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<center>{| cellpadding="2" cellspacing="5" align="center" style="border:1px solid #aaaaaa;text-align:center;margin:6px -8px;align:center;vertical-align:top;width:90%;background-color:#fcfcfc"|style="text-align:center;color:#000;line-height:2em;width:100%;";|This article is currently undergoing major editing. It's a mess [[right]] now, but will be fixed soon.|}</center>{{TopTopppp}}désir]]''|-|| [[German]]: ''[[Wunsch{{Bottom}}

The concept of [[Desiredesire]] is at the center of [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]] as a major [[theoretical]], [[ethical]] and [[clinical]] point of reference. Theoretically, Lacan's elaboration of the [[concept ]] is supported by, yet goes beyond, its [[Freudian]] origins. From an ethical perspective, Lacan has examined in an original way the [[relationship]] between desire and the [[law]], and its implications for [[treatment|psychoanalytic praxis]].<!-- he concept of [[desire]] is the central concern of [[psychoanalytic theory]].-->

The concept ==Sigmund Freud==<!--[[Freud]]'s ''[[Interpretation of Dreams]]'' established the basis for the psychoanalytic conception of desire (including Lacan's own contributions), even if the Freudian ''[[Wunsch]]'' (translated as 'wish' in the ''[[Standard Edition]]'') does not exactly coincide with Lacan's desire.<ref>(Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 256-7)</ref>-->[[Lacan]]'s term, ''[[désir]]'', is the term used in the [[French]] translations of [[Freud]] to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Wunsch]]'', which is translated as "[[wish]]" in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''. <!-- Hence English translators of [[Lacan]] are faced with a dilemma; should they translate ''[[désir]]'' by "[[wish]]", which is closer to [[Freud]]'s ''[[Wunsch]]'', or should they translate it as "[[desire]]", which is closer to the [[French]] term, but which [[lacks]] the allusion to [[Freud]]? All of [[Lacan]]'s [[English]] translators have opted for the latter, since the [[English]] term "[[desire]] " conveys, like the [[French]] term, the implication of a ''continuous force'', which is essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept. The [[English]] term also carries with it the same allusions to [[Hegel]]'s ''[[Begierde]]'' as are carried by the [[French]] term, and thus retains the central concern [[philosophical]] nuances which are so essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept of ''[[désir]]'' and which make it "a [psychoanalytic theory[category]] far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]]himself." -->

The indestructibility that Freud attributes to the unconscious wish is a property of its [[Lacanstructural]]'s term, ''[[désirposition]]'', : it is the term used in the necessary, not [[Frenchcontingent]] translations , effect of a fundamental gap in the subject's [[Freudpsyche]] to translate ; the gap [[Freudleft]]'s term ''by a lost satisfaction (cf. the seventh chapter of The [[WunschInterpretation]]'', which is translated as "of [[wishDreams]]" in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''; Freud, 1953, pp. 509-621).

Hence English translators Such a structural gap in the subject is of a [[sexual]] [[Lacanorder]] are faced with ; it corresponds ultimately to a dilemma; should they translate ''[[désirloss]]'' by "of sexual jouissance due to the fact of the [[wishprohibition]]", to which [[sexuality]] is closer to subjected in the human [[being]]. This prohibition is a structural [[Freudcultural]]'s ''[[Wunschnecessity]]'', or should they translate it as "not a [[desirecontingency]]", and its [[subjective]] correlate is the [[Oedipus]] [[complex]] — which is closer to the a [[Frenchnormative]] termorganization, but which lacks the allusion to rather than a more or less typical set of [[Freudpsychological]]? manifestations.

All The [[model]] of the unconscious wish elucidated by Freud in his monumental work [[LacanOn Dreams|on dreams]]'s remained his [[Englishguide]] translators have opted for the latterrest of his theoretical and clinical production; in pa rticular, since it continued to inform, until the end, Freud's clinical interventions — [[Englishinterpretations]] term "and constructions in analysis — and his rationale for [[desirethem]]" conveys, like . This model is inseparable from the [[Frenchform]] term, of [[discourse]] that Freud created: the implication rule of a ''continuous force'', which is essential to free [[Lacanassociation]], the subject's conceptspeech, reveals his/her desire and the essential gap that constitutes it.

