Changes

<center>{| cellpadding="2" cellspacing="5" align="center" style="border:1px solid #aaaaaa;text-align:center;margin:6px -8px;align:center;vertical-align:top;width:90%;background-color:#fcfcfc"|style="text-align:center;color:#000;line-height:2em;width:100%;";|This article is currently undergoing major editing. It's a mess [[right]] now, but will be fixed soon.|}</center>{{TopTopppp}}désir]]''|-|| [[German]]: ''[[Wunsch{{Bottom}}

The concept of [[Desiredesire]] is at the center of [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]] as a major [[theoretical]], [[ethical]] and [[clinical]] point of reference. Theoretically, Lacan's elaboration of the [[concept ]] is supported by, yet goes beyond, its [[Freudian]] origins. From an ethical perspective, Lacan has examined in an original way the [[relationship]] between desire and the [[law]], and its implications for [[treatment|psychoanalytic praxis]].<!-- he concept of [[desire]] is the central concern of [[psychoanalytic theory]].-->

The concept ==Sigmund Freud==<!--[[Freud]]'s ''[[Interpretation of Dreams]]'' established the basis for the psychoanalytic conception of desire (including Lacan's own contributions), even if the Freudian ''[[Wunsch]]'' (translated as 'wish' in the ''[[Standard Edition]]'') does not exactly coincide with Lacan's desire.<ref>(Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 256-7)</ref>-->[[Lacan]]'s term, ''[[désir]]'', is the term used in the [[French]] translations of [[Freud]] to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Wunsch]]'', which is translated as "[[wish]]" in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''. <!-- Hence English translators of [[Lacan]] are faced with a dilemma; should they translate ''[[désir]]'' by "[[wish]]", which is closer to [[Freud]]'s ''[[Wunsch]]'', or should they translate it as "[[desire]]", which is closer to the [[French]] term, but which [[lacks]] the allusion to [[Freud]]? All of [[Lacan]]'s [[English]] translators have opted for the latter, since the [[English]] term "[[desire]] " conveys, like the [[French]] term, the implication of a ''continuous force'', which is essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept. The [[English]] term also carries with it the same allusions to [[Hegel]]'s ''[[Begierde]]'' as are carried by the [[French]] term, and thus retains the central concern [[philosophical]] nuances which are so essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept of ''[[désir]]'' and which make it "a [psychoanalytic theory[category]] far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]]himself." -->

By shifting the object of study from the imagery of the [[manifest]] [[Lacancontent]]'s termof the [[dream]] to its unconscious determinants in the dreaming subject, ''Freud unveiled the [[désirstructure]]''of both the dream and [[The Subject|the subject]]. Beyond the [[preconscious]] wishes attached to a [[number]] of desirable [[objects]] that the dream-[[work]] utilizes, is there lies the term used unconscious wish — indestructible, [[infantile]] in its origins, the French translations product of Freud to translate Freud's term Wunsch[[repression]], which is translated as 'wish' by Strachey permanently insisting in reaching fulfilment through the dream and the other [[formations]] of the Standard Editionunconscious.

Hence English translators The indestructibility that Freud attributes to the unconscious wish is a property of its [[structural]] [[Lacanposition]] are faced with a dilemma; should they translate ''désir'' by 'wish': it is the necessary, which is closer to not [[Freudcontingent]], effect of a fundamental gap in the subject's ''Wunsch'', or should they translate it as "[[desirepsyche]]", which is closer to ; the gap [[Frenchleft]] term, but which lacks by a lost satisfaction (cf. the allusion to seventh chapter of The [[Interpretation]] of [[FreudDreams]]? ; Freud, 1953, pp. 509-621).

