Difference between revisions of "Discourse of the analyst"

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In [[psychoanalytic treatment]]
 
In [[psychoanalytic treatment]]
  
The task of the [[analyst]] throughout the [[treatment]] is to make it impossible for the [[analysand]] to be sure that he knows what the [[analyst]] wants from him; the [[analyst]] must make sure that his [[desire]] "remains an x" for the [[analysand]].<ref>{{S11}} p. 274</ref>
+
The task of the [[analyst]] throughout the [[treatment]] is to make it [[impossible]] for the [[analysand]] to be sure that he [[knows]] what the [[analyst]] wants from him; the [[analyst]] must make sure that his [[desire]] "remains an x" for the [[analysand]].<ref>{{S11}} p. 274</ref>
  
In this way the [[analyst]]'s supposed [[desire]] becomes the [[treatment|driving force]] of the [[analytic]] [[process]], since it keeps the [[analysand]] working, trying to discover what the [[analyst]] wants from him.
+
In this way the [[analyst]]'s supposed [[desire]] becomes the [[treatment|driving force]] of the [[analytic]] [[process]], since it keeps the [[analysand]] [[working]], trying to discover what the [[analyst]] wants from him.
  
 
<blockquote>"The [[desire]] of the [[analyst]] is ultimately that which operates in [[psychoanalysis]]."<ref>{{Ec}} p. 854</ref></blockquote>
 
<blockquote>"The [[desire]] of the [[analyst]] is ultimately that which operates in [[psychoanalysis]]."<ref>{{Ec}} p. 854</ref></blockquote>
  
By presenting the [[analysand]] with an enigmatic [[desire]], the [[analyst]] occupies the position of the [[Other]], of whom the [[subject]] asks "'''[[Che vuoi?]]'''" ("What do you want from me?"), with the result that the [[subject]]'s [[fantasy|fundamental fantasy]] emerges in the [[transference]].
+
By presenting the [[analysand]] with an enigmatic [[desire]], the [[analyst]] occupies the [[position]] of the [[Other]], of whom the [[subject]] asks "'''[[Che vuoi?]]'''" ("What do you [[want]] from me?"), with the result that the [[subject]]'s [[fantasy|fundamental fantasy]] emerges in the [[transference]].
  
 
---
 
---
  
First, Lacanian psychoanalysis demands that the [[analyst]] thwart the [[patient]]’s efforts to know what the [[analyst]] wants from the [[patient]].  
+
First, [[Lacanian psychoanalysis]] [[demands]] that the [[analyst]] thwart the [[patient]]’s efforts to [[know]] what the [[analyst]] wants from the [[patient]].  
  
  
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The position of the [[analyst]] in [[Lacan]]'s account of the [[discourse of the analyst]].
 
The position of the [[analyst]] in [[Lacan]]'s account of the [[discourse of the analyst]].
  
In [[Lacanian]] [[psychoanalytic theory|theory]] the [[analyst]] stands in the place of "[[objet (petit) a|object a]]", or [[objet (petit) a|object cause of desire]].
+
In [[Lacanian]] [[psychoanalytic theory|theory]] the [[analyst]] stands in the [[place]] of "[[objet (petit) a|object a]]", or [[objet (petit) a|object cause of desire]].
  
This is an [[imaginary|imaginary object]] that both sets [[desire]] in motion and represents its impossibility as the
+
This is an [[imaginary|imaginary object]] that both sets [[desire]] in motion and represents its [[impossibility]] as the
 
[[jouissance|excess]] or [[lack|deficit]] produced by coming under the [[Symbolic]].  
 
[[jouissance|excess]] or [[lack|deficit]] produced by coming under the [[Symbolic]].  
  
