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==Philosophy==The term '"[[dialectic]]' " originated with the Greeks, for whom it denoted (among other things) a discursive procedure in which an opponent in a debate is questioned in such a way as to bring out the contradictions in his [[discourse]].

This is the tactic which [[Plato ]] ascribes to [[Socrates]], who is shown as beginning most dialogues by first reducing his interlocutor to a state of confusion and helplessness.

==Psychoanalytic Treatment==[[Lacan ]] compares this to the first stage of [[psychoanalytic treatment]], when the [[analyst ]] forces the [[analysand ]] to confront the contradictions and gaps [[gap]]s in his narrative.

However, just as [[Socrates ]] then proceeds to draw out the [[truth ]] from the confused statements of his interlocutor, so also the [[analyst ]] proceeds to draw out the [[truth ]] from the [[analysand]]'s [[free associationsassociation]]s.<ref>{{S8}} p.140</ref>

Thus [[Lacan ]] argues that "psychoanalysis is a dialectical experience"<ref>{{Ec}} p.216</ref>, since the analyst must engage the analysand in 'a dialectical operation."<ref>{{S1}} p.278</ref>

It is only by means of "an endless dialectical process" that the [[analyst ]] can subvert the [[ego]]'s disabling illusions [[illusion]]s of permanence and stability, in a manner identical to the Socratic Dialogue.<ref>{{L}} "[[Works of Jacques Lacan|Some Reflections on the Ego]], " ''Int. J. Psycho-Anal.'', vol. 34, 1953 [1951b: ]. p. 12</ref>

==Hegelian Dialectic==Although the origin of [[dialectic]]s goes back to the Greek philosophers, its dominance in modern philosophy is due to the revival of the concept in the eighteenth century by the [[Kant|post---Kantian]] [[idealism|idealists]] Fichte and [[Hegel]], who conceived of the [[dialectic]] as a [[triad]] of [[dialectic|thesis]], [[dialectic|antithesis]] and [[dialectic|synthesis]].

Although the origin of dialectics goes back to the Greek philosophers, its dominance in modern philosophy is due to the revival of the concept in the eighteenth century by the post-Kantian idealists Fichte and For [[Hegel]], who conceived of the [[dialectic as ]] is both a triad method of thesis, antithesis exposition and synthesisthe [[structure]] of historical progress itself.

For Thus in ''[[Phenomenology of Spirit]]'' (1807), [[Hegel, the ]] shows how [[consciousness]] [[progress]]es towards [[dialectic is both |absolute knowledge]] by means of a method series of exposition and the structure of historical progress itselfconfrontations between opposing elements.

Thus Each confrontation is resolved by an operation called the ''[[Aufhebung]]'' (usually translated as "[[sublation]]") in which a new idea (the [[Phenomenology of Spiritdialectic|synthesis]] (1807)is born from the opposition between [[dialectic|thesis]] and [[dialectic|antithesis]]; the [[[[dialectic|synthesis]] simultaneously annuls, Hegel shows how consciousness progresses towards absolute knowledge by means of preserves and raises this opposition to a series of confrontations between opposing elementshigher level.

Each confrontation is resolved by an operation called ==Alexandre Kojève==The particular way in which the ''[[AufhebungHegelian]]'' (usually translated as '[[sublationdialectic]]') in which a new idea (the is appropriated by [[synthesisLacan]]) is born from the opposition between owes much to [[thesisAlexandre Kojève]] and , whose lectures on [[antithesisHegel]]; the [[synthesisLacan]] simultaneously annuls, preserves and raises this opposition to a higher levelattended in Paris in the 1930s.

The particular way in which ==Progression Toward Truth==Using the [[HegelianDora]] case to illustrate his point, [[dialecticLacan]] is appropriated by shows how [[Lacanpsychoanalytic treatment]] owes much to [[Alexandre Kojeveprogress]], whose lectures on es towards [[Hegeltruth]] by a series of [[Lacandialectical]] attended in Paris in the 1930sreversals.<ref>{{L}} 1951a.</ref>

Following [[Kojeve]] [[Lacan]] puts great emphasis on the particular stage of the [[dialectic]] in which the [[master]] confronts the [[slave]], and on the way that [[desire]] is constituted [[dialectically]] by a relationship with the [[desire]] of the [[Other]].  Using the [[Dora]] case to illustrate his point, [[Lacan]] shows how [[psychoanalytic treatment]] [[progress]]es towards [[truth]] by a series of [[dialectical]] reversals.<ref>Lacan 1951a.</ref>==''Aufhebung''==[[Lacan]] also makes use of a concept of ''[[Aufhebung]]'' to show hwo how the [[symbolic]] [[order]] can simultaneously annul, preserve and raise an [[imaginary]] [[object]] (the [[imaginary]] [[phallus]]) to the status of a [[signfiiersignfier]] (the [[symbolic]] [[phallus]]); the [[phallus]] then becomes "the signifier of this ''[AufhebundAufhebung]]'' itself, which it inaugurates by its disappearance."<ref>{{E}} p.288</ref>  ---

For [[Lacan]], there is no such thing as a final [[dialectic|synthesis ]] such as is represented by Hegel's concept of absolut eknowledge[[dialectic|absolute knowledge]]; the irreducibility of the [[unconscious ]] represents the impossibility of any such [[dialectic|absolute knowledge]].

For [[Lacan]], then, "the ''[[Aufhebung]]'' is one of those sweet dreams of [[philosophy]]."<ref>{{S20}} p.79</ref>

This [[disavowal|denial ]] of a final [[dialectic|synthesis ]] subverts the very concept of [[progress]] itself. Thus [[Lacan]] contrasts his own version of the ''[[Aufhebung]]'' with that of [[Hegel]], arguing that it repalces [[Hegel]]'s idea of [[progress]] with"the avatars of a lack."<ref>{{Ec}} p.837</ref>