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<center>{| cellpadding="2" cellspacing="5" align="center" style="border:1px solid #aaaaaa;text-align:center;margin:6px -8px;align:center;vertical-align:top;width:90%;background-color:#fcfcfc"|style="text-align:center;color:#000;line-height:2em;width:100%;";|This article is currently undergoing major editing. It's a mess [[right]] now, but will be fixed soon.|}</center>{{TopTopppp}}désir]]''|-|| [[German]]: ''[[Wunsch{{Bottom}}

The concept of [[Desiredesire]] is at the center of [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]] as a major [[theoretical]], [[ethical]] and [[clinical]] point of reference. Theoretically, Lacan's elaboration of the [[concept ]] is supported by, yet goes beyond, its [[Freudian]] origins. From an ethical perspective, Lacan has examined in an original way the [[relationship]] between desire and the [[law]], and its implications for [[treatment|psychoanalytic praxis]].<!-- he concept of [[desire]] is the central concern of [[psychoanalytic theory]].-->

The concept ==Sigmund Freud==<!--[[Freud]]'s ''[[Interpretation of Dreams]]'' established the basis for the psychoanalytic conception of desire (including Lacan's own contributions), even if the Freudian ''[[Wunsch]]'' (translated as 'wish' in the ''[[Standard Edition]]'') does not exactly coincide with Lacan's desire.<ref>(Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 256-7)</ref>-->[[Lacan]]'s term, ''[[désir]]'', is the term used in the [[French]] translations of [[Freud]] to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Wunsch]]'', which is translated as "[[wish]]" in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''. <!-- Hence English translators of [[Lacan]] are faced with a dilemma; should they translate ''[[désir]]'' by "[[wish]]", which is closer to [[Freud]]'s ''[[Wunsch]]'', or should they translate it as "[[desire]]", which is closer to the [[French]] term, but which [[lacks]] the allusion to [[Freud]]? All of [[Lacan]]'s [[English]] translators have opted for the latter, since the [[English]] term "[[desire]] " conveys, like the [[French]] term, the implication of a ''continuous force'', which is essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept. The [[English]] term also carries with it the same allusions to [[Hegel]]'s ''[[Begierde]]'' as are carried by the [[French]] term, and thus retains the central concern [[philosophical]] nuances which are so essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept of ''[[désir]]'' and which make it "a [psychoanalytic theory[category]] far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]]himself." -->

By shifting the object of study from the imagery of the [[manifest]] [[content]] of the [[dream]] to its unconscious determinants in the dreaming subject, Freud unveiled the [[structure]] of both the dream and [[The Subject|the subject]]. Beyond the [[preconscious]] wishes attached to a [[number]] of desirable [[objects]] that the dream----[[work]] utilizes, there lies the unconscious wish — indestructible, [[infantile]] in its origins, the product of [[repression]], permanently insisting in reaching fulfilment through the dream and the other [[formations]] of the unconscious.

The indestructibility that Freud attributes to the unconscious wish is a property of its [[Lacanstructural]]'s term, ''[[désirposition]]'', : it is the term used in the necessary, not [[Frenchcontingent]] translations , effect of a fundamental gap in the subject's [[Freudpsyche]] to translate ; the gap [[Freudleft]]'s term ''by a lost satisfaction (cf. the seventh chapter of The [[WunschInterpretation]]'', which is translated as "of [[wishDreams]]" by Strachey in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''; Freud, 1953, pp. 509-621).

Hence English translators Such a structural gap in the subject is of a [[sexual]] [[Lacanorder]] are faced with ; it corresponds ultimately to a dilemma; should they translate ''[[désirloss]]'' by "of sexual jouissance due to the fact of the [[wishprohibition]]", to which [[sexuality]] is closer to subjected in the human [[being]]. This prohibition is a structural [[Freudcultural]]'s ''[[Wunschnecessity]]'', or should they translate it as "not a [[desirecontingency]]", and its [[subjective]] correlate is the [[Oedipus]] [[complex]] — which is closer to the a [[Frenchnormative]] termorganization, but which lacks the allusion to rather than a more or less typical set of [[Freudpsychological]]? manifestations.