The [[English]] term also carries with it the same allusions to [[Hegel]]Lacan's ''elaboration of the praxis ([[Begierdetheory]]'' as are carried by the and [[Frenchpractice]] term) of desire extends over his half-century of work in psychoanalysis, and thus retains attempting to abbreviate it or replace the philosophical nuances which are so essential to necessary [[Lacanreading]]'s concept of ''with a [[désirsummary]]would be imprudent and misleading. Therefore, we can only indicate some suggestions for further reading (in Lacan'' s works) and which make it "a category far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[Freud]] himselffurther lines of enquiry."<ref>Macey, 1995: 80</ref>

=====A first ingredient of the concept of desire in Lacan''Unconscious'' Desire=====If there s work contains a [[Hegelian]] reference, according to which desire is any one concept which can claim bound to be its being recognized — even if later on Lacan emphasized the very center of [[Lacandifference]]between his and Hegel's thoughtpositions (Lacan, it is the concept of [1977 [desire]1959], pp. 292-325).

But the reference to Freud's analysis of desire as revealed in the dream is from the start highly significant. Lacan emphasized that the analysis of the dream is in fact an analysis of the dreamer, that is, a subject who tells the dream to an other (with whom the subject is engaged in a [[Lacantransference]] follows -relation). In '[[Spinoza]] The function and field of speech and language in arguing that "[[desirepsychoanalysis]] is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p. 275</ref>' (1953), Lacan writes:

:Nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire finds its [[Desiremeaning]] is simultaneously in the heart desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the key to the object desired, as because the first [[humanobject of desire]] [[existence]] and is to be recognized by the central concern of [other. (Lacan, 1977 [psychoanalysis]1959], p.58)

However, when That the other holds the key to the object desired takes on added [[Lacanvalue]] talks about later in Lacan's work. Yet that desire emerges in a relationship with the other which is [[desiredialectical]], it that is, which is embedded in discourse, is an essential property of human desire. Human desire is not any kind the desire of the Other (over and above the [[others]] who are [[desireconcrete]] he is referring toincarnations of the Other), but always 'not '[[unconsciousnatural]]'' , endogenous appetites or tendencies that would push the subject in one direction or [[another]] irrespective of his/her relations with the Other; desireis always inscribed in and mediated by language (cf. The Four Fundamental [[Concepts]]of [[Psycho]]-Analysis, which is an essential reference in its entirety; Lacan, 1977).

This is not because Lacan's study of the dialectical [[Lacannature]] sees of desire led to his [[consciousdistinction]] between desire, need and demand. The [[desirethree]] as unimportant, but simply because it is [[unconsciousterms]] describe lacks in the subject; yet it is indispensable to [[desireidentify]] that forms the central concern each of these lacks, and their interrelations. The satisfaction of vital [[psychoanalysisneeds]]is subject to demand, and makes the subject dependent on speech and language.

The least noisy appeal of the infant is already inscribed in language, as it is [[Unconsciousinterpreted]] by the 'significant' others as speech, not as a mere cry. This primordial discursive circuit makes of the infant already a [[desirespeaking]] is entirely being, a subject of speech, even at the [[sexuality|sexualstage]]; <blockquote>"in which he/she is still infant. This subordination to the motives of Other through language marks the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire human forever. . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p. 142</ref></blockquote>Lacan writes:

