Changes

<center>{| cellpadding=def"2" cellspacing="5" align="center" style="border:1px solid #aaaaaa;text-align:center;margin:6px -8px;align:center;vertical-align:top;width:90%;background-color:#fcfcfc"Desire (dEsire|style="text-align:center;color:#000; Wunsch, Begierde, Lust)line-height:2em;width:100%;";|THe Standard Edition translates Freud's ''Wunsch'' as 'wish', which corresponds closely to the Germna wordThis article is currently undergoing major editing.Frued It's French translators, however, have always used 'desire' rather than 'voeu', which corresponds to 'Wunsch' and 'wish'a mess right now, but which is less widely used in current Frenchwill be fixed soon.The crucial distincition betwen |}</center>{{Topppp}}désir]]'Wunsch' and 'wish', on the one hand, and 'desire', on the other, is that the German and English words are limited to individual isolated acts of wishing, whle the French has the much stronger implication of a continuous force.It is this implication that Lacan has elaborated and placed at the centre of his psychoanalytic theory, which is why I have rendered 'dEsire' by 'desire'.|-Furthermore, Lacan has linked the concept of || [[German]]: 'desire' with 'need' (besoin) and 'demand' (deamnde) in the following way.[[Wunsch{{Bottom}}

The human individual sets out with concept of [[desire]] is at the center of [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]] as a particular organismtheoretical, with cetain biological needsethical and clinical point of reference. Theoretically, which are satisfied by certain objects.What effect does the acquisition Lacan's elaboration of language have on these needS?All speech is demand; it presupposes the Other to whom it concept is addressedsupported by, yet goes beyond, whose very signifiers it takes over in its formulationFreudian origins.By the same token From an ethical perspective, that which comes from Lacan has examined in an original way the Other is treated no so much as a particular satisfaction of a need, but rather as a response to an appeal, a gift, a token of love.There is no adequation relationship between the need desire and the demand that conveys it; indeed[[law]], it is the gap betwen them that costitutes desire, at once particular like the first and absolute like the secondits implications for [[treatment|psychoanalytic praxis]].Desire (fundamentally in the singular) is a perpetual effect <!-- he concept of symbolic articulaton.It [[desire]] is not an appetite: it is essentially excentic and insatiable.That is why Lacan co-ordinates it not with the object that would seem to satisfy it, but with the object that causes it (one is reminded central concern of fetishism)[[psychoanalytic theory]].-->

=def=In By shifting the Lacanian cosmology desire is fundamental to every aspect object of study from the imagery of the psychic life manifest content of the individual and dream to the social system its unconscious determinants in which the individual finds himself or herself embedded. It is endemic to the symbolic order (since it is at base a quest for presencedreaming subject, Freud unveiled the possibility structure of which is precluded by both the mechanism of signification), dream and thus inhabits all signification, providing the subject with its primary motivation and frustration. The chief elements Beyond the preconscious wishes attached to a number of desirable objects that the dream-work utilizes, there lies the Lacanian conception of desire as I will outline it here are unconscious wish — indestructible, infantile in its origins in , the master/slave dialectic product of G.W.F. Hegel (as explicated by Alexandre Kojève)repression, its fundamentally social dimension, its relationship to permanently insisting in reaching fulfilment through the death drive, dream and finally its focus on the chief bugbear other formations of all Lacan’s thought, the objet aunconscious.

a) Hegel:Back The indestructibility that Freud attributes to the top.As with Lacan’s conception of the symbolic order, his conception of desire unconscious wish is most fruitfully conceived in light a property of its antecedents and sources. For desire, Lacan draws almost exclusively on the work of Hegel as structural position: it was popularised through Kojève’s lectures in Paris in the 1930s. The central Hegelian text for Lacan is the Phenomenology necessary, not contingent, effect of Spirit, particularly a fundamental gap in the section which elaborates subject's psyche; the master/slave dialectic as gap left by a dawning moment of individual self-consciousness: "Hegel […] provided lost satisfaction (cf. the ultimate theory seventh chapter of the proper function The Interpretation of aggressivity in human ontologyDreams; Freud, seeming to prophecy the iron law of our time. From the conflict of the Master and Slave1953, he deduced the entire subjective and objective progress of our history" (Ecrits 26)pp. The connection between aggressivity and desire is so fundamental that Lacan does not even mention it in this passage, though it turns up repeatedly in his work, perhaps most obviously in his formulation of the infant’s aggressive rivalrous response to his or her specular image in the very moment of recognising it as an object of desire (as that with which he or she would like to be identified509-621).

