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{{Topppp}}désir]]''
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|| [[German]]: ''[[Wunsch{{Bottom}}
The concept of [[desire]] is at the center of [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]] as a [[theoretical]], [[ethical]] and [[clinical]] point of reference. Theoretically, Lacan's elaboration of the [[concept]] is supported by, yet goes beyond, its [[Freudian]] origins. From an ethical perspective, Lacan has examined in an original way the [[relationship]] between desire and the [[law]], and its implications for [[treatment|psychoanalytic praxis]].
<!-- he concept of [[desire]] is the central concern of [[psychoanalytic theory]]. -->
The term ==Sigmund Freud==<!--[[Freud]]'s ''[[Interpretation of Dreams]]'' established the basis for the psychoanalytic conception of desire(including Lacan's own contributions), even if the Freudian ''[[Wunsch]]'' (translated as 'wish' in the ''[[Standard Edition]]' ') does not exactly coincide with Lacan's desire.<ref>(Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 256-7)</ref>-->[[Lacan]]'s term, ''[[désir]]'', is the term used in the [[French]]: translations of [[Freud]] to translate [[Freud]]'s term ''[[Wunsch]]'', which is translated as "[[wish]]" in the ''[[Standard Edition]]''. <!-- Hence English translators of [[Lacan]] are faced with a dilemma; should they translate ''[[désir]]'') by "[[wish]]", which is closer to [[Freud]]'s ''[[Wunsch]]'', or should they translate it as "[[desire]]", which is closer to the [[French]] term, but which [[lacks]] the allusion to [[Freud]]? All of [[Lacan]]'s [[English]] translators have opted for the latter, since the [[English]] term "[[desire]]" conveys, like the [[French]] term, the implication of a ''continuous force'', which is located at essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept. The [[English]] term also carries with it the center same allusions to [[Hegel]]'s ''[[Begierde]]'' as are carried by the [[French]] term, and thus retains the [[philosophical]] nuances which are so essential to [[Lacan]]'s concept of ''[[désir]]'' and which make it "a [[Lacaniancategory]] far wider and more abstract than any employed by [[psychoanalysisFreud]]himself." -->
By shifting the object of study from the imagery of the [[manifest]] [[content]] of the [[dream]] to its unconscious determinants in the dreaming subject, Freud unveiled the [[structure]] of both the dream and [[The concept Subject|the subject]]. Beyond the [[preconscious]] wishes attached to a [[number]] of desirable [[desireobjects]] is that the central concern dream-[[work]] utilizes, there lies the unconscious wish — indestructible, [[infantile]] in its origins, the product of [[psychoanalytic repression]], permanently insisting in reaching fulfilment through the dream and the other [theory[formations]]of the unconscious.
The indestructibility that Freud attributes to the unconscious wish is a property of its [[structural]] [[position]]: it is the necessary, not [[contingent]], effect of a fundamental gap in the subject's [[psyche]]; the gap [[left]] by a lost satisfaction (cf. the seventh chapter of The [[Interpretation]] of [[Dreams]]; Freud, 1953, pp. 509-621).
==Human Existence==[[Desire]] Such a structural gap in the subject is the heart of a [[humansexual]] [[existenceorder]].; it corresponds ultimately to a [[Lacanloss]], following of sexual jouissance due to the fact of the [[Spinozaprohibition]], argues that "to which [[desiresexuality]]" is subjected in the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p.275</ref>human [[Desirebeing]] . This prohibition is fundamental to every aspect of the a structural [[psychiccultural]] [[lifenecessity]] of the , not a [[individualcontingency]] , and to its [[subjective]] correlate is the [[socialOedipus]] [[systemcomplex]] in — which the is a [[individualnormative]] finds him organization, rather than a more or herself embeddedless typical set of [[psychological]] manifestations.
The [[model]] of the unconscious wish elucidated by Freud in his monumental work [[On Dreams|on dreams]] remained his [[guide]] for the rest of his theoretical and clinical production; in pa rticular, it continued to inform, until the end, Freud's clinical interventions — [[interpretations]] and constructions in analysis — and his rationale for [[them]]. This model is inseparable from the [[form]] of [[discourse]] that Freud created: the rule of free [[association]], the subject's speech, reveals his/her desire and the essential gap that constitutes it.