All The [[model]] of the unconscious wish elucidated by Freud in his monumental work [[LacanOn Dreams|on dreams]]'s remained his [[Englishguide]] translators have opted for the latterrest of his theoretical and clinical production; in pa rticular, since it continued to inform, until the end, Freud's clinical interventions — [[Englishinterpretations]] term "and constructions in analysis — and his rationale for [[desirethem]]" conveys, like . This model is inseparable from the [[Frenchform]] term, of [[discourse]] that Freud created: the implication rule of a continuous force, which is essential to free [[Lacanassociation]], the subject's conceptspeech, reveals his/her desire and the essential gap that constitutes it.

The [[English]] term also carries with it the same allusions to [[Hegel]]Lacan's ''elaboration of the praxis ([[Begierdetheory]]'' as are carried by the and [[Frenchpractice]] term) of desire extends over his half-century of work in psychoanalysis, and thus retains attempting to abbreviate it or replace the philosophical nuances which are so essential to necessary [[Lacanreading]]'s concept of ''with a [[désirsummary]]would be imprudent and misleading. Therefore, we can only indicate some suggestions for further reading (in Lacan'' s works) and which make it "a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]] himselffurther lines of enquiry."<ref>Macey, 1995: 80</ref>

==Human Desire==If there is any one A first ingredient of the concept of desire in Lacan's work contains a [[Hegelian]] reference, according to which can claim desire is bound to be its being recognized — even if later on Lacan emphasized the very center of [[Lacandifference]]between his and Hegel's thoughtpositions (Lacan, it is the concept of 1977 [[desire]1959], pp. 292-325).

But the reference to Freud's analysis of desire as revealed in the dream is from the start highly significant. Lacan emphasized that the analysis of the dream is in fact an analysis of the dreamer, that is, a subject who tells the dream to an other (with whom the subject is engaged in a [[Lacantransference]] follows -relation). In '[[Spinoza]] The function and field of speech and language in arguing that "[[desirepsychoanalysis]]" is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p. 275</ref>' (1953), Lacan writes:

:Nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire finds its [[Desiremeaning]] is simultaneously in the heart desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the key to the object desired, as because the first [[humanobject of desire]] [[existence]] and is to be recognized by the central concern of [other. (Lacan, 1977 [psychoanalysis]1959], p.58)

HoweverThat the other holds the key to the object desired takes on added [[value]] later in Lacan's work. Yet that desire emerges in a relationship with the other which is [[dialectical]], that is, which is embedded in discourse, when is an essential property of human desire. Human desire is the desire of the Other (over and above the [[Lacanothers]] talks about who are [[desireconcrete]]incarnations of the Other), it is not any kind of '[[natural]]', endogenous appetites or tendencies that would push the subject in one direction or [[desireanother]] he irrespective of his/her relations with the Other; desire is referring to, but always inscribed in and mediated by language (cf. The Four Fundamental [[unconsciousConcepts]] of [[desirePsycho]]-Analysis, which is an essential reference in its entirety; Lacan, 1977).

This is not because Lacan's study of the dialectical [[Lacannature]] sees of desire led to his [[consciousdistinction]] between desire, need and demand. The [[desirethree]] as unimportant, but simply because it is [[unconsciousterms]] describe lacks in the subject; yet it is indispensable to [[desireidentify]] that forms the central concern each of these lacks, and their interrelations. The satisfaction of vital [[psychoanalysisneeds]]is subject to demand, and makes the subject dependent on speech and language.