The basic steps Such a structural gap in Hegel’s dialectic the subject is of the master and the slave are as follows: In a primal moment and place (not unlike that in which Freud situated sexual order; it corresponds ultimately to a loss of sexual jouissance due to the primal act fact of the originary parricide) before prohibition to which sexuality is subjected in the advent of any human community whatever, two individuals encounter one anotherbeing. Prior to this encounter each thinks of himself as unique and supreme in his uniqueness – this uniqueness and supremacy This prohibition is the very foundation of each individual’s identity. When the two individuals confront one anothera structural cultural necessity, thennot a contingency, each and its subjective correlate is faced with the apparition of another individual that Oedipus complex — which is seemingly of the same sort. Each experiences the confrontation as a threat to his position of uniqueness and supremacy in the world. Thus faced with the prospect of having the two axes of their identities disruptednormative organization, the two individuals are unable to acknowledge each other as creatures rather than a more or less typical set of the same order without abandoning their own identities. To do so would be to suspend the desire for recognition which forms the basic motivation of each interlocutor in this situation. Each seeks recognition of his supremacy from the other, but neither will grant it to the other, since to do so would amount to ceding the claims to supremacypsychological manifestations.

The next step model of the unconscious wish elucidated by Freud in this vignette is that each individual sets about asserting his uniqueness and supremacy by attempting to destroy monumental work on dreams remained his guide for the other. This fight is the Hegelian primal fight to the death which can have only two possible outcomes. In the first and more sterile possibility, neither individual cedes rest of his claim to supremacy theoretical and one eventually succeeds clinical production; in slaying the other. The victor is thus returned pa rticular, it continued to his position of uniqueness and supremacyinform, at least until he encounters yet another individual and the drama plays itself out all over again. The second possibility is that one of the individuals will succumb to the instinct for self-preservation end, Freud's clinical interventions — interpretations and surrender to the other. The chief consequence of this surrender is that the loser of the battle agrees to recognise the victor’s supremacy constructions in analysis — and to come under his controlrationale for them. This model is inseparable from the point at which we are now able to speak form of the master (the victor) and the slave (the loser). An irony also occurs at this point in the drama, however, in discourse that Freud created: the only recognition which the master will recognise or accept is that from an equal. The recognition rule of free association, the slavesubject's speech, falls short of this requirement since reveals his subjection deprives him of /her desire and the equality vital to a meaningful recognitionessential gap that constitutes it.

The master thus finds himself in a tautological position Lacan's elaboration of pure self-referentiality, demanding recognition from the slave praxis (as a creature he knows intuitively to be of the same kind as himselftheory and practice) and yet unable to accept the worth of that recognition since it comes from a creature whose innate inferiority he has already established. As a consequence desire extends over his half-century of his victory, however, the master does not simply execute the slave, but persists work in his total domination by putting the slave to work producing objects for his consumption. Thuspsychoanalysis, for example, whereas the master had previously eaten whatever food may have come and attempting to hand, he now demands that abbreviate it or replace the slave prepare the food in such necessary reading with a way as to make it more desirable summary would be imprudent and more completely consumablemisleading. Whereas he may previously have had to eat whatever apples he foundTherefore, the master now demands an apple pie of the slave, compelling him to produce an object of desire that will be completely obliterated we can only indicate some suggestions for further reading (in its enjoyment; the master utterly absorbs that which he enjoys in this fashion, thanks to the work Lacan's works) and further lines of the slave in transforming the objects in the phenomenal world to render them more assimilableenquiry.

The central feature A first ingredient of this domination is the effect it has on the slave. In being forced to prepare objects in the world for the master’s consumption, the slave experiences the ultimate abasement concept of having to defer the satisfaction of his own desire (an unpleasant experience hitherto unknown to the slave) in order Lacan's work contains a Hegelian reference, according to gratify the which desire of the master. That is, he is forced bound to repeat its being recognized — even if later on Lacan emphasized the act of recognition over difference between his and over as he concedes the master’s right of desire for a given object over his own. Even though he may be just as desirous of the apples as the masterHegel's positions (Lacan, 1977 [1959], the slave nonetheless must repeat the drama of recognition in recognising the superiority of the master’s desire for the applespp. The repeated drama of recognition is given its stalemate conclusion each time the master consumes the object of desire prepared by the slave, utterly negating the material evidence of the slave’s recognition of the supremacy of his desire and re292-setting the conditions for yet another repetition of the whole process325).

The slave’s deferral of his own desire in preparing objects of desire for But the master’s consumption is absolutely vital reference to the development Freud's analysis of the slave’s consciousness, desire as he gradually overcomes his fear of nature (the fear of death that lead him to capitulate revealed in his battle with the master) by altering nature through the suspension of his desire and dream is from the application of his labourstart highly significant. Whereas the master exists in pure self-referentiality, then, the slave learns to interact with his world, elevating Lacan emphasized that which he finds around him by transforming it, and governing desire by suspending it. As the master becomes more and more dependent upon the slave’s production for the gratification analysis of his desire, a dialectical process takes place whereby the slave comes to control the master and each moves beyond his designation dream is in the binary master/slave. As the producer fact an analysis of the master’s objects of desiredreamer, the slave gradually comes to govern the satisfaction or suspension of the master’s desirethat is, and thus to control the master’s desire in a roundabout way. Whereas subject who tells the master remains in dream to an ignorant relation to the natural world in which he moves and desires, other (with whom the slave has learned to master that world and thus to master desire. That subject is, engaged in suspending his immediate urge for satisfaction (pleasurea transference-relation), the slave has learned how to increase the value of that desire by deferring it and displacing it. In 'The end result function and field of this drama is that the master expires speech and language in a well of self-referentiality, while the slave rises beyond his slavish state to master the very nature of which his fear psychoanalysis' (i.e. his fear of mortality1953) lead him to surrender in the primal confrontation – human community is born in the repeated suspension and deferral of desire., Lacan writes:

