DESIRE: DRIVE = TRUTH: KNOWLEDGESlavoj ZizekAs Jacques-[[Alain]] [[Miller]] has pointed out, the [[concept]] of "constructions in [[analysis]]" does not rely on the (dubious) [[claim]] that the [[analyst]] is always [[right]] (if the [[patient]] accepts the analyst's proposed [[construction]], that's straightforward confirmation of its correctness; if the patient rejects it, this is a [[sign]] of [[resistance]] which, consequently, again confirms that the construction has touched on the [[truth]]); the point, rather, is the obverse--the [[analysand]] is always, by definition, in the wrong. In [[order]] to get this point, one should focus on the crucial [[distinction]] between construction and its [[counterpart]], [[interpretation]], correlative to the couple [[knowledge]]/ truth. That is to say, an interpretation is a gesture that is always embedded in the [[intersubjective]] [[dialectic]] of [[recognition]] between the analysand and the analyst, it aims at bringing [[about]] the effect of truth apropos of some [[particular]] [[formation]] of the [[unconscious]] (a [[dream]], a [[symptom]], a [[slip]] of tongue). The [[subject]] is expected to "recognize" himself in the [[signification]] proposed by the interpreter, precisely to subjectivize it, to assume the proposed signification as "his own" (Yes, my God, that's me, I really wanted this). The very success of interpretation is measured by this "effect of truth," by the extent to which it affects the [[subjective]] [[position]] of the analysand (stirring up [[memories]] of the hitherto deeply [[repressed]] [[traumatic]] encounters, provoking violent resistance).UmbrIn clear contrast to it, a construction (exemplarily, that of afundamental [[fantasy]])has the status of a knowledge which can never be subjectivized, assumed by [[The Subject|the subject]] as the truth about himself, pp 147-152the truth in which he recognizes the innermost kernel of his [[being]]. A construction is a purely [[logical]] explanatory presupposition, like the second [[stage]] (I am being beaten by my [[father]]) of the [[child]]'s fantasy "A child is being beaten" which, as [[Freud]] emphasizes, is so radically unconscious that it cannot ever be remembered:
This second [[phase]] is the most important and the most momentous of all. But we may say that in a certain [[sense]] it has never had a [[real]] [[existence]]. It is never remembered, it has never succeeded in becoming [[conscious]]. It is a construction of analysis, but it is no less a [[necessity]] on that account.<ref> [[Sigmund Freud]], "A Child Is Being Beaten," [[Standard Edition]], vol. 10, p. 185.</ref>
As Jacques-Alain Miller has pointed outThe fact that this phase "never had a real existence," of course, indexes the concept status of "constructions in analysis" does not rely on the (dubious) claim that [[Lacanian]] real; the analyst is always right (if the patient accepts the analyst's proposed construction, that's straightforward confirmation knowledge we have of its correctness; if the patient rejects it, this phase is a sign of resistance which, consequently, again confirms that the construction has touched on the truth); "knowledge in [[The Real|the pointreal]], rather" i.e., it is the obversean "acephalic," non--the analysand is always, by definition, in the wrongsubjectivized knowledge. In order to get this pointAlthough (or, one should focus on the crucial distinction between construction and its counterpart, interpretationrather, correlative to for the couple knowledge/ truth. That is to say, an interpretation is a gesture very [[reason]] that ) it is always embedded in the intersubjective dialectic of recognition between the analysand and the analyst, it aims at bringing about the effect of truth apropos of some particular formation of the unconscious (a dream, a symptom, a slip kind of tongue). The subject is expected to "recognizeThou art that!" himself in which articulates the signification proposed by very kernel of the interpreter, precisely to subjectivize it, to assume the proposed signification as "his own" (Yes, my God, thatsubject's being, its assumption desubjectivizes me, I really wanted this)i.e. The very success of interpretation is measured by this "effect of truth,I can only assume my [[fundamental fantasy]] insofar as I undergo what [[Lacan]] calls " by the extent to which it affects the [[subjective position of the analysand (stirring up memories of the hitherto deeply repressed traumatic encountersdestitution]]." Or, provoking violent resistance). In clear contrast to put itin yet [[another]] way, a interpretation and construction (exemplarilystand to each [[other]] like symptom and fantasy: [[symptoms]] are to be [[interpreted]], that of a the fundamental fantasyis to be (re) has the status constructed. This [[notion]] of a "acephalic" knowledge which can never be subjectivized, assumed by the subject as the truth about himselfemerges rather late in Lacan's teaching, after the [[relationship]] between knowledge and truth underwent a profound shift in which he recognizes the innermost kernel of his beingearly seventies. A construction is a purely logical explanatory presupposition, like the second stage (I am being beaten by my father) of the child's fantasy "A child is being beaten" which, as Freud emphasizes, is so radically unconscious that it cannot ever be remembered:
This second In the "early" phase , from the 1940s to the 1960s, Lacan moves within the coordinates of the standard [[philosophical]] opposition between "inauthentic" objectifying knowledge which disregards the subject's position of [[enunciation]], and the "authentic" truth by which one is existentially engaged, affected. In the most important [[psychoanalytic]] [[clinic]], this opposition is perhaps best exemplified by the clear contrast between [[obsessional]] [[neurosis]] and [[hysteria]]. The obsessional [[neurotic]] lies in the most momentous guise of alltruth. But we may say that in At the level of factual accuracy, his statements are as a certain sense it rule [[true]], yet he uses factual accuracy to dissimulate the truth about his [[desire]]. When, for example, my [[enemy]] has a car accident because of a brake malfunction, I go to great lengths to explain to everyone that I was never had a real existencenear his car and am therefore not [[responsible]] for the malfunction. It While this is true, this "truth" is never rememberedpropagated by me to conceal the fact that the accident realized my desire. On the contrary, it has never succeeded the [[hysteric]] tells the truth in the guise of a lie; the truth of my desire articulates itself in becoming consciousthe very distortions of the "factual accuracy" of my [[speech]]. When, instead of "I hereby open this [[session]]," I say "I hereby close this session," my desire clearly reveals itself. It The aim of the psychoanalytic [[treatment]] is thus to (re)focus attention from factual accuracy to [[hysterical]] lies which unknowingly articulate the truth, and then to [[progress]] to a construction new knowledge which dwells at the [[place]] of analysistruth, but it is no less to a knowledge which, instead of dissimulating truth, gives rise to truth-effects, i.e. to what the Lacan of the fifties called "[[full]] speech," the speech in which subjective truth reverberates. This notion of truth, of course, belongs to a necessity on that accountlong [[tradition]], from [[Kierkegaard]] to [[Heidegger]], of despising mere "factual truth. (1)"
The fact that this phase Beginning in the late sixties, however, Lacan focuses his attention more and more on [[drive]] as a kind of "acephalic"never had a real existenceknowledge which brings about [[satisfaction]]. This knowledge involves no inherent relation to truth, no [[subjective position]] of enunciation-- not because it dissimulates the subjective position of enunciation, but because it is in itself nonsubjectivized," or ontologically prior to the very [[dimension]] of truth (of course, indexes the status term [[ontological]] becomes thereby problematic, since [[ontology]] is by definition a [[discourse]] on truth). Truth and knowledge are thus related as desire and drive: interpretation aims at the truth of the Lacanian real; [[subject's desire]] (the knowledge we have truth of this phase desire is the desire for truth, as one is tempted to put it in a pseudo-[[Heideggerian]] way), while construction provides [[know]]- ledge about drive. Is not the paradigmatic [[case]] of such an "acephalic"knowledge in provided by modern [[science]] which exemplifies the "blind [[insistence]]" of the real([[death]]) drive?<ref>[[Jacques-Alain Miller]], "[[Savoir]] et satisfaction," i.ein La [[Cause]] freudienne 33, [[Paris]] 1996.</ref> Modern science follows its path (in microbiology, in manipulating genes, in particle [[physics]]) heedless of cost--satisfaction is here provided by knowledge itself, it not by any [[moral]] or communal goals [[scientific]] knowledge is an supposed to serve. All the "acephalic,[[ethical]] committees" nonwhich abound today and attempt to establish rules for the proper conduct of gene-subjectivized knowledgemanipulation, of medical experiments, etc. Although -- are they ultimately not desperate attempts to reinscribe this inexorable drive-progress of science which [[knows]] of no inherent limitation (or, rather, for in short: this inherent [[ethic]] of the very reason thatscientific attitude) within the