==DesireLacan's elaboration of the praxis ([[theory]] and [[practice]]) of desire extends over his half-century of work in psychoanalysis, and attempting to abbreviate it or replace the necessary [[reading]] with a [[summary]] would be imprudent and misleading. Therefore, Need we can only indicate some suggestions for further reading (in Lacan's works) and Demand==further lines of enquiry.
A first ingredient of the concept of desire in Lacan's work contains a [[Hegelian]] reference, according to which desire is bound to its being recognized — even if later on Lacan emphasized the [[difference]] between his and Hegel's positions (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp. 292-325).
[[But the reference to Freud's analysis of desire as revealed in the dream is from the start highly significant. Lacan]] distinguishes between three related concepts:* emphasized that the analysis of the dream is in fact an analysis of the dreamer, that is, a subject who tells the dream to an other (with whom the subject is engaged in a [[desiretransference]]* -relation). In '[[need]]* [[demandThe function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis]]' (1953), Lacan writes:
Lacan has linked :Nowhere does it appear more clearly that man's desire finds its [[meaning]] in the desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the key to the object desired, as because the concept first [[object of 'desire' with 'need' ]] is to be recognized by the other. (besoinLacan, 1977 [1959], p. 58) and 'demand' (demande) in the following way.
The That the other holds the key to the object desired takes on added [[humanvalue]] later in Lacan's work. Yet that desire emerges in a relationship with the other which is [[infantdialectical]] , that is, which is embedded in discourse, is an essential property of human desire. Human desire is born with fundamental the desire of the Other (over and above the [[others]] who are [[biologicalconcrete]] incarnations of the Other), not '[[neednatural]]s ', endogenous appetites or tendencies that require would push the subject in one direction or [[another]] irrespective of his/her relations with the Other; desire is always inscribed in and mediated by language (constant or periodic) cf. The Four Fundamental [[Concepts]] of [[satisfactionPsycho]]-Analysis, which is an essential reference in its entirety; Lacan, 1977).
(The Lacan's study of the dialectical [[humannature]] of desire led to his [[infantdistinction]]between desire, being born into a state of need and demand. The [[helplessnessthree]], is unable to [[satisfyterms]] its own describe lacks in the subject; yet it is indispensable to [[needsidentify]]each of these lacks, and thus depends on the their interrelations. The satisfaction of vital [[Otherneeds]] is subject to help it [[satisfy]] themdemand, and makes the subject dependent on speech and language.)
(The [[least noisy appeal of the infant]]is already inscribed in language, unable to as it is [[satisfyinterpreted]] its own by the 'significant' others as speech, not as a mere cry. This primordial discursive circuit makes of the infant already a [[needsspeaking]]being, a subject of speech, depends on even at the [[Otherstage]] in which he/she is still infant. This subordination to help it [[satisfy]] themthe Other through language marks the human forever.)Lacan writes:
:The [[Needphenomenology]] that emerges from [[analytic]] [[experience]] is certainly of a kind to demonstrate in desire the paradoxical, deviant, erratic, eccentric, even scandalous [[biologicalcharacter]] by which it is distinguished from need [...]:Demand in itself bears on something other than the satisfactions it calls for. It is demand of a presence or of an [instinct[absence]]— which is what is manifested in the primordial relation to the mother, pregnant with that Other to be situated short of the needs that it can satisfy.:Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of [[Needsatisfying]] emerges according needs, that is to say, the requirements [[power]] of depriving them of that alone by which they are [[satisfied]] [...].:In this way, demand annuls (''aufhebt'') the organism [[particularity]] of everything that can be granted by transmuting it into a proof of love, and abates completely the very satisfactions that it obtains for need are reduced (even if only temporarily''sich erniedrigt'') when to the level of being no more than the crushing of the demand for love.:Thus desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second, the phenomenon of their [[splitting]] ([[satisfiedSpaltung]]). (Lacan, 1977 [1959], pp.286-7)
This residual status of desire constitutes its [[essence]]; at this point the question of the [[Object of Desire|object of desire]] acquires crucial importance. Lacan considered his theory of this object to be his only original contribution to psychoanalysis.
The Although an exaggeration in [[humanreality]] , Lacan's position is justified because with that theory he introduced in psychoanalysis a conception of the object that is genuinely revolutionary and that makes possible a [[rational]] critique of the [[infantnotion]] is born into a state of '[[helplessnessobject relations]]' and its clinical applications.