This drama sets the stage for our understanding of Lacan’s conception of :Nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire and finds its central role meaning in the formation and function of subjectivity. The first important feature desire of the master/slave drama is that the nature of other, not so much because the relationship between other holds the master and the slave is only nominally that of establishing a right of precedence over a given object of desire. What is more key to the point is that the struggle between the two is a struggle for the other’s desire. What makes the master’s control over the slave gratifying, beyond the various objects of desire he produces, is that he controls the slave’s desire. In forcing the slave to transform a natural object into an object of desiredesired, as because the master merely succeeds in obtaining a desirable first object (an apple pie, to keep with our example). What makes this process existentially satisfying to the master is that he knows that the slave desires the apple pie as much as he does. This knowledge of the slave’s desire (whether actual or merely supposed) makes the pie all the more desirable, as it is now an emblem of the slave’s (the other’s) desire. Moreover, the more the slave must suspend his desire in order to produce a given object for the master’s consumption, the more the final product may be said to contain the sublimation of that desire. It becomes more than itself as a result of the process recognized by which it is transformed, effectively absorbing the slave’s suppressed and sublimated desire as added valueother. The model of desire that emerges from Hegel’s drama(Lacan, and which Lacan adopts1977 [1959], is thus one in which desire exceeds both demand and needp. Whereas demand and need can both be met, desire is an existential condition which no object or series of objects can ever satiate; it is a "lack of being" as opposed to a "lack of having" (Evans 9558).

Returning thus That the other holds the key to desire as a constitutive feature of human existence, we find a ready expression of how the object desired takes on added value later in Lacan's work. Yet that desire for the other’s desire functions emerges in the mirror stage. As I have shown above, the infant enters the imaginary through a process of identification relationship with a specular image, an "the other" with which it longs to be identified. The essential component to such identificationis dialectical, however (and the aspect that renders it impossible)is, which is embedded in discourse, is the necessity for the other similarly to an essential property of human desire identification with the infant. This Human desire for is the other’s desire is not a simple matter of mutual desire such as that experienced in erotic love, but a more all-encompassing demand for total recognition; the infant wants not some part Other (however large) over and above the others who are concrete incarnations of the other’s desireOther), not 'natural', but all of it – he endogenous appetites or she wants to be tendencies that would push the be-all and end-all subject in one direction or another irrespective of his/her relations with the other’s Other; desire. The impossibility of such a total identification is what keeps subjectivity moving from object to object always inscribed in its quest for an object that will represent and capture the other’s desire and mediated by possession language (cf. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, which the individual can absorb and utterly subjugate the other’s desire. Most simply put, desire is always a desire for the other’s desirean essential reference in its entirety; only the other’s desire for a given object transforms it from an object of demand or need into one of desireLacan, 1977).

The second aspect Lacan's study of desire which Lacan exploits from Hegel’s model is that the dialectical nature of desire as an aggressive drive not simply led to possess an object, but to assimilate it completely, to negate it beyond all redemption. This aspect of his distinction between desire is most clearly represented in the case of the apple pie, which the master seeks not merely to possess, but to make a part of his identity by consuming itneed and demand. The act of negating three terms describe lacks in the pie by eating subject; yet it is also a display of mastery over the other’s desire, since the object is indispensable to some degree always also cathected with the desire of the other (whether because he produced the object or simply because he also desires it). And while the process is nowhere near as clear-cut with objects that are not so literally consumed, the basic dynamic remains the same. Just as the infant in the mirror stage perceives his or her specular image as an object identify each of desirethese lacks, but also as a rival which must be encountered and vanquished in the process their interrelations. The satisfaction of identification, so all desire is fundamentally aggressive and annihilating. Insofar as desire vital needs is a drive subject to possessdemand, it is also always a drive to obtain the absolute right of life and death (or being and non-being) over makes the object: "This is my (car, house, plant, book, sno-cone, etc.) subject dependent on speech and I’ll do what I want with itlanguage."