confines of [[human]] goals, to provide it with a "human face," a limitation? The commonplace wisdom today is that "our extraordinary [[power]] to manipulate [[nature]] through scientific devices has run ahead of our faculty to lead a kind meaningful existence, to make human use of this immense power."Thou art that!" which articulates Thus, the very kernel properly modern [[ethics]] of "following the subjectdrive" clashes with traditional ethics whereby one is instructed to live one's being, [[life]] according to standards of proper measure and to subordinate all its assumption desubjectivizes measpects to some all-encompassing notion of the [[Good]]. The problem is, i.e.of course, I that no [[balance]] between these two notions of ethics can only assume my ever be achieved. The notion of reinscribing scientific drive into the constraints of the life-[[world]] is fantasy at its purest--perhaps the fundamental fascist fantasy insofar as I undergo what Lacan calls "subjective destitution." Or, Any limitation of this kind is utterly foreign to put it in yet another way, interpretation and construction stand the inherent [[logic]] of science--science belongs to each other like symptom the real and fantasy: symptoms are to be interpreted, as a mode of the fundamental fantasy real of [[jouissance]], it is indifferent to be (re)constructed. This notion the modalities of "acephalic" knowledge emerges rather late in Lacan's teachingits [[symbolization]], after to the relationship between knowledge and truth underwent a profound shift in the early seventiesway it will [[affect]] [[social]] life.
In Of course, the [[concrete]] organization of the scientific [[apparatus]], up to its most abstract [[conceptual]] schemas, is socially "earlymediated," phasebut the [[whole]] [[game]] of discerning a patriarchal, Eurocentric, mechanistic, from the 1940s nature-exploiting bias to modern science does not really concern science, the 1960s, Lacan moves within drive which effectuates itself in the coordinates operation of the standard philosophical opposition between "inauthentic" objectifying knowledge which disregards the subjectscientific [[machine]]. Heidegger's position seems here utterly ambiguous; perhaps, it is all too easy to dismiss him as the most sophisticated proponent of enunciation, and the [[thesis]] that science a priori misses the dimension of truth. Didn't he claim that "authenticscience doesn't [[think]]," truth i.e. that it is by which one is existentially engageddefinition unable to reflect its own philosophical foundation, affected. In the psychoanalytic clinichermeneutic horizon of its functioning, and, furthermore, that this opposition incapacity, far from playing the [[role]] of an impediment, is perhaps best exemplified by the clear contrast between obsessional neurosis and hysteria. The obsessional neurotic lies in the guise a positive condition of truth. At the level possibility of factual accuracyits smooth functioning? His crucial point is rather that modern science, his statements are as a rule truesuch, yet he uses factual accuracy cannot be reduced to dissimulate the truth about his desire. Whensome limited, for exampleontical, my enemy has a car accident because "socially conditioned" option (expressing the interests of a brake malfunctioncertain social group, I go to great lengths to explain to everyone that I was never near his car and am therefore not responsible for the malfunctionetc. While this is true), this "truth" but is propagated by me to conceal rather the fact real of our historical [[moment]], that which "remains the accident realized my desire. On the contrary, the hysteric tells the truth same" in the guise of a lie; the truth of my desire articulates itself in the very distortions of the all possible ("progressive"factual accuracyand " of my speech. Whenreactionary, instead of "I hereby open this session"technocratic" and "ecological," I say "I hereby close this session,patriarchal" and "[[feminist]]" my desire clearly reveals itself) [[symbolic]] universes. The aim of the psychoanalytic treatment Heidegger is thus well aware that all fashionable "critiques of science" according to (re)focus attention from factual accuracy to hysterical lies which unknowingly articulate the truthscience is a tool of Western [[capitalist]] domination, of patriarchal oppression, etc., fall short and then to progress thus leave unquestioned the "hard kernel" of the scientific drive. Lacan obliges us to add that science is perhaps "real" in an even more radical sense: it is the first (and probably unique) case of a new knowledge which dwells at discourse that is strictly nonhistorical even in the Heideggerian sense of the place [[historicity]] of