The For what Lacan emphasized was the [[infantillusory]] must depend on nature of any object that appears to fulfil desire, while the gap, the original splitting which is constitutive of the subject, is [[Otherreal]] to help ; and it is in this gap that the [[object a]], the object [[satisfycause of desire]] its own , installs itself. (Lacan 1977; in [[needsparticular]], chapter 20).
The Desire requires the support of the [[humanfantasy]] , which operates as its ''mise en scène'', where the [[infantfading]] has certain subject faces the [[biologicallost object]] thatcauses his/her desire (Lacan 1977 [[need1959]]s which are satisfied by certain [[, p. 313). This fading of the subject in the fantastic scenario that supports his/her desire is what makes desire opaque to the subject him-/herself. Desire is a metonymy (p. 175) because the object that causes it, constituted as lost, makes it displace permanently, from object to object, as no one object]]scan really satisfy it.
The This permanent [[infantdisplacement]]of desire follows the [[logic]] of the unconscious; thus Lacan could say that desire is its interpretation, in order to get help from as it moves along the [[Otherchain]] of unconscious [[signifiers]], must articulate without ever being [[captured]] by any particular [[signifier]] (express) its cf. [[needSeminar]]s (vocally) in (the form of a) VI, '[[demandDesire and its Interpretation]]'; Lacan, 1958-59).
The In the [[infantanalytic experience]], in order to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]sdesire 'must be taken literally', must engage in as it is through the [[dialectic]] unveiling of the signifiers that support it (albeit never exhausting it) that its real cause can be circumscribed (Lacan, 1977 [[exchange1959]] with others, pp. 256-77).
Desire is the other side of the law: the contributions of psychoanalysis to ethical [[reflection]] and practice have started off by recognizing this [[principle]] (Lacan, 1990; 1992). Desire opposes a [[barrier]] to jouissance - the jouissance of the drive (always [[partial]], not in relation to the [[body]] considered as a [[totality]], but to the [[organic]] function to which it is attached and from which it detaches), and that of the [[super-ego]] (with its implacable command to [[enjoy]]; Lacan, 1977 [1959], p. 319).
The Thus, desire appears to be on the side of [[life]] preservation, as it opposes the lethal [[demanddimension]] serves to bring of jouissance (the partiality of the drive, which disregards the requirements of the [[living]] organism, and the [[demands]] of the [[superego]] - that `[[senseless]] law' - which result in the [[Otherself]]-destructive unconscious [[sense]] of [[guilt]] to help ). But desire itself is not without a structural relation with [[satisfydeath]] : death at the heart of the [[needsspeaking being]] 's lack-in-being (manqué à l'être); death in the mortifying effect of those objects of the [[infantworld]] that entice desire, inducing its [[alienation]], without ever satisfying any promise.
The There is no Sovereign [[demandGood]]that would sustain the `right' orientation of desire, or [[guarantee]] the subject's of well-being. As a consequence, the [[infantethics]] is for of psychoanalysis require that the [[Otheranalyst]] does not pretend to help embody or to deliver any Sovereign Good; it rather prescribes for the analyst that `the only [[satisfything]] its of which one can be [[needsguilty]]is of having given ground relative to one's desire' (Lacan, 1992, p. 319).
The function of analyst's desire, 'a desire to obtain absolute difference', is the original [[demandLacanian]] is to serve as an articulation concept that defines the position of the analyst in [[needanalytic discourse]], and represents a culmination of his elucidationof the function of desire in psychoanalysis (Lacan, 1977, p. 276; 1991).
This position is structural, constitutive of analytic discourse - not a psychological [[Demandstate]] of the analyst. It is also a his/her lack-in-being, rather than any 'positive' mode of being that orients the analyst's [[demandDirection of the Treatment|direction of the treatment]](Lacan, 1977 [1959] for , p. 230). This means that the analyst cannot incarnate an [[loveideal]] (beyond for the analysand, and that he/she occupies a position of [[satisfactionsemblant]] of the cause of desire (Lacan, 1991; 1998). Only in this way may the analyst's desire become the [[needinstrument]])of the analysand's access to his/her own desire.
The See also: [[presencejouissance]] of the , [[Othersubject]] becomes important in itself.