All Such a structural gap in the subject is of a [[Lacansexual]]'s [[Englishorder]] translators have opted for ; it corresponds ultimately to a [[loss]] of sexual jouissance due to the latter, since fact of the [[Englishprohibition]] term "to which [[desiresexuality]]" conveys, like is subjected in the human [[being]]. This prohibition is a structural [[Frenchcultural]] [[necessity]] term, the implication of not a continuous force[[contingency]], and its [[subjective]] correlate is the [[Oedipus]] [[complex]] — which is essential to a [[normative]] organization, rather than a more or less typical set of [[Lacanpsychological]]'s conceptmanifestations.

The [[Englishmodel]] term also carries with of the unconscious wish elucidated by Freud in his monumental work [[On Dreams|on dreams]] remained his [[guide]] for the rest of his theoretical and clinical production; in pa rticular, it continued to inform, until the same allusions to Hegelend, Freud's Begierde as are carried by the clinical interventions — [[Frenchinterpretations]] term, and thus retains constructions in analysis — and his rationale for [[them]]. This model is inseparable from the philosophical nuances which are so essential to [[Lacanform]]'s concept of ''désir'' and which make it "a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[discourse]] that Freudcreated: the rule of free [[association]] himself."<ref>Macey, 1995: 80<the subject's speech, reveals his/ref>her desire and the essential gap that constitutes it.

==Human Desire==If there is any one concept which can claim to be Lacan's elaboration of the very center of praxis ([[theory]] and [[Lacanpractice]]'s thought) of desire extends over his half-century of work in psychoanalysis, and attempting to abbreviate it is or replace the concept of necessary [[reading]] with a [[desiresummary]]would be imprudent and misleading. Therefore, we can only indicate some suggestions for further reading (in Lacan's works) and further lines of enquiry.

A first ingredient of the concept of desire in Lacan's work contains a [[LacanHegelian]] follows reference, according to which desire is bound to its being recognized — even if later on Lacan emphasized the [[Spinozadifference]] in arguing that "between his and Hegel's positions (Lacan, 1977 [[desire1959]]" is the essence of man, pp."<ref>{{S11}} p292-325). 275</ref>

[[Desire]] But the reference to Freud's analysis of desire as revealed in the dream is simultaneously from the heart start highly significant. Lacan emphasized that the analysis of the dream is in fact an analysis of the dreamer, that is, a subject who tells the dream to an other (with whom the subject is engaged in a [[humantransference]] -relation). In '[[existence]] The function and the central concern field of [[speech and language in psychoanalysis]].' (1953), Lacan writes:

However, when :Nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire finds its [[Lacanmeaning]] talks about [[in the desire]]of the other, it is not any kind of so much because the other holds the key to the object desired, as because the first [[object of desire]] he is referring tobe recognized by the other. (Lacan, but always 1977 [[unconscious]] [[desire]1959], p.58)

This That the other holds the key to the object desired takes on added [[value]] later in Lacan's work. Yet that desire emerges in a relationship with the other which is not because [[Lacandialectical]] sees , that is, which is embedded in discourse, is an essential property of human desire. Human desire is the desire of the Other (over and above the [[consciousothers]] who are [[desireconcrete]] as unimportantincarnations of the Other), but simply because it is not '[[unconsciousnatural]] ', endogenous appetites or tendencies that would push the subject in one direction or [[another]] irrespective of his/her relations with the Other; desireis always inscribed in and mediated by language (cf. The Four Fundamental [[Concepts]] that forms the central concern of [[psychoanalysisPsycho]]-Analysis, which is an essential reference in its entirety; Lacan, 1977).

Lacan's study of the dialectical [[Unconsciousnature]] of desire led to his [[distinction]] between desire, need and demand. The [[three]] [[terms]] describe lacks in the subject; yet it is entirely indispensable to [[sexuality|sexualidentify]]:each of these lacks, and their interrelations. The satisfaction of vital [[needs]] is subject to demand, and makes the subject dependent on speech and language.