The least noisy appeal of the infant is already inscribed in language, as it is [[Unconsciousinterpreted]] by the 'significant' others as speech, not as a mere cry. This primordial discursive circuit makes of the infant already a [[desirespeaking]] is entirely being, a subject of speech, even at the [[sexuality|sexualstage]]in which he/she is still infant. This subordination to the Other through language marks the human forever. Lacan writes:

<blockquote>":The motives [[phenomenology]] that emerges from [[analytic]] [[experience]] is certainly of a kind to demonstrate in desire the unconscious are limited paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric, even scandalous [[character]] by which it is distinguished from need [.. . ]:Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls for. It is demand of a presence or of an [[absence]] — which is what is manifested in the primordial relation to sexual desire the mother, pregnant with that Other to be situated short of the needs that it can satisfy.:Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of [[satisfying]] needs, that is to say, the [[power]] of depriving them of that alone by which they are [[satisfied]] [... ]. :In this way, demand annuls (''aufhebt'') the [[particularity]] of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced (''sich erniedrigt'') to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love. The other great generic :Thus desireis neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of hungerthe first from the second, is not representedthe phenomenon of their [[splitting]] ([[Spaltung]])."<ref>{{E}} p(Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 142</ref></blockquote>286-7)

Although an exaggeration in [[Desirereality]] , Lacan's position is justified because with that theory he introduced in psychoanalysis a conception of the heart of [[human]] object that is genuinely revolutionary and that makes possible a [[existencerational]], fundamental to every aspect critique of the [[psychic]] [[lifenotion]] of the '[[individualobject relations]] ' and to the [[social]] [[system]] in which the [[individual]] finds him or herself embeddedits clinical applications.

For what Lacan emphasized was the [[Desireillusory]] provides nature of any object that appears to fulfil desire, while the gap, the original splitting which is constitutive of the subject, is [[subjectreal]] with its primary motivation ; and it is in this gap that the [[object a]], the object [[cause of desire]], installs itself. (Lacan 1977; in [[frustrationparticular]], chapter 20).

==Desire and Psychoanalytic Treatment====Truth requires the support of Desire in Psychoanalytic Treatment==The the [[aimfantasy]] of , which operates as its ''mise en scène'', where the [[psychoanalyticfading]] subject faces the [[treatmentlost object]] is to lead the [thatcauses his/her desire (Lacan 1977 [analysand1959]] to recognize , p. 313). This fading of the subject in the [[truth]] about fantastic scenario that supports his or /her [[desire]]is what makes desire opaque to the subject him-/herself. Desire is a metonymy (p. 175) because the object that causes it, constituted as lost, makes it displace permanently, from object to object, as no one object can really satisfy it.

It is only possible to recognize one's This permanent [[displacement]] of desirefollows the [[logic]] when of the unconscious; thus Lacan could say that desire is its interpretation, as it is articulate in moves along the [[chain]] of unconscious [[signifiers]], without ever being [[captured]] by any particular [[signifier]] (cf. [[Seminar]] VI, '[[speechDesire and its Interpretation]]'; Lacan, 1958-59).

<blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in In the [[presence]] of the [[otheranalytic experience]], that [[desire]]'must be taken literally', whatever as it is, is recognised in through the full sense unveiling of the termsignifiers that support it (albeit never exhausting it) that its real cause can be circumscribed (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp."<ref>{{S1}} p256-77). 183</ref></blockquote>

Hence in Desire is the other side of the law: the contributions of psychoanalysis to ethical [[reflection]] and practice have started off by recognizing this [[psychoanalysisprinciple]](Lacan, "what's important is 1990; 1992). Desire opposes a [[barrier]] to teach jouissance - the jouissance of the drive (always [[subjectpartial]] , not in relation to namethe [[body]] considered as a [[totality]], but to the [[organic]] function to articulatewhich it is attached and from which it detaches), to bring this and that of the [[desiresuper-ego]] into (with its implacable command to [[existenceenjoy]]; Lacan, 1977 [1959], p."<ref>{{S2}} p319). 228</ref>