Clearly this The least noisy appeal of the infant is an extremely basic version of desirealready inscribed in language, and one which does not take into consideration such variations on the theme as are generated it is interpreted by the desire for objects that are desirable only because they render 'significant' others as speech, not as a more desirable object attainable or objects which can never be completely possessed by one individual and are thus subject to distribution and distortionmere cry. NonethelessThis primordial discursive circuit makes of the infant already a speaking being, it provides the basis for our consideration of desire in Lacan’s conception a subject of subjectivityspeech, and points to the fundamentally social character of desire: "The most important point to emerge from Lacan’s phrase [that "even at the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. stage in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but which he/she is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects" (Evans 39)still infant. And while this aspect of desire is certainly important This subordination to keep in mind, it is not simply "the perceived desires of other subjects" which motivates desire, but the prohibition on fulfillment of desire which provides Other through language marks the most stimulus for its reproductionhuman forever.Lacan writes:

If we recall Lacan’s reliance on :The phenomenology that emerges from analytic experience is certainly of a kind to demonstrate in desire the insights of structural anthropologyparadoxical, deviant, erratic, and the dialectical nature of his thinking on desireeccentric, we can see that the establishment of human community and the formalisation of desire even scandalous character by which it is as dependent distinguished from need [...]:Demand in itself bears on its prohibition as something other than the satisfactions it calls for. It is on the perception demand of a presence or of an absence — which is what is desirable. As with the slave’s necessary suspension of his desire manifested in the production of objects for primordial relation to the master’s consumptionmother, each subject is governed by a series pregnant with that Other to be situated short of prohibitions the needs that make desire it can satisfy.:Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the ultimate motivational force in subjectivity. Analogous 'privilege' of satisfying needs, that is to say, the master’s prohibition power of the slave’s enjoymentdepriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied [...].:In this way, the law demand annuls (inaugurated by the paternal prohibition from enjoying the mother’s body''aufhebt'') actually "creates desire in the first place particularity of everything that can be granted by creating interdiction. Desire is essentially the desire to transgresstransmuting it into a proof of love, and for there to be transgression the very satisfactions that it is first necessary obtains for there to be prohibition" need are reduced (Evans 99''sich erniedrigt''). Interdiction effectively seals off certain objects to the level of desire or kinds being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.:Thus desire as unlawfulis neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, thus endowing them with a mystique but the difference that allows for their conception as results from the final answer to desire. Tantamount to subtraction of the curiosity-arousing command not to look in first from the one locked room in a many-roomed mansionsecond, the law thus participates in the generation phenomenon of desire as that which circulates endlessly around a prohibited coretheir splitting (Spaltung). (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp.286-7)

Yet simply to conceive of the core around which desire circulates as prohibited is to miss a vital condition of that prohibition, the fact that it is simply the articulation This residual status of a pre-existing impossibility, since desire is by constitutes its very nature insatiable. The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility. The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossibleessence; the paternal interdiction only formalises at this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with point the compensation question of symbolisation. Likewise, the prohibitive aspect of the law is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental impossibility at the heart object of desireacquires crucial importance. In the name Lacan considered his theory of the social good a society may prohibit certain kinds or objects of desire, but the reality is that no this object can ever fulfil desire. The belief that desire is a desire for something is perhaps the greatest misperception of all, and one which makes even less sense if we consider the intimate link between desire, subjectivity, and languageto be his only original contribution to psychoanalysis.

The fact that desire is born at the moment of the infant’s accession to the symbolic order (i.e. at the same moment as the infant becomes a subject) leads Lacan to maintain that it is part and parcel of the signifying chain in its essential metonymy: "man’s desire is a metonymy. […] desire is a metonymy" (Ecrits 175). The perpetual reference of one signifier to all others in Although an eternal deferral of meaning as content, as "consisting" exaggeration in any one signreality, as present in any way, is but another formulation of the ceaseless movement of desire. The full-blown outgrowth of the drive to identification governing the mirror stage, desire Lacan's position is more sophisticated than that drive, bound up justified because with an awareness of the absence at the core of subjectivity and vulnerable to complex strategies of deferral, displacement, and sublimation in ways to which imaginary drives are impervious. Inseparable from the symbolic order, desire is fundamentally metonymic and inheres in signification as such. Just as the signifying capacity of any individual signifier is always subverted by its failure to coincide precisely with that which it signifies, so any attempt to satisfy desire is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable. "Although the truth about desire is present to some degree theory he introduced in all speech, speech can never articulate the whole truth about desire; whenever speech attempts to articulate desire, there is always a leftover, a surplus, which exceeds speech" (Evans 36). This innate incapacity of language fully to articulate desire extends to subjectivity insofar as it, too, is psychoanalysis a function conception of the symbolic order. The surplus which object that is left over after every attempt to articulate desire, to bring it to genuinely revolutionary and that makes possible a halt and see it coincide once and for all with some particular object or configuration of objects (or signifier or configuration rational critique of signifiers), however frustrating, is also the very lifeblood notion of subjectivity, as it forestalls the necessary corollary to the fulfillment of desire, the dissolution of the subject'object relations' and its clinical applications. == def ==

For what Lacan emphasized was the illusory nature of any object that appears to fulfil desire , while the gap, the original splitting which is constitutive of the subject, is real; and it is in this gap that the object a, the object cause of desire, installs itself. (dÈsirLacan 1977; in particular, chapter 20) .