<blockquote>"The motives least noisy appeal of the unconscious are limited infant is already inscribed in language, as it is [[interpreted]] by the 'significant' others as speech, not as a mere cry. . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desireThis primordial discursive circuit makes of the infant already a [[speaking]] being, that a subject of hungerspeech, even at the [[stage]] in which he/she is not representedstill infant."<ref>{{E}} pThis subordination to the Other through language marks the human forever.142</ref></blockquote>Lacan writes:

:The [[phenomenology]] that emerges from [[analytic]] [[experience]] is certainly of a kind to demonstrate in desire the paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric, even scandalous [[character]] by which it is distinguished from need [...]:Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls for. It is demand of a presence or of an [[absence]] — which is what is manifested in the primordial relation to the mother, pregnant with that Other to be situated short of the needs that it can satisfy.:Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of [[satisfying]] needs, that is to say, the [[power]] of depriving them of that alone by which they are [[satisfied]] [...].:In this way, demand annuls (''aufhebt'') the [[particularity]] of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced (''sich erniedrigt'') to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.:Thus desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the phenomenon of their [[splitting]] ([[Spaltung]]). (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 286---7)

This residual status of desire constitutes its [[Desireessence]] is ; at this point the heart question of the [[human]] [[existence]], fundamental to every aspect Object of Desire|object of the [[psychic]] [[lifedesire]] acquires crucial importance. Lacan considered his theory of the [[individual]] and this object to be his only original contribution to the [[social]] [[system]] in which the [[individual]] finds him or herself embeddedpsychoanalysis.

Although an exaggeration in [[Desirereality]] provides , Lacan's position is justified because with that theory he introduced in psychoanalysis a conception of the object that is genuinely revolutionary and that makes possible a [[rational]] critique of the [[subjectnotion]] with its primary motivation and of '[[frustrationobject relations]]' and its clinical applications.

==Desire and Psychoanalytic Treatment====Truth of Desire in Psychoanalytic Treatment==The For what Lacan emphasized was the [[aimillusory]] nature of any object that appears to fulfil desire, while the gap, the original splitting which is constitutive of the subject, is [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatmentreal]] ; and it is to lead in this gap that the [[analysandobject a]] to recognize , the object [[truthcause of desire]] about his or her , installs itself. (Lacan 1977; in [[desireparticular]], chapter 20).

It is only possible to recognize oneDesire requires the support of the [[fantasy]], which operates as its ''mise en scène''s , where the [[desirefading]] when it is articulate in subject faces the [[speechlost object]]thatcauses his/her desire (Lacan 1977 [1959], p. 313). This fading of the subject in the fantastic scenario that supports his/her desire is what makes desire opaque to the subject him-/herself. Desire is a metonymy (p. 175) because the object that causes it, constituted as lost, makes it displace permanently, from object to object, as no one object can really satisfy it.

<blockquote>"It This permanent [[displacement]] of desire follows the [[logic]] of the unconscious; thus Lacan could say that desire is only once its interpretation, as it is formulated, named in moves along the [[presencechain]] of the unconscious [[othersignifiers]], that without ever being [[captured]] by any particular [[signifier]] (cf. [[desireSeminar]]VI, whatever it is'[[Desire and its Interpretation]]'; Lacan, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p1958-59). 183</ref></blockquote>

Hence in In the [[psychoanalysisanalytic experience]], "whatdesire 's important must be taken literally', as it is to teach through the unveiling of the signifiers that support it (albeit never exhausting it) that its real cause can be circumscribed (Lacan, 1977 [[subject]1959] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]pp."<ref>{{S2}} p256-77). 228</ref>

However, it Desire is not a question the other side of the law: the contributions of seeking psychoanalysis to ethical [[reflection]] and practice have started off by recognizing this [[principle]] (Lacan, 1990; 1992). Desire opposes a new means [[barrier]] to jouissance - the jouissance of expression for the drive (always [[partial]], not in relation to the [[body]] considered as a given [[desiretotality]], for this would imply a expressionist theory but to the [[organic]] function to which it is attached and from which it detaches), and that of the [[languagesuper-ego]](with its implacable command to [[enjoy]]; Lacan, 1977 [1959], p. 319).