HoweverThus, desire appears to be on the side of [[life]] preservation, as it opposes the lethal [[dimension]] of jouissance (the partiality of the drive, which disregards the requirements of the [[living]] organism, and the [[demands]] of the [[superego]] - that `[[senseless]] law' - which result in the [[self]]-destructive unconscious [[sense]] of [[guilt]]). But desire itself is not without a question structural relation with [[death]]: death at the heart of the [[speaking being]]'s lack-in-being (manqué à l'être); death in the mortifying effect of seeking a new means those objects of expression for a given the [[desireworld]]that entice desire, for this would imply a expressionist theory of inducing its [[languagealienation]], without ever satisfying any promise.

On There is no Sovereign [[Good]] that would sustain the contrary`right' orientation of desire, by articulating or [[desireguarantee]] in the subject's well-being. As a consequence, the [[speechethics]], of psychoanalysis require that the [[analysandanalyst]] brings does not pretend to embody or to deliver any Sovereign Good; it into rather prescribes for the analyst that `the only [[existencething]]of which one can be [[guilty]] is of having given ground relative to one's desire' (Lacan, 1992, p. 319).

<blockquote>"That The analyst's desire, 'a desire to obtain absolute difference', is the original [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desireLacanian]]; concept that is defines the efficacious action position of the analyst in [[analysisanalytic discourse]]. But it isn't , and represents a question culmination of his elucidationof [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[subject]] createsfunction of desire in psychoanalysis (Lacan, brings forth1977, a new [[presence]] in the worldp."<ref>{{S2}} p276; 1991). 228-9</ref></blockquote>

This position is structural, constitutive of analytic discourse -not a psychological [[state]] of the analyst. It is his/her lack-in-being, rather than any 'positive' mode of being that orients the analyst's [[Direction of the Treatment|direction of the treatment]] (Lacan, 1977 [1959], p. 230). This means that the analyst cannot incarnate an [[ideal]] for the analysand, and that he/she occupies a position of [[semblant]] of the cause of desire (Lacan, 1991; 1998). Only in this way may the analyst's desire become the [[instrument]] of the analysand's access to his/her own desire.

The See also: [[analysandjouissance]], by articulating [[desiresubject]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]].

However#Lacan, there is a limit to how far J. (1958-59) `Le désir et son interpretation' (seven sessions, ed. by J.-A. [[desireMiller]] can be articulated ). [[Ornicar]]? 24 (1981):7-31; 25 (1982):13-36; 26/27 (1983):7-44. The final three sessions appeared as `Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in [[speechHamlet]] because '. Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977):11-52. There are unedited transcripts of a fundamental "incompatibility between the [[desirewhole]] seminar available in French and English.#Lacan, J. (1977) [1959] Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock.#Lacan, J. (1977) The [[speechFour Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis]];"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the London: Tavistock.# Lacan, J. (1990) `[[Kant]] with [[unconsciousSade]] '. October 51. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.# Lacan, J. (i1991) Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, L'envers de la [[psychanalyse]], 1969-1970.e[[Paris]]: Seuil. the fact the the # Lacan, J. (1992) [[unconsciousThe Seminar]] is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known''Book VII, [[The Ethics of Psychoanalysis]], 1959-1960. New York: W.W. Norton; London: Routledge.# Lacan, J. (1998)The Seminar, Book XX, [[Encore]], 1972-1973, On [[Feminine]] Sexuality: The Limits of Love and [[Knowledge]]. New York: W.W. Norton. [[Leonardo]] S.Rodriguez

