Difference between revisions of "Dialectic"
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| − | dialectic (dialectique) | + | dialectic (dialectique) |
| − | for whom it denoted (among other things) a discursive procedure in which an | + | The term 'dialectic' originated with the Greeks, for whom it denoted (among other things) a discursive procedure in which an opponent in a debate is questioned in such a way as to bring out the contradictions in his discourse. This is the tactic which Plato ascribes to Socrates, who is shown as beginning most dialogues by first reducing his interlocutor to a state of confusion and helplessness. Lacan compares this to the first stage of psychoanalytic treatment, when the analyst forces the analysand to confront the contradictions and gaps in his narrative. However, just as Socrates then proceeds to draw out the truth from the confused statements of his interlocutor, so also the analyst proceeds to draw out the truth from the analysand's free associations (see S8, 140). Thus Lacan argues that 'psychoanalysis is a dialectical experience' (Ec, 216), since the analyst must engage the analysand in 'a dialectical operation' (Sl, 278). It is only by means of 'an endless dialectical process' that the analyst can subvert the ego's disabling illusions of permanence and stability, in a manner identical to the Socratic Dialogue (Lacan, 1951b: 12). |
| − | + | Although the origin of dialectics goes back to the Greek philosophers, its dominance in modern philosophy is due to the revival of the concept in the eighteenth century by the post-Kantian idealists Fichte and Hegel, who conceived of the dialectic as a triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. For Hegel, the dialectic is both a method of exposition and the structure of historical progress itself. Thus in Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Hegel shows how consciousness progresses towards absolute knowledge by means of a series of confrontations between opposing elements. Each confrontation is resolved by an operation called the Aufhebung (usually translated as 'sublation') in which a new idea (the synthesis) is born from the opposition between thesis and antithesis; the synthesis simultaneously annuls, preserves and raises this opposition to a higher level. | |
| − | opponent in a debate is questioned in such a way as to bring out the | + | The particular way in which the Hegelian dialectic is appropriated by Lacan |
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | who is shown as beginning most dialogues by first reducing his interlocutor to | ||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | psychoanalytic treatment, when the analyst forces the analysand to confront | ||
| − | |||
| − | the contradictions and gaps in his narrative. However, just as Socrates then | ||
| − | |||
| − | proceeds to draw out the truth from the confused statements of his interlocutor, | ||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | associations (see S8, 140). Thus Lacan argues that 'psychoanalysis is | ||
| − | |||
| − | dialectical experience' (Ec, 216), since the analyst must engage the analysand | ||
| − | |||
| − | in 'a dialectical operation' (Sl, 278). It is only by | ||
| − | |||
| − | dialectical process' that the analyst can subvert the ego's disabling illusions | ||
| − | |||
| − | of permanence and stability, in a manner identical to the Socratic Dialogue | ||
| − | |||
| − | (Lacan, 1951b: 12). | ||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | dominance in modern philosophy is due to the revival of the concept in the | ||
| − | |||
| − | eighteenth century by the post-Kantian idealists Fichte and Hegel, who | ||
| − | |||
| − | conceived of the dialectic as a triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. For | ||
| − | |||
| − | Hegel, the dialectic is both | ||
| − | |||
| − | historical progress itself. Thus in Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Hegel | ||
| − | |||
| − | shows how consciousness progresses towards absolute knowledge by means | ||
| − | |||
| − | of a series of confrontations between opposing elements. Each confrontation is | ||
| − | |||
| − | resolved by | ||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | |||
| − | between thesis and antithesis; the synthesis simultaneously annuls, preserves | ||
| − | |||
| − | and raises this opposition to a higher level. | ||
| − | |||
| − | |||
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Revision as of 08:30, 26 April 2006
dialectic (dialectique)
The term 'dialectic' originated with the Greeks, for whom it denoted (among other things) a discursive procedure in which an opponent in a debate is questioned in such a way as to bring out the contradictions in his discourse. This is the tactic which Plato ascribes to Socrates, who is shown as beginning most dialogues by first reducing his interlocutor to a state of confusion and helplessness. Lacan compares this to the first stage of psychoanalytic treatment, when the analyst forces the analysand to confront the contradictions and gaps in his narrative. However, just as Socrates then proceeds to draw out the truth from the confused statements of his interlocutor, so also the analyst proceeds to draw out the truth from the analysand's free associations (see S8, 140). Thus Lacan argues that 'psychoanalysis is a dialectical experience' (Ec, 216), since the analyst must engage the analysand in 'a dialectical operation' (Sl, 278). It is only by means of 'an endless dialectical process' that the analyst can subvert the ego's disabling illusions of permanence and stability, in a manner identical to the Socratic Dialogue (Lacan, 1951b: 12). Although the origin of dialectics goes back to the Greek philosophers, its dominance in modern philosophy is due to the revival of the concept in the eighteenth century by the post-Kantian idealists Fichte and Hegel, who conceived of the dialectic as a triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. For Hegel, the dialectic is both a method of exposition and the structure of historical progress itself. Thus in Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Hegel shows how consciousness progresses towards absolute knowledge by means of a series of confrontations between opposing elements. Each confrontation is resolved by an operation called the Aufhebung (usually translated as 'sublation') in which a new idea (the synthesis) is born from the opposition between thesis and antithesis; the synthesis simultaneously annuls, preserves and raises this opposition to a higher level. The particular way in which the Hegelian dialectic is appropriated by Lacan
PAGE 43