 
[[Bruce Fink|Fink]] writes,
 
[[Bruce Fink|Fink]] writes,
<blockquote>The analyst plays the part of pure desirousness (pure desiring subject), and interrogates the subject
+
<blockquote>The analyst plays the part of pure desirousness (pure [[desiring]] subject), and interrogates the subject
in his or her division [i.e., between the conscious and unconscious]. . . . The patient in a sense
+
in his or her [[division]] [i.e., between the [[conscious]] and [[unconscious]]]. . . . The patient in a [[sense]]
“coughs up” a master signifier that has not yet been brought into relation with any other signifier.<ref>[[Bruce Fink|Fink, Bruce]]. 1998. p. 37</ref></blockquote>
+
“coughs up” a [[master signifier]] that has not yet been brought into relation with any other signifier.<ref>[[Bruce Fink|Fink, Bruce]]. 1998. p. 37</ref></blockquote>
  
 
=====Socrates=====
 
=====Socrates=====
Line 37: Line 37:
  
 
[[Lacan]] says that [[Socrates]] refuses [[Alcibaides]] because "for [Socrates] there is
 
[[Lacan]] says that [[Socrates]] refuses [[Alcibaides]] because "for [Socrates] there is
nothing in himself worthy of love. His essence was that of ''ouden'', emptiness, hollowness."<ref>Cited in Salecl. 1998. p. 28</ref>
+
[[nothing]] in himself worthy of [[love]]. His [[essence]] was that of ''ouden'', emptiness, hollowness."<ref>Cited in Salecl. 1998. p. 28</ref>
  
 
Like the proper response of the [[analyst]], [[Socrates]] does not reciprocate, thus maintaining his emptiness.
 
Like the proper response of the [[analyst]], [[Socrates]] does not reciprocate, thus maintaining his emptiness.
  
 
In both [[Socrates]] and [[Lacan]], there are two critical dimensions of their position, the fundamental
 
In both [[Socrates]] and [[Lacan]], there are two critical dimensions of their position, the fundamental
role of the [[desire of the analyst]] in propelling the [[patient]]’s [[treatment]] and the [[ethics|ethical
+
[[role]] of the [[desire of the analyst]] in propelling the [[patient]]’s [[treatment]] and the [[ethics|ethical
 
position]] of the [[analyst]].  
 
position]] of the [[analyst]].  
  
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[[Lacan]] writes,
 
[[Lacan]] writes,
  
<blockquote>It is in as much as the analyst’s desire, which remains an x, tends in a direction that is the exact
+
<blockquote>It is in as much as the analyst’s [[desire,]] which remains an x, tends in a direction that is the exact
opposite of identification, that the crossing of the plane of identification is possible, through the
+
opposite of [[identification]], that the crossing of the plane of identification is possible, through the
mediation of the separation of the subject in experience.<ref>{{L}} 1973/1981. p. 274</ref></blockquote>
+
mediation of the [[separation]] of the subject in [[experience]].<ref>{{L}} 1973/1981. p. 274</ref></blockquote>
  
 
Socrates is keenly aware of this, as well.  
 
Socrates is keenly aware of this, as well.  
  
He does not enjoin his patients to simply take up his
+
He does not enjoin his [[patients]] to simply take up his
opinions and make them their own; he rejects this identificatory maneuver and maintains his own ignorance.  
+
opinions and make [[them]] their own; he rejects this identificatory maneuver and maintains his own [[ignorance]].  
  
 
“I know nothing.”  
 
“I know nothing.”  
  
This does not mean, of course, that analysts do not know anything.  
+
This does not mean, of course, that [[analysts]] do not know anything.  
  
Both Lacan and Socrates were immersed in the intellectual, political, and cultural tides of their days, and Lacan maintains that analysts should strive to become experts in these matters.<ref>Evans, 1996, p. 198.</ref>
+
Both Lacan and Socrates were immersed in the [[intellectual]], [[political]], and [[cultural]] tides of their days, and Lacan maintains that analysts should strive to become experts in these matters.<ref>Evans, 1996, p. 198.</ref>
  
 
It is not, however, that the analyst simply feigns to know nothing.
 
It is not, however, that the analyst simply feigns to know nothing.
Line 68: Line 68:
 
[[Lacan]] writes, "From a certain point of view, the analyst is not fully aware what he is doing in psychoanalysis."<ref>{{L}} 1986/1992. p. 291</ref>  
 
[[Lacan]] writes, "From a certain point of view, the analyst is not fully aware what he is doing in psychoanalysis."<ref>{{L}} 1986/1992. p. 291</ref>  
  
Contrary to the illusion of transparent reflexivity, part of this action remains hidden even to the analyst (Lacan, 1986/
+
Contrary to the [[illusion]] of [[transparent]] reflexivity, part of this [[action]] remains hidden even to the analyst (Lacan, 1986/
 
1992, p. 291).  
 
