Difference between revisions of "Disparities"

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=====Book Description=====
 
=====Book Description=====
The concept of disparity has long been a topic of obsession and argument for philosophers but Slavoj Žižek would argue that what disparity and negativity could mean, might mean and should mean for us and our lives has never been more hotly debated.
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The [[concept]] of disparity has long been a topic of [[obsession]] and argument for [[philosophers]] but [[Slavoj Žižek]] would argue that what disparity and negativity could mean, might mean and should mean for us and our lives has never been more hotly debated.
  
Disparities explores contemporary ‘negative’ philosophies from Catherine Malabou’s plasticity, Julia Kristeva’s abjection and Robert Pippin’s self-consciousness to the God of negative theology, new realisms and post-humanism and draws a radical line under them. Instead of establishing a dialogue with these other ideas of disparity, Slavoj Žižek wants to establish a definite departure, a totally different idea of disparity based on an imaginative dialectical materialism. This notion of rupturing what has gone before is based on a provocative reading of how philosophers can, if they’re honest, engage with each other. Slavoj Žižek borrows Alain Badiou’s notion that a true idea is the one that divides. Radically departing from previous formulations of negativity and disparity, Žižek employs a new kind of negativity: namely positing that when a philosopher deals with another philosopher, his or her stance is never one of dialogue, but one of division, of drawing a line that separates truth from falsity.
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Disparities explores contemporary ‘negative’ philosophies from Catherine Malabou’s plasticity, Julia Kristeva’s abjection and Robert Pippin’s [[self]]-[[consciousness]] to the God of [[negative]] [[theology]], new realisms and post-[[humanism]] and draws a radical line under [[them]]. Instead of establishing a dialogue with these [[other]] [[ideas]] of disparity, Slavoj Žižek wants to establish a definite departure, a totally different [[idea]] of disparity based on an imaginative [[dialectical]] [[materialism]]. This [[notion]] of rupturing what has gone before is based on a provocative [[reading]] of how philosophers can, if they’re honest, engage with each other. Slavoj Žižek borrows [[Alain]] Badiou’s notion that a [[true]] idea is the one that [[divides]]. Radically departing from previous formulations of negativity and disparity, Žižek employs a new kind of negativity: namely positing that when a [[philosopher]] deals with [[another]] philosopher, his or her stance is never one of dialogue, but one of [[division]], of drawing a line that separates [[truth]] from [[falsity]].

Revision as of 05:51, 24 May 2019

Disparities.jpg
Book Description

The concept of disparity has long been a topic of obsession and argument for philosophers but Slavoj Žižek would argue that what disparity and negativity could mean, might mean and should mean for us and our lives has never been more hotly debated.

Disparities explores contemporary ‘negative’ philosophies from Catherine Malabou’s plasticity, Julia Kristeva’s abjection and Robert Pippin’s self-consciousness to the God of negative theology, new realisms and post-humanism and draws a radical line under them. Instead of establishing a dialogue with these other ideas of disparity, Slavoj Žižek wants to establish a definite departure, a totally different idea of disparity based on an imaginative dialectical materialism. This notion of rupturing what has gone before is based on a provocative reading of how philosophers can, if they’re honest, engage with each other. Slavoj Žižek borrows Alain Badiou’s notion that a true idea is the one that divides. Radically departing from previous formulations of negativity and disparity, Žižek employs a new kind of negativity: namely positing that when a philosopher deals with another philosopher, his or her stance is never one of dialogue, but one of division, of drawing a line that separates truth from falsity.