truth, to a knowledge which, instead the epochs of dissimulating truth, gives rise to truth-effectsBeing, i.e. epochs whose functioning is inherently indifferent to what the Lacan historically determined horizons of the fifties called disclosure of Being. Precisely insofar as science "full speechdoesn't think," it knows, ignoring the speech in which subjective dimension of truth reverberates, and is as such drive at its purest. This notion Lacan's [[supplement]] to Heidegger would thus be: why should this utter "[[forgetting]] of truth, Being" at [[work]] in modern science be perceived only as the greatest "[[danger]]? Does it not contain also a "liberating" dimension? Is not the suspension of ontological Truth in the unfettered functioning of course, belongs to science already a long tradition, from Kierkegaard to Heidegger, kind of despising mere "factual truth.passing through" and "getting over"the metaphysical closure?
Beginning in the late sixtiesWithin [[psychoanalysis]], however, Lacan focuses his attention more and more on this knowledge of drive as a kind which can never be subjectivized assumes the [[form]] of knowledge of the subject's "acephalicfundamental fantasy," knowledge the specific [[formula]] which brings about satisfactionregulates his or her access to jouissance. This knowledge involves no inherent relation That is to truthsay, desire and jouissance are inherently antagonistic, no subjective position of enunciation-- exclusive even: desire's raison d'etre (or "utility function," to use Richard Dawkins's term) is not because it dissimulates the subjective position of enunciationto realize its [[goal]], to find full satisfaction, but because to reproduce itself as desire. How is it is in itself nonsubjectivizedpossible nonetheless to couple desire and jouissance, or ontologically prior to [[guarantee]] a minimum of jouissance within the very dimension [[space]] of truth (of course, the term ontological becomes thereby problematic, since ontology desire? This is made possible by definition the famous Lacanian [[object]] a discourse on truth). Truth and knowledge are thus related as desire and drive: interpretation aims at that mediates between the truth incompatible domains of the subject's desire (and jouissance. In what precise sense is [[object a]] the truth object-[[cause of desire ]]? [[Object A|Object a]] is not what we [[desire,]] what we are after, but rather that which sets our desire in motion, the [[formal]] [[frame]] that confers consistency on our desire for truth. Desire is of course metonymical, as it shifts from one is tempted object to put it in another; through all its displacements, however, desire nonetheless retains a pseudo-Heideggerian way)minimum of formal consistency, while construction provides know- ledge about drive. Is not the paradigmatic case a set of such an "acephalic" knowledge provided by modern science (2)[[fantasmatic]] features which exemplifies the "blind insistence" of the (death) drive? Modern science follows its path (, when encountered in microbiologya positive object, in manipulating genesinsures that we will come to desire this object. Object a, in particle physics) heedless as the cause of cost--satisfaction is here provided by knowledge itselfdesire, not by any moral or communal goals scientific knowledge is supposed to serve[[nothing]] but this formal frame of consistency. All In a slightly different way, the same [[mechanism]] regulates the "ethical committees" which abound today and attempt to establish rules for subject's falling in [[love]]: the proper conduct automatism of gene-manipulationlove is set in motion when some [[contingent]], of medical experiments, etc. -- are they ultimately not desperate attempts to reinscribe this inexorable driveindifferent ([[libidinal]]) object finds itself occupying a pre-progress given fantasy place. This role of science which knows fantasy in the automatic emergence of love hinges on the fact that "there is no inherent limitation (in short: this inherent ethic [[sexual]] relationship," no [[universal]] formula or [[matrix]] guaranteeing a [[harmonious]] [[sexual relationship]] with the partner. Because of the scientific attitude) within the confines [[lack]] of human goalsthis universal formula, every [[individual]] has to provide it with invent a "human facefantasy of his own,a " a limitation? The commonplace wisdom today is that private"our extraordinary power to manipulate nature through scientific devices has run ahead of our faculty to lead formula far the [[Sexual Relationship|sexual relationship]]; for a meaningful existenceman, to make human use of this immense powera relationship with a [[woman]] is possible only inasmuch as she fits