The References[[presenceFreud, S.]] of the (1953) [1900a] [[OtherThe Interpretation of Dreams]] . Standard Edition of the [[symbolizesComplete]] the Psychological Works of [[OtherSigmund Freud]]'s , Vols 4 & 5. [[loveLondon]]: Hogarth Press.
#Lacan, J. (1958-59) `Le désir et son interpretation' (seven sessions, ed. by J.-A. [[Miller]]). [[Ornicar]]? 24 (1981):7-31; 25 (1982):13-36; 26/27 (1983):7-44. The final three sessions appeared as `Desire and the Interpretation of Desire in [[needHamlet]]s which '. Yale French Studies 55/56 (1977):11-52. There are articulated unedited transcripts of the [[whole]] seminar available in French and English.#Lacan, J. (1977) [1959] Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock.#Lacan, J. (1977) The [[Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis]]. London: Tavistock.# Lacan, J. (1990) `[[Kant]] with [demand[Sade]]s are '. October 51. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.# Lacan, J. (1991) Le Séminaire, Livre XVII, L'envers de la [[psychanalyse]], 1969-1970. [[Paris]]: Seuil.# Lacan, J. (1992) [[The Seminar]], Book VII, [[The Ethics of Psychoanalysis]], 1959-1960. New York: W.W. Norton; London: Routledge.# Lacan, J. (1998) The Seminar, Book XX, [[Encore]], 1972-1973, On [[Feminine]] Sexuality: The Limits of Love and [[Knowledge]]. New York: W.W. Norton. [[satisfiedLeonardo]]S.Rodriguez
Even after =====''Unconscious'' Desire=====<!-- If there is any one concept which can [[claim]] to be the very center of [[needLacan]]'s which are articulated [[thought]], it is the concept of [[desire]]. -->[[Lacan]] follows [[Spinoza]] in arguing that "[[desire]] is the essence of man."<ref>{{S11}} p. 275</ref> [[Desire]] is simultaneously the heart of [[demandhuman]]s are [[satisfiedexistence]] and the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. However, when [[Lacan]] talks [[about]] [[desire]], it is not any kind of [[desire]]he is referring to, but always ''[[demandunconscious]]'' [[desire]]. This is not because [[Lacan]] sees [[conscious]] [[desire]] (as unimportant, but simply because it is [[unconscious]] [[desire]] that forms the central concern of [[psychoanalysis]]. <!-- [[demandUnconscious]] for [[lovedesire]]) remains is entirely [[unsatisfiedsexuality|sexual]]; <blockquote>"the motives of the unconscious are limited . . . to sexual desire . . . The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented."<ref>{{E}} p.142</ref></blockquote> -->
This leftover =====Truth and Desire=====The [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his [[desire]]. It is only possible to recognize one's [[desire]]when it is articulate in [[speech]]. <!-- <blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the [[full]] sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p.183</ref></blockquote> -->
=====Existence=====Hence in [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to [[name]], to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[Desireexistence]] ."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228</ref> However, it is what remains not a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given [[desire]], for this would imply a expressionist theory of [[demandlanguage]] after . On the contrary, by articulating [[needdesire]] in [[speech]], the [[analysand]] brings it into [[existence]]. (The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]]s which are articulated in [[speech]], (does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]] but rather) brings that [[demanddesire]] are into [[satisfiedexistence]].)
However, whereas the Other can provide the objects which <blockquote>"That the [[subject requires ]] should come to satisfy recognise and to name his needs, [[desire]]; that is the Other cannot provide that unconditional love efficacious [[action]] of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[subject craves]] creates, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p. 228-9</ref></blockquote>
The However, there is a [[Otherlimit]] to how far [[desire]] can help to be articulated in [[speech]] because of a fundamental "incompatibility between [[desire]] and [[satisfyspeech]] ;"<ref>{{E}} p. 275</ref> it is this incompatibility which explains the [[needirreducibility]]s of the [[infantunconscious]] (i.e. the fact the the [[unconscious]]is not that which ''is not known'', but that which ''cannot be known'').