On Thus, desire appears to be on the contraryside of [[life]] preservation, by articulating as it opposes the lethal [[dimension]] of jouissance (the partiality of the drive, which disregards the requirements of the [[living]] organism, and the [[demands]] of the [[superego]] - that `[[senseless]] law' - which result in the [[self]]-destructive unconscious [[sense]] of [[guilt]]). But desireitself is not without a structural relation with [[death]] in : death at the heart of the [[speechspeaking being]], 's lack-in-being (manqué à l'être); death in the mortifying effect of those objects of the [[analysandworld]] brings it into that entice desire, inducing its [[existencealienation]], without ever satisfying any promise.

<blockquote>"That There is no Sovereign [[Good]] that would sustain the `right' orientation of desire, or [[subjectguarantee]] should come to recognise and to name his the subject's well-being. As a consequence, the [[desireethics]]; of psychoanalysis require that is the efficacious action of [[analysisanalyst]]. But does not pretend to embody or to deliver any Sovereign Good; it isn't a question of rather prescribes for the analyst that `the only [[recognisingthing]] something of which would one can be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[subjectguilty]] createsis of having given ground relative to one's desire' (Lacan, brings forth1992, a new [[presence]] in the worldp."<ref>{{S2}} p319). 228-9</ref></blockquote>

The This position is structural, constitutive of analytic discourse - not a psychological [[analysandstate]]of the analyst. It is his/her lack-in-being, by articulating rather than any 'positive' mode of being that orients the analyst's [[desireDirection of the Treatment|direction of the treatment]](Lacan, 1977 [1959] in , p. 230). This means that the analyst cannot incarnate an [[speechideal]]for the analysand, (does not simply give expression to and that he/she occupies a pre-existing position of [[desiresemblant]] but ratherof the cause of desire (Lacan, 1991; 1998) brings that [[. Only in this way may the analyst's desire]] into become the [[existenceinstrument]]of the analysand's access to his/her own desire.

However, there is a limit to how far References[[desireFreud, S.]] can be articulated in [(1953) [speech]1900a] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desireThe Interpretation of Dreams]] and . Standard Edition of the [[speechComplete]];"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility Psychological Works of the [[unconsciousSigmund Freud]] (i, Vols 4 & 5.e. the fact the the [[unconsciousLondon]] is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known''): Hogarth Press.

"Although #Lacan, J. (1958-59) `Le désir et son interpretation' (seven sessions, ed. by J.-A. [[Miller]]). [[Ornicar]]? 24 (1981):7-31; 25 (1982):13-36; 26/27 (1983):7-44. The final three sessions appeared as `Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in [[truthHamlet]] about '. Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977):11-52. There are unedited transcripts of the [[desirewhole]] is present to some degree seminar available in all French and English.#Lacan, J. (1977) [1959] Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock.#Lacan, J. (1977) The [[speechFour Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis]]. London: Tavistock.# Lacan, J. (1990) `[[Kant]] with [[speechSade]] can never articulate the whole '. October 51. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.# Lacan, J. (1991) Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, L'envers de la [[truthpsychanalyse]] about , 1969-1970. [[desireParis]]; whenever : Seuil.# Lacan, J. (1992) [[speechThe Seminar]] attempts to articulate , Book VII, [[desireThe Ethics of Psychoanalysis]], there is always a leftover1959-1960. New York: W.W. Norton; London: Routledge.# Lacan, J. (1998) The Seminar, Book XX, a [[surplusEncore]], which exceeds 1972-1973, On [[Feminine]] Sexuality: The Limits of Love and [[speechKnowledge]]."<ref>{{Evans}} pNew York: W.W. Norton. [[Leonardo]] S. 36</ref>Rodriguez