his formula." Thus, the properly modern ethics The formula of "following the drive" clashes with traditional ethics whereby one is instructed to live oneWolfman, Freud's life according to standards famous patient, consisted of proper measure "a woman, viewed from behind, on her hands and to subordinate all its aspects to some all-encompassing notion of the Good. The problem isknees, of course, that no balance between these two notions of ethics can ever be achieved. The notion of reinscribing scientific drive into and washing or cleaning something on the constraints ground in front of her"; the life-world is fantasy at its purest--perhaps the fundamental fascist fantasy. Any limitation view of a woman in this kind is utterly foreign position automatically gave rise to love. John Ruskin's formula, which followed the inherent logic [[model]] of science--science belongs to the real old Greek andRoman statues, as led to a mode of tragicomic disappointment when, in the real course of jouissancehis wedding night, it is indifferent to Ruskin caught [[sight]] of pubic hair not found on the modalities of its symbolizationstatues. This discovery made him totally impotent, to the way it will affect social lifesince he was convinced that his wife was a monster.
Of courseRecently, Slovene feminists reacted with outrage at the concrete organization publicity poster for a sun lotion, depicting a series of well-tanned [[women]]'s behinds in tight bathing suits, accompanied by the scientific apparatus, up to its most abstract conceptual schemas, is socially slogan "Each has her own factor."mediatedOf course," but this ad campaign was based on a rather vulgar [[double]] entendre: the whole game of discerning a patriarchal, Eurocentric, mechanistic, nature-exploiting bias slogan ostensibly refers to modern science does not really concern science, the drive sun lotion which effectuates itself in the operation is offered to customers with different sun factors to fit different kinds of the scientific machine. Heidegger's position seems here utterly ambiguousskin; perhapshowever, it its effect is all too easy to dismiss him as based on the most sophisticated proponent of the thesis that science a priori misses the dimension of truth. Didn't he claim that obvious [[male]]-chauvinist [[reading]]: "science doesn't think," i.e. that it is by definition unable to reflect its own philosophical foundationEach woman can be had, if only the hermeneutic horizon of its functioningman knows her factor, and, furthermoreher specific catalyst, what arouses her!" The [[Freudian]] point about fundamental fantasy would be that this incapacityeach subject, far from playing the role of an impediment[[female]] or male, is possesses such a positive condition of possibility of its smooth functioning? His crucial point is rather that modern science, as such, cannot be reduced to some limited, ontical, "socially conditionedfactor" option (expressing the interests of a certain social group, etc.), but is rather the real of our historical moment, that which regulates her or his desire: "remains the same" in all possible ("progressive" and "reactionarya woman," "technocratic" and "ecologicalviewed from behind," "patriarchal" on her hands and knees"feminist") symbolic universes. Heidegger is thus well aware that all fashionable "critiques of science" according to which science is was the Wolfman's factor; a tool of Western capitalist domination, of patriarchal oppression, statue-like woman without pubic hair was Ruskin's factor; etc., fall short and thus leave unquestioned the "hard kernel" of the scientific driveetc. Lacan obliges us to add that science There is perhaps nothing uplifting about our [[awareness]] of this "realfactor" in an even more radical sense: this awareness can never be subjectivized, it is the first (and probably unique) case of a discourse that is strictly nonhistorical [[uncanny]], horrifying even in the Heideggerian sense of the historicity of the epochs of Being, i.e. epochs whose functioning is inherently indifferent to the historically determined horizons of the disclosure of Being. Precisely insofar as science since it somehow "doesn't think,depossesses" it knows, ignoring the dimension of truthsubject, and is as such drive at its purest. Lacan's supplement reducing her or him to Heidegger would thus be: why should this utter "forgetting of Being" at work in modern science be perceived only as the greatest "danger? Does it not contain also a puppet-like level "liberating" dimension? Is not the suspension of ontological Truth in the unfettered functioning of science already a kind of "passing through" beyond dignity and [[freedom]]."getting over" the metaphysical closure?
