this would imply a expressionist theory of [[language]]. On the contrary, by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], the [[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]]. (The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]].) <blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious action of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[subject]] creates, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228-9</ref></blockquote> However, there is a limit to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]];"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the [[unconscious]] (i.e. the fact the the [[unconscious]] is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known''). "Although the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is present to some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]], there is always a leftover, a [[surplus]], which exceeds [[speech]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p. 36</ref> =====Criticism=====One of [[Lacan]]'s most important criticisms of the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]] of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire]] with the related concepts of [[demand]] and [[need]]. In opposition to this tendency, [[Lacan]] insists on distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957,<ref>{{S4}} pp. 100-1, 125</ref>, but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} (1958c) "[[The Signification of the Phallus|La signification du phallus]]." ''[[Écrits]]''. Paris: Seuil, 1966: 685-95 ["[[The Signification of the Phallus|The signification of the phallus]]". Trans. [[Alan Sheridan]] ''[[Écrits: A Selection]]''. London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977: 281-91].</ref> =====Need=====[[Need]] is a purely [[biological]] [[instinct]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The [[human]] [[subject]], being born in a state of [[helplessness]], is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and hence depends on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them. In order to get the [[Other]]'s help, the [[infant]] must express its [[need]]s vocally; need must be articulated in [[demand]]. The primitive [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the [[Other]] to minister to the [[infant]]'s [[need]]s. However, the [[presence]] of the [[Other]] soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]], since this [[presence]] [[symbolize]]s the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. Hence [[demand]] soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of [[need]] and as a [[demand]] for [[love]]. However, whereas the [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, the [[Other]] cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[subject]] craves. Hence even after the [[need]]s which were articulated in [[demand]] have been satisfied, the other aspect of [[demand]], the craving for [[love]], remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is [[desire]].  <blockquote>"Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."<ref>{{E}} p. 287</ref></blockquote> =====Demand=====[[Desire]] is thus the [[surplus]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]];  <blockquote>"Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which [[demand]] becomes separated from need."<ref>{{E}} p. 311</ref></blockquote>  Unlike a [[need]], which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the [[subject]] until another [[need]] arises, [[desire]] can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal. The realisation of [[desire]] does not consist in being "fulfilled", but in the reproduction of [[desire]] as such. =====Alexandre Kojève=====[[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the [[biology|biological]] point of view."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref> =====Desire and Drive=====It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s. Although they both belong to the field of the [[Other]] (as opposed to [[love]]), [[desire]] is one whereas the [[drive]]s are many. In other words, the [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]] (although there may also be [[desire]]s which are not manifested in the [[drive]]s).<ref>{{S11}} p. 243</ref> There is only one [[object]] of [[desire]], [[object (petit) a]], and this is represented by a variety of partial objects in different partial [[drive]]s. The [[object (petit) a]] is not the [[object]] towards which [[desire]] tends, but the [[cause]] of [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]]. =====Desire of the Other=====One of [[Lacan]]'s most oft-repeated formulas is: "man's desire is the desire of the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref> This can be understood in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important. =====More=====1. [[Desire]] is essentially "desire of the Other's desire", which means both [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]], and [[desire]] for recognition by another.  [[Lacan]] takes this idea from [[Hegel]], via [[Kojève]], who states: <blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote> =====Object of Another's Desire=====[[Kojève]] goes on to argue (still following [[Hegel]]) that in order to achieve the [[desire]]d recognition, the [[subject]] must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see [[master]]). That [[desire]] is essentially [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]] is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the [[Oedipus complex]], when the [[subject]] desires to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]]. =====Two=====2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[desire]]s from the point of view of another. The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref> What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]]d by another.  The [[desire]] of the [[Other]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref>  This idea too is taken from [[Kojève]]'s reading of [[Hegel]]; [[Kojève]] argues that: <blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is 'mediated' by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote> <blockquote>The reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>[[CategoryAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969:40</ref></blockquote> =====Hysteria=====This universal feature of [[desire]] is especially evident in [[hysteria]]; the [[hysteric]] is one who sustains another person's [[desire]], converts another's [[desire]] into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire).<ref>{{S4}} p. 138; {{F}} (1905e) "[[{{FB}}|Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria]]." [[SE]] VII, 3.</ref> Hence what is important in the [[analysis]] of a [[hysteric]] is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she [[desire]]s (the [[subject]] with whom she identifies). =====Desire for the Other=====# [[Desire]] is [[desire]] ''for'' the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition ''de''). The fundamental [[desire]] is the incestuous [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p. 67</ref> # [[Desire]] is always "the desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has. The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p. 175</ref> # [[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]]; i.e. in the [[unconscious]].  =====Social Product=====The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]]'s phrase is that [[desire]] is a social product. [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a [[dialectic|dialectical relationship]] with the perceived [[desire]]s of other [[subject]]s. =====(M)other=====The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the child is at the mercy of her [[desire]]. It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by castrating the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to the whims of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]]. ==See Also=={{See}}* [[Need]]||* [[Drive]]||* [[Demand]]{{Also}} ==References==<div style="font-size:11px" class="references-small"><references/></div> {{OK}}[[Category:TermsSymbolic]][[Category:ConceptsReal]][[Category:PsychoanalysisMess]]