Difference between revisions of "Dialectic"
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| − | + | {{Top}}[[dialectique]]{{Bottom}} | |
| − | The term | + | ==Philosophy== |
| + | The term "[[dialectic]]" originated with the [[Greeks]], for whom it denoted (among other things) a discursive procedure in which an opponent in a debate is questioned in such a way as to bring out the contradictions in his [[discourse]]. | ||
| − | This is the tactic which Plato ascribes to Socrates, who is shown as beginning most dialogues by first reducing his interlocutor to a state of confusion and helplessness. | + | This is the tactic which [[Plato]] ascribes to [[Socrates]], who is shown as beginning most dialogues by first reducing his interlocutor to a [[state]] of confusion and [[helplessness]]. |
| − | Lacan compares this to the first stage of psychoanalytic treatment, when the analyst forces the analysand to confront the contradictions and | + | ==Psychoanalytic Treatment== |
| + | [[Lacan]] compares this to the first [[stage]] of [[psychoanalytic treatment]], when the [[analyst]] forces the [[analysand]] to confront the contradictions and [[gap]]s in his [[narrative]]. | ||
| − | However, just as Socrates then proceeds to draw out the truth from the confused statements of his interlocutor, so also the analyst proceeds to draw out the truth from the analysand's free | + | However, just as [[Socrates]] then proceeds to draw out the [[truth]] from the confused statements of his interlocutor, so also the [[analyst]] proceeds to draw out the [[truth]] from the [[analysand]]'s [[free association]]s.<ref>{{S8}} p. 140</ref> |
| − | Thus Lacan argues that "psychoanalysis is a dialectical experience"<ref>{{Ec}} p.216</ref>, since the analyst must engage the analysand in 'a dialectical operation."<ref>{{S1}} p.278</ref> | + | Thus [[Lacan]] argues that "[[psychoanalysis]] is a dialectical [[experience]]"<ref>{{Ec}} p. 216</ref>, since the analyst must engage the analysand in 'a dialectical operation."<ref>{{S1}} p. 278</ref> |
| − | It is only by means of "an endless dialectical process" that the analyst can subvert the ego's disabling | + | It is only by means of "an endless dialectical [[process]]" that the [[analyst]] can subvert the [[ego]]'s disabling [[illusion]]s of permanence and [[stability]], in a manner identical to the Socratic Dialogue.<ref>{{L}} "[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Some Reflections on the Ego]]," ''Int. J. [[Psycho]]-[[Anal]].'', vol. 34, 1953 [1951b]. p. 12</ref> |
| + | ==Hegelian Dialectic== | ||
| + | Although the origin of [[dialectic]]s goes back to the Greek [[philosophers]], its dominance in modern philosophy is due to the revival of the [[concept]] in the eighteenth century by the [[Kant|post-Kantian]] [[idealism|idealists]] [[Fichte]] and [[Hegel]], who conceived of the [[dialectic]] as a [[triad]] of [[dialectic|thesis]], [[dialectic|antithesis]] and [[dialectic|synthesis]]. | ||
| − | + | For [[Hegel]], the [[dialectic]] is both a method of exposition and the [[structure]] of [[Historical Progress|historical progress]] itself. | |
| − | + | Thus in ''[[Phenomenology of Spirit]]'' (1807), [[Hegel]] shows how [[consciousness]] [[progress]]es towards [[dialectic|absolute knowledge]] by means of a series of confrontations between opposing elements. | |
| − | + | Each confrontation is resolved by an operation called the ''[[Aufhebung]]'' (usually translated as "[[sublation]]") in which a new [[idea]] (the [[dialectic|synthesis]]) is [[born]] from the opposition between [[dialectic|thesis]] and [[dialectic|antithesis]]; the [[dialectic|synthesis]] simultaneously annuls, preserves and raises this opposition to a higher level. | |
| − | + | ==Alexandre Kojève== | |
| − | + | The [[particular]] way in which the [[Hegelian]] [[dialectic]] is appropriated by [[Lacan]] owes much to [[Alexandre Kojève]], whose lectures on [[Hegel]] [[Lacan]] attended in [[Paris]] in the 1930s. | |