"Although =====''Unconscious'' Desire=====<!-- If there is any one concept which can [[claim]] to be the very center of [[Lacan]]'s [[thought]], it is the concept of [[desire]]. -->[[truthLacan]] about follows [[Spinoza]] in arguing that "[[desire]] is present to some degree in all the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p. 275</ref> [[Desire]] is simultaneously the heart of [[speechhuman]], [[speechexistence]] can never articulate and the whole central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. However, when [[truthLacan]] talks [[about ]] [[desire]]; whenever , it is not any kind of [[speechdesire]] attempts he is referring to articulate , but always ''[[unconscious]]'' [[desire]]. This is not because [[Lacan]] sees [[conscious]] [[desire]] as unimportant, there but simply because it is always a leftover, a [[surplusunconscious]] [[desire]] that forms the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. <!-- [[Unconscious]] [[desire]], which exceeds is entirely [[speechsexuality|sexual]]; <blockquote>"the motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."<ref>{{EvansE}} p. 36142</ref></blockquote> -->

=====Truth and Desire=====The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his [[desire]]. It is only possible to recognize one's [[desire]] when it is articulate in [[speech]]. <!--<blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the [[full]] sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p. 183</ref></blockquote> -->

One of Lacan=====Existence=====Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's most important criticisms is to teach the [[subject]] to [[name]], to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref> However, it is not a question of seeking a new means of the psychoanalytic theories expression for a given [[desire]], for this would imply a expressionist theory of his day was that they tended to confuse [[language]]. On the concept of contrary, by articulating [[desire with ]] in [[speech]], the related concepts of DEMAND and NEED[[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]]. (The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]]. )

<blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious [[action]] of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In opposition to this tendencynaming it, the [[subject]] creates, brings forth, Lacan insists on distinguishing between these three conceptsa new [[presence]] in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228-9</ref></blockquote>

This distinction begins However, there is a [[limit]] to emerge in his work how far [[desire]] can be articulated in 1957 [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[speech]];"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the [[irreducibility]] of the [[unconscious]] (see S4, 100-1, 125)i.e. the fact the the [[unconscious]] is not that which ''is not known'', but only crystallises in 1958 (Lacan, 1958cthat which ''cannot be known'').

Need is a purely =====Criticism=====One of [[biologicalLacan]] 's most important criticisms of the [[instinctpsychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]], an appetite which emerges according of his day was that they tended to confuse the requirements concept of [[desire]] with the organism related concepts of [[demand]] and which abates completely [[need]]. In opposition to this tendency, [[Lacan]] insists on distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957,<ref>{{S4}} pp. 100-1, 125</ref>, but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} (even if only temporarily1958c) when satisfied"[[The Signification of the Phallus|La signification du phallus]]." ''[[Écrits]]''. Paris: Seuil, 1966: 685-95 ["[[The Signification of the Phallus|The signification of the phallus]]". Trans. [[Alan Sheridan]] ''[[Écrits: A Selection]]''. London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977: 281-91]. </ref>

=====Need=====[[Need]] is a purely [[biological]] [[instinct]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The [[human]] [[subject]], being [[born ]] in a state of [[helplessness]], is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and hence depends on the [[Other]] to [[help ]] it [[satisfy]] them.   In order to get the [[Other]]'s help, the [[infant]] must express its [[need]]s vocally; need must be articulated in [[demand]].   The [[primitive ]] [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the [[Other]] to minister to the [[infant]]'s [[need]]s.   However, the [[presence]] of the [[Other]] soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]], since this [[presence]] [[symbolize]]s the [[Other]]'s [[love]].   Hence [[demand]] soon takes on a [[double ]] function, serving both as an articulation of [[need]] and as a [[demand]] for [[love]].   However, whereas the [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, the [[Other]] cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[subject]] craves.   Hence even after the [[need]]s which were articulated in [[demand]] have been satisfied, the other aspect of [[demand]], the craving for [[love]], remains [[unsatisfied]], and this leftover is [[desire]].