The "Although the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is [[present]] to some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [Other[speech]] cannot provide that unconditional attempts to articulate [[lovedesire]] , there is always a leftover, a [[surplus]], which the exceeds [[infantspeech]] craves."<ref>{{Evans}} p. 36</ref>
The =====Criticism=====One of [[biologicalLacan]] 's most important criticisms of the [[needpsychoanalysis|psychoanalytic theories]]s of the individual is his day was that they have become inseparable fromtended to confuse the concept of [[desire]] with the related concepts of [[demand]] and [[need]]. In opposition to this tendency, and importantly subordinated [[Lacan]] insists on distinguishing between these three concepts. This distinction begins toemerge in his work in 1957, <ref>{{S4}} pp. 100-1, 125</ref>, but only crystallises in 1958.<ref>{{L}} (1958c) "[[The Signification of the vicissitudes Phallus|La signification du phallus]]." ''[[Écrits]]''. Paris: Seuil, 1966: 685-95 ["[[The Signification of its demand for the recognition and love Phallus|The signification of other peoplethe phallus]]". Trans. [[Alan Sheridan]] ''[[Écrits: A Selection]]''. London: Tavistock, 1977; New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1977: 281-91]. </ref>
=====Need=====[[Need]] is a purely [[biological]] [[instinct]], an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely (even if only temporarily) when satisfied. The [[human]] [[subject]], being [[born]] in a state of [[helplessness]], is unable to [[satisfy]] its own [[need]]s, and hence depends on the [[Other]] can to [[help]] it [[satisfy]] them. In order to get the [[Other]]'s help, the [[infant]] must express its [[need]]s that are vocally; need must be articulated in [[demand]]. The [[primitive]] [[demand]]s of the [[infant]] may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the [[Other]] to minister to the [[infant]]'s [[need]]s. However, the [[presence]] of the [[Other]] soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the [[satisfaction]] of [[need]], since this [[presence]] [[symbolize]]s the [[Other]]'s [[love]]. Hence [[demand]] soon takes on a [[double]] function, serving both as an articulation of [[need]] and as a [[demand]] for [[love]]. However, whereas the [[Other]] can provide the [[object]]s which the [[subject]] requires to satisfy his [[need]]s, the [[Other]] cannot provide that unconditional [[love]] which the [[subject]] craves. Hence even after the [[need]]s which were articulated in [[demand]] have been satisfied, the other aspect of [[demand]], the craving for [[love]], remains [[infantunsatisfied]], and this leftover is [[desire]].
The [[Other]] cannot [[satisfy]] <blockquote>"Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the [[infant]]'s [[demand]] for [[love]], but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second."<ref>{{E}} p.287</ref></blockquote>
=====Demand=====
[[Desire]] is thus the [[surplus]] produced by the articulation of [[need]] in [[demand]];
<blockquote>"[[Desire]] is neither the appetite for [[satisfaction]], nor begins to take shape in the margin in which [[demand]] for [[love]], but the difference that results becomes separated from the subtraction of the first from the secondneed."<ref>{{E}} p.287311</ref></blockquote>
Unlike a [[Desireneed]] is , which can be satisfied and which then ceases to motivate the [[surplussubject]] until another [[need]] arises, [[desire]] produced by the articulation can never be satisfied; it is constant in its pressure, and eternal. The realisation of [[needdesire]] does not consist in being "fulfilled", but in the reproduction of [[demanddesire]]as such.
<blockquote>"=====Alexandre Kojève=====[[Lacan]]'s distinction between [[need]] and [[desire]], which lifts the concept of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]], is strongly reminiscent of [[Kojève]]'s distinction between [[animal]] and [[human]] [[desire]]; [[Desiredesire]] begins is shown to take shape in the margin in which be distinctively [[human]] when it is directed either toward another [[demanddesire]] becomes separated , or to an object which is "perfectly useless from the [[needbiology|biological]]point of view."<ref>{{E}} p[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans.311[[James]] H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>
=====Desire and Drive=====It is important to distinguish between [[Needdesire]] can and the [[drive]]s. Although they both belong to the field of the [[Other]] (as opposed to [[love]]), [[desire]] is one whereas the [[drive]]s are many. In other [[words]], the [[drive]]s are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called [[desire]] (although there may also be [[satisfieddesire]]s which are not manifested in the [[drive]]s).<ref>{{S11}} p. 243</ref> There is only one [[object]] of [[desire]], [[object (petit) a]], and this is represented by a variety of [[partial objects]] in different partial [[drive]]s. The [[object (petit) a]] is not the [[object]] towards which [[desire]] tends, but the [[cause]] of [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]].