Lacan's term, dÈsir, is Desire requires the term used in support of the French translations of Freud to translate Freud's term Wunschfantasy, which is translated operates as its 'wish' by Strachey in the Standard Edition. Hence English translators of Lacan are faced with a dilemma; should they translate dÈsir by mise en scène'wish', which is closer to Freud's Wunsch, or should they translate it as 'where the fading subject faces the lost object thatcauses his/her desire'(Lacan 1977 [1959], which is closer to the French term, but which lacks the allusion to Freud? All p. 313). This fading of Lacan's English translators have opted for the latter, since subject in the English term 'fantastic scenario that supports his/her desire is what makes desire' conveys, like opaque to the French term, the implication of subject him-/herself. Desire is a continuous force, which is essential to Lacan's conceptmetonymy (p. The English term also carries with 175) because the object that causes it the same allusions to Hegel's Begierde , constituted as are carried by the French termlost, makes it displace permanently, and thus retains the philosophical nuances which are so essential from object to Lacan's concept of dÈsir and which make object, as no one object can really satisfy it 'a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by Freud himself' (Macey, 1995: 80).

If there is any one concept which can claim to be the very centre of Lacan's thought, it is the concept This permanent displacement of desire. Lacan follows Spinoza in arguing that 'desire is the essence logic of man' (Sll, 275; see Spinoza, 1677: 128)the unconscious; desire is simultaneously the heart of human existence, and the central concern of psychoanalysis. However, when thus Lacan talks about could say that desire, it is not any kind of desire he is referring toits interpretation, but always unconscious desire. This is not because Lacan sees conscious desire as unimportant, but simply because it is unconscious desire that forms the central concern of psychoanalysis. Unconscious desire is entirely sexual; 'moves along the motives chain of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desiresignifiers, that of hunger, is not represented' without ever being captured by any particular signifier (E, 142)cf.The aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to recognise the truth about his desire. HoweverSeminar VI, it is only possible to recognise one's desire when it is articulated in speech: Desire and its Interpretation'It is only once it is formulated, named in the presence of the other, that desire, whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term' (Sl; Lacan, 1831958-59).

Hence in psychoanalysis 'what's important is to teach In the subject to nameanalytic experience, to articulate, to bring this desire into existence' (S2, 228). Howevermust be taken literally', as it is not a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given desire, for this would imply a expressionist theory through the unveiling of language. On the contrary, by articulating desire in speech, the analysand brings signifiers that support it (albeit never exhausting it into existence:That the subject should come to recognise and to name his desire; ) that is theefficacious action of analysis. But it isn't a question of recognising some-thing which would its real cause can be entirely given. . . . In naming it, the subject createscircumscribed (Lacan,brings forth1977 [1959], a new presence in the worldpp. (S2, 228256-977).

However, there Desire is a limit the other side of the law: the contributions of psychoanalysis to how far desire can be articulated in speech because of a fundamental 'incompatibility between desire ethical reflection and speech' practice have started off by recognizing this principle (ELacan, 2751990; 1992); it is this incompatibility which explains . Desire opposes a barrier to jouissance - the irreducibility jouissance of the unconscious drive (i.e. always partial, not in relation to the fact that body considered as a totality, but to the unconscious organic function to which it is not that attached and from which is not knownit detaches), but and that which cannot be known). Although of the truth about desire is present super-ego (with its implacable command to some degree in all speech, speech can never articulate the whole truth about desireenjoy; whenever speech attempts to articulate desireLacan, there is always a leftover1977 [1959], a surplus, which exceeds speechp. 319).

One Thus, desire appears to be on the side of life preservation, as it opposes the lethal dimension of jouissance (the partiality of Lacan's most important criticisms the drive, which disregards the requirements of the psychoanalytic theories living organism, and the demands of his day was the superego - that they tended to confuse `senseless law' - which result in the concept self-destructive unconscious sense of guilt). But desire itself is not without a structural relation with death: death at the related concepts heart of DEMAND and NEED. In opposition to this tendency, Lacan insists on distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge the speaking being's lack-in his work in 1957 -being (see S4, 100-1, 125manqué à l'être); death in the mortifying effect of those objects of the world that entice desire, but only crystallises in 1958 (Lacaninducing its alienation, 1958c)without ever satisfying any promise.