---=====Demand=====[[Desire]] is thus the [[surplus ]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]];

Unlike a [[need]], which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the [[subject]] until another [[need]] arises, [[desire]] can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal.   The realisation of [[desire]] does not consist in being "fulfilled", but in the reproduction of [[desire]] as such. --- [[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of Kojève's distinction between animal and human [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively human when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the biological point of view."<ref>Kojève, 1947: 6</ref> --- It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.  Although they both belong to the field of the [[Other]] (as opposed to [[love]]), [[desire]] is one whereas the [[drive]]s are many.  In other words, the [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]] (although there may also be [[desire]]s which are not manifested in the [[drive]]s).<ref>{{S11}} p. 243</ref>  There is only one [[object]] of [[desire]], [[object (petit) a]], and this is represented by a variety of partial objects in different partial [[drive]]s.  The [[object (petit) a]] is not the [[object]] towards which [[desire]] tends, but the [[cause]] of [[desire]].  [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]]. --- One of [[Lacan]]'s most oft-repeated formulas is: "man's desire is the desire of the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref>  This can be understood in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important. --- 1. [[Desire]] is essentially "desire of the Other's desire", which means both [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]], and [[desire]] for recognition by another.  [[Lacan]] takes this idea from Hegel, via Kojève, who states: --- <blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.<ref>KojËve, 1947: 6</ref></blockquote> --- KojËve goes on to argue (still following Hegel) that in order to achieve the desired recognition, the subject must risk his own life in a struggle for pure prestige (see MASTER).  That desire is essentially desire to be the object of another's desire is clearly illustrated in the first 'time' of the Oedipus complex, when the subject desires to be the phallus for the mother. --- 2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[desire]]s from the point of view of another.  The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} 1951b: 12</ref>

What makes an =====Alexandre Kojève=====[[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[objectbiology]] desirable , is not any intrinsic quality strongly reminiscent of the thing in itself but simply the fact that [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[desire]]d by another, or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the [[biology|biological]] point of view."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. [[James]] H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>

The =====Desire and Drive=====It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s. Although they both belong to the field of the [[Other]] (as opposed to [[love]]), [[desire]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish one whereas the special significance of any one particular object[[drive]]s are many. In other [[words]], but at the same time it brings into view [[drive]]s are the existence particular (partial) manifestations of objects without numbera single force called [[desire]] (although there may also be [[desire]]s which are not manifested in the [[drive]]s)."<ref>{{LS11}} 1951b: 12p. 243</ref> There is only one [[object]] of [[desire]], [[object (petit) a]], and this is represented by a variety of [[partial objects]] in different partial [[drive]]s. The [[object (petit) a]] is not the [[object]] towards which [[desire]] tends, but the [[cause]] of [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].

This idea too =====Desire of the Other=====One of [[Lacan]]'s most oft-repeated [[formulas]] is taken from KojËve: "man's reading desire is the desire of Hegel; KojËve argues that:the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref> This can be [[understood]] in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.

<blockquote>"=====More=====1. [[Desire directed toward a natural object ]] is human only to essentially "desire of the extent that it is Other's desire"mediated" by , which means both [[desire]] to be the Desire [[object]] of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others 's [[desire]], because they and [[desire it]] for [[recognition]] by another."<ref>KojËve, 1947: 6</ref>

<blockquote>The reason for this goes back to Desire is human only if the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another one desires, I can make not the body, but the Desire of the other recognise my right . . . that is to say, if he wants to possess that objectbe 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, and thus make a function of the other recognise my superiority over himdesire for 'recognition'.<ref>KojËve[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947[1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 406</ref></blockquote>

This universal feature of =====Two=====2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[desire]] s from the point of view of another. The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is especially evident in essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} "[[hysteriaSome Reflections on the Ego]]; the ." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref> What makes an [[hystericobject]] desirable is one who sustains another person's not any intrinsic quality of [[desirethe thing]], converts another's in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]] into her own (e.g. Dora desires Frau K because she identifies with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire; S4, 138; see Freud, 1905e)d by another.