=====''Unconscious'' Desire=====<!--If there is any one concept which can [[claim]] to be the very center of [[Lacan]]'s [[thought]], it is the concept of [[desire]]. -->[[Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] in arguing that "[[desire]] is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p. 275</ref> [[Desire]] is simultaneously the heart of [[human]] [[existence]] and the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. However, when [[Lacan]] talks [[about]] [[desire]], it is not any kind of [[desire]] he is referring to, but always ''[[unconscious]]'' [[desire]]. This is not because [[Lacan]] sees [[conscious]] [[desire]] as unimportant, but simply because it is [[unconscious]] [[desire]] that forms the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. <!-- [[Unconscious]] [[desire]] is entirely [[sexuality|sexual]]; <blockquote>"the motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p. 142</ref></blockquote> -->

One =====Truth and Desire=====The [[aim]] of Lacan[[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his [[desire]]. It is only possible to recognize one's most important criticisms [[desire]] when it is articulate in [[speech]]. <!-- <blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the psychoanalytic theories of his day was [[other]], that they tended to confuse [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the concept [[full]] sense of desire with the related concepts of DEMAND and NEEDterm."<ref>{{S1}} p. 183</ref></blockquote> -->

In opposition =====Existence=====Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to [[name]], to articulate, to bring this tendency[[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref> However, Lacan insists on distinguishing between these three conceptsit is not a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given [[desire]], for this would imply a expressionist theory of [[language]]. On the contrary, by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], the [[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]]. (The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]]. )

This distinction begins <blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to emerge in recognise and to name his work in 1957 (see S4[[desire]]; that is the efficacious [[action]] of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, 100-1the [[subject]] creates, 125)brings forth, but only crystallises a new [[presence]] in 1958 (Lacan, 1958c)the world."<ref>{{S2}} p.228-9</ref></blockquote>

Need "Although the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is a purely [[biologicalpresent]] to some degree in all [[instinctspeech]], an appetite which emerges according [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to the requirements of the organism and articulate [[desire]], there is always a leftover, a [[surplus]], which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfiedexceeds [[speech]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p. 36</ref>

The =====Criticism=====One of [[humanLacan]] 's most important criticisms of the [[subjectpsychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]], being born in a state of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire]] with the related concepts of [[helplessnessdemand]]and [[need]]. In opposition to this tendency, is unable [[Lacan]] insists on distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957,<ref>{{S4}} pp. 100-1, 125</ref>, but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} (1958c) "[[satisfyThe Signification of the Phallus|La signification du phallus]] its own ." ''[[needÉcrits]]s''. Paris: Seuil, and hence depends on 1966: 685-95 ["[[The Signification of the Phallus|The signification of the phallus]]". Trans. [[OtherAlan Sheridan]] to help it ''[[satisfyÉcrits: A Selection]]''. London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977: 281-91] them. </ref>

=====Need=====[[Need]] is a purely [[biological]] [[instinct]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The [[human]] [[subject]], being [[born]] in a state of [[helplessness]], is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and hence depends on the [[Other]] to [[help]] it [[satisfy]] them. In order to get the [[Other]]'s help, the [[infant]] must express its [[need]]s vocally; need must be articulated in [[demand]].   The [[primitive ]] [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the [[Other]] to minister to the [[infant]]'s [[need]]s.   However, the [[presence]] of the [[Other]] soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]], since this [[presence]] [[symbolize]]s the [[Other]]'s [[love]].   Hence [[demand]] soon takes on a [[double ]] function, serving both as an articulation of [[need]] and as a [[demand]] for [[love]].   However, whereas the [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, the [[Other]] cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[subject]] craves.   Hence even after the [[need]]s which were articulated in [[demand]] have been satisfied, the other aspect of [[demand]], the craving for [[love]], remains [[unsatisfied]], and this leftover is [[desire]].

---=====Demand=====[[Desire]] is thus the [[surplus ]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]];

Unlike a [[need]], which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the [[subject]] until another [[need]] arises, [[desire]] can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal.   The realisation of [[desire]] does not consist in being "fulfilled", but in the reproduction of [[desire]] as such.