Need There is a purely biological INSTINCT, an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of no Sovereign Good that would sustain the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The human subject, being born in a state of helplessness, is unable to satisfy its own needs, and hence depends on the Other to help it satisfy them. In order to get the Other`right's help, the infant must express its needs vocally; need must be articulated in demand. The primitive demands orientation of the infant may only be inarticulate screamsdesire, but they serve to bring or guarantee the Other to minister to the infantsubject's needswell-being. HoweverAs a consequence, the presence ethics of the Other soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance psychoanalysis require that goes beyond the satisfaction of need, since this presence symbolises the Other's love. Hence demand soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of need and as a demand for love. However, whereas the Other can provide the objects which the subject requires analyst does not pretend to embody or to satisfy his needs, the Other cannot provide that unconditional love which the subject craves. Hence even after the needs which were articulated in demand have been satisfied, the other aspect of demand, the craving deliver any Sovereign Good; it rather prescribes for love, remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is desire. 'Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference analyst that results from `the subtraction only thing of the first from the second' (E, 287).Desire which one can be guilty is thus the surplus produced by the articulation of need in demand; having given ground relative to one''Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from needs desire' (ELacan, 311). Unlike a need1992, which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the subject until another need arises, desire can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternalp. The realisation of desire does not consist in being 'fulfilled', but in the reproduction of desire as such319).

LacanThe analyst's distinction between need and desire, which lifts 'a desire to obtain absolute difference', is the original Lacanian concept of desire completely out that defines the position of the realm analyst in analytic discourse, and represents a culmination of biology, is strongly reminiscent his elucidationof KojËve's distinction between animal and human desire; desire is shown to be distinctively human when it is directed either toward another desire, or to an object which is 'perfectly useless from the biological point function of view' desire in psychoanalysis (KojËveLacan, 1977, 1947: 6p. 276; 1991).

It This position is important to distinguish between desire and structural, constitutive of analytic discourse - not a psychological state of the drivesanalyst. Although they both belong to It is his/her lack-in-being, rather than any 'positive' mode of being that orients the field analyst's direction of the Other treatment (as opposed to loveLacan, 1977 [1959], p. 230), desire is one whereas . This means that the analyst cannot incarnate an ideal for the drives are many. In other wordsanalysand, and that he/she occupies a position of semblant of the drives are the particular (partial) manifestations cause of a single force called desire (although there may also be desires which are not manifested in the drives: see S1lLacan, 2431991; 1998). There is only one object of desire, OBJETPETITA, and Only in this is represented by a variety of partial objects in different partial drives. The OBJET PETIT A iS not way may the object towards which analyst's desire tends, but become the cause instrument of the analysand's access to his/her own desire. Desire is not a relation to an object, but a relation to a LACK.

One of Lacan's most oft-repeated formulas isSee also: 'man's desire is the desire of the Other' (Sll[[jouissance]], 235). This can be understood in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.[[subject]]

1ReferencesFreud, S. (1953) [1900a] The Interpretation of Dreams. Desire is essentially 'desire Standard Edition of the Other's desire', which means both desire to be the object Complete Psychological Works of another's desireSigmund Freud, and desire for recognition by anotherVols 4 & 5. Lacan takes this idea from Hegel, via KojËve, who statesLondon:Hogarth Press.

Desire is human only if the one desires#Lacan, not the bodyJ. (1958-59) `Le désir et son interpretation' (seven sessions, but ed. by J.-A. Miller). Ornicar? 24 (1981):7-31; 25 (1982):13-36; 26/27 (1983):7-44. The final three sessions appeared as `Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet'. Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977):11-52. There are unedited transcripts of the other whole seminar available in French and English. #Lacan, J. (1977) [1959] Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock.#Lacan, J. (1977) The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. London: Tavistock. that is to say# Lacan, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'lovedJ. (1990) `Kant with Sade'. October 51. Cambridge, orMA and London: MIT Press.# Lacan, ratherJ. (1991) Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, L'recognised' in his human valueenvers de la psychanalyse, 1969-1970. Paris: Seuil. # Lacan, J. . In other words(1992) The Seminar, Book VII, all humanThe Ethics of Psychoanalysis, anthropogenetic Desire 1959-1960. New York: W.W. Norton; London: Routledge. # Lacan, J. is(1998) The Seminar, finallyBook XX, a function Encore, 1972-1973, On Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of the desire for 'recognition'Love and Knowledge. (KojËve, 1947New York: 6)W.W. Norton. Leonardo S. Rodriguez

KojËve goes on =====Truth and Desire=====The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to argue (still following Hegel) that in order lead the [[analysand]] to achieve recognize the desired recognition, the subject must risk [[truth]] about his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see MASTER)[[desire]]. That desire It is essentially desire only possible to be the object of anotherrecognize one's [[desire ]] when it is clearly illustrated articulate in [[speech]]. <!-- <blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the first 'time' [[presence]] of the Oedipus complex[[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, when is recognised in the subject desires to be full sense of the phallus for the motherterm."<ref>{{S1}} p.183</ref></blockquote> -->

2. It =====Existence=====Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is qua Other that to teach the [[subject desires (E]] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref> However, 312): that it isnot a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given [[desire]], for this would imply a expressionist theory of [[language]]. On the subject desires from contrary, by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], the point of view of another[[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]]. (The effect of this is [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that 'the object of man's [[desire ]] into [[existence]]. . . is essentially an object desired by someone else' (Lacan, 1951b:)