Within psychoanalysis, this knowledge of drive which can never be subjectivized assumes the form of knowledge of the subject's "fundamental fantasy," the specific formula which regulates his or her access to jouissance. That is to say, desire and jouissance are inherently antagonistic, exclusive even==Source==* [[Desire:Drive = Truth: desireKnowledge]] 's raison d'etre Umbr(or "utility function," to use Richard Dawkins's term) is not to realize its goal, to find full satisfaction, but to reproduce itself as desire. How is it possible nonetheless to couple desire and jouissance, to guarantee a minimum of jouissance within the space of desire? This is made possible by the famous Lacanian object a that mediates between the incompatible domains of desire and jouissance. In what precise sense is object a the object-cause of desire? Object a is not what we desire, what we are after, but rather that which sets our desire in motion, the formal frame that confers consistency on our desire. Desire is of course metonymical, it shifts from one object to another; through all its displacements, however, desire nonetheless retains a minimum of formal consistency, a set of fantasmatic features which, when encountered in a positive object, insures that we will come to desire this object. Object a, as the cause of desire, is nothing but this formal frame of consistency. In a slightly different way, the same mechanism regulates the subject's falling in love: the automatism of love is set in motion when some contingent, ultimately indifferent (libidinal) object finds itself occupying a pre-given fantasy place. This role of fantasy in the automatic emergence of love hinges on the fact that "there is no sexual relationship," no universal formula or matrix guaranteeing a harmonious sexual relationship with the partner. Because of the lack of this universal formula, every individual has to invent a fantasy of his own, a "private" formula far the sexual relationship; for a man, a relationship with a woman is possible only inasmuch as she fits his formula. The formula of the Wolfman, Freud's famous patient, consisted of "a woman, viewed from behind, on her hands and knees, and washing or cleaning something on the ground in front of her"; the view of a woman in this position automatically gave rise to love. John Ruskin's formula, which followed the model of old Greek and Roman statues, led to a tragicomic disappointment when, in the course of his wedding night, Ruskin caught sight of pubic hair not found on the statues. This discovery made him totally impotent, since he was convinced that his wife was a monster. Recently, Slovene feminists reacted with outrage at the publicity poster for a sun lotion, depicting a series of well-tanned women's behinds in tight bathing suits, accompanied by the slogan "Each has her own factor." Of course, this ad campaign was based on a rather vulgar double entendre: the slogan ostensibly refers to the sun lotion which is offered to customers with different sun factors to fit different kinds of skin; however, its effect is based on the obvious male-chauvinist reading: "Each woman can be had, if only the man knows her factor, her specific catalyst, what arouses her!" The Freudian point about fundamental fantasy would be that each subject, female or male, possesses such a "factor" which regulates her or his desire: "a woman, viewed from behind, on her hands and knees" was the Wolfman's factor; a statue-like woman without pubic hair was Ruskin's factor; etc., etc. There is nothing uplifting about our awareness of this "factor": this awareness can never be subjectivized, it is uncanny, horrifying even, since it somehow "depossesses" the subject, reducing her or him to a puppet-like level "beyond dignity and freedom." (1) Sigmund Freud, "A Child Is Being Beaten," Standard Edition, vol. 10, p. 185. (2) see Jacques-Alain Miller, "Savoir et satisfaction," in La Cause freudienne 33, Paris 1996.From: Umbr(a), pp 147-152.Available: <http://wings.buffalo.edu/student-life/graduate/gsa/lacan/slavvy.html.>[[Category:Articles by Slavoj Žižek]][[Category:ZizekSlavoj Žižek]]
[[Category:Works]]
[[Category:Essays]]