A =====Desire of the Other=====One of [[needLacan]] (that is 's most oft-repeated [[satisfiedformulas]]) ceases to motivate is: "man's desire is the desire of the Other."<ref>{{S11}} p. 235</ref> This can be [[infantunderstood]] until another [[need]] arisesin many complementary ways, of which the following are the most important.
=====More=====1. [[Desire]] can never is essentially "desire of the Other's desire", which means both [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]], and [[desire]] for [[satisfiedrecognition]]by another.
(There is no adequation between the need and the demand that conveys it.)[[Lacan]] takes this [[idea]] from [[Hegel]], via [[Kojève]], who states:
The distance between <blockquote>Desire is human only if the one desires, not the body, but the Desire of the other . . . that is to say, if he wants to be 'desired' or 'loved', or, rather, 'recognised' in his human value. . . . In other words, all human, anthropogenetic Desire . . . is, finally, a function of the desire for 'recognition'.<ref>[[needAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] and (1947 [[demand]] constitutes [[desire]1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr.New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>
=====Object of Another's Desire=====
[[Kojève]] goes on to argue (still following [[Hegel]]) that in order to achieve the [[desire]]d recognition, the [[subject]] must risk his own life in a [[struggle]] for pure prestige (see [[master]]). That [[desire]] is essentially [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of another's [[desire]] is clearly illustrated in the first '[[time]]' of the [[Oedipus complex]], when the [[subject]] desires to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]].
=====Two=====2. It is qua Other that the subject desires:<ref>{{E}} p. 312</ref> that is, the [[subject]] [[Desiredesire]] s from the point of view of another. The effect of this is constant that "the object of man's desire . . . is essentially an object desired by someone else."<ref>{{L}} "[[Some Reflections on the Ego]]." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref> What makes an [[object]] desirable is not any intrinsic quality of [[the thing]] in its pressure, and eternalitself but simply the fact that it is [[desire]]d by another.
The realization [[desire]] of the [[desireOther]] is thus what makes objects equivalent and exchangeable; this "tends to diminish the special [[significance]] does not consist in being 'fulfilled'of any one particular object, but in at the reproduction same time it brings into view the existence of objects without number."<ref>{{L}} "[[desireSome Reflections on the Ego]] as such." ''International Journal of Psychoanalysis''. Vol. 34. 1953[1951b]: 12</ref>
This idea too is taken from [[Kojève]]'s reading of [[Hegel]]; [[Kojève]] argues that:
==Animal and Human <blockquote>"Desire==[[Lacan]]directed toward a natural object is human only to the extent that it is 'mediated's distinction between by the Desire of another directed towards the same object: it is human to desire what others desire, because they desire it."<ref>[[needAlexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] and (1947 [[desire1933-39]] lifts ) ''Introduction to the concept Reading of [[desire]] completely out of the realm of [[biology]]Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr.New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 6</ref></blockquote>
<blockquote>The [[reason]] for this goes back to the former point about human desire being desire for recognition; by desiring that which another desires, I can make the other recognise my right to possess that object, and thus make the other recognise my superiority over him.<ref>[[Alexandre Kojève|Kojève, Alexandre]] (1947 [1933-39]) ''Introduction to the Reading of Hegel''. Trans. James H. Nichols Jr. New York and London: Basic Books, 1969: 40</ref></blockquote>
=====Hysteria=====
This [[universal]] feature of [[desire]] is especially evident in [[hysteria]]; the [[hysteric]] is one who sustains another person's [[desire]], converts another's [[desire]] into her own (e.g. [[Dora]] desires Frau K because she [[identifies]] with Herr K, thus appropriating his perceived desire).<ref>{{S4}} p. 138; {{F}} (1905e) "[[{{FB}}|Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria]]." [[SE]] VII, 3.</ref> Hence what is important in the [[analysis]] of a [[hysteric]] is not to find out the object of her desire but to discover the [[place]] from which she [[desire]]s (the [[subject]] with whom she identifies).