12). What makes an object desirable is not any intrinsic quality of <blockquote>"That the thing in itself but simply the fact [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desire]]; that it is desired by anotherthe efficacious action of [[analysis]]. The desire of the Other is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this But it isn'tends to diminish the special significance t a question of any one particular object[[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, but at the same time it [[subject]] creates, brings into view the existence of objects without number' (Lacanforth, 1951b: 12).This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that 'Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to new [[presence]] in the extent that it is "mediatedworld." by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it' (KojËve, 1947: 6)<ref>{{S2}} p.228-9</ref></blockquote>

The reason for this goes back However, there is a limit to the former point about human how far [[desire being ]] can be articulated in [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire for recognition]] and [[speech]]; by desiring that "<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which another desires, I can make explains the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make irreducibility of the other recognise my superiority over him [[unconscious]] (KojËvei.e. the fact the the [[unconscious]] is not that which ''is not known'', 1947: 40but that which ''cannot be known'').

This universal feature of "Although the [[truth]] about [[desire ]] is especially evident present to some degree in hysteria; all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the hysteric is one who sustains another person's whole [[truth]] about [[desire, converts another's ]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K]], thus appropriating his perceived desire; S4there is always a leftover, 138; see Freuda [[surplus]], 1905e)which exceeds [[speech]]. Hence what is important in the analysis of a hysteric is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she desires (the subject with whom she identifies)"<ref>{{Evans}} p.36</ref>

3. Desire is =====Criticism=====One of [[Lacan]]'s most important criticisms of the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]] of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire for ]] with the Other related concepts of [[demand]] and [[need]]. In opposition to this tendency, [[Lacan]] insists on distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957,<ref>{{S4}} pp. 100-1, 125</ref>, but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} (playing on the ambiguity 1958c) "[[The Signification of the French preposition de)Phallus|La signification du phallus]]." ''[[Écrits]]''. Paris: Seuil, 1966: 685-95 ["[[The fundamental desire is Signification of the incestuous desire for Phallus|The signification of the motherphallus]]". Trans. [[Alan Sheridan]] ''[[Écrits: A Selection]]''. London: Tavistock, the primordial Other (S71977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 67)1977: 281-91].</ref>

4=====Need=====[[Need]] is a purely [[biological]] [[instinct]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. Desire The [[human]] [[subject]], being born in a state of [[helplessness]], is always unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and hence depends on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them. In order to get the [[Other]]'s help, the desire for something else[[infant]] must express its [[need]]s vocally; need must be articulated in [[demand]]. The primitive [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the [[Other]] to minister to the [[infant]]' (Es [[need]]s. However, the [[presence]] of the [[Other]] soon acquires an importance in itself, 167)an importance that goes beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]], since it is impossible this [[presence]] [[symbolize]]s the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. Hence [[demand]] soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of [[need]] and as a [[demand]] for [[love]]. However, whereas the [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to desire what one already hassatisfy his [[need]]s, the [[Other]] cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[subject]] craves. The object Hence even after the [[need]]s which were articulated in [[demand]] have been satisfied, the other aspect of desire is continually deferred[[demand]], the craving for [[love]], remains unsatisfied, which and this leftover is why [[desire is a METONYMY (E, 175)]].

5. <blockquote>"Desire emerges originally in is neither the field of appetite for satisfaction, nor the Other; i.e. in demand for love, but the unconscious. The most important point to emerge difference that results from Lacan's phrase is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with subtraction of the first from the perceived desires of other subjectssecond."<ref>{{E}} p.287</ref></blockquote>

The first person to occupy the place of the Other is the mother, and at first the child is at the mercy of her desire. It =====Demand=====[[Desire]] is only when the Father articulates desire with thus the law [[surplus]] produced by castrating the mother that the subject is freed from subjection to the whims articulation of the mother's desire (see CASTRATION COMPLEX).== def ==[[need]] in [[demand]];

In [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]], <blockquote>"Desire begins to take shape in the term '''desire''' designates the impossible relation that a [[subject (philosophy)|subject]] has with [[objet petit a]]. According to Lacan, desire proper (margin in contrast with which [[demand (psychoanalysis)|demand]]) can never be fulfilledbecomes separated from need."<ref>{{E}} p.311</ref></blockquote>

Desire =====Alexandre Kojève=====[[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the Desire [[biology|biological]] point of view."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the OtherReading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>