=====Truth and Desire=====:The [[aimphenomenology]] that emerges from [[analytic]] [[experience]] is certainly of a kind to demonstrate in desire the paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric, even scandalous [[psychoanalyticcharacter]] by which it is distinguished from need [...]:Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls for. It is demand of a presence or of an [[treatmentabsence]] — which is what is manifested in the primordial relation to lead the mother, pregnant with that Other to be situated short of the needs that it can satisfy.:Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of [[analysandsatisfying]] needs, that is to recognize say, the [[truthpower]] of depriving them of that alone by which they are [[satisfied]] about his [...].:In this way, demand annuls (''aufhebt'') the [[particularity]] of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced (''sich erniedrigt'') to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.:Thus desireis neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the phenomenon of their [[splitting]] ([[Spaltung]]). (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp.286-7)

It is only possible to recognize one's This residual status of desire constitutes its [[desireessence]] when it is articulate in ; at this point the question of the [[speechObject of Desire|object of desire]]acquires crucial importance. Lacan considered his theory of this object to be his only original contribution to psychoanalysis.

<blockquote>"It Although an exaggeration in [[reality]], Lacan's position is only once it is formulated, named justified because with that theory he introduced in psychoanalysis a conception of the object that is genuinely revolutionary and that makes possible a [[presencerational]] critique of the [[othernotion]], that of '[[desireobject relations]], whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p' and its clinical applications. 183</ref></blockquote>

Hence in Desire requires the support of the [[psychoanalysisfantasy]], "whatwhich operates as its ''mise en scène''s important is to teach , where the [[subjectfading]] to name, to articulate, to bring this subject faces the [[desirelost object]] into [thatcauses his/her desire (Lacan 1977 [existence]1959], p. 313). This fading of the subject in the fantastic scenario that supports his/her desire is what makes desire opaque to the subject him-/herself."<ref>{{S2}} Desire is a metonymy (p. 228</ref>175) because the object that causes it, constituted as lost, makes it displace permanently, from object to object, as no one object can really satisfy it.

HoweverThis permanent [[displacement]] of desire follows the [[logic]] of the unconscious; thus Lacan could say that desire is its interpretation, as it is not a question moves along the [[chain]] of seeking a new means of expression for a given unconscious [[signifiers]], without ever being [[captured]] by any particular [[signifier]] (cf. [[desireSeminar]]VI, for this would imply a expressionist theory of '[[languageDesire and its Interpretation]]'; Lacan, 1958-59).

On In the contrary, by articulating [[desire]] in [[speechanalytic experience]], desire 'must be taken literally', as it is through the [[analysand]] brings unveiling of the signifiers that support it (albeit never exhausting it into [) that its real cause can be circumscribed (Lacan, 1977 [existence]1959], pp. 256-77).

(The Desire is the other side of the law: the contributions of psychoanalysis to ethical [[reflection]] and practice have started off by recognizing this [[analysandprinciple]](Lacan, by articulating 1990; 1992). Desire opposes a [[desirebarrier]] in to jouissance - the jouissance of the drive (always [[speechpartial]], (does not simply give expression in relation to the [[body]] considered as a pre-existing [[desiretotality]] , but ratherto the [[organic]] function to which it is attached and from which it detaches) brings , and that of the [[desiresuper-ego]] into (with its implacable command to [[existenceenjoy]]; Lacan, 1977 [1959], p.319).

<blockquote>"That Thus, desire appears to be on the side of [[life]] preservation, as it opposes the lethal [[dimension]] of jouissance (the partiality of the drive, which disregards the requirements of the [[subjectliving]] should come to recognise organism, and to name his the [[demands]] of the [[desiresuperego]]; - that is `[[senseless]] law' - which result in the efficacious action [[self]]-destructive unconscious [[sense]] of [[analysisguilt]]). But it isn't desire itself is not without a question structural relation with [[death]]: death at the heart of the [[recognisingspeaking being]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, 's lack-in-being (manqué à l'être); death in the mortifying effect of those objects of the [[subjectworld]] creates, brings forththat entice desire, a new inducing its [[presencealienation]] in the world, without ever satisfying any promise."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228-9</ref></blockquote>

However, there There is a limit to how far no Sovereign [[desireGood]] can be articulated in that would sustain the `right' orientation of desire, or [[speechguarantee]] because of the subject's well-being. As a fundamental "incompatibility between consequence, the [[desireethics]] and of psychoanalysis require that the [[speechanalyst]]does not pretend to embody or to deliver any Sovereign Good;"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains rather prescribes for the irreducibility of analyst that `the only [[unconsciousthing]] (i.e. the fact the the of which one can be [[unconsciousguilty]] is not that which ''is not knownof having given ground relative to one's desire'(Lacan, 1992, but that which ''cannot be known''p. 319).