=====Desire for the Other=====# [[Desire]] is [[humandesire]] ''for'' the [[Other]] (playing on the ambiguity of the French preposition ''de''). The fundamental [[desire]] when it is directed toward another the incestuous [[desire]] or to an for the [[objectmother]] that is "'perfectly useless from , the biological point of viewprimordial [[Other]]."<ref>Kojeve. 1947. {{S7}} p.667</ref>
# [[Desire]] is always "the desire for something else,"<ref>{{E}} p. 167</ref> since it is [[impossible]] to [[desire]] what one already has. The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p. 175</ref>
==# [[Desire ]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other==]]; i.e. in the [[unconscious]].
=====Social Product=====The most important point to emerge from [[Lacan]] asserted 's phrase is that [[desire]] is a [[social]] product. [[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a [[dialectic|dialectical relationship]] with the perceived [[desire]] s of the other [[Othersubject]]s.
<blockquote>"=====(M)other=====The first person to occupy the place of the [[Other]] is the [[mother]], and at first the [[Manchild]]'s is at the mercy of her [[desire]] . It is only when the [[Father]] articulates [[desire]] with the [[law]] by [[castrating]] the [[mother]] that the [[subject]] is freed from subjection to the whims of the [[Othermother]]'s [[desire]].<ref>{{S11}} p.235</ref></blockquote>
==See Also==
{{See}}
* [[Need]]
||
* [[Drive]]
||
* [[Demand]]
{{Also}}
==References==
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ONE [[Desire]] is the [[desire]] for the [[Other]]'s [[desire]], that is, the [[desire]] to be the [[object]] of the [[Other]]'s [[desire]]. [[Desire]] is a [[desire]] for '[[recognition]]' (by another). The [[Oedipus complex]] illustrates the [[desire]] of the [[subject]] to be the [[phallus]] for the [[mother]]. TWO <blockquote>"The [[object]] of [[man]]'s [[desire]] ... is essentially an [[object]] [[desire]]d by someone else."<ref>Lacan. 1951b. p.12</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] is [[desirable]] (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because [[other]]s [[desire]] it. The [[object]] is [[desirable]] (not due to any intrinsic quality but) because it is [[desire]]d by [[other]]s. It is qua [[Other]] that the [[subject]] [[desire]]s.<ref>{{E}} p.312</ref> It is [[human]] to [[desire]] what others [[desire]] because they [[desire]] it. THREE[[Desire]] is [[desire]] for the [[Other]]. The fundamental [[desire]] is the [[incestuous]] [[desire]] for the [[mother]], the primordial [[Other]].<ref>{{S7}} p.67</ref> FOUR <blockquote>[[Desire]] is always "the [[desire]] for something else," because it is impossible to [[desire]] what one already has.<ref>{{EOK}} p.167</ref></blockquote> The [[object]] of [[desire]] is continually deferred, which is why [[desire]] is [[metonymy]].<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref> FIVE[[Desire]] emerges originally in the field of the [[Other]], that is, in the [[unconscious]]. [[Desire]] is a social product.[[Desire]] is not the private affair it appears to be, but is always constituted in a [[dialectical]] relationship with the perceived [[desire]]s of others. <blockquote>The most important point to emerge from Lacan’s phrase [that "the object of man’s desire […] is essentially an object desired by someone else" (qtd. in Evans 38)] is that desire is a social product. Desire is not the private affair it appears to be but is always constituted in a dialectical relationship with the perceived desires of other subjects."<ref>Evans 39</ref></blockquote> The statement provides the basis for our consideration of desire in Lacan’s conception of subjectivity, and points to the fundamentally social character of desire. OBJET AThe [[objet petit a]] is represented by a variety of [[partial object]]s in diffent partial [[drive]]s. The [[objet petit a]] is not the object towards which desire tends, but the cause of desire. [[Desire]] is not a relation to an [[object]], but a relation to a [[lack]]. LAW The [[prohibition]] of ''[[jouissance]]'' (or '[[enjoyment]]') the prohibition on fulfillment of desire which provides the most stimulus for its reproduction. <blockquote>The [[law]] (or [[prohibition]]) "creates [[desire]] in the first place by creating interdiction. [[Desire]] is essentially the [[desire]] to [[transgress]], and for there to be [[transgression]] it is first necessary for there to be [[prohibition]]."