=====Alexandre Kojève=====[[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the [[biology|biological]] point of view."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933---39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. [[James]] H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>

=====Desire and Drive=====It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[Lacandrive]]'s distinction between . Although they both belong to the field of the [[Other]] (as opposed to [[needlove]] and ), [[desire]] is one whereas the [[drive]]s are many. In other [[words]], which lifts the concept [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]] (although there may also be [[desire]] completely out of s which are not manifested in the realm [[drive]]s).<ref>{{S11}} p. 243</ref> There is only one [[object]] of [[biologydesire]], [[object (petit) a]], and this is strongly reminiscent represented by a variety of Kojève'[[partial objects]] in different partial [[drive]]s distinction between animal and human . The [[object (petit) a]] is not the [[object]] towards which [[desire]]; tends, but the [[cause]] of [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is shown not a relation to be distinctively human when it is directed either toward another an [[desireobject]], or but a relation to an object which is "perfectly useless from the biological point of viewa [[lack]]."<ref>Kojève, 1947: 6</ref>

=====Desire of the Other=====One of [[Lacan]]'s most oft---repeated [[formulas]] is: "man's desire is the desire of the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref> This can be [[understood]] in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.

It =====More=====1. [[Desire]] is important essentially "desire of the Other's desire", which means both [[desire]] to distinguish between be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]] , and the [[drivedesire]] for [[recognition]]sby another.

Although they both belong to the field of the [[OtherLacan]] (as opposed to takes this [[loveidea]]), from [[desireHegel]] is one whereas the , via [[driveKojève]]s are many. , who states:

<blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.<ref>[[driveAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called 1947 [[desire1933-39]] (although there may also be [[desire]]s which are not manifested in ) ''Introduction to the [[drive]]s)Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr.New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>{{S11}} p. 243</refblockquote>

There is only one =====Object of Another's Desire=====[[Kojève]] goes on to argue (still following [[objectHegel]] of ) that in order to achieve the [[desire]]d recognition, the [[subject]] must risk his own life in a [[object struggle]] for pure prestige (petitsee [[master]]) a. That [[desire]], and this is represented by a variety essentially [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of partial objects another's [[desire]] is clearly illustrated in different partial the first '[[drivetime]]' of the [[Oedipus complex]], when the [[subject]] desires to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]]s.

The =====Two=====2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[object (petit) adesire]] s from the point of view of another. The effect of this is not that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} "[[objectSome Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b] towards which : 12</ref> What makes an [[desireobject]] tends, but the desirable is not any intrinsic quality of [[causethe thing]] of in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]]d by another.

The [[Desiredesire]] of the [[Other]] is not a relation thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to an diminish the special [[objectsignificance]]of any one particular object, but a relation to a at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} "[[lackSome Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref>

One <blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is 'mediated' by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>[[LacanAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]](1947 [1933-39]) 's most oft-repeated formulas is: "man's desire is Introduction to the desire Reading of the OtherHegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr."New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>{{S11}} p. 235</refblockquote>

This <blockquote>The [[reason]] for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can be understood in many complementary waysmake the other recognise my right to possess that object, of which and thus make the following are other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the most importantReading of Hegel''. Trans. James H.Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 40</ref></blockquote>

1. =====Desire for the Other=====# [[Desire]] is essentially "[[desire ]] ''for'' the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the OtherFrench preposition ''de''s desire", which means both ). The fundamental [[desire]] to be is the incestuous [[objectdesire]] of another's for the [[desiremother]], and the primordial [[desireOther]] for recognition by another. <ref>{{S7}} p. 67</ref>