"Although the [[truth]] about [[The analyst's desire, 'a desire]] is present to some degree in all [[speech]]obtain absolute difference', is the original [[speechLacanian]] can never articulate concept that defines the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate position of the analyst in [[desireanalytic discourse]], there is always and represents a leftoverculmination of his elucidationof the function of desire in psychoanalysis (Lacan, a [[surplus]]1977, which exceeds [[speech]]p."<ref>{{Evans}} p276; 1991). 36</ref>

=====Criticism=====One This position is structural, constitutive of analytic discourse - not a psychological [[Lacanstate]]of the analyst. It is his/her lack-in-being, rather than any 's most important criticisms positive' mode of being that orients the analyst's [[psychoanalysisDirection of the Treatment|psychoanalytic theoriesdirection of the treatment]] of his day was (Lacan, 1977 [1959], p. 230). This means that they tended to confuse the concept of analyst cannot incarnate an [[desireideal]] with for the related concepts analysand, and that he/she occupies a position of [[demandsemblant]] and of the cause of desire (Lacan, 1991; 1998). Only in this way may the analyst's desire become the [[needinstrument]]of the analysand's access to his/her own desire.

In opposition to this tendencySee also: [[jouissance]], [[Lacansubject]] insists on distinguishing between these three concepts.

This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957References[[Freud,<ref>{{S4}} ppS. 100-1, 125</ref>, but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} ]] (1958c1953) "[1900a] [[The Signification Interpretation of the Phallus|La signification du phallusDreams]]." ''Standard Edition of the [[ÉcritsComplete]]''. Paris: Seuil, 1966: 685-95 Psychological Works of ["[[The Signification of the Phallus|The signification of the phallusSigmund Freud]]". Trans, Vols 4 & 5. [[Alan SheridanLondon]] ''[[Écrits: A Selection]]''. London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977: 281-91]Hogarth Press.</ref>

=====Need=====#Lacan, J. (1958-59) `Le désir et son interpretation' (seven sessions, ed. by J.-A. [[Miller]]). [[Ornicar]]? 24 (1981):7-31; 25 (1982):13-36; 26/27 (1983):7-44. The final three sessions appeared as `Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in [[Hamlet]]'. Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977):11-52. There are unedited transcripts of the [[whole]] seminar available in French and English.#Lacan, J. (1977) [1959] Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock.#Lacan, J. (1977) The [[Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis]]. London: Tavistock.# Lacan, J. (1990) `[[Kant]] with [[Sade]]'. October 51. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.# Lacan, J. (1991) Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, L'envers de la [[Needpsychanalyse]] is a purely , 1969-1970. [[biologicalParis]] : Seuil.# Lacan, J. (1992) [[instinctThe Seminar]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements Book VII, [[The Ethics of the organism and which abates completely Psychoanalysis]], 1959-1960. New York: W.W. Norton; London: Routledge.# Lacan, J. (even if only temporarily1998) when satisfiedThe Seminar, Book XX, [[Encore]], 1972-1973, On [[Feminine]] Sexuality: The Limits of Love and [[Knowledge]]. New York: W.W. Norton. [[Leonardo]] S. Rodriguez