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| + | Following [[Kojève]] [[Lacan]] puts great emphasis on the particular stage of the [[dialectic]] in which the [[master]] confronts the [[slave]], and on the way that [[desire]] is constituted [[dialectically]] by a [[relationship]] with the [[desire]] of the [[Other]]. | ||
| + | ==Progression Toward Truth== | ||
| + | Using the [[Dora]] [[case]] to illustrate his point, [[Lacan]] shows how [[psychoanalytic treatment]] [[progress]]es towards [[truth]] by a series of [[dialectical]] reversals.<ref>{{L}} "[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Intervention sur le transfert]]", in {{Ec}} pp. 215-26 ["[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Intervention on the Transference]]", trans. [[Jacqueline Rose]], in Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (eds), ''[[Feminine]] [[Sexuality]]: [[Jacques Lacan]] and the École Freudienne'', [[London]]: Macmillan, 1982 [1951a]. pp. 61-73</ref> | ||
| + | ==''Aufhebung''== | ||
| + | [[Lacan]] also makes use of a concept of ''[[Aufhebung]]'' to show how the [[symbolic]] [[order]] can simultaneously annul, preserve and raise an [[imaginary]] [[object]] (the [[imaginary]] [[phallus]]) to the status of a [[signifier]] (the [[symbolic]] [[phallus]]); the [[phallus]] then becomes "the signifier of this ''[[Aufhebung]]'' itself, which it inaugurates by its [[disappearance]]."<ref>{{E}} p. 288</ref> | ||
| + | ==Lacanian Dialectic== | ||
However, there are also important differences between the [[Lacanian]] [[dialectic]], and the [[Hegelian]] [[dialectic]]. | However, there are also important differences between the [[Lacanian]] [[dialectic]], and the [[Hegelian]] [[dialectic]]. | ||
| − | For Lacan, there is no such thing as a final synthesis such as is represented by Hegel's concept of | + | For [[Lacan]], there is no such [[thing]] as a final [[dialectic|synthesis]] such as is represented by Hegel's concept of [[dialectic|absolute knowledge]]; the [[irreducibility]] of the [[unconscious]] represents the [[impossibility]] of any such [[dialectic|absolute knowledge]]. |
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| + | For [[Lacan]], then, "the ''[[Aufhebung]]'' is one of those sweet [[dreams]] of [[philosophy]]."<ref>{{S20}} p. 79</ref> | ||
| + | This [[disavowal|denial]] of a final [[dialectic|synthesis]] subverts the very concept of [[progress]] itself. | ||
| + | Thus [[Lacan]] contrasts his own version of the ''[[Aufhebung]]'' with that of [[Hegel]], arguing that it repalces [[Hegel]]'s idea of [[progress]] with"the avatars of a lack."<ref>{{Ec}} p. 837</ref> | ||
==See Also== | ==See Also== | ||
| − | + | {{See}} | |
| + | * [[Analysand]] | ||
| + | * [[Analyst]] | ||
| + | || | ||
| + | * [[Desire]] | ||
| + | * [[Lack]] | ||
| + | || | ||
| + | * [[Knowledge]] | ||
| + | * [[Master]] | ||
| + | || | ||
| + | * [[Other]] | ||
| + | * [[Philosophy]] | ||
| + | || | ||
| + | * [[Progress]] | ||
| + | * [[Time]] | ||
| + | || | ||
| + | * [[Treatment]] | ||
| + | * [[Truth]] | ||
| + | {{Also}} | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
| + | <div style="font-size:11px" class="references-small"> | ||
<references/> | <references/> | ||
| + | </div> | ||
[[Category:Psychoanalysis]] | [[Category:Psychoanalysis]] | ||
[[Category:Philosophy]] | [[Category:Philosophy]] | ||
[[Category:Jacques Lacan]] | [[Category:Jacques Lacan]] | ||
| + | [[Category:Dictionary]] | ||
[[Category:Concepts]] | [[Category:Concepts]] | ||
[[Category:Terms]] | [[Category:Terms]] | ||
| + | {{OK}} | ||
| + | __NOTOC__ | ||
Latest revision as of 22:06, 27 May 2019
| French: [[dialectique]] |
Philosophy
The term "dialectic" originated with the Greeks, for whom it denoted (among other things) a discursive procedure in which an opponent in a debate is questioned in such a way as to bring out the contradictions in his discourse.
This is the tactic which Plato ascribes to Socrates, who is shown as beginning most dialogues by first reducing his interlocutor to a state of confusion and helplessness.
Psychoanalytic Treatment
Lacan compares this to the first stage of psychoanalytic treatment, when the analyst forces the analysand to confront the contradictions and gaps in his narrative.
However, just as Socrates then proceeds to draw out the truth from the confused statements of his interlocutor, so also the analyst proceeds to draw out the truth from the analysand's free associations.[1]
Thus Lacan argues that "psychoanalysis is a dialectical experience"[2], since the analyst must engage the analysand in 'a dialectical operation."[3]
It is only by means of "an endless dialectical process" that the analyst can subvert the ego's disabling illusions of permanence and stability, in a manner identical to the Socratic Dialogue.[4]
Hegelian Dialectic
Although the origin of dialectics goes back to the Greek philosophers, its dominance in modern philosophy is due to the revival of the concept in the eighteenth century by the post-Kantian idealists Fichte and Hegel, who conceived of the dialectic as a triad of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.
For Hegel, the dialectic is both a method of exposition and the structure of historical progress itself.
Thus in Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), Hegel shows how consciousness progresses towards absolute knowledge by means of a series of confrontations between opposing elements.
Each confrontation is resolved by an operation called the Aufhebung (usually translated as "sublation") in which a new idea (the synthesis) is born from the opposition between thesis and antithesis; the synthesis simultaneously annuls, preserves and raises this opposition to a higher level.
Alexandre Kojève
The particular way in which the Hegelian dialectic is appropriated by Lacan owes much to Alexandre Kojève, whose lectures on Hegel Lacan attended in Paris in the 1930s.
Following Kojève Lacan puts great emphasis on the particular stage of the dialectic in which the master confronts the slave, and on the way that desire is constituted dialectically by a relationship with the desire of the Other.
Progression Toward Truth
Using the Dora case to illustrate his point, Lacan shows how psychoanalytic treatment progresses towards truth by a series of dialectical reversals.[5]
Aufhebung
Lacan also makes use of a concept of Aufhebung to show how the symbolic order can simultaneously annul, preserve and raise an imaginary object (the imaginary phallus) to the status of a signifier (the symbolic phallus); the phallus then becomes "the signifier of this Aufhebung itself, which it inaugurates by its disappearance."[6]
Lacanian Dialectic
However, there are also important differences between the Lacanian dialectic, and the Hegelian dialectic.
For Lacan, there is no such thing as a final synthesis such as is represented by Hegel's concept of absolute knowledge; the irreducibility of the unconscious represents the impossibility of any such absolute knowledge.
For Lacan, then, "the Aufhebung is one of those sweet dreams of philosophy."[7]
This denial of a final synthesis subverts the very concept of progress itself.
Thus Lacan contrasts his own version of the Aufhebung with that of Hegel, arguing that it repalces Hegel's idea of progress with"the avatars of a lack."[8]
See Also
References
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Le Séminaire. Livre VIII. Le transfert, 1960-61. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Seuil, 1991. p. 140
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. p. 216
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book I. Freud's Papers on Technique, 1953-54. Trans. John Forrester. New York: Nortion; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p. 278
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. "Some Reflections on the Ego," Int. J. Psycho-Anal., vol. 34, 1953 [1951b]. p. 12
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. "Intervention sur le transfert", in Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. pp. 215-26 ["Intervention on the Transference", trans. Jacqueline Rose, in Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose (eds), Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the École Freudienne, London: Macmillan, 1982 [1951a]. pp. 61-73
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Tavistock Publications, 1977. p. 288
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Le Séminaire. Livre XX. Encore, 1972-73. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Paris: Seuil, 1975. p. 79
- ↑ Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. p. 837