[[Lacan]] takes this idea from Hegel, via Kojève, who states: --- <blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.<ref>KojËve, 1947: 6</ref></blockquote> --- KojËve goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that in order to achieve the desired recognition, the subject must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see MASTER).  That desire is essentially desire to be the object of another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the Oedipus complex, when the subject desires to be the phallus for the mother. --- 2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[desire]]s from the point of view of another.  The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} 1951b: 12</ref>  What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]]d by another.  The [[desire]] of the [[Other]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish the special significance of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} 1951b: 12</ref> This idea too is taken from KojËve's reading of Hegel; KojËve argues that: <blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is "mediated" by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>KojËve, 1947: 6</ref> --- <blockquote>The reason for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>KojËve, 1947: 40</ref></blockquote> --- This universal feature of [[desire]] is especially evident in [[hysteria]]; the [[hysteric]] is one who sustains another person's [[desire]], converts another's [[desire]] into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138; see Freud, 1905e).  Hence what is important in the [[analysis]] of a [[hysteric]] is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she [[desire]]s (the [[subject]] with whom she identifies). --- # [[Desire]] is desire for the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition de).  The fundamental [[desire]] is the incestuous [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial Other (S7, 67).  # [[Desire]] is always "the desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is [[impossible ]] to [[desire]] what one already has.   The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p. 175</ref>