The =====''Unconscious'' Desire=====<!-- If there is any one concept which can [[claim]] to be the very center of [[humanLacan]] 's [[subjectthought]], being born it is the concept of [[desire]]. -->[[Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] in a state arguing that "[[desire]] is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p. 275</ref> [[Desire]] is simultaneously the heart of [[human]] [[existence]] and the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. However, when [[Lacan]] talks [[about]] [helplessness[desire]], it is unable not any kind of [[desire]] he is referring to , but always ''[[unconscious]]'' [[satisfydesire]] its own . This is not because [[needLacan]]ssees [[conscious]] [[desire]] as unimportant, and hence depends on but simply because it is [[unconscious]] [[desire]] that forms the central concern of [[Otherpsychoanalysis]] to help it . <!-- [[Unconscious]] [[desire]] is entirely [[satisfysexuality|sexual]] them; <blockquote>"the motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p. 142</ref></blockquote> -->

In order =====Truth and Desire=====The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to get recognize the [[Othertruth]] about his [[desire]]. It is only possible to recognize one's help[[desire]] when it is articulate in [[speech]]. <!-- <blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[infantpresence]] must express its of the [[needother]]s vocally; need must be articulated , that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the [[demandfull]]sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p. 183</ref></blockquote> -->

The primitive =====Existence=====Hence in [[demandpsychoanalysis]], "what's of important is to teach the [[infantsubject]] to [[name]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref> However, it is not a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given [[desire]], for this would imply a expressionist theory of [[language]]. On the contrary, by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], the [[Otheranalysand]] brings it into [[existence]]. (The [[analysand]] , by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to minister to the a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[infantdesire]]'s into [[needexistence]]s. )

However, <blockquote>"That the [[presencesubject]] of the should come to recognise and to name his [[Otherdesire]] soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance ; that goes beyond is the efficacious [[satisfactionaction]] of [[needanalysis]], since this . But it isn't a question of [[presencerecognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[symbolizesubject]]s the creates, brings forth, a new [[Other]]'s lovepresence]]in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228-9</ref></blockquote>

Hence However, there is a [[limit]] to how far [[desire]] can be articulated in [[demandspeech]] soon takes on because of a double function, serving both as an articulation of fundamental "incompatibility between [[needdesire]] and as a [[demandspeech]];"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the [[irreducibility]] of the [[unconscious]] for (i.e. the fact the the [[loveunconscious]]is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known'').

However, whereas "Although the [[Othertruth]] can provide the about [[objectdesire]]s which the is [[subjectpresent]] requires to satisfy his some degree in all [[needspeech]]s, [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[Otherdesire]] cannot provide that unconditional , there is always a leftover, a [[lovesurplus]] , which the exceeds [[subjectspeech]] craves. "<ref>{{Evans}} p. 36</ref>

=====Criticism=====One of [[Lacan]]'s most important criticisms of the [[psychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]] of his day was that they tended to confuse the concept of [[desire]] with the related concepts of [[demand]] and [[need]]. In opposition to this tendency, [[Lacan]] insists on distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins to emerge in his work in 1957,<ref>{{S4}} pp. 100-1, 125</ref>, but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} (1958c) "[[The Signification of the Phallus|La signification du phallus]]." ''[[Écrits]]''. Paris: Seuil, 1966: 685-95 ["[[The Signification of the Phallus|The signification of the phallus]]". Trans. [[Alan Sheridan]] ''[[Écrits: A Selection]]''. London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977: 281-91].</ref> =====Need=====[[Need]] is a purely [[biological]] [[instinct]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The [[human]] [[subject]], being [[born]] in a state of [[helplessness]], is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and hence depends on the [[Other]] to [[help]] it [[satisfy]] them. In order to get the [[Other]]'s help, the [[infant]] must express its [[need]]s vocally; need must be articulated in [[demand]]. The [[primitive]] [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the [[Other]] to minister to the [[infant]]'s [[need]]s. However, the [[presence]] of the [[Other]] soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]], since this [[presence]] [[symbolize]]s the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. Hence [[demand]] soon takes on a [[double]] function, serving both as an articulation of [[need]] and as a [[demand]] for [[love]]. However, whereas the [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, the [[Other]] cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[subject]] craves. Hence even after the [[need]]s which were articulated in [[demand]] have been satisfied, the other aspect of [[demand]], the craving for [[love]], remains [[unsatisfied]], and this leftover is [[desire]].