Hence what is important in the The [[analysisdesire]] of a the [[hystericOther]] is not thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to find out diminish the object of her desire but to discover the place from which she special [[desiresignificance]]s (of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} "[[subjectSome Reflections on the Ego]] with whom she identifies)." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref>

# [[<blockquote>"Desire directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is 'mediated' by the Desire]] of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire for the what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>[[OtherAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (playing on 1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the ambiguity Reading of the French preposition de)Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>

<blockquote>The fundamental [[desirereason]] is for this goes back to the incestuous [[former point about human desire being desire]] for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>[[motherAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]], the primordial Other (S7, 671947 [1933-39])''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''.Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 40</ref></blockquote>

=====Desire for the Other=====# [[Desire]] is always "[[desire]] ''for'' the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition ''de''). The fundamental [[desire ]] is the incestuous [[desire]] for something elsethe [[mother]],"the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{ES7}} p. 16767</ref> since it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.

# [[Desire]] is always "the desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is [[impossible]] to [[desire]] what one already has. The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p. 175</ref>

--- The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]]'s phrase is that desire is a social product.  [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other [[subject]]s. --- The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the child is at the mercy of her [[desire]].  It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by castrating the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to the whims of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]]. ==Desire, Need and Demand==[[Lacan]] distinguishes between three related concepts:* [[desire]]* [[need]] (''besoin'')* [[demand]] (''demande'')  =Social Product=Need==The [[human]] [[infant]] is born with certain [[biological]] [[need]]s that require (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]]. The [[human]] [[infant]] has certain [[biological]] [[need]]s which are satisfied by certain [[object]]s. [[Need]] is a [[biological]] [[instinct]] that requires (constant or periodic) [[satisfaction]]. [[Need]] emerges according to the requirements of the organism and abates completely (even if only temporarily) when [[satisfied]]. The [[human]] [[infant]] is born into a state of [[helplessness]], and is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[biological]] [[needs]]. The [[infant]], unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[needs]], must depend on the [[Other]] to help it [[satisfy]] them. The [[Other]] can help to [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s of the [[infant]]. The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s. ==Demand==The function of [[demand]] is to serve as an articulation of [[need]]. The [[infant]], in order to get help from the [[Other]], must articulate (express) its [[need]]s (vocally) in (the form of a) [[demand]]. The [[demand]] serves to bring the [[Other]] to help [[satisfy]] the [[needs]] of the [[infant]]. [[Demand]] is also a [[demand]] for [[love]] (beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]]). The [[presence]] of the [[Other]] (becomes most important in itself) [[symbolizes]] the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. The [[biological]] [[need]]s of the [[infant]] becomes subordinated point to the [[demand]] for the [[recognition]] and [[love]] of the [[Other]].  The [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]]. The [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, but cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[infant]] craves.  The [[Other]] (can [[satisfy]] the [[need]]s that are articulated in the [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] but) cannot [[satisfy]] the [[infant]]'s [[demand]] for [[love]]. Even after the [[need]]s which are articulated in [[demand]]s are [[satisfied]], [[demand]] (as the [[demand]] for [[love]]) remains [[unsatisfied]] This leftover is [[desire]]. ==Desire==[[Desire]] is what remains of [[demand]] after the [[need]]s which are articulated in that [[demand]] are [[satisfied]]. <blockquote>"[[Desire]] is neither the appetite for [[satisfaction]], nor the [[demand]] for [[love]], but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."<ref>{{E}} p.287</ref></blockquote> [[Desire]] is the [[surplus]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]]. <blockquote>"[[Desire]] begins to take shape in the margin in which [[demand]] becomes separated emerge from [[need]]."