=====Desire and Drive=====It is on the basis of this fundamental understanding of identity that Lacan maintained throughout his career that important to distinguish between [[desire is ]] and the desire of the Other[[drive]]s. What is meant by him in this formulation is not the triviality that humans desire others, when Although they sexually desire (an observation which is not universally true). Again developing Freud's theorisation of sexuality, Lacan's contention is rather that what psychoanalysis reveals is that human-beings need to learn how and what to desire. Lacanian theory does not deny that infants are always born into the world with basic biological needs that need constant or periodic satisfaction. Lacan's stress, however, is that, from a very early age, the child’s attempts both belong to satisfy these needs become caught up in the dialectics field of its exchanges with others. Because its sense of self is only ever garnered from identifying with the images of these others [[Other]] (or itself in the mirror, as a kind of otheropposed to [[love]]), Lacan argues that it demonstrably belongs to humans to [[desire- directly- as or through another or others. We get a sense of his meaning when we consider such social phenomena as fashion. As the squabbling of children more readily testifies, it ]] is fully possible for an object to become desirable for individuals because they perceive that others desire it, such that when these others' desire is withdrawn, one whereas the object also loses its allure[[drive]]s are many. Lacan articulates this 'decentring' of desire when he contends that what has happened to the biological needs of the individual is that they have become inseparable from, and importantly subordinated to, the vicissitudes of its demand for the recognition and love of In other people. Events as apparently 'natural' as the passing or holding back of stool, he remarks in Ecritswords, become episodes in the chronicle of [[drive]]s are the child's relationship with its parents, expressive particular (partial) manifestations of its compliance or rebellion. A hungry child a single force called [[desire]] (although there may even refuse to eat food if it perceives that this food is offered less as a token of love than one of its parents' dissatisfaction or impatience.In this light, Lacan's important recourse to game theory also becomes explicable. For game theory involves precisely the attempt to formalise the possibilities available to individuals in situations where their decisions concerning their wants can in principle both affect and be affected by the decisions of others. As Lacan'[[desire]]s article which are not manifested in the Ecrits on the "Direction [[drive]]s).<ref>{{S11}} p. 243</ref> There is only one [[object]] of the Treatment" spells out[[desire]], he takes it that the analytic situation, as theorised by Freud around the notion of transference [[object (see Part 2petit)a]], and this is precisely such represented by a situation. In that essay, Lacan focuses on the dream variety of the butcher's wife partial objects in Freud'different partial [[drive]]s Interpretation of Dreams. The said 'butcher’s wife’ thought that she had had [[object (petit) a dream ]] is not the [[object]] towards which was proof of [[desire]] tends, but the invalidity [[cause]] of Freud's theory that dreams are always encoded wish-fulfilments[[desire]]. As Freud comments, however, this dream becomes explicable when one considers how, after [[Desire]] is not a patient has entered into analysis, her wishes are constructed (at least in part) in relation to the perceived wishes of the analyst. In this casean [[object]], at least one of the wishes expressed by the dream was the woman's wish that Freud’s desire (for his theory to be correct) be thwarted. In the same way, Lacan details how the deeper unconscious wish expressed in the manifest content of the dream (which featured the woman attempting but a relation to stage a dinner party with only one piece of smoked salmon) can only be comprehended as the coded fulfilment of a desire that her husband would not fulfil her every wish, and leave her with an unsatisfied desire[[lack]].

=====More=====1. [[Desire]] is essentially "desire of the Other's desire", which means both [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]], and [[desire]] for recognition by another.  [[Lacan]] takes this idea from [[Hegel]], via [[Kojève]], who states: <blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote> =====Object of Another's Desire=====[[Kojève]] goes on to argue (still following [[Hegel]]) that in order to achieve the [[desire]]d recognition, the [[subject]] must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see [[master]]). That [[desire]] is essentially [[desire]] to be the [[Categoryobject]] of another's [[desire]] is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the [[Oedipus complex]], when the [[subject]] desires to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]]. =====Two=====2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[desire]]s from the point of view of another. The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref> What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]]d by another.  The [[desire]] of the [[Other]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref>  This idea too is taken from [[Kojève]]'s reading of [[Hegel]]; [[Kojève]] argues that: <blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is 'mediated' by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote> <blockquote>The reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969:40</ref></blockquote> =====Hysteria=====This universal feature of [[desire]] is especially evident in [[hysteria]]; the [[hysteric]] is one who sustains another person's [[desire]], converts another's [[desire]] into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire).<ref>{{S4}} p. 138; {{F}} (1905e) "[[{{FB}}|Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria]]." [[SE]] VII, 3.</ref> Hence what is important in the [[analysis]] of a [[hysteric]] is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she [[desire]]s (the [[subject]] with whom she identifies). =====Desire for the Other=====# [[Desire]] is [[desire]] ''for'' the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition ''de''). The fundamental [[desire]] is the incestuous [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p. 67</ref> # [[Desire]] is always "the desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has. The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p. 175</ref> # [[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]]; i.e. in the [[unconscious]].  =====Social Product=====The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]]'s phrase is that [[desire]] is a social product. [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a [[dialectic|dialectical relationship]] with the perceived [[desire]]s of other [[subject]]s. =====(M)other=====The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the child is at the mercy of her [[desire]]. It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by castrating the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to the whims of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]]. ==See Also=={{See}}* [[Need]]||* [[Drive]]||* [[Demand]]{{Also}} ==References==<div style="font-size:11px" class="references-small"><references/></div> {{OK}}[[Category:TermsSymbolic]][[Category:ConceptsReal]][[Category:PsychoanalysisMess]]