Unlike a [[need]], which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the [[subject]] until another [[need]] arises, [[desire]] can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal.   The realisation of [[desire]] does not consist in being "fulfilled", but in the reproduction of [[desire]] as such.

[[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]]; [[desire]] is shown to be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[desire]], or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the [[biology|biological]] point of view."<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. [[James ]] H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref>

It is important to distinguish between [[desire]] and the [[drive]]s.   Although they both belong to the field of the [[Other]] (as opposed to [[love]]), [[desire]] is one whereas the [[drive]]s are many.   In other [[words]], the [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]] (although there may also be [[desire]]s which are not manifested in the [[drive]]s).<ref>{{S11}} p. 243</ref>   There is only one [[object]] of [[desire]], [[object (petit) a]], and this is represented by a variety of [[partial objects ]] in different partial [[drive]]s.   The [[object (petit) a]] is not the [[object]] towards which [[desire]] tends, but the [[cause]] of [[desire]].   [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].

One of [[Lacan]]'s most oft-repeated [[formulas ]] is: "man's desire is the desire of the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref>   This can be [[understood ]] in many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.

1. [[Desire]] is essentially "desire of the Other's desire", which means both [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]], and [[desire]] for [[recognition ]] by another.

[[Lacan]] takes this [[idea ]] from [[Hegel]], via [[Kojève]], who states:

[[Kojève]] goes on to argue (still following [[Hegel]]) that in order to achieve the [[desire]]d recognition, the [[subject]] must risk his own life in a [[struggle ]] for pure prestige (see [[master]]).   That [[desire]] is essentially [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]] is clearly illustrated in the first '[[time]]' of the [[Oedipus complex]], when the [[subject]] desires to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]].

2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[desire]]s from the point of view of another.   The effect of this is that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref>   What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of [[the thing ]] in itself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]]d by another.

The [[desire]] of the [[Other]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish the special [[significance ]] of any one particular object, but at the same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref>

<blockquote>The [[reason ]] for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 40</ref></blockquote>

 This [[universal ]] feature of [[desire]] is especially evident in [[hysteria]]; the [[hysteric]] is one who sustains another person's [[desire]], converts another's [[desire]] into her own (e.g. [[Dora ]] desires Frau K because she [[identifies ]] with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire).<ref>{{S4}} p. 138; {{F}} (1905e) "[[{{FB}}|Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria]]." [[SE]] VII, 3.</ref>  Hence what is important in the [[analysis]] of a [[hysteric]] is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the [[place ]] from which she [[desire]]s (the [[subject]] with whom she identifies).

# [[Desire]] is [[desire]] ''for'' the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition ''de'').  The fundamental [[desire]] is the incestuous [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p. 67</ref> # [[Desire]] is always "the desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is [[impossible ]] to [[desire]] what one already has.   The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p. 175</ref>

 The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]]'s phrase is that [[desire]] is a [[social ]] product.   [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a [[dialectic|dialectical relationship]] with the perceived [[desire]]s of other [[subject]]s.

The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the [[child ]] is at the mercy of her [[desire]].   It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by [[castrating ]] the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to the whims of the [[mother]]'s [[desire]].

 __NOTOC__ {{Encore}}:* [[Desiring|Desire]], 5, 50:: [[analysis]] and, 5, 6, 11, 32, 34-37, 92-4, 99, 126:: [[cause]] and, 6:: [[demand]] and, 100:: [[lack]] and, 6:: [[language]] and, 127:: [[love]] and, 4, 6, 72 :: [[man]]'s [[desire]] as (for) the [[Other]]'s [[desire]], 4''n'' :Category: ''[[object a]]'' and, 6, 72, 80, 92-93, 95, 99-100, 126, 136 :: [[Other]] and, 4, 69, 80, 92, 98-100, 121, 126 :: [[satisfaction]] and, 6 :: ''See also'' [[Demand]]; [[Jouissance]]; [[Object aMess]]