<ref>{{E}} p.311</ref></blockquote> [[Desire]], unlike [[need]], can never be [[satisfied]]. A [[need]] (that is [[satisfied]]) ceases to motivate the [[infant]] until another [[need]] arises. [[Desire]] is constant in its pressure, and eternal.   ==Desire of the Other==[[Lacan]] asserted that [[desire]] is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]]. [[Desire]] is [[human]] when it is directed toward another [[desire]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]'s [[desire]] phrase is the [[desire]] of the [[Other]].<ref>{{S11}} p.235</ref></blockquote> The statement provides the basis for our consideration of [[desire]] in [[Lacan]]’s conception of [[subjectivity]] and points to the fundamentally social character of [[desire]].  ==Object of the Other's Desire==[[Desire]] is the [[desire]] for the [[Other]]'s [[desire]], that is, the [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of the [[Other]]'s [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is a [[desire]] for '[[recognition]]' (by another). The [[Oedipus complex]] illustrates the [[desire]] of the [[subject]] to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]]. ==Object Desired by Others==<blockquote>"The [[object]] of [[man]]'s [[desire]] ... is essentially an [[object]] [[desire]]d by someone else."<ref>Lacan. 1951b. p.12</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] is [[desirable]] (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because [[other]]s [[desire]] it. It is qua [[Other]] that the [[subject]] [[desire]]s.<ref>{{E}} p.312</ref> It is [[human]] to [[desire]] what others [[desire]] because they [[desire]] it. ==Desire for the Other==[[Desire]] is [[desire]] for the [[Other]]. The fundamental [[desire]] is the [[incestuous]] [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p.67</ref>  ==Impossible Desire==<blockquote>[[Desire]] is always "the [[desire]] for something else," because it is impossible to [[desiresocial]] what one already has.<ref>{{E}} p.167</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref>  ==Social Desire==[[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]], that is, in the [[unconscious]]. [[Desire]] is a social product. [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be, but is always constituted in a [[dialectic|dialecticalrelationship]] relationship with the perceived [[desire]]s of others. <blockquote>The most important point to emerge from Lacan’s phrase [that "the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects."<ref>Evans 39</ref></blockquote> OBJET AThe [[objet petit a]] is represented by a variety of [[partial object]]s in diffent partial [[drive]]s. The [[objet petit a]] is not the object towards which [[desire]] tends, but the cause of desire. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].  ==Desire and Prohibition==<blockquote>The [[law]] (or [[prohibition]]) "creates [[desire]] in the first place by creating interdiction. [[Desire]] is essentially the [[desire]] to [[transgress]], and for there to be [[transgression]] it is first necessary for there to be [[prohibition]]."<ref>{{Evans}} p.99</ref></blockquote> The [[law]] gives rise to [[desire]] as that which circulates endlessly around a [[prohibited]] core (of ''[[jouissance]]''). (The [[prohibition]] establishes [[desire]] as the ultimate motivational force in [[subjectivity]].)   ==Desire and Language== [[Desire]] is created at the moment of the [[infant]]'s accession to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]. [[Desire]] is inseparable from the [[symbolic]] [[order]] and thus inhabits all (inheres in) [[signification]] (as such). [[Desire]] is inscribed in the [[signifying chain]] in its essential [[metonymy]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]’s [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]]. [...] [[Desire]] is a [[metonymy]]."<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref></blockquote> The perpetual reference of one [[signifer]] to another in an eternal deferral of [[meaning]] is a formulation of the ceaseless movement of [[desire]]. ==Impossible Desire== According to [[Lacan]], [[desire]] is by its very nature [[insatiable]]; it can never be fulfilled. Any attempt to [[satisfy]] [[desire]] is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable. [[Desire]] designates the impossible relation that a [[subject]] has with [[objet petit a]].  The core around which [[desire]] circulates is [[prohibited]]. ==Desire and Impossibility==The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility.  The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossible. The paternal interdiction only formalises this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with the compensation of symbolisation. The prohibitive aspect of the [[law]] is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental [[impossibility]] at the heart of desire.  No [[object]] can ever fulfil [[desire]].  ==Desire and the Death Drive== [[Lacan]] posits a distinction between [[desire]] and [[drive]]. It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.  The [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]].

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