<ref>Evans 99</ref></blockquote> The [[law]] gives rise to [[desire]] as that which circulates endlessly around a [[prohibited]] core (of ''[[jouissance]]''). (The [[prohibition]] establishes [[desire]] as the ultimate motivational force in [[subjectivity]].) TREATMENTThe [[aim]] of [[psychoanalytic]] [[treatment]] is to lead the [[analysand]] to recognize the [[truth]] about his or her [[desire]]. It is only possible to recognize one's [[desire]] when it is articulate in [[speech]]. <blockquote>"It is only once it is formulated, named in the [[presence]] of the [[other]], that [[desire]], whatever it is, is recognised in the full sense of the term."<ref>{{S1}} p.183</ref></blockquote> <blockquote>In [[psychoanalysis]], "what's important is to teach the [[subject]] to name, to articulate, to bring this [[desire]] into [[existence]]."<ref>{{S2}} p.228</ref></blockquote> There is a limit to how far desire can be articulated in speech because of a fundamental “incompatibility between desire and speech.”<ref>{{E}} p.275</ref> (This incompatibility which explains the irreducibility of the unconscious (i.e. the fact that the unconscious is not that which is not known, but that which cannot be known).) The [[analysand]] does not simply give expression to a pre-existing [[desire]]. The [[analysand]], by articulating [[desire]] in [[speech]], brings that [[desire]] into [[existence]]. <blockquote>"That the [[subject]] should come to recognise and to name his [[desire]]; that is the efficacious action of [[analysis]]. But it isn't a question of [[recognising]] something which would be entirely given. ... In naming it, the [[subject]] creates, brings forth, a new [[presence]] in the world."<ref>{{S2}} p.228-9</ref></blockquote> <blockquote>"Although the [[truth]] about [[desire]] is present to some degree in all [[speech]], [[speech]] can never articulate the whole [[truth]] about [[desire]]; whenever [[speech]] attempts to articulate [[desire]], there is always a leftover, a [[surplus]], which exceeds [[speech]]."<ref>Evans 36</ref></blockquote> innate incapacity of [[language]] fully to articulate [[desire]] LAW[[Desire]] is created at the moment the [[infant]] becomes a [[subject]].[[Desire]] is created at the moment of the [[infant]]'s accession to the [[symbolic]] [[order]]. it is endemic to (inseparable from) the [[symbolic]] [[order]] and thus inhabits all signification, providing the subject with its primary motivation and frustration. [[Desire]] is fundamentally [[metonymic]] and inheres in [[signification]] as such. [[Desire]] is inscribed in the [[signifying chain]] in its essential [[metonymy]]. <blockquote>"[[Man]]’s [[desire]] is a [[metonymy]]. [...] [[Desire]] is a [[metonymy]]."<ref>{{E}} p.175</ref></blockquote> The perpetual reference of one [[signifer]] to another in an eternal deferral of [[meaning]] (as content, as 'consisting' in any one [[sign]], as present in any way) is a formulation of the ceaseless movement of [[desire]]. ==Impossible Desire== any attempt to satisfy desire is always undercut by a residue that remains unattainable. In [[Lacan]]ian [[psychoanalysis]], the term '''desire''' designates the impossible relation that a [[subject (philosophy)|subject]] has with [[objet petit a]]. According to Lacan, desire proper (in contrast with [[demand (psychoanalysis)|demand]]) can never be fulfilled. The core around which [[desire]] circulates is [[prohibited]]. The [[prohibition]] is simply the articulation of a pre-existing [[impossibility]]. [[Desire]] is by its very nature [[insatiable]]. The important aspect of the paternal interdiction that inaugurates the infant’s traumatic accession to the symbolic order is that what the word-of-the-father interdicts is in fact an impossibility. The infant’s sought-after direct identification with the mother is impossible. The paternal interdiction only formalises this impossibility as a prohibition, covering it over with the compensation of symbolisation. Likewise, the prohibitive aspect of the law is merely a socially institutionalised form of the fundamental impossibility at the heart of desire. In the name of the social good a society may prohibit certain kinds or objects of desire, but the reality is that no object can ever fulfil desire. ==Desire and the Death Drive== [[Lacan]] posits a distinction between [[desire]] and [[drive]]. It is important to distinguish between desire and the drives. The drives are the particular (partial) manifestations of a single force called desire. ==Unsorted==it is at base a quest for presence, the possibility of which is precluded by the mechanism of signification [[Category:Jacques Lacan]][[Category:TermsSymbolic]][[Category:ConceptsReal]][[Category:PsychoanalysisMess]]