--- The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]]'s phrase is that desire is a social product.  [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other [[subject]]s. --- The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the child is at the mercy of her [[desire]].  It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by castrating the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to the whims of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]]. ==Desire, Need and Demand==[[Lacan]] distinguishes between three related concepts:* [[desire]]* [[need]] (''besoin'')* [[demand]] (''demande'')  =Social Product=Need==The [[human]] [[infant]] is born with certain [[biological]] [[need]]s that require (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]]. The [[human]] [[infant]] has certain [[biological]] [[need]]s which are satisfied by certain [[object]]s. [[Need]] is a [[biological]] [[instinct]] that requires (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]]. [[Need]] emerges according to the requirements of the organism and abates completely (even if only temporarily) when [[satisfied]]. The [[human]] [[infant]] is born into a state of [[helplessness]], and is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[biological]] [[needs]]. The [[infant]], unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[needs]], must depend on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them. The [[Other]] can help to [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s of the [[infant]]. The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s. ==Demand==The function of [[demand]] is to serve as an articulation of [[need]]. The [[infant]], in order to get help from the [[Other]], must articulate (express) its [[need]]s (vocally) in (the form of a) [[demand]]. The [[demand]] serves to bring the [[Other]] to help [[satisfy]] the [[needs]] of the [[infant]]. [[Demand]] is also a [[demand]] for [[love]] (beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]]). The [[presence]] of the [[Other]] (becomes most important in itself) [[symbolizes]] the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. The [[biological]] [[need]]s of the [[infant]] becomes subordinated point to the [[demand]] for the [[recognition]] and [[love]] of the [[Other]].  The [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]]. The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, but cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[infant]] craves.  The [[Other]] (can [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s that are articulated in the [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] but) cannot [[satisfy]] the [[infant]]'s [[demand]] for [[love]]. Even after the [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]], [[demand]] (as the [[demand]] for [[love]]) remains [[unsatisfied]] This leftover is [[desire]]. ==Desire==[[Desire]] is what remains of [[demand]] after the [[need]]s which are articulated in that [[demand]] are [[satisfied]]. <blockquote>"[[Desire]] is neither the appetite for [[satisfaction]], nor the [[demand]] for [[love]], but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."<ref>{{E}} p.287</ref></blockquote> [[Desire]] is the [[surplus]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]]. <blockquote>"[[Desire]] begins to take shape in the margin in which [[demand]] becomes separated emerge from [[need]]."<ref>{{E}} p.311</ref></blockquote> [[Desire]], unlike [[need]], can never be [[satisfied]]. A [[need]] (that is [[satisfied]]) ceases to motivate the [[infant]] until another [[need]] arises. [[Desire]] is constant in its pressure, and eternal.   ==Desire of the Other==[[Lacan]] asserted that [[desire]] is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]]. [[Desire]] is [[human]] when it is directed toward another [[desire]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]'s [[desire]] phrase is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]].<ref>{{S11}} p.235</ref></blockquote> The statement provides the basis for our consideration of [[desire]] in [[Lacan]]’s conception of [[subjectivity]] and points to the fundamentally social character of [[desire]].  ==Object of the Other's Desire==[[Desire]] is the [[desire]] for the [[Other]]'s [[desire]], that is, the [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of the [[Other]]'s [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is a [[desire]] for '[[recognition]]' (by another). The [[Oedipus complex]] illustrates the [[desire]] of the [[subject]] to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]]. ==Object Desired by Others==<blockquote>"The [[object]] of [[man]]'s [[desire]] ... is essentially an [[object]] [[desire]]d by someone else."<ref>Lacan. 1951b. p.12</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] is [[desirable]] (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because [[other]]s [[desire]] it. It is qua [[Other]] that the [[subject]] [[desire]]s.<ref>{{E}} p.312</ref> It is [[human]] to [[desire]] what others [[desire]] because they [[desire]] it. ==Desire for the Other==[[Desire]] is [[desire]] for the [[Other]]. The fundamental [[desire]] is the [[incestuous]] [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p.67</ref>  ==Impossible Desire==<blockquote>[[Desire]] is always "the [[desire]] for something else," because it is impossible to [[desiresocial]] what one already has.<ref>{{E}} p.167</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref>  ==Social Desire==[[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]], that is, in the [[unconscious]]. [[Desire]] is a social product. [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be, but is always constituted in a [[dialectic|dialecticalrelationship]] relationship with the perceived [[desire]]s of others. <blockquote>The most important point to emerge from Lacan’s phrase [that "the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects."<ref>Evans 39</ref></blockquote> OBJET AThe [[objet petit a]] is represented by a variety of [[partial object]]s in diffent partial [[drive]]s. The [[objet petit a]] is not the object towards which [[desire]] tends, but the cause of desire. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].  ==Desire and Prohibition==<blockquote>The [[law]] (or [[prohibition]]) "creates [[desire]] in the first place by creating interdiction. [[Desire]] is essentially the [[desire]] to [[transgress]], and for there to be [[transgression]] it is first necessary for there to be [[prohibition]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p.99</ref></blockquote> The [[law]] gives rise to [[desire]] as that which circulates endlessly around a [[prohibited]] core (of ''[[jouissance]]''). (The [[prohibition]] establishes [[desire]] as the ultimate motivational force in [[subjectivity]].)   ==Desire and Language== [[Desire]] is created at the moment of the [[infant]]'s accession to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]. [[Desire]] is inseparable from the [[symbolic]] [[order]] and thus inhabits all (inheres in) [[signification]] (as such). [[Desire]] is inscribed in the [[signifying chain]] in its essential [[metonymy]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]’s [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]]. [...] [[Desire]] is a [[metonymy]]."<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref></blockquote> The perpetual reference of one [[signifer]] to another in an eternal deferral of [[meaning]] is a formulation of the ceaseless movement of [[desire]]. ==Impossible Desire== According to [[Lacan]], [[desire]] is by its very nature [[insatiable]]; it can never be fulfilled. Any attempt to [[satisfy]] [[desire]] is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable. [[Desire]] designates the impossible relation that a [[subject]] has with [[objet petit a]].  The core around which [[desire]] circulates is [[prohibited]]. ==Desire and Impossibility==The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility.  The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossible. The paternal interdiction only formalises this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with the compensation of symbolisation. The prohibitive aspect of the [[law]] is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental [[impossibility]] at the heart of desire.  No [[object]] can ever fulfil [[desire]].  ==Desire and the Death Drive== [[Lacan]] posits a distinction between [[desire]] and [[drive]]. It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.  The [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]].

 __NOTOC__[[Category:Mess]]