1992, p. 291).  
  
This is markedly different from the conventional image of the technical expert,
+
This is markedly different from the conventional [[image]] of the technical expert,
 
the professional.  
 
the professional.  
  
 
It is by positing the desire of the analyst as enigmatic, as the [[desire]] of the
 
It is by positing the desire of the analyst as enigmatic, as the [[desire]] of the
 
[[Other]], that the operative Lacanian question, Che vuoi? What does the Other want from me?
 
[[Other]], that the operative Lacanian question, Che vuoi? What does the Other want from me?
allows the analysand, or patient, towork on and through his or her fantasy.
+
allows the analysand, or patient, towork on and through his or her [[fantasy]].
  
Yet it is the analyst that brings forth this truth of the [[subject]].  
+
Yet it is the analyst that brings forth this [[truth]] of the [[subject]].  
  
 
This is also an important qualification to the
 
This is also an important qualification to the
posttraditionalism “wholesale reflexivity” (Giddens, 1990). In analytic discourse, some element always remains beyond knowledge; the self never becomes fully transparent to consciousness
+
posttraditionalism “wholesale reflexivity” ([[Giddens]], 1990). In [[analytic discourse]], some element always remains beyond knowledge; the [[self]] never becomes fully transparent to [[consciousness]]
but is inevitably enigmatic, resisting representation.
+
but is inevitably enigmatic, resisting [[representation]].
  
The second dimension is the analyst’s ethical position.
+
The second [[dimension]] is the analyst’s [[ethical]] position.
  
For Lacan, analysts must become barren before they can be the cause of others’ barrenness; that is, analysts must go through analysis that aims to reconstitute their conscious relation to their desire.  
+
For Lacan, analysts must become barren before they can be the [[cause]] of others’ barrenness; that is, analysts must go through [[analysis]] that aims to reconstitute their conscious relation to their desire.  
  
The uniqueness of the Lacanian pass, or the completion of training analysis, embodies precisely the Socratic
+
The uniqueness of the Lacanian [[pass]], or the completion of [[training]] analysis, embodies precisely the Socratic
 
spirit.  
 
spirit.  
  
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requirements or of sitting for a series of exams.  
 
requirements or of sitting for a series of exams.  
  
This is merely connaissance or factual knowledge.
+
This is merely [[connaissance]] or factual knowledge.
  
 
The pass asks the passant to testify to his or her experience in analysis as it reaches its
 
The pass asks the passant to testify to his or her experience in analysis as it reaches its
logical terminus and to articulate some sort of symbolic knowledge, or savoir.  
+
[[logical]] terminus and to articulate some sort of symbolic knowledge, or [[savoir]].  
  
For Socrates, we learn of his “labors” with Diotima that taught him the philosophy of love in the Symposium.<ref>201d; see also Lacan, 1975/1999, p. 67</ref>
+
For Socrates, we learn of his “labors” with Diotima that taught him the philosophy of love in the [[Symposium]].<ref>201d; see also Lacan, 1975/1999, p. 67</ref>
  
The analyst must come to resist functions of his ego, to resist patient identification, to allowthe patient’s own unique truth to emerge, or to rephrase, to allow the patient to identify with a (an empty) truth that is the ground of the
+
The analyst must come to resist functions of his ego, to resist patient identification, to allowthe patient’s own unique truth to emerge, or to rephrase, to allow the patient to [[identify]] with a (an empty) truth that is the ground of the
subject’s being.  
+
subject’s [[being]].  
  
 
This is a truth that resides beyond knowledge.
 
This is a truth that resides beyond knowledge.

Revision as of 05:48, 24 May 2019

In psychoanalytic treatment

The task of the analyst throughout the treatment is to make it impossible for the analysand to be sure that he knows what the analyst wants from him; the analyst must make sure that his desire "remains an x" for the analysand.[1]

In this way the analyst's supposed desire becomes the driving force of the analytic process, since it keeps the analysand working, trying to discover what the analyst wants from him.

"The desire of the analyst is ultimately that which operates in psychoanalysis."[2]

By presenting the analysand with an enigmatic desire, the analyst occupies the position of the Other, of whom the subject asks "Che vuoi?" ("What do you want from me?"), with the result that the subject's fundamental fantasy emerges in the transference.

---

First, Lacanian psychoanalysis demands that the analyst thwart the patient’s efforts to know what the analyst wants from the patient.


---

The position of the analyst in Lacan's account of the discourse of the analyst.

In Lacanian theory the analyst stands in the place of "object a", or object cause of desire.

This is an imaginary object that both sets desire in motion and represents its impossibility as the excess or deficit produced by coming under the Symbolic.

Fink writes,

The analyst plays the part of pure desirousness (pure desiring subject), and interrogates the subject

in his or her division [i.e., between the conscious and unconscious]. . . . The patient in a sense

“coughs up” a master signifier that has not yet been brought into relation with any other signifier.[3]

Socrates

In the dialogues, Socrates is essentially in the position of the object a, barren, bringing forth what is, in effect, the signifier of the subject.

Socrates can be read as the pure desiring subject.

Indeed, this is the force of Lacan’s (1991) account of Alcibaides, Socrates’s enamored student.

Lacan says that Socrates refuses Alcibaides because "for [Socrates] there is nothing in himself worthy of love. His essence was that of ouden, emptiness, hollowness."[4]

Like the proper response of the analyst, Socrates does not reciprocate, thus maintaining his emptiness.

In both Socrates and Lacan, there are two critical dimensions of their position, the fundamental role of the desire of the analyst in propelling the patient’s treatment and the ethical position of the analyst.

First, Lacanian psychoanalysis demands that the analyst thwart the patient’s efforts to know what the analyst wants from the patient.

Lacan writes,

It is in as much as the analyst’s desire, which remains an x, tends in a direction that is the exact

opposite of identification, that the crossing of the plane of identification is possible, through the

mediation of the separation of the subject in experience.[5]

Socrates is keenly aware of this, as well.

He does not enjoin his patients to simply take up his opinions and make them their own; he rejects this identificatory maneuver and maintains his own ignorance.

“I know nothing.”

This does not mean, of course, that analysts do not know anything.

Both Lacan and Socrates were immersed in the intellectual, political, and cultural tides of their days, and Lacan maintains that analysts should strive to become experts in these matters.[6]

It is not, however, that the analyst simply feigns to know nothing.

Lacan writes, "From a certain point of view, the analyst is not fully aware what he is doing in psychoanalysis."[7]

Contrary to the illusion of transparent reflexivity, part of this action remains hidden even to the analyst (Lacan, 1986/ 1992, p. 291).

This is markedly different from the conventional image of the technical expert, the professional.

It is by positing the desire of the analyst as enigmatic, as the desire of the Other, that the operative Lacanian question, Che vuoi? What does the Other want from me? allows the analysand, or patient, towork on and through his or her fantasy.

Yet it is the analyst that brings forth this truth of the subject.

This is also an important qualification to the posttraditionalism “wholesale reflexivity” (Giddens, 1990). In analytic discourse, some element always remains beyond knowledge; the self never becomes fully transparent to consciousness but is inevitably enigmatic, resisting representation.

The second dimension is the analyst’s ethical position.

For Lacan, analysts must become barren before they can be the cause of others’ barrenness; that is, analysts must go through analysis that aims to reconstitute their conscious relation to their desire.

The uniqueness of the Lacanian pass, or the completion of training analysis, embodies precisely the Socratic spirit.

Completion of training to be an analyst is not a matter of fulfilling a set of established requirements or of sitting for a series of exams.

This is merely connaissance or factual knowledge.

The pass asks the passant to testify to his or her experience in analysis as it reaches its logical terminus and to articulate some sort of symbolic knowledge, or savoir.

For Socrates, we learn of his “labors” with Diotima that taught him the philosophy of love in the Symposium.[8]

The analyst must come to resist functions of his ego, to resist patient identification, to allowthe patient’s own unique truth to emerge, or to rephrase, to allow the patient to identify with a (an empty) truth that is the ground of the subject’s being.

This is a truth that resides beyond knowledge.

See Also

References

  1. Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p. 274
  2. Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. p. 854
  3. Fink, Bruce. 1998. p. 37
  4. Cited in Salecl. 1998. p. 28
  5. Lacan, Jacques. 1973/1981. p. 274
  6. Evans, 1996, p. 198.
  7. Lacan, Jacques. 1986/1992. p. 291
  8. 201d; see also Lacan, 1975/1999, p. 67