Discourse of the analyst
The task of the analyst throughout the treatment is to make it impossible for the analysand to be sure that he knows what the analyst wants from him; the analyst must make sure that his desire "remains an x" for the analysand.
By presenting the analysand with an enigmatic desire, the analyst occupies the position of the Other, of whom the subject asks "Che vuoi?" ("What do you want from me?"), with the result that the subject's fundamental fantasy emerges in the transference.
In both Socrates and Lacan, there are two critical dimensions of their position, the fundamental role of the desire of the analyst in propelling the patient’s treatment and the ethical position of the analyst.
It is in as much as the analyst’s desire, which remains an x, tends in a direction that is the exact
opposite of identification, that the crossing of the plane of identification is possible, through the
Socrates is keenly aware of this, as well.
“I know nothing.”
This does not mean, of course, that analysts do not know anything.
It is not, however, that the analyst simply feigns to know nothing.
This is markedly different from the conventional image of the technical expert, the professional.
It is by positing the desire of the analyst as enigmatic, as the desire of the Other, that the operative Lacanian question, Che vuoi? What does the Other want from me? allows the analysand, or patient, towork on and through his or her fantasy.
This is also an important qualification to the posttraditionalism “wholesale reflexivity” (Giddens, 1990). In analytic discourse, some element always remains beyond knowledge; the self never becomes fully transparent to consciousness but is inevitably enigmatic, resisting representation.
For Lacan, analysts must become barren before they can be the cause of others’ barrenness; that is, analysts must go through analysis that aims to reconstitute their conscious relation to their desire.
Completion of training to be an analyst is not a matter of fulfilling a set of established requirements or of sitting for a series of exams.
This is merely connaissance or factual knowledge.
The analyst must come to resist functions of his ego, to resist patient identification, to allowthe patient’s own unique truth to emerge, or to rephrase, to allow the patient to identify with a (an empty) truth that is the ground of the subject’s being.
This is a truth that resides beyond knowledge.
- Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1977. p. 274
- Lacan, Jacques. Écrits. Paris: Seuil, 1966. p. 854
- Fink, Bruce. 1998. p. 37
- Cited in Salecl. 1998. p. 28
- Lacan, Jacques. 1973/1981. p. 274
- Evans, 1996, p. 198.
- Lacan, Jacques. 1986/1992. p. 291
- 201d; see also Lacan, 